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ABSTRACT 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A THEOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OF 
MARITAL COMMITMENT AND A JURIDICAL ARTICULATION OF MARITAL 
CONSENT IN SACRAMENTAL MARRIAGES IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
 
By 
Angela M. Robb 
May 2015 
 
Dissertation supervised by George Worgul, Ph.D. 
Sacramental marriage is an essential social, public, ecclesial, and theological 
good, yet its influence in the United States is threatened by a divorce rate comparable to 
the U.S. population in general, an explosive increase in cohabitation, and a declining 
marriage rate.  The underlying assumption of this dissertation is that commitment and 
consent, more thoroughly understood and consistently lived, are essential to lifelong, 
faithful, and life-giving marriage that symbolizes and makes present Christ’s indissoluble 
love for the church.  Through an adapted use of Don Browning’s fundamental practical 
theological method, this study begins with practical concerns regarding concrete marital 
and family practices in the United States and ends with practical means and strategies 
related to the pastoral care of sacramental marriages and all those in the stages of 
marriage preparation, aftercare, and sadly, family fragmentation.  Within this theological 
 v 
method, canon law is considered an ecclesial science distinct from theology yet 
organically united to it in the church.  Relying primarily on Ladislas Örsy’s theory of the 
relationship between theology and canon law, I affirm that theology identifies, explains, 
and evaluates the values or goods of marriage through the movements of biblical, 
historical, systematic, and moral theology, whereas canon law produces norms, 
processes, and structures for the protection and promotion of those goods.  In this view, 
theology judges canon law to determine the fittingness of canonical norms and structures 
for theological realities.  Furthermore, canon law is a ministry that is both pastoral and 
juridical to ensure freedom and good order within the church.  Canon law is part of the 
overall care of the faithful given that justice is the minimum demand of love.  Consent 
creates marriage; therefore, an integral and in-depth understanding of consent in canon 
law in light of a theology of commitment is important in helping the church to 
appropriate the human and theological values of marriage.    
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
THE CONTEXT FOR THE QUESTION 
 
 
1.1 Describing Marriage and Family Practices in the United States 
 
 In the early 1980’s, Americans experienced the highest divorce rate in the 
nation’s history.  In 2010, that rate was nearly twice that of 1960, despite a gradual 
decline.1  In addition, many Americans are choosing not to marry in the first place.  From 
1970 through 2010, the marriage rate declined by more than 50 percent.  This decline can 
be attributed to the increased median age of first marriages and the slight decrease in 
remarriage among divorced persons.2  Another contributing factor is the increasing 
growth of the phenomenon of cohabitation.  Cohabitation, or the state of unmarried 
sexual partners sharing a household, has increased more than seventeen-fold since 1960 
in America.3  In more than 60 percent of all first marriages, living together outside of a 
marital commitment comes before marriage, a situation that frequently increases the 
likelihood of couples breaking up, unless cohabitation occurs after engagement.4  
                                                 
1. W. Bradford Wilcox and Elizabeth Marquardt, eds., The State of Our Unions, Marriage in 
America 2010:  When Marriage Disappears:  The New Middle America (Charlottesville, VA: National 
Marriage Project and the Institute for American Values, December 2010), 71, 
http://www.virginia.edu/marriageproject/pdfs/Union_11_12_10.pdf (accessed June 1, 2011). 
 
2.  National Marriage Project and Center for Marriage and Families, "Social Indicators of Marital 
Health & Well-Being:  Trends of the Past Five Decades," in The State of Our Unions (Charlottesville, VA: 
National Marriage Project and Institute for American Values, 2012), 62, 
http://www.stateofourunions.org/2012/SOOU2012.pdf (accessed July 1, 2014). 
 
3. Ibid., 76. 
 
4. Ibid., 76-77.  The significance of engagement will be addressed in later chapters.  See Galena K. 
Rhoades, Scott M. Stanley, and Howard J. Markman, "The Pre-Engagement Cohabitation Effect:  A 
Replication and Extension of Previous Findings," Journal of Family Psychology 23, no. 1 (2009): 110. 
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Increasingly, there is also a separation in ideology and practice between marriage and 
child-rearing.  Over 40 percent of all cohabiting couples live with children who are under 
the age of 18, an almost 1,000 percent increase since 1960.5  Furthermore, more than four 
out of ten births nationally are to unmarried mothers.6  For those who do choose to marry, 
the lifetime probability that their first marriage will end in divorce is between 40 and 50 
percent, although there are several factors that greatly reduce the risk of divorce or 
separation within the first ten years of marriage.7   Unfortunately, simply being a Catholic 
is not one of those factors.  The number of Catholics, who are divorced, separated, or 
living with a partner is very similar to the U.S. population as a whole, according to a 
2007 survey from the Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate.8    
 Identifying and clarifying the psychological, social, and economic aspects of 
divorce, cohabitation, and single parenting is an integral part of understanding marriage 
and family in America today. The data on the consequences of divorce and single 
                                                 
5. W. Bradford Wilcox and Elizabeth Marquardt, eds., The State of Our Unions, Marriage in 
America 2009:  Money & Marriage (Charlottesville, VA: National Marriage Project and the Institute for 
American Values, December 2009), 103, http://www.virginia.edu/marriageproject/pdfs 
/Union_11_25_09.pdf (accessed June 1, 2010). 
 
6. Wilcox and Marquardt, The State of Our Unions, Marriage in America 2010:  When Marriage 
Disappears:  The New Middle America, 95. 
 
7. Ibid., 72-74. 
 
8. Mark M. Gray, Paul M. Perl, and Tricia C. Bruce. Marriage in the Catholic Church:  A Survey 
of U.S. Catholics (Georgetown University: Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate, October 2007), 
19, 24, 123, 124, http://www.usccb.org/laity/marriage/marriage_report.pdf (accessed February 4, 2008).  
The CARA Report states that those in the Vatican II Generation (born 1943-1960) are more likely to be 
currently divorced or to have ever been divorced (38% compared to 16% in the Post-Vatican II Generation 
and 25% in the Pre-Vatican II Generation).  This could change as the younger generations age.  However, 
Vatican II and Post-Vatican II Catholics are less likely to say their view of marriage is consistent with the 
statement that marriage is a lifelong commitment.  In addition, the report finds that the more frequently 
Catholics attend Mass, the less likely they are to be divorced, currently or previously.  Those who attend 
Mass more frequently are more likely to say their views are very consistent with marriage as a lifelong 
commitment, marriage as contributing to the common good of society, and marriage as a vocation.  One 
should keep in mind that these findings are correlational and not causal so interpretation must be qualified.   
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parenting has been growing and gaining wider recognition in the past 20 to 30 years.  
Probable and possible effects of divorce and single parenting on children include:  
increased risk of poverty, juvenile delinquency, and child abuse; average lower 
educational achievement, career advancement, and  psychological well-being; and 
difficulty in forming long-term commitments when grown, to name a few.9  In addition, a 
2008 report from the Institute for American Values estimates that family fragmentation 
costs U.S. taxpayers at least $112 billion every year.10  The faces of poverty in America 
are primarily women and children due in large part to the breakup of families through 
divorce and the failure of fathers to integrate into the mother/infant dyad.  Such a 
phenomenon is known as the “feminization of kinship and poverty.”11 According to 
recent data, the creation of stepfamilies does not seem to resolve these issues for children 
of divorce.  The divorce rate of second marriages (67%) is higher than first-time 
marriages (40-50%), and children in stepfamilies suffer as many risks as children of 
single mothers, if not more.12   Family breakup is even more likely for cohabiting couples.  
Children of cohabiting parents have more than five times the risk of parental separation 
                                                 
9. Glenn T. Stanton, Why Marriage Matters:  Reasons to Believe in Marriage in a Postmodern 
Society (Colorado Springs, CO: Piñon Press, 1997), 133-40. 
 
10. Benjamin Scafidi, The Taxpayer Costs of Divorce and Unwed Childbearing:  First-Ever 
Estimates for the Nation and All Fifty States (New York, NY: Institute for American Values, 2008), 5, 
http://www.cpr-mn.org/Documents/Taxpayer%20Cost%20of%20Divorce.pdf (accessed January 15, 2014). 
 
11. Don. S. Browning, Equality and the Family:  A Fundamental, Practical Theology of Children, 
Mothers, and Fathers in Modern Societies, Religion, Marriage, and Family Series, ed. Don. S. Browning 
and John Witte Jr. (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2007), 90. 
 
12. Wilcox and Marquardt, The State of Our Unions, Marriage in America 2009:  Money & 
Marriage, 102; Stanton, Why Marriage Matters:  Reasons to Believe in Marriage in a Postmodern Society, 
143-54. Mark Banschick, “The High Failure Rate of Second and Third Marriages,” last modified February 
6, 2012, http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-intelligent-divorce/201202/the-high-failure-rate-
second-and-third-marriages (accessed July 14, 2014). 
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compared to children of married parents.13   Even a cursory look at the data demonstrates 
that marriage is beneficial for spouses and their children.14 According to W. Bradford 
Wilcox and a team of family scholars, marriage is an essential social and public good, 
extending benefits to all, even poor and minority communities in which marriage is 
tenuous.  In this report, leading family scholars have concluded that marriage (not 
including remarriage) is associated with better relationships among family members, 
increased wealth, reduced poverty, better physical and psychological health, lowered risk 
of infant mortality, reduced rates of drug and alcohol abuse, and longer life 
expectancies.15  When marriages break down or fail to form in the first place, the support 
and care that family members provide one another then need to be given by other 
agencies, private and public, ecclesial and secular.  The psychological, social, and 
economic effects of family breakup ripple across generations and communities.  Failed 
marriages and parental separation are a problem for the world, a problem requiring a 
sustained, organized, and concentrated response from the Church.16 
                                                 
13. David Popenoe, Cohabitation, Marriage and Child Wellbeing:  A Cross-National Perspective 
(New Brunswick, NJ: The National Marriage Project at Rutgers University, 2008), 4, 
http://www.virginia.edu/marriageproject/pdfs/NMP2008CohabitationReport.pdf (accessed June 26, 2010). 
 
14. Linda J. Waite and Maggie Gallagher, The Case for Marriage: Why Married People Are 
Happier, Healthier, and Better Off Financially (New York: Broadway Books, 2000); Judith S. Wallerstein, 
Julia M. Lewis, and Sandra Blakeslee, The Unexpected Legacy of Divorce:  A 25 Year Landmark Study 
(New York: Hyperion, 2000); Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, The Divorce Culture:  Rethinking Our 
Commitments to Marriage and Family (New York:  NY: Vintage Books, 1998), 179. 
 
15. W. Bradford Wilcox, et. al, Why Marriage Matters:  Twenty-Six Conclusions from the Social 
Sciences, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Institute for American Values, 2005). 
 
16. The Church (capitalized) throughout this dissertation refers to the Roman Catholic Church in 
the United States of America, because that is the focus of this study.  That being said, the primary reality of 
the Catholic Church is the diocesan church or “particular church.”  The Roman Catholic Church in the U.S. 
(and worldwide) is a communion of diocesan churches.  For a practical theology, this point is significant, 
for the ministry of the church happens in the concrete, in the local church, or parish, which is connected to 
the other Eucharistic communities in the particular church.  The church (in lower case) refers to the parish, 
diocese, or universal church. 
5 
 
 The preceding empirical picture of marriage and family in America situates us in 
the thickness of practice, the beginning and end of this study.  The thrust of this 
dissertation began with my very real concern for the concrete lives and marriages of men 
and women today and especially for their children.17  It is this practical/pastoral concern 
that is the beginning and end of this study.  In other words, this practical concern began 
my questioning and research, and it is always toward offering practical ideas and 
recommendations that my study leans.  To be precise, the primary practical/pastoral 
problems to be addressed and in need of a response are the failed state of too many 
apparent Catholic sacramental marriages in the United States today, the explosion of 
cohabitation as a prelude to marriage or a replacement for marriage, and the changing 
cultural landscape of thought and practice regarding the ordering of our sexual lives in 
America. 
 
1.2 Underlying Principles of Operation 
 
 
 In accord with the work of Don S. Browning, this dissertation is written under the 
operational principle that all theology is fundamentally practical.  In the article that was 
the springboard for his meticulous work on theological method, A Fundamental Practical 
Theology, Browning defines fundamental practical theology as “critical reflection on the 
church’s dialogue with Christian sources and other communities with the aim of guiding 
its action toward social and individual transformation.”18  His methodology is heavily 
                                                 
17. For an in-depth study based upon the theory that the divorce cycle can be attributed primarily 
to the lessons learned in childhood about commitment, see Nicholas H. Wolfinger, Understanding the 
Divorce Cycle:  The Children of Divorce in Their Own Marriages (New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005). 
 
18. Browning, Equality and the Family:  A Fundamental, Practical Theology of Children, 
6 
 
informed by Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutic theory and the “practice-theory-
practice” model of human understanding.19  Browning interprets Gadamer’s hermeneutic 
circle as a practical circle which is set in motion by practical questions.  These questions 
are then posed to the historical classics that are already imbedded in our understanding.20  
Browning then follows the trajectory of Gadamer’s thought and develops a theological 
method that is practical throughout.   
 In Truth and Method, Gadamer painstakingly dismantles the Enlightenment’s 
prejudice against prejudice.  Our prejudices, literally pre-judgments, open us up to that 
which we are trying to understand.  It is our prejudices, understood as our preliminary, 
anticipatory, fore-meanings and fore-conceptions, which constitute our finitude and 
historicity.  Such prejudices are the inevitable corollary of our historical situatedness in 
the world.  Prejudice was not understood as a negative concept and attribute until the 
Enlightenment.21  The Enlightenment’s demand to free oneself from all prejudices in 
order to know anything scientifically is demonstrated by Gadamer to be not only an error, 
but more accurately, a prejudice itself.  Gadamer asserts, “The overcoming of all 
prejudices, this global demand of the Enlightenment, will prove to be a prejudice, and 
removing it opens the way to an appropriate understanding of the finitude which 
dominates not only our humanity but also our historical consciousness.”22  The 
                                                                                                                                                 
Mothers, and Fathers in Modern Societies, 6. 
 
19. Browning, Equality and the Family:  A Fundamental, Practical Theology of Children, 
Mothers, and Fathers in Modern Societies, 8. 
 
20. Ibid., 3. 
 
21. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 
2nd ed. (New York, NY: Continuum, 2004), 273. 
 
22. Ibid., 277. 
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hermeneutical task is to “fore-ground” and appropriate one’s own biases, prejudices, 
fore-meanings.23  In this view, reason and faith in authority are not mutually exclusive.  
Faith in the authority of another is itself an act of reason, the acknowledgment that the 
judgment of another is superior to one’s own, and consequently, should be trusted.  The 
prejudices of another are taken as one’s own, because the authority has earned such a 
position.24  The influences of authority and tradition, that is, the prejudices and explicit 
judgments of others in space and time, comprise our historical being.  We are situated 
within traditions that help shape the very questions that are the path to knowledge.  
Gadamer’s articulation of “historically effected consciousness” is crucial in his 
explanation of the hermeneutical process:   
In seeking to understand tradition, historical consciousness must not rely on the 
critical method with which it approaches its sources, as if this preserved it from 
mixing in its own judgments and prejudices.  It must, in fact, think within its own 
historicity.  To be situated within a tradition does not limit the freedom of 
knowledge but makes it possible.25  
 
Our prejudices constitute the horizon of the historical present.26  In other words, they 
limit and influence the range of our current worldview.  What has been handed down to 
us from the past, Gadamer’s dynamic conception of tradition, shapes the very questions 
that we bring to a text, event, or practice we are seeking to understand.  Vital to 
understanding anything is to become conscious of effective history, which means being 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
23. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 271. 
 
24. Ibid., 281. 
 
25. Ibid., 354. 
 
26. Ibid., 304-5. 
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conscious of the hermeneutical situation.27  The horizons of the past are not entirely 
foreign to us, because they form a singular horizon in which we all live and move, 
Gadamer’s active notion of continuing tradition.28   We experience distinct horizons as 
we project a historical horizon as that which is different and distant from our present 
situation.  Understanding occurs when these apparently disparate horizons are fused.29 
The seemingly alien world of the text, event, or practice becomes one’s own.30   
Gadamer’s notable “fusion of horizons,” when it happens systematically, is the outcome 
of historically effected consciousness.31  In Truth and Method, Gadamer’s argument then 
leads to the significance of application in interpretation and understanding.  The role of 
application in theological method is critical in this study. 
 For Gadamer, understanding is always intimately connected to interpretation and 
application.  Understanding, interpretation, and application are aspects of one integrated 
process.32  Neither interpretation nor application is an afterthought in coming to 
understand a text, event, work of art, or current practice.  Through an explication of 
Aristotle’s concept of phronesis, “the virtue of thoughtful reflection,” Gadamer 
demonstrates how the hermeneutical process is similar to practical moral wisdom, in that 
neither abstractly applies universal knowledge to particular situations. 33  Instead, both the 
                                                 
27. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 300-1. 
 
28. Ibid., 303. 
 
29. Ibid., 305. 
 
30. Ibid., 390. 
 
31. Ibid., 306. 
 
32. Ibid., 306-7. 
 
33. Ibid., 319. 
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hermeneutical process and the virtue of phronesis are codetermined from the beginning 
by the concrete situation of the interpreter and moral thinker.  Gadamer states directly 
that application implicitly or explicitly governs understanding from the beginning.  “We 
too determined that application is neither a subsequent nor merely an occasional part of 
the phenomenon of understanding, but codetermines it as a whole from the beginning.  
Here too application did not consist in relating some pregiven universal to the particular 
situation.”34  The interpreter can only truly understand a text, event, or practice if he does 
not try to discount himself, but rather connect and correlate it to his present situation and 
present concerns.  The interpreter, the scholar, the practitioner all seek to understand 
through their own prejudices and fore-meanings.  Whether conscious of it or not, the 
concern for concrete application drives all knowing.  In seeking to understand, the 
interpreter becomes a part of the meaning grasped.35  Method, understood as that which 
frees the scientist from bias and prejudice, is utterly impossible.  For Gadamer, method 
has limits; whereas, truth occurs ultimately through the structure of questioning and 
answering, the dialogue.36  These fundamental precepts of Gadamer’s thought—the 
significance of prejudice, the decisive role of application in understanding, and the 
dialogical character of understanding—inform Browning’s methodology, and 
consequently, the method and structure of this dissertation. 
 According to Browning, all of our practices have been shaped by religious and 
cultural classics.  They are “theory-laden.”37  Fore-meanings and prejudices are contained 
                                                 
34. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 321. 
 
35. Ibid., 335. 
 
36. Ibid., 484. 
 
37. Don S. Browning, A Fundamental Practical Theology:  Descriptive and Strategic Proposals 
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within those practices.  When these practices come into crisis in a religious community, 
the community begins to question the present situation and the normative texts and events 
that form the community.  The crisis precipitates the need and desire to look more closely 
into the meanings and theories contained within its current practices and to engage in 
conversation with the normative texts of the community.  This crisis leads the community 
to see its normative texts and events in a new light, which may lead to change in current 
practices.  Change in practices stimulates change in questions engendering a more 
differentiated conversation between the religious community’s new questions and its new 
practices.  This spiraling view of practical theology is stated more concisely by 
Browning:  “Or more accurately, it goes from present theory-laden practice to a retrieval 
of normative theory-laden practice to the creation of more critically held theory-laden 
practices.”38  Hence, for Browning all theology is practical, because all theology (and all 
understanding) begins in and arises from questions about concrete, theory-laden practice. 
This dissertation adheres to the assumptions of Browning’s analysis of the hermeneutical 
process and method in theology. 
 The “crisis” which gave rise to this dissertation was described in numbers and 
statistics previously.  The proportions of adult Catholics who are married, divorced, 
remarried, or living with a partner are similar to the U.S. population as a whole.  The 
numbers are cold and unfeeling, but the stories behind the numbers are filled with pain, 
confusion, disillusionment, loss, and broken hearts and lives.  Decades of social and 
psychological research have delivered the conclusion that broken families and absent 
fathers leave all family members at risk economically, psychologically, and socially.  The 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Minneapolis:  MN: Fortress Press, 1991), 6. 
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ways in which our families are formed and dismantled and formed again with different 
family members deserve our continued attention.  Evidence that such an organized and 
sustained effort is happening in the Catholic Church in the United States is the formation 
of the National Pastoral Initiative for Marriage by the U.S. Bishops.  The initiative began 
in 2005 with development, research, and consultation with married persons, priests, 
pastoral ministers, theologians, social scientists, and canonists, among others.  The 
fulfillment of the initiative is the creation, dissemination, and implementation of a 
pastoral letter on marriage and family which responds to current pastoral concerns by 
providing teaching and guidance to engaged and married persons and their ministers. The 
pastoral letter, Marriage:  Love and Life in the Divine Plan, was published and began 
implementation in 2009.39  Through the initiative, the U.S. Bishops seek to witness to the 
benefits of marriage to spouses, their families, and their communities by working with 
social organizations to protect, promote, and strengthen marriages.  This initiative is a 
source of hope for marriage in America, but further questions remain.  Again, in accord 
with Gadamer and Browning, these questions arising from current practices propel our 
search for meaning and desire for more life-giving practices. 
 As the Catholic Church in the United States seeks to strengthen and promote 
marriage, some fundamental questions should be asked:  Why do the proportions of 
married, divorced, or cohabiting Catholics look so similar to those proportions in the 
general population?  What is marriage, and what is the theological meaning of 
sacramental marriage?  What are the theological reasons for the prevalence of so many 
                                                 
39. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Committee on Laity, Marriage, Family Life, 
and Youth, Marriage:  Love and Life in the Divine Plan (Washington, D.C.: United States Conference of 
Catholic Bishops, 2009), http://www.usccb.org/laity/loveandlife/MarriageFINAL.pdf (accessed June 26, 
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divorced sacramental marriages?  What is the theological meaning of divorce and civil 
remarriage in light of the doctrine of indissolubility?  What is the theological meaning of 
cohabitation, and how is it different from the theological meaning of marriage?  What 
makes some marriages last a lifetime while others fall terribly short?  Only with a more 
differentiated and critical understanding of these questions do we have a greater hope of 
answering the final question:  How should the Catholic Church in the United States, as 
redemptive community, respond?  These questions should be asked systematically by 
theologians, ordained and non-ordained, although they may surface from the experiences 
of the faithful intuitively as well.  What is necessary is an intentional, systematic response 
from the Church at the national level to be implemented at the local level in the concrete 
lives of the faithful. 
 Before these questions can be answered, some preliminary but foundational 
thoughts on the church and human history should be noted.   This brief, introductory 
ecclesiological sketch is a synthesis of the ecclesiology of Joseph Komonchak, who 
fleshes out the outlines of a theology of the church inspired by the work of Bernard 
Lonergan.40  Prejudice, as described previously, is a neutral concept.  It is constitutive of 
our finite, historical existence.  In the lives of human persons, prejudice may have a 
positive or negative value.41  This neutral concept of prejudice is not to be confused with 
Lonergan’s negative principle termed bias.  Komonchak develops the foundations for an 
ecclesiology built upon Lonergan’s theory of human history.  According to Lonergan, 
human history is a story of progress, decline, and recovery.   
                                                 
40. Joseph A. Komonchak, “Foundations in Ecclesiology,” ed. Fred Lawrence, supplementary 
issue, Lonergan Workshop Journal 11 (1995): vii-ix. 
 
41. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 273. 
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 Progress occurs in human history when persons and groups use their intelligence 
and freedom to ask questions, which leads to understanding and action based upon such 
new understanding.  Acting in the world then changes the concrete situation, which may 
then lead to new questions and understanding.42 This process is reminiscent of the 
hermeneutical theory of Gadamer and the theological method of Browning.  However, 
human history is not only the story of free and intelligent persons working together to 
create progress.  
 This is not a world in which all persons at all times live attentively, intelligently, 
reasonably, and responsibly, that is, according to Lonergan’s transcendental precepts.43  
Decline is also a part of human history.  Decline occurs due to the negative principle of 
bias, theologically understood as sin.  Bias, or sin, obstructs, averts, and warps progress. 
Komonchak summarizes Lonergan’s analysis of the three44 forms of bias: 
Individual bias is a person’s subordination of the demands of intelligence, reason, 
and responsibility to selfish needs and interests.  Consciousness is made to serve 
egoistic purposes, and its self-transcending thrust is blunted.  Group bias is a sort 
of collective selfishness by which the needs and interests of a group within the 
larger society constitute the primary criterion for its actions.  Intelligence, reason, 
and responsibility here are deflected from their service of the common good of the 
whole society to serve local and particular interests.  Finally, there is a general 
bias, a culture-wide surrender of transcendent exigencies to the tyranny of 
‘common sense.’45  
 
                                                 
42. Komonchak, “Foundations in Ecclesiology,” 78-79. 
 
43. Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 
55. 
 
44. Dramatic bias, or unconscious, psychological disturbance, thwarts progress by excluding from 
consciousness painful, unwanted insights.  It is due in part to the fear of insights.  This bias of unconscious 
motivation will not be discussed here.  See Bernard Lonergan, Insight:  A Study of Human Understanding, 
ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, 5th ed., vol. 3of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, 
(Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 214-27. 
 
45. Komonchak, “Foundations in Ecclesiology,” 79-80. 
 
14 
 
Here, bias refers to the twisting and misuse of human freedom and intelligence.  Bias is a 
force human persons create in the world, and yet at the same time, it is that into which 
human persons are born and raised.  The recognition of decline in the world and history 
presupposes the ideal of progress.46  We experience decline in history as that which 
should not be.  In theological terms, it is the difference between the ideal intention of 
creation and the reality of creation infested with sin in human history.   
 The battle between the forces of intelligence and freedom on one hand and bias on 
the other is not the center of the human story.  Salvation history is the story of recovery.  
God’s grace is the redemptive principle of human history.47  The salvific work of God in 
human hearts and human history realizes the possibility of the restoration of progress: 
In fact, then, the solution to the problem of individual, social, and cultural decline 
cannot come from theory or argument, for arguments can only be heard by selves 
living within horizons, and inauthentic horizons do not include the materials for 
their own reversal.  Inauthenticity is an existential condition, a practical alienation 
of freedom and intelligence from their own self-transcending goal.  If that 
alienation cannot be overcome, there is no solution.  A new and higher viewpoint 
is not enough; there must be a new and higher integration of human living itself.48  
 
The force of sin is not something humans can overcome independently.  This higher 
integration is made possible by the gift of redemptive recovery in the message, work, and 
person of Jesus Christ.  Christ’s message reveals the sinful condition of humanity and the 
way to triumph over it.  Union with Christ through His death and resurrection is 
redemption, the only way to overcome the principle of bias and recover the possibility of 
progress.49  
                                                 
46. Komonchak, “Foundations in Ecclesiology,” 80. 
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 From this sketch of the components of human history, Komonchak articulates the 
foundations for an ecclesiology that takes seriously theological and transcendent 
dimensions of the church as well as sociological and concrete ones.  The human person is 
given the “redemptive possibility,” that is, the potential for conversion—religious, moral, 
and intellectual—through Christ and the power of the Spirit.50  As bias is a force in 
human history, more powerfully, grace is the force in human history.  This “redemptive 
possibility” is realized in the church:   
A new community, defined by new experiences, new insights and judgments, new 
values and commitments, came to be in response to the life, teachings, death and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ.  That community, which we call the Church, was and 
is the concrete social and historic difference he has made.  It is the enduring sign 
of his life and work because it is their effect.  A new community of meaning and 
value has been constituted in this natural world of ours:  a new intersubjectivity in 
grace, with its own language and symbols, its own roles and institutions, its own 
interpretative and evaluative culture.  Among the many worlds constituted by 
meaning and value there exists one which defines itself by reference to Jesus 
Christ and lives by the grace of His Spirit.51  
 
The church in the world gives future generations the language, symbols, examples, roles, 
institutions, and norms that make possible conversion and authentic living.  Christ’s life 
and work continue in history through the power of the Spirit in the church.52  The church 
is then the instrument of Christ, the life of Christ, the Body of Christ in the world to save 
the world. 
 The church, as redemptive community, must respond to the sin of the world.  That 
is its purpose.  One may even be so bold as to say that without sin, there would be no 
church.  Perhaps, more fittingly, all human persons together would be church, one in 
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perfect communion with God and one another.  However, the more suitable term for such 
a perfect communion is not church, but the Kingdom of God.  Essentially, the church is 
the beginning of the Kingdom of God.53  The world, affected by and infected with sin, 
needs the church, set apart from the world yet in it, to continue the redemptive work of 
Christ.  According to Komonchak, the church is the practical solution to the practical 
problem of “our incapacity for sustained development caused by existential, social, and 
cultural bias.”54  The church, as the practical solution to the problem of sin, can be 
described as “the realization of an alternate, redemptive experience of community.”55   
 An ecclesiology that emphasizes the practical role of the church in history calls 
for an understanding of theology that is practical throughout:   
This means, first, that a theology intended to serve the self-realization of 
redemptive community must be conceived as a theory about a practice. 
It is practice and not theory that comes first.  It is the practical history of 
frustrated and distorted development in individuals, societies, and cultures that 
sets the problem.  It is the practical history of Jesus Christ, the practical 
experiences of grace in individuals, the practical self-realization of redemptive 
community in the Church that describe the solution.56 
 
Here, Komonchak understands theology as “a theoretical mediation of a practice.”57  
Through seeking to understand practical problems confronting us in our concrete 
historical situation, theologians can make an irreplaceable contribution to effectively 
changing current problematic practices and to work with and in the church to participate 
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in Christ’s redemptive mission.  In the theological task, the theologian cannot be removed 
from the work being done.  The theologian’s historical situation and personal worldview 
are a part of her interpretation of the problems at hand and understanding of the 
normative Christian texts and events.  In explicating his division of the functional 
specialties in theology, Lonergan emphasizes the unrivaled importance of conversion for 
theology.  “As conversion is basic to Christian living, so an objectification of conversion 
provides theology with its foundations.”58  The emphasis on conversion in theology 
heightens the point that the theologian cannot be eliminated from her theology.  The 
intellectually converted theologian knows that true knowing is “experiencing, 
understanding, judging, and believing.”59  The real process of knowing is a process of 
self-transcendence, a process of living by the transcendental precepts.60  The morally 
converted theologian knows that in choosing values over mere satisfactions, one is 
essentially deciding the kind of person to be.61  Living morally means striving to be 
aware of the sin and bias that is in the world and in oneself and to do the good one 
knows.  The religiously converted theologian exists in a state of unconditional self-
surrender to God, the ground and goal of all that is.62  All three forms of conversion are 
foundational to the theologian in order that one can “foreground” not only the prejudices 
that help understanding, but more importantly, those that hinder understanding, namely, 
the forces of bias or sin. 
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1.3 Focusing the Question through an Adapted Use of Fundamental  
Practical Theological Method 
 
 As stated previously, some of the foremost practical problems or crises 
confronting the Church in the United States today are the following:  the failed state of 
too many apparent Catholic sacramental marriages, the declining rate of marriage, the 
explosive increase in the rate of nonmarital cohabitation, and the separation in ideology 
and practice between marriage and childrearing.  Many factors could be identified as 
contributory to marital and family breakup—factors that are economic, political, social-
structural, or psychological.  While these factors are important and deserve the attention 
of scholars in their respective fields, questions of commitment in the context of sin, 
virtue, character, culture, and community deserve increased attention in the discipline of 
theology.  From the foundation of conversion, theologians understand these problems 
from distinctive worldviews.  The expressions may be different, but they originate from 
the same faith.63  Part of the task at hand is to develop a theology of marital commitment, 
in order that the Church can understand more critically its current theory-laden practices 
of marriage and family for the greater purpose of more effectively strengthening, 
supporting, and promoting lifelong, committed marriages. 
 According to the methodology of Browning,64 all theology is fundamentally 
practical with the traditional disciplines of historical, systematic, moral, and practical 
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64. This dissertation is an approximate use of Browning’s methodology.  A stricter use of his 
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States.  Descriptive theology, as all of theology, develops as a conversation where the pre-understandings 
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theology serving as movements or subspecialties within a trajectory that is practical 
throughout.65  The preliminary task of fundamental practical theology is to “fore-ground” 
theological dimensions of current practices which are in conflict with cultural meanings.  
Such conflicts in theological and cultural meanings create the “crises” that spur 
theological reflection.  There can be no question that there are vast differences in 
theological and cultural meanings of marriage and family today, yet marriages, divorces, 
and sexual relationships inside and outside of the Church look disturbingly similar.  The 
theological task begins with what Browning has coined descriptive theology.  Browning 
elucidates, “It is to describe the contemporary theory-laden practices that give rise to the 
practical questions that generate all theological reflection.”66  The statistics previously 
mentioned regarding marriage, divorce, and cohabitation rates and their effects give a 
cursory level description of our current marriage and family practices in the U.S.  This is 
part of the task of descriptive theology.  Descriptive theology uses the human sciences 
but always within theological horizons.  The particular theological lens through which 
one sees the data will be greatly dependent upon one’s historical situatedness and 
personal experience, including the experience of conversion.  In Browning’s analysis, the 
most concrete level of human action refers to the rules, roles, and patterns of 
communication embodied within the thickness of practice.67  In order to describe, and 
consequently, to understand the concrete practices of Catholic marriages (and the 
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effective disintegrations of many), a descriptive theology must consider the role of canon 
law.   
 Canon law is an inevitable and overriding aspect of all Catholic marriages.  It is a 
part of the thickness of the concrete practices of marrying in the Catholic Church.  All 
persons intending to marry in the Catholic Church must establish canonical freedom to 
marry, and they must marry according to canonical form, unless the appropriate 
dispensations are given.  Significant to this study is canon 1057 of the 1983 Code of 
Canon Law.68  Canon 1057 embodies in canonical language the tradition of the church 
since the twelfth century that it is consent which makes marriage.  The underlying 
assumption of this study is that commitment and consent, accurately understood and 
lived, are essential to lifelong, faithful, and life-giving marriage.  It is the relationship 
between consent as understood in canon law and commitment as understood in theology 
that is the focus of this study.  Before this relationship can be explored, the relationship 
between the two ecclesial sciences of theology and canon law needs to be clarified.  The 
distinctions and connections between theology and canon law are the focus of Chapter 
Two.  Within Browning’s methodology, canon law can be envisaged as an ecclesial 
science that theologians can and should draw on by being in dialogue with canonists for 
the purpose of describing marriage and divorce more completely, critically, and 
accurately.  In this way, canon law is a science used in conjunction with other human 
sciences to describe concrete practices theologically.  The marriages of Catholics are 
governed by canon law and have been for centuries; therefore, canonical language and 
                                                 
68. John P. Beal, James A. Coriden, and Thomas J. Green, eds., New Commentary on the Code of 
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meanings are very much a part of the pre-understandings, pre-judgments, that is, 
prejudices that form the horizon of the historical present. 
 The movement of descriptive theology concerns what Catholics are doing 
presently in marriage and family practices.  This leads to questions of what the Church 
should be doing in marriage and ministry.  Inevitably, this leads back to the normative 
and authoritative texts and events which have shaped the current meaning and practice of 
sacramental marriage.  The second movement or subspecialty in a theology that is 
practical from beginning to end is historical theology.  In this movement, Browning 
places biblical studies and the history of Christian thought.69  The normative texts of the 
Christian tradition are engaged and analyzed in order to better understand what marriage 
has been, what it currently is, and what it should be.  Chapter Three begins as an exercise 
in historical theology.  The biblical foundations for sacramental marriage are explored 
along with key texts and events that have been formative in the history of the 
development of sacramental marriage in the Church.  This is certainly not a new task, nor 
is it intended to be comprehensive. With faith in the expertise of biblical and historical 
theologians, I rely on their analyses and conclusions. 
 The movement of historical theology flows into the movement of systematic 
theology, which Browning identifies as a critical correlation between the meaning and 
vision inherent in our current practices and the meaning and vision interpreted from our 
normative texts and events.  “The systematic character of this movement comes from its 
effort to investigate general themes of the gospel that respond to the general questions 
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that characterize the situations of the present.”70  Chapter Three is also an exercise in 
systematic theology as terms, concepts, and themes central to a nuanced understanding of 
sacramental marriage are explored, such as:  sacrament, matrimonium in fieri, 
matrimonium in facto esse, contract, covenant, faith, intention, ratum et consummatum, 
grace, vinculum, communion, family, domestic church, sexuality, vocation, intimacy, and 
love.   
 For Browning, theological ethics, or moral theology, is not a distinct movement in 
theology, but rather contained within the final movements in two particular forms.  “First, 
I mean the theoretical and critical form it takes in systematic theology.  And second, I 
mean the concrete and contextually nuanced form it takes in strategic practical 
theology.”71  In Chapter Four, the first form of moral theology can be found.  It is a more 
abstract form that provides the distance necessary to clarify general assertions regarding 
character and norms of action.  Browning calls the first form “only a passing moment 
between concrete practical interests and consequent concrete practical acts.”72  The final 
movement of strategic practical theology, and the placement of the second form of moral 
theology within it, will be discussed shortly.  In Chapter Four, a theological 
understanding of commitment is placed within the context of a cultural lack of 
commitment in present-day American life.  Here, I use Browning’s division of the five 
dimensions of practical moral thinking to give structure to what it means to sustain an 
interpersonal, in this case marital, commitment.  Moving from the abstract to the more 
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concrete, these dimensions or levels correspond to the five dimensions of social action 
and are named:  visional, obligational, tendency-need, environmental-social, and rule-
role.73  The possibility of being released, morally, from a marital commitment is also 
discussed using these dimensions. 
 After expressing a more differentiated view of the role of canon law in theology, 
the meaning of sacramental marriage, and the significance of marital commitment in 
actual marriages, this study turns toward the meaning of marital consent in canon law.  
This is the focus of Chapter Five.  In this chapter, I rely on the expertise of canonists 
found in commentaries on the canons, scholarly books and articles on canon law, papal 
allocutions to the Roman Rota, and jurisprudence contained within canon law journals.74  
In agreement with Ladislas Örsy, James Coriden, and many others in the field, I argue 
that theology has the capacity to judge canon law.75  Therefore, theology provides the 
framework and parameters within which marital consent can be understood.  As affirmed 
previously, an inclusive understanding of sacramental marriage cannot occur without the 
proficiency of canonists included in the critical conversation.  The Code of Canon Law 
along with its interpretation by canonists and concrete jurisprudence are indispensible in 
the movements of descriptive, historical, and systematic theology.  Chapter Five begins 
by uncovering the meaning of marriage, both natural and sacramental, contained in 
canonical language.  Terms, concepts, and themes central to a nuanced understanding of 
                                                 
73. Browning, A Fundamental Practical Theology:  Descriptive and Strategic Proposals, 105-11. 
 
74. Sources used in this study are primarily from the English-speaking world as this study focuses 
on the marriages of Catholics in the United States. 
 
75. Ladislas Örsy, Theology and Canon Law:  New Horizons for Legislation and Interpretation 
(Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1992), 172; James A. Coriden, Canon Law as Ministry:  
Freedom and Good Order for the Church (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 2000), 142. 
 
24 
 
marital consent in canon law are explored, such as:  consortium totius vitae, ends, 
essential properties, essential elements, conjugal rights and obligations, indissolubility, 
and nullity.  An inquiry into both theological and juridical meanings of marriage is 
needed to present a detailed picture of what marriage is and should be, as gleaned from 
the church’s normative texts.  In this vein, what is articulated regarding consent in 
juridical norms and language should be evaluated based upon a theological understanding 
of marital commitment. 
 Browning identifies the final movement of the practice-theory-practice structure 
of all theology as strategic practical theology.  He understands this final movement to be 
the “culmination of an inquiry that has been practical throughout.”76  With Gadamer, 
Browning sees an inner fusion among understanding, interpretation, and application.77  
The concrete application of our theological thinking is not a post facto addendum to the 
other movements in theology.  The concern for concrete application is determinative of 
all theological thinking from the beginning and throughout the process.  Chapter Six will 
utilize Browning’s questions that direct strategic practical theology to frame the current 
crisis in marriage and family and proposed pastoral recommendations regarding marriage 
in the Catholic Church in the United States.78  (1) “How do we understand this concrete 
situation in which we must act?” (2) “What should be our praxis in this concrete 
situation?” (3) “What means, strategies, and rhetorics should we use in this concrete 
                                                 
76. Browning, A Fundamental Practical Theology:  Descriptive and Strategic Proposals, 57. 
 
77. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 306-21. 
 
78. Browning’s question regarding how we critically defend the norms of our praxis in this 
concrete situation will not be addressed in this study. 
 
25 
 
situation?”79  The final question is not the totality of practical theology but the end and 
beginning of further theological thinking.  “The practices that emerge from the judgments 
of fully strategic practical theology soon engender new questions that start the 
hermeneutic circle again.”80  The second form of moral theology is found within this final 
movement.  Moral theology as a part of systematic theology is a moment of stepping 
back to reveal general themes in moral thinking; whereas Christian ethics as a part of 
strategic practical theology is an immersion into the immediate questions about concrete 
practice facing a specific community.81  Many of the fields traditionally associated with 
practical theology are found in this movement, fields such as:  liturgics, homiletics, 
education, care, and social justice ministries.82  
 In this schema, what is the relation of strategic practical theology to canon law?  
Previously, emphasis on the importance of incorporating the insights of canonists into the 
movements of descriptive, historical, and systematic theology was stated.  In strategic 
practical theology, it is even more essential that there be dialogue and mutual interchange 
between canonists and theologians.  In concert with other fields of study in strategic 
practical theology, canon law is a ministry in the church.83  James Coriden describes 
ministry as “public activity, performed by baptized members of the church, under the 
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impetus of the Spirit’s gifts, recognized or affirmed by the community, in service to the 
kingdom of God.”84  Further, he adds that canon law is “the theology of the church put 
into practice” and “applied theology.”85  So as not to mistake this for a theory-to-practice 
model of theology and ministry, the nuances of the role of canon law in strategic practical 
theology are discussed in Chapter Two.  Keeping canon law as a vital participant in the 
hermeneutical conversation maintains and underscores the practice-theory-practice 
structure of all theology.86 
 Although Chapter Six cannot be called an exercise in strategic practical theology 
in a strict sense, this final chapter is a movement toward a practical response to the failed 
state of so many sacramental marriages in the United States and the reality of family 
breakup.  Canon law as a ministry within the church is very often the place where 
concrete marriages come into contact with theological reflection.  The practice of canon 
law is theory-laden; the prejudices, in the Gadamerian sense, and the explicit convictions 
of the legislator are embedded in the canons.  In addition, the judgments of ecclesiastical 
tribunals contain the prejudices and convictions of their respective jurists.  The concrete 
practice of canon law in marriage cases is part of the thick description of social action 
that spurs theological reflection.  The movements of descriptive, historical, and 
systematic theology culminate in practical theological thinking about the ministries of the 
church.  Canon law is one of these ministries, and therefore, an essential dialogue partner 
in strategic practical theology.  In other words, canon law is intended to be one aspect of 
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difficulty to be addressed further. 
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the church’s practical response to sin in the world and a participation in Christ’s salvation 
of the world.  In this way, Browning’s questions that direct strategic practical theology 
can direct our thinking about the relationship between a theological understanding of 
marital commitment and a juridical articulation of marital consent.  After describing the 
situation of the many divorced, remarried, or cohabiting Catholics, what should be the 
concrete response of the Church?  Do our canonical norms on consent reflect a 
theological understanding of commitment and the human person?  Does a more critically-
held theological understanding of marital commitment together with a more differentiated 
understanding of marital consent illumine the practice of cohabitation from a theological 
horizon?  What does cohabitation mean from within such a horizon, and how can greater 
clarity on the meaning of cohabitation contribute to the ministry of the Church in caring 
for marriages?  What are some specific strategies and courses of action that would 
promote, support, and strengthen marital commitment, while at the same time offer the 
love of Christ to those whose commitments have broken? 
 The practical or pastoral aim throughout this study is to work toward greater 
clarity in our understanding and articulation of commitment and consent in order that 
sacramental marriages may more closely re-present Christ’s love for the Church.  
Sacramental marriages are meant to be a symbol and witness to the world of God’s 
undying love and unwavering covenant.  In essence, sacramental marriages are to be 
transformative of human persons, families, neighborhoods, communities, that is, the 
world in which God acts.  In order to better form children and adolescents in the truth of 
human sexuality, to better prepare couples for marriage, to better help couples elicit valid 
consent in the Church, to better support married couples in all their stages, and to better 
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deal with marriages that have painfully failed, we must be clear on the commitment and 
consent necessary for marriages to last a lifetime. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ECCLESIAL  
 
DISCIPLINES OF THEOLOGY AND CANON LAW 
 
 
2.1 Theology and Canon Law as Ecclesial Disciplines 
 
 
 Insights, principles, and directions in this chapter are heavily influenced by the 
work of Ladislas Örsy, canonist and theologian.  His articulation of the distinction, yet 
organic connection, between these two disciplines is foundational in the overall current of 
this dissertation.  With a basic synthesis of Örsy’s thought presented at the outset, greater 
nuance can be elucidated afterward along with the placement of canon law within a 
fundamental practical theology.  These initial particulars regarding theology and canon 
law will facilitate a clearer picture of marital commitment theologically understood and 
marital consent juridically articulated. 
 Örsy’s theory regarding the relationship between theology and canon law is built 
upon an epistemological approach.1  For his use of this approach, Örsy credits the 
methodological insights of his colleague at the Gregorian University in Rome, Bernard 
Lonergan.2  Örsy’s theory centers on the operating subject of both theology and canon 
law, namely, the church.  He envisions the generation of both disciplines in a way that 
mimics the operation of the human spirit.  Both disciplines are generated from within the 
church making the church the “acting subject” in both disciplines; therefore, they can be 
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called ecclesial disciplines.3  Theology and canon law may be related to other disciplines, 
even intimately, as theology is related to secular philosophy and canon law is related to 
secular jurisprudence.  However, both sciences are generated, understood, and interpreted 
in the light of faith and the context of the church, making them truly ecclesial disciplines.   
The assertion that theology is an ecclesial discipline requires little elucidation, 
whereas the classification of canon law has been the subject of debate.4  Is canon law a 
juridical science or a theological science or are both categories suitable/unsuitable?  If an 
indication of the nature or classification of canon law is necessary (and some may argue 
it is not), the identification of canon law as an ecclesial science seems most appropriate 
and consonant with Örsy’s thought.  He argues, “The correct conception of canon law 
places it in the order of salvation; it sees our whole legal system as part of the redeeming 
mission of the church.”5  Örsy states explicitly, “Canon law proper is essentially an 
ecclesial science.”6  The creation, interpretation, and implementation of canon law take 
place within an “ecclesial context.”7  This is no minor detail but rather a fundamental 
hermeneutical consideration.  To further reinforce this point Örsy explains, “In brief, the 
proper locus of interpretation of our laws is the redeeming church, and inside of it, the 
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overriding truth of redemption must govern the meanings of the norms.”8  In addition to 
Örsy, Catherine Clifford designates both theology and canon law as “ecclesial sciences” 
as she offers her respectful and perceptive critique of Örsy’s theory.9  Her valuable 
critique will follow this synthesis of Örsy’s theory. 
 For Örsy ‘the church’ refers to “the whole community of believers, which is an 
organically structured communion.”10  Each member of the Body of Christ has a unique 
and irreplaceable role:  mothers and fathers, bishops and priests, theologians and 
canonists, sisters and brothers, that is, all of the faithful.  From the pope to the pauper, the 
church is the People of God and a communion of communions as Vatican Council II 
emphasized.  In referring to the ecclesiology of Vatican Council II, Örsy clearly states the 
inimitable value of each member of the church.  “Each person is an integral part of a 
body where all the organs work together for the good of the whole:  one body, one 
soul.”11  Thus, every person in the church has an ecclesial vocation.  Örsy focuses 
specifically on the complementary ecclesial vocations of both theologians and canon 
lawyers.  He explains, “Vocation is not an idle word here.  In this order of creation and 
redemption God needs the help of his creatures to carry his word and distribute his 
strength.  The church needs persons who can explain his saving deeds and also persons 
who can help the community to approach the mysteries.”12  The significance of 
describing church as “organically structured communion” and the unique vocation of 
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each member will be explored in more detail at the end of this chapter when the role of 
the reception of canon law is discussed. 
 
2.2 Theology:  The Church Knowing 
 
 
 Because Örsy uses an epistemological approach in explaining how to relate 
theology and canon law, he emphasizes the church as subject doing theology.  For Örsy 
the church doing theology is encapsulated in St. Anselm’s classic definition:  fides 
quaerens intellectum.  The whole church is “contemplative” as the faithful seek greater 
understanding of the mysteries.13  Whenever and wherever persons of faith think 
intelligently about the mysteries, the church is doing theology.  Of course, there are those 
who dedicate their lives to plumbing the depths of the mysteries, thus Örsy states, 
“Within this contemplation the ecclesial vocation of theologians is located.”14   
 According to Örsy, the church is enlivened by the Holy Spirit, and it is this Spirit 
that leads the church in seeking knowledge.15  The church desires to know more deeply 
the mystery of God who has been revealed and intends to grow in understanding of all 
God has done in salvation history.  This knowledge has two elements or dimensions.16  
Principally, all theological knowledge begins in God.  God’s gift to the church is God 
revealed.  In the act of faith, the church accepts God’s revelation.  This is what Örsy calls 
the divine element of theological knowledge.  The human element is our struggle to 
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articulate this mystery using human concepts and categories limited by time and culture.  
Both elements, the human and divine, unite when the church does theology. 
 Absolutely central to Örsy’s theory of how theology and canon law relate is the 
concept of the instrumentality of “values.”  He situates values in this principal position 
due to the historicity of persons and communities.  Human beings are imperfect, meaning 
that they need to progress in order to become complete.  This is reminiscent of 
Lonergan’s theory of human history as the story of progress, decline, and recovery 
discussed in Chapter One.  Örsy explains how in order to progress, persons need to 
appropriate good things at every level:  biological, psychological, intellectual, and 
spiritual.  “In all these processes, the pattern is the same:  intelligent and free persons 
appropriate good things, and when a symbiosis between persons and good things takes 
place, the persons are enriched; to a small degree, they may become perfect.”17   In short, 
values are “’good things’ which contribute to the development of persons.”18   
Always and only through the power of the Holy Spirit, the church is vital in this 
process of perfecting human persons.  Theology, as an ecclesial science, has a significant 
role to play in helping members of the church reach their completeness and in moving the 
world toward wholeness in time.  For Örsy, the church doing theology means the church 
naming the values the community needs in order to sustain its life and to grow in faith, 
hope, and love.19  The theological task is to know, to name, to identify, to understand, and 
to articulate the mysteries of faith.  Through the identification of necessary values, 
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theology provides a vision of the mysteries of God and our relationship to those mysteries 
in order that the community may recognize what is true and good for our development 
and perfection.20 
 
2.3 Canon Law:  The Church Acting 
 
 
 Again using an epistemological approach, Örsy considers what the church as 
subject is doing in canon law.  He asks, “What is the church doing in creating decisions 
(legislation) and prompting the community to action (implementing the laws)?”21  
Modifying St. Anselm’s classic definition of theology, Örsy’s response is succinct:  
ecclesia quaerit actionem.  The church is “active” as the faithful reach for the good by 
continuing the work of Christ through word and sacrament, actions that from the 
beginning have required norms issued by authorities.22  The ecclesial vocation of 
canonists is found here in the church active.  Because the church is both contemplative 
and active, the ecclesial vocations of theologians and canonists are complementary, 
indicating their interdependence and “organic unity.”23   
 Örsy clearly identifies what he means by ‘canon law’ or ecclesiastical law.  Canon 
law does not refer singly to the canons in the Code of Canon Law.  The canons of the 
Code have notably different literary forms, not all of them laws properly speaking.  The 
principal literary forms of the Code are dogmatic statements, theological opinions, 
statements of morality, spiritual exhortations, philosophical theories, conclusions from 
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the empirical sciences, and laws creating right and duty situations.24  Additionally, not all 
ecclesiastical laws are contained in the Code.25  Örsy explains, “It is a system of 
structures and norms to secure freedom for the people so that they can receive, without 
impediment, the gifts of the Spirit.  And it is a system of structures and norms to secure 
freedom for the Spirit to dispense, without impediment, God’s gifts.”26  The shift in focus 
is significant, because it illustrates how canon law provides freedom for the people as 
well as a context in which the Spirit is free to work in the church.  Canon law provides 
stability and structure to the church moving through history.  Freedom and good order 
provide the church with an open and ordered space for the movement of God and God’s 
people.  Freedom is protected and good order is maintained as a means to “prepare the 
way of the Lord so that his people are well disposed to receive him.”27  This is the ideal 
purpose of canon law.  Whether or not this purpose is achieved is another question 
altogether. 
 Just as theology is described as having divine and human elements, so also does 
canon law.  These elements intermingle to reveal both present in the church’s norms and 
structures, because both are present in the church itself.  Örsy describes canon law as “a 
necessary human instrument, in a divinely founded community, to bring good balances 
into the operations of the group.”28  In an introductory article in the New Commentary on 
the Code of Canon Law commissioned by the Canon Law Society of America, Örsy 
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describes the role of law in the church.  This passage summarizes the human element of 
canon law in its contingency, reformability, fragility, and limitedness.  It also makes clear 
canon law’s “affinity with the divine” in its transcendence and close connection to the 
Word of God and the sacraments: 
It is part of the external visible sacramental structure of the Church; there it shares 
the composite nature of the community.  In its provisions it can be human; it can 
display the limitations and weaknesses of our nature.  It can also represent divine 
wisdom and thus testify that God is present among his people.  It is contingent 
and in constant need of reform in order to be in harmony with the rhythm of life 
of the Church and of the surrounding world; it is constant as far as it gives effect 
to the word of God.29  
 
Örsy further maintains this tension in asserting that faith does not work alone in canon 
law.  He states, “Faith, however, does not articulate the norms:  our practical reason does, 
with the help of some divine wisdom revealed to us and some human ingenuity brought 
into play.”30  Keeping in mind this intricate balance between the divine and human 
elements in canon law is important in understanding and evaluating the relation of 
theology and canon law. 
For Örsy, seeking knowledge of the values necessary for the church to grow in 
grace is an indispensable task of theology.  In contemplating the mysteries, the church 
seeks awareness of the values that not only fulfill and perfect our human nature but also 
connect us with the divine nature in eternal life.31  Once these values are known, they 
need to be appropriated.  Through canon law, the church translates these values into 
norms and structures that facilitate increased faith, hope, and love.  When explaining the 
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role of values in the worlds of theology and canon law, Örsy succinctly and cogently 
presents his theory of their relation: 
These two worlds meet where the values are.  First, theology leads to their 
discovery, then canon law sets the norms for their appropriation.  Theology 
provides the knowledge necessary for acknowledging them, canon law gives 
binding norms for acquiring them.  The two worlds are linked together by the 
dynamic movement of the subjects from vision to action.32  
 
In his epistemological approach, canon law cannot be understood without reference to 
theology.  The church can act because it has first known. 
 
2.4 Theology and Canon Law as Distinct and Organically United 
 
 
 2.4.1 Theology and Canon Law in their Origins 
 To unearth the precise ways in which theology and canon law are distinct yet 
organically united, Örsy examines them both in their origins (dynamic process) and in 
their developed content (static existence).  In referring to the genesis of each, Örsy 
considers language, authority, and intentionality.33  He simplifies (perhaps 
oversimplifies) their difference in language by stating that theology is in the indicative 
mood while canon law is in the imperative mood.34  Theology articulates what is, while 
canon law issues commands about what ought to be.  John Coughlin’s articulation of 
what canon law is not may help clarify this distinction Örsy is trying to convey, for 
certainly theology expresses what ought to be through magisterial documents, homilies, 
and moral discourse to name a few.  Coughlin specifies that canon law is not Scripture.  
“Although canon law carries a certain normativity and authority in the Roman Catholic 
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Church, it is not constitutive and foundational in the sense that sacred scripture is to the 
church.”35  In other words, canon law does not carry the same weight as Scripture and 
Tradition, because it is not revelation.  He proffers the suggestion that “canon law acts as 
a bridge between immutable theological truths and practical action.”36  The use of “is” in 
theology versus “ought to be” in canon law points to the distinction in what the church is 
doing in each discipline; in theology, the church is knowing, whereas in canon law, the 
church is acting or obliging one to act.  The church is acting in other areas as well, such 
as liturgics, homiletics, education, care, and social justice ministries.  As discussed in 
Chapter One, these are the fields associated with the movement of strategic practical 
theology, which reinforces Örsy’s point that canon law is the church acting.  What 
distinguishes canon law from the other types of action the church does relates to Örsy’s 
second and third points regarding authority and intentionality.   
The distinct worlds of theology and canon law differ in the authority governing 
them.  For theology, this authority is faith as it mediates God’s self-revelation and reason 
as it moves to understand in human concepts and categories the mysteries of faith.37   For 
canon law, this authority is the ecclesiastical legislator who through divine authorization 
and human execution seeks to bring order to the community.38  The origin of canon law 
can be an ecumenical council, the pope, the diocesan bishop or ordinary equivalent to 
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him in law, or a provincial chapter of a religious institute.39  Canon law is not equivalent 
to a body of moral norms, because it has been promulgated as law.  The origin of law is 
related to authority in that it comes from a “person or persons who are vested with the 
sacred power of governance,” because they have care over the community.40    
Finally, as discussed previously, the worlds of theology and canon law differ in 
intentionality.  In theology, the church intends knowledge of the truth, that is, the 
mysteries of faith and those values that will bring growth and life to the community.  
Conversely in canon law, the church intends actions that help the community appropriate 
the good, the coming to be of those values in the life of the community.  According to 
Coughlin, canon law can be differentiated into doctrinal law and disciplinary law.  
“Doctrinal law contains some specific doctrinal point drawn directly from sacred 
scripture, natural law, or tradition.”41  He points out that parts and chapters in the Code of 
Canon Law often begin with introductory canons that quote directly from the documents 
of Vatican II.42  Theological doctrine then becomes promulgated as doctrinal law.  “In 
contrast, disciplinary law sets forth some practical norm of action that explains and urges 
the spiritual good of the faithful.”43  Canon law guides the Catholic Church by obligating 
the faithful through the rule of law, meaning that "those who exercise the power of 
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governance do so through laws.”44  Canon law occupies an intermediary role in the 
church by ensuring that truth and justice are embodied in the concrete actions of the 
community.  It rests on divine and natural authority, but it also “encompasses certain 
positivistic justifications,” because it is a command of ecclesiastical authority.45  As a 
bridge between theological truth and practical action, canon law “functions in an 
auxiliary role in setting the conditions for the church’s salvific mission.  Canon law 
cannot eradicate sin from the human condition.  Rather, canon law is intended to assist in 
setting conditions in the church that favor justice.”46  According to Örsy, theology and 
canon law are related in their genesis as two stages of the human spirit in the process of 
moving from knowledge to action.  Örsy summarizes,  
The process has two stages because our spirit can intend two different objectives 
and operate in two distinct ways.  It can intend to find the truth or to reach for the 
good; in the first case its operation will rest in a judgment, in the second it will 
terminate in a decision.  These are two distinct movements of the human spirit 
driven by an unbounded desire to know and an innate impulse to act.47  
 
Örsy’s analysis of the differences between theology and canon law in their genesis and 
dynamic existence—differences in language, authority, and intentionality—demonstrates 
the distinction in unity between these two disciplines.  This distinction in unity can also 
be discovered by an analysis of the content of the two disciplines, a more static view. 
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2.4.2 Theology and Canon Law in their Content 
In presenting this static view, Örsy warns that such an analysis runs the risk of 
oversimplifying the reality of the relationship for the sake of understanding.  He qualifies, 
“Besides, even if they can be so represented, theology and canon law are not like two 
material constructions which can be physically measured and meticulously compared.  
They have all the subtlety of a product of the mind.”48  He attempts to avoid this risk 
through clarification and nuance.  Whether or not he is successful in avoiding this risk 
will be addressed subsequently.  In comparing their content, Örsy examines their forms, 
horizons, hermeneutics, and matrices. 
 Because theology uses the indicative mood, its form is a body of knowledge, 
whereas canon law, written in the imperative mood, is a system of commands.  Örsy 
reinforces this point by recalling the centuries-old distinction between heresy (obstinate 
denial of defined doctrine) and schism (obstinate breaking with legitimate authority).49  
Further revealing this difference in form is the long separation between departments of 
theology and canon law.  Örsy rightly asserts that the “divorce has gone too far,” 
although it is a clear reminder of the differing forms of the two disciplines.50  
 Another difference between the two disciplines is found in their horizons and 
corresponding hermeneutics.  The world of theology has no limiting horizon, because the 
end of theology is knowledge of all that is uncreated and created, all that has been 
revealed and received, all the relationships God has with creation traversing all time and 
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space.  This unlimited horizon of theology requires a “hermeneutics for expansion.”51  By 
this, Örsy means the interpreter endlessly seeks to learn more about the divine mysteries.  
A hermeneutics for expansion connotes an ever increasing breadth and depth in meaning 
for the theologian to explore.  The end can never truly be reached.  On the other hand, the 
world of canon law encompasses a defined field of study.  All of the ordering norms of 
canon law are publicly promulgated making canon law as a field of study clearly 
circumscribed.  Örsy names the corresponding hermeneutics for canon law a 
“hermeneutics for restriction.”52  He stresses the importance of utilizing this hermeneutic 
without negating the great difficulty of accomplishing such a task: 
If this hermeneutical rule were respected, it would soon put an end to diffuse 
commentaries and would give us canon law books marked by concise lucidity.  
The process of discovery in commenting on a legal text should focus on the 
unique intended action, and not on every conceivable construction that the words 
can bear.  To find that unique action and to express it with classical brevity and 
clarity is hardly ever easy:  to reach the required certainty a great deal of historical 
and doctrinal background study is needed.53  
 
Örsy contrasts the unlimited hermeneutics for expansion required for theology with the 
limited hermeneutics for restriction necessary for canon law.  This distinction necessarily 
follows from Örsy’s separation of knowledge and action in theology and canon law 
respectively. 
 Örsy describes a final distinction between theology and canon law in their 
content, namely, their matrices.  The church has received God’s revelation and seeks to 
understand those mysteries more fully and to act on that knowledge more freely.  For 
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centuries, the church doing theology has tried to comprehend the mysteries using 
philosophical systems, categories, and concepts.  The particular philosophies used have 
varied through time as the church doing theology “mediates between revelation and 
contemporary culture.”54  For theology, secular philosophy has been the primary cultural 
matrix in which theology grows and forms.  The cultural matrix reveals the human 
dimension of theology, but as mentioned previously, the human dimension cannot be 
separated from the divine.  A theology is as it is due to its own underlying and shaping 
philosophy, whether implicit or explicit.  The same prominent philosophies that have 
influenced and formed secular culture have also affected and molded theology.  From 
Platonic and Aristotelian philosophies to Existentialism and Phenomenology, theology 
utilizes philosophy to aid in understanding.  Similarly, canon law develops and takes 
shape within a cultural matrix.  However, for canon law this matrix is secular 
jurisprudence.  When Christianity was not only accepted, but more accurately privileged, 
by the Roman Emperor Constantine in the fourth century, the influence of Roman culture 
on the church was vast.  It was practically inevitable that “the church of the empire” 
would be heavily shaped by Roman law in terms of legal structures, procedures, and 
language.55  During the classical period of canon law from the twelfth through the 
fourteenth centuries, renewed interest in the study and use of Roman law again solidified 
the entrenched connection between canon law and secular jurisprudence, specifically 
Roman law.56 
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2.4.3 Theology and Canon Law United in the Church 
 All of these aforementioned differences do not negate their more profound unity.  
The basis for this unity is found in Örsy’s epistemological approach.  The disciplines of 
theology and canon law are two products of one dynamic process of the church moving 
from vision to action.57  For that reason, both disciplines share terms and concepts, 
although such ‘identical’ concepts take on particular nuance within each field.58  Örsy 
asserts that theological concepts such as church, communio, and intention can also have a 
“canonical meaning” when such concepts “appear in a specific horizon in which 
everything is ordered to action.”59  Örsy expounds upon the canonical meaning of 
theological realities and the importance of understanding and respecting the difference 
between the two meanings, that is, theological and canonical.  This distinction is of 
primary importance to this dissertation concerning the theological meaning of marital 
commitment and the canonical meaning of marital consent.  Therefore, Örsy’s 
explication is quoted at length: 
The problem with the “canonical meaning” of theological realities is that law 
cannot create realities but can only adjust to them.  When this adjustment is not 
correct, the law creates a fiction and operates on the basis of such fiction.  Such 
deviation, when it occurs, carries its own built in penalty:  the subjects soon 
perceive the shadows of formalism or legalism, and a contempt for law follows.  
Reality (including theological reality) has its own way of taking revenge. 
 This does not mean that research into the “canonical meaning” of (say) 
communio is not legitimate; on the contrary, it is of supreme importance to 
discover how far canon law has adjusted to the theological reality of communio.  
The researcher, however, should be aware that the study is not completed until it 
is shown how far the canonical concept corresponds to, or deviates from, the only 
existing reality, which is theological.60  
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 Because Örsy envisions the theological meaning of ‘identical’ canonical concepts 
as the only existing reality, he states explicitly that theology has the capacity to judge 
canon law.  Theology points to the values the church ought to appropriate, and canon law 
provides the norms and structures for doing so.  The judgment is unidirectional.  Örsy 
affirms, “Canon law has no capacity at all to judge theology because legal ordinationes 
are not meant to be judgments.”61  For Örsy, the capacity of theology to judge canon law 
does not imply that canon law is useless to theology.  On the contrary, canon law 
“supports the moral life of the community.”62  Those structures and norms derived from 
theological values give the church the ability to live out the values it knows it must.  They 
become the means to live what the church knows.  Another way canon law is important 
to theology is through granting theologians the necessary space to accomplish their task.  
Whether this “free space” is given in reality is a worthy question, but one that is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation.63 
 The organic connection between theology and canon law, affirmed and upheld, 
produces “an integrated community.”64  When a person lacks connection between what 
one knows and what one does, that person lacks integrity.  A community can lack 
integrity, also.  Örsy states, “Hence, the church itself cannot have internal harmony and 
operational integrity unless its perception of values through theology is followed by 
practical effort to appropriate them.  The precept to uphold this unity can be called rightly 
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‘the principle of integration.’”65  Two types of distortions occur when this organic unity 
is deficient.  Perfect integration is only an ideal, but when the distinction between the two 
disciplines becomes a veritable break, the church as a whole suffers.  The first type of 
distortion occurs when the structures and norms of canon law become divorced from 
theological values.  When law becomes autonomous, it can develop into a type of 
unyielding dictator.  This independence of law can arise during the making of law or 
during the interpretation of law.  At either point in the life of the law, the resulting 
“sickness” in the church is “legalism.”66  The law then is perceived to be taxing and 
vacant, and the consequences for the community will likely be failure to observe the law 
with the possibility of outright challenges to the suitability of the law.  Coughlin 
maintains that legalism “places the law above the person and community” and “often 
reflects a notion of reason that is disconnected from faith and theological reflection.”67  
For example, the gratuitous granting of declarations of nullity on psychological grounds 
in the period following Vatican II demonstrates a legalistic approach divorced from 
theological reflection.68  Many of these decisions were based upon expert testimony 
whose anthropological assumptions were antithetical to Christian anthropology.  In his 
1987 and 1988 Addresses to the Roman Rota, John Paul II focuses upon this problem.69  
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The proliferation of these affirmative sentences gave the impression that tribunals were 
just a legalistic machine pumping out “Catholic divorces.”  During this period, canon law 
failed to uphold the theological value of the bonum sacramenti, indissolubility. 
The second type of distortion occurs when theological values are not adequately 
enfleshed in fit canonical structures and norms, or if they are, then they are disregarded.  
For this type of distortion, the resulting disease is “lawlessness.”70  Coughlin calls this 
distortion “antinomianism,” which “diminishes or rejects the validity of law.”71  “It often 
results from a theological or pastoral response that severs the connection between canon 
law and the order of reason.”72  Coughlin cites as an example of antinomianism the 
response of the church to what would later be known as the clergy sexual abuse crisis in 
the period following Vatican II.73 Instead of using penal processes as outlined in canon 
law, church officials opted for more “pastoral” or “therapeutic” avenues.  Failure to 
enforce the canonical norms and structures that would have protected children and 
prevented future abuse brought about immeasurable pain and distrust.  The denial of 
canon law its proper role in the life of the church led to great devastation culminating in a 
period of panic and perhaps even anarchy.  Quickly the pendulum swung in the opposite 
direction toward legalism.74  Coughlin claims that the legalistic approach of the U.S. 
Bishops in 2002 to the crisis led to “an environment of suspicion and doubt about 
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fundamental justice in the public order of the church.”75  Coughlin explains why a 
predominantly antinomian approach will yield an overly legalistic approach and vice-
versa: 
The rule of reciprocity between legalism and antinomianism in the church 
corresponds to the conflicting anthropological desires for order and freedom.  The 
anthropological reality helps to explain why legalism and antinomianism may 
coexist in the same situation.  Legalism and antinomianism may each represent a 
doomed attempt to restore balance between the need for a common life and the 
rightful autonomy of the human person in the ecclesial community.76 
 
Both of these extremes can be avoided through sustained and intentional collaboration 
between theologians and canonists and between the hierarchy and the faithful.  
Maintaining and supporting the organic harmony between theology and canon law is 
absolutely necessary for the health of the whole church.  Örsy sees both disciplines as 
“signs of life and growth in the church,”77 because both are necessary for the church to 
continually move toward its telos, which is the kingdom of God. 
 
2.5 Distinction or Dichotomy between Theology and Canon Law? 
 
 
 2.5.1 Historical Development of the Discipline of Canon Law 
 In order to properly evaluate Örsy’s theory of the relation of theology to canon 
law, a brief sketch of the development of the discipline of canon law is offered.  In this 
historical sketch, the demarcation of periods follows the work of Myriam Wijlens.  
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Although history is fluid and muddled, she delineates four periods based upon certain 
horizon or paradigm shifts.78  
 The first period spans the time from the post-apostolic church until Gratian in the 
twelfth century.  Although canon law can hardly be called a discipline in this period for it 
lacked systemization and critical analysis, this early period is particularly significant for 
practical theology.  Canon law, or church order, consisted mainly of collections of 
practical wisdom and recorded customs.  Processes for councils and synods were 
developed, and the first ecumenical council took place in Nicaea in 325.  In these first 
centuries, church order and discipline were created primarily through councils and 
customs.79  When the church moved from the minority, in terms of power relations, to the 
majority in the fourth century, canon law assumed new elements and challenges.  Canon 
law became heavily influenced by Roman law as mentioned previously.  In addition, the 
bishop of Rome, now referred to as pope, took on a position of centrality and authority.  
Popes began to issue decretal letters, which began to be added to collections of canon law 
in conjunction with customary and conciliar legislation.80  Perhaps one of the greatest 
challenges, one that still lingers today, is the effect of the church becoming the 
established religion of the empire.  The explosion in membership meant “a decrease in 
the levels of preparation and commitment.”81   Additional challenges and changes to 
canon law occurred during the feudal period from the mid-ninth century until the early 
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part of the thirteenth century.  Germanic law, which tended to be more customary, had an 
extensive influence on the development of canon law.82  This influence is particularly 
apparent in subsequent chapters when exploring the historical context as the church 
discerned specifically what makes marriage.  The prevailing and unifying mark of canon 
law in this first period is its practical approach to solving the concrete problems of local 
churches.  Wijlens summarizes, “Canon law was not an independent discipline, but still 
part of the whole of theology and was considered ‘practical theology.’”83  Örsy 
characterizes the approach to canon law in this period as a “non-critical and non-
scientific approach:  the horizon of Christian wisdom.”84  During this period, specifically 
in 1054, both theology and canon law suffered from the separation of Eastern and 
Western Christianity.  The tension between collegiality and centrality is concretized by 
this persistent division in Christianity.  In Eastern Christianity, synodality and collegiality 
have been emphasized in ecclesiology and canonical structures, whereas in the West, 
centralizing tendencies have been dominant.85  This dissertation focuses primarily on the 
theological and canonical traditions of the West, while acknowledging the immense loss 
to both branches due to their division. 
 The second period in the history of canon law extends from Gratian to the Council 
of Trent.  The beginning of this period, from the mid-twelfth century to the mid-
fourteenth century, is known as the period of “classical canon law.”86  Graziano de 
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Clusio, known as Gratian, was most likely a Camaldolese monk who taught at the 
University of Bologna.87  Although never formally promulgated, his Concordia 
discordantium canonum completed around 1140 transformed canon law into a science 
and discipline.  Gratian’s Decretum, as it came to be called, utilized the scholastic sic et 
non method for the purpose of finding an internal harmony among divergent canons, 
hence the name, A Harmony of Discordant Canons.88  Whereas previous collections were 
simply that, aggregate collections, Gratian’s Decretum added critical analysis, 
abstraction, systemization, comparison, and evaluation.  The application of scholastic 
scientific inquiry to canon law marks the horizon shift into a new period in canonical 
history.  During this period of classical canon law, Gratian’s Decretum became the 
primary reference point for study, reflection, commentary, and teaching of canon law in 
European universities, particularly in Bologna and Paris.89  The science of canon law was 
further advanced by the compilation of decretals from councils and popes by Gregory IX 
in 1234, marking the first time any collection of juridical decisions was promulgated as 
authoritative for the entire church.90  At this same time, there occurred a rediscovery of 
and renewed interest in classical Roman law.  Canon law continued to develop in a 
theological context while at the same time interacting with legal science.  The pragmatic 
approach of the first period changed into a critical process of abstraction in the second 
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period.91  Örsy identifies the approach to canon law in this period as a “critical and 
scientifically organized approach:  the horizon of scientific abstraction.”92  
 The latter part of this second period, from the mid-fourteenth century to the mid-
sixteenth century, may be called the “post-classical period.”93  In theology and canon law, 
this was a time of decline, instability, stagnancy, and finally reform.  Significant and 
contributory events of this time include:  the Black Death (1348-1349), the Avignon 
Papacy (1309-1377), the Great Western Schism (1378-1417), and the Protestant 
Reformation (1517-1560).94  Papal power was in a state of corruption through the abuse 
of appointments to ecclesiastical offices and in a state of confusion through the 
simultaneous election of two, then three, popes.  Stagnancy ensued as no noteworthy 
canonical legislation was developed and the scholastic language of the period of classical 
canon law became enshrined in the church’s system of governance.  Canonists were 
instrumental in settling the Great Western Schism at the Council of Constance (1414-
1418) by unifying papal power.95  This council instituted a structure for ongoing reform 
by commanding general councils to be held every ten years.  Eventually this practice 
lapsed due to fear that conciliar acts might detract from papal power.96  The failure of the 
church to articulate canonical legislation that supports and promotes the theological value 
of trinitarian unity in diversity has played a significant part in deleterious divisions, 
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namely the split of Eastern and Western Christianity in the eleventh century and the 
Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century. 
 The third period in the history of canon law spans the time from the Council of 
Trent to the Second Vatican Council.  The process of abstraction and scholastic scientific 
inquiry that marked the early part of the second period fell into decline in the post 
classical period, which led to a horizon shift demarcating the third period.  The Catholic 
Counter Reformation begat a more defensive church imaged as a “perfect society.”97  
Canonical legislation was based less on rational argument and critical inquiry and more 
on the will and authority of the legislator.  Canon law grew to be thick and tedious while 
becoming detached from its historical context.  The perennial struggle to adequately 
balance unity and diversity in terms of power and authority took form once again, but this 
time as the debate between the Ultramontanists and the Gallicans and Febronians.  The 
dispute was settled at the First Vatican Council in 1870, which strongly upheld and 
enforced centralized papal power.  During this period, the Western world was greatly 
influenced by humanism and Enlightenment rationalism, while the Roman Catholic 
Church gradually lost political power and remained in a defensive position against the 
modern world.98  In the midst of an intricate web of canonical legislation, Pius X ordered 
the reorganization and reform of canon law under the direction of Pietro Gasparri.  The 
new codification of canon law began in 1904 and was not completed until 1914.  The 
Code of Canon Law was promulgated by Pope Benedict XV in 1917, and this act of 
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codification, which had become more popular in Europe, ushered in a new way of doing 
canon law.  Coriden explains, 
All previous compilations of canons had been in the form of collections of 
documents; the original words, pastoral situation, date, and issuing authority were 
retained.  The canonical rule remained in its historical context.  “Codification” is 
an exercise in conceptual juridical abstraction.  It strives to reduce the rules to 
terse and abstract formulations and arrange them in a carefully constructed 
system.  It is strong on clarity, brevity, consistency, and order, but the rules are 
entirely set apart from the social and historical context that gave rise to them.99  
 
The abstract nature of a universal code reinforced the centralization of power, which 
added some clarity to the state of canon law at the time but at the expense of creativity in 
canon law.  In this period, canon law was considerably disconnected from theology and 
served chiefly to obey and serve authority rather than promote and preserve theological 
values.100  Örsy characterizes this period as “the loss of critical spirit:  the horizon of 
literal exegesis.”101  
 At the end of the third period, significant development began in ecclesiology.  
With inspired thinkers such as Yves Congar, Henri de Lubac, and Karl Rahner, to name a 
few, the images of the church as central, historical, visible, perfect, and hierarchical are 
gradually subsumed into the larger image of church as communio.  In Pius XII’s 1943 
encyclical Mystici Corporis Christi, he refers to the church as “the Church Militant” but 
also as the Mystical Body:   
There can, then, be no real opposition or conflict between the invisible mission of 
the Holy Spirit and the juridical commission of Ruler and Teacher received from 
Christ, since they mutually complement and perfect each other—as do the body 
and soul in man—and proceed from our one Redeemer who not only said as He 
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breathed on the Apostles “Receive ye the Holy Spirit,” but also clearly 
commanded: “As the Father hath sent me, I also send you;” and again: “He that 
heareth you, heareth me.”102 
 
In his collection of essays titled The Mystery of the Church, Yves Congar centers his 
ecclesiology on the role of the Holy Spirit in the unity and life of the church.103  For 
Congar, the church is the Mystical Body of Christ.  “Everything is already fulfilled in 
Christ; the church is simply the manifestation of what is in him, the visible reality 
animated by his Spirit.”104  Congar does not deny the structural nature of the church; on 
the contrary, this Mystical Body animated by the Spirit is sacramental, apostolic, 
hierarchical, and social.105  He describes Pentecost as the time when the church received 
the Holy Spirit, which is both law and soul: 
What is law?  It is the order authoritatively decreed by the head of a community, 
giving it its form of life, its rule of collective living; and so it harmonizes and 
adjusts the conduct of individuals to make of them a social unity.  It is at once 
clear that when, as is the case with the Church, we are dealing with a community 
whose aim is salvation, whose life is of the spirit, the law is much more than 
something imposed by external force.  As regards Christians, this law is chiefly 
the Holy Spirit in their hearts.106 
 
The Holy Spirit works within the individual and among all in the Body of Christ.  The 
Holy Spirit is the principle of life for all the different members of the church and “the law 
of their communion in unity.”107  For de Lubac, the church is primarily a mystery, 
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because as a complex and paradoxical reality the church holds in tension all the 
seemingly contradictory elements of the church (human and divine, visible and invisible, 
of earth and of heaven).108  Coughlin points out that Congar and de Lubac emphasize the 
tension in the church between charism and institution and the visible and invisible aspects 
of the church.109  Coughlin adds, “Canon law attempts to regulate the visible institutional 
elements in accordance with the invisible charismatic qualities of the Catholic 
Church.”110  Rahner describes the church as “the historical continuation of Christ in and 
through the community of those who believe in him, and who recognize him explicitly as 
the mediator of salvation in a profession of faith.”111  Using many images for the church, 
Rahner asserts the need for law even in an ecclesial community: 
Without a holy law, without a division of labor, functions and hence also of rights 
among different individuals, without this kind of differentiation of functions in the 
community the church would cease being the people of God, the house of God, 
the body of Christ and the community of the faithful.  It would become a 
disjointed conglomerate of religious individualists.  There has to be in the church 
a holy order, a holy law, and hence also a power which may and must be 
exercised juridically by one person in relation to others.112 
 
Although written after the Second Vatican Council, this passage reflects the communion 
ecclesiology of that time in the diversity of images and the recognition of the need for 
law to create good order in the church.  Rahner contends that “the real imposition of laws 
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in the church is a real self-actualization of the church as a society and as a pneumatic 
community only if the law is maintained with a humility and a spirit of service which 
knows that law in God’s church can provide space for this life and his grace, and even 
provide their presence.”113  In the work of these theologians so influential over the 
Second Vatican Council, there is room for law but law is in the service of the Spirit.  The 
Second Vatican Council brought these ecclesiological developments to the forefront, and 
a “new attitude of mind, novus habitus mentis,”114 was introduced inaugurating 
tremendous change in the church.  Örsy uses this expression from Paul VI to describe the 
horizon shift that occurred around the council.  The significance of communio 
ecclesiology and the church receiving the council will be discussed later in this chapter. 
 Because theology and canon law are both interrelated ecclesial sciences, these 
changes in ecclesiology led to questions about the nature and methodology of canon law.  
From explorations of these questions came various responses, which can be grouped into 
several theories (or schools of thought) regarding the relationship of theology to canon 
law.  The schools of thought are not formal and defined but represent differing 
perspectives on the foundations of canon law and its relationship to theology.115  In very 
broad strokes, these theories are dissatisfying due either to their undue separation of 
canon law from theology and the excessive autonomy of each or due to their near 
                                                 
113. Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith:  An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity, 398. 
 
114. Örsy, Theology and Canon Law:  New Horizons for Legislation and Interpretation, 9. 
 
115. For an overview of these schools of thought, see Örsy’s article “Theology and Canon Law” 
in the beginning of the commentary on the Code used in this study, Beal, Coriden, and Green, New 
Commentary on the Code of Canon Law, 1-9; Wijlens, Theology and Canon Law:  The Theories of Klaus 
Mörsdorf and Eugenio Corecco, 14-22.  In addition to this brief overview, Wijlens’ work is an in-depth 
comparison of the relationship between theology and canon law in the founder of the Münich School 
(Mörsdorf) and one of his disciples (Corecco); James A. Coriden, Canon Law as Ministry:  Freedom and 
Good Order for the Church (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 2000), 13-19; Ladislas Örsy, "Theology and 
Canon Law:  An Inquiry Into Their Relationship," The Jurist 50 (1990): 418-29. 
 
58 
 
identification of canon law with theology.  Similar to the early church’s struggle to 
articulate the divine and human in Christ during the christological heresies, the various 
theories may either describe too great a separation or too great an identification between 
the two disciplines in the church.  Wijlens notes that whereas the other trends or schools 
of thought (mostly demarcated by language) discuss the relationship between theology 
and canon law “on the level of conceptual content,” Örsy discusses that relationship “on a 
cognitional and epistemological level” as has already been described.116 
 One school of thought adds some insight into the relationship between theology 
and canon law that is worth exploring.  This school of thought has been named the 
Concilium Project, because its main proponents were the editors of the periodical 
Concilium, who in its first issue recommended “a ‘dejuridicizing’ of theology and a 
‘detheologizing’ of canon law.”117  Theodore Jiménez-Urresti, one of the original editors 
of the canon law issues of Concilium, explains how there is “distinction and gradation” in 
the two ecclesial sciences of theology and canon law.118  The theology of the church 
espoused in his view (and the Concilium Project as a whole) is inspired and directed by 
the documents and spirit of Vatican II.  Jiménez-Urresti upholds that the church is both 
event and institution composed of human and divine elements.  As such, the church is a 
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sacrament in that it expresses and making visible its “substance” or “basic structure.”119  
The function of canon law is to apply and implement theological data into social-
structural and historical form, namely ecclesiastical law.  The “particularizing” role of 
canon law is described by Jiménez-Urresti: 
Canon Law, on the other hand, receives these theological data in generic form as 
they concern the basic social structure of the Church, and particularizes them in 
its laws.  Its end is the good of the body politic of the Church; it moves on the 
level of the instrumental and positive, adapting its social instruments (laws) to its 
end and prescribing a social conduct with practical judgments, so that canonical 
truth consists in the fitting of its means to the end intended by the legislator—in 
their efficacy.120  
 
It is the “instrumentality” and “particularization” of canon law that distinguishes it from 
theology.121  He states, “Thus, the task of Canon Law is to effect the actualization of 
generic divine law while being faithful to its theological basis, to make it function while 
being faithful to its inner sacramentary nature, and to order the ecclesial structure in 
fidelity to its transcendent aim of salus animarum.”122  Jiménez-Urresti explains that a 
“juridicist theology” occurs when theologians fail to recognize the distinction between 
the two ecclesial sciences.  A “juridicist theology” is one in which theological principles 
are identified with one possible particular and historical application.  When specific 
historicized canons are treated as theology without “stripping them first of their skin of 
canonical particularization,” theology suffers by being restricted and canon law suffers by 
being absolutized.123  The call for a “de-theologizing” of canon law means to preserve its 
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“theological kernel” without its particular historical applications.  In this view, canon law 
is law only in an analogous sense, and canon law as an ecclesial science must always be 
intimately related to theology without being confused with it.124  Jiménez-Urresti argues 
that trying to contain both disciplines within their own proper field is extremely difficult, 
because the church “exercises a doctrinal magisterium and so moves in the sphere of 
theology, and at the same time, being visible society, possesses and effects a social order, 
and so moves in the sphere of implementation.”125  The church doing both at the same 
time is the reason why there is overlap in seemingly ‘identical’ concepts creating 
confusion and the danger of treating both disciplines identically.  Despite this danger, 
Jiménez-Urresti holds that canon law “finds its roots, nature and end in theology, not civil 
law, a fact which has sometimes in practice been overlooked.”126  Jiménez-Urresti clearly 
states the relation of canon law to practical theology: 
The function of canon law will be to formulate such “divine positive law” in a 
way to make it historical and achievable.  Practical reason, along with its proper 
logic, devotes itself to this task.  Thus one can consider canonical science as 
canonical practical theology.  Still, this is insufficient; canon law, in order to 
fulfill its purpose, must appeal to the methods and sciences of normative 
implementation and to formal technical and organizational sciences.  Such 
recourse is necessary not precisely because of the limits of human intelligence 
(though this is a valid reason, at least partially and at the beginning) but because 
objectively God has left this an area of free autonomous human decision. Thus, 
canonical science has its own proper and autonomous area, and so we should 
speak of the science of canon law as a science of implementation.127 
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Jiménez-Urresti’s approach has a great deal of affinity with Örsy’s epistemological 
approach, and will be evident in Catherine Clifford’s contribution to be discussed 
subsequently. 
The view of the relationship between theology and canon law that emerges from 
the Concilium Project is based upon an ecclesiology that clearly flows out of Vatican II.  
In his theology of canon law, Lamberto de Echevarría quotes from Lumen gentium 8 that 
the church is a “complex reality” of seemingly disparate and paradoxical elements such 
as hierarchical and mystical, visible and spiritual, and earthly and heavenly.128  Because 
the church is institutional, as well as being mystical, it “embraces the idea of an order, a 
structure, an authority, as opposed to the mere existence of these things, which could 
merely be the causal result of some quality or interest in the Church.”129  De Echevarría is 
affirming that canon law represents the rule of law although not exactly in the same way 
as civil law, because it does not allow for democratic participation in legislation.  Order 
in the church ensures “the best means for the faithful to obtain the salus animarum which 
is the ultimate end of ecclesial activity.”130  It is that space and structure that allows the 
Spirit to work in the church.  De Echevarría affirms that “the Council showed a clear 
preference for the pastoral side of Church activity,” a significant change from the image 
of “the Church militant” of the preceding period.131  He maintains that the church is “one 
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reality of governing and instructing” and that “the rule of the church is juridical and 
pastoral at the same time.”132  The theme of balancing and connecting the juridical and 
the pastoral in the church will resurface throughout this study. 
2.5.2 Limitations of Ladislas Örsy’s Theory and Catherine Clifford’s 
         Contribution 
Örsy’s innovative epistemological approach simplifies the relationship between 
theology and canon law in a way that takes seriously the principle of integration and the 
movement of the church from vision to action, at least ideally.  However, Örsy’s theory 
can be enhanced and nuanced by Catherine Clifford’s critique and contribution.  Clifford 
articulates a possible danger in Örsy’s approach to discriminating between theology and 
canon law, where theology concerns knowledge and canon law concerns action.  Clifford 
states, “By introducing a distinction between worlds of knowing and doing, 
contemplation and action, one risks falling into the dichotomy which until recently 
dominated Catholic philosophy in the faculty psychology which distinguished, and 
ultimately separated, the faculties of intellect and will.”133  Although Örsy does not intend 
to dichotomize the worlds of knowing and doing, his characterization of theology as fides 
quaerens intellectum and canon law as fides quaerens actionem could lead to the 
mistaken conclusion that Lonergan’s fourth level of conscious intentional operations has 
no place in the world of theology.134  Clifford mentions the work of practical theologians 
as evidence of the centrality of action, decision, and living in theology.  She continues, 
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Örsy seems to relate separate operations of intellect and will as two distinct stages 
in a single cognitive or decisional process.  An unintended consequence of such 
an approach is that, dividing up the operations of conscious intentionality among 
two ecclesial sciences, it appears to fragment, if not break down the unified 
cognitive process of conscious intentionality.135  
 
Rather than entirely rejecting Örsy’s theory, Clifford seems to build upon his work while 
adding greater nuance and clarification.  She maintains that Lonergan’s eight functional 
specialties can be found in both ecclesial disciplines and that theologians and canonists 
operate on all four levels of conscious intentionality.136  Specifically, Clifford 
underscores the theological task of canon law (as does Örsy137 ) and situates canon law 
within the functional specialty of communications, where all the other functional 
specialties are interior and anterior to communications.138  
 According to Lonergan, “Functional specialization distinguishes and separates 
successive stages in the process from data to results.”139  The functional specialties are 
“intrinsically related to one another” and “successive parts of one and the same 
process.”140  The theologian operates on all four levels of conscious intentionality 
(empirical, intellectual, rational, and responsible) in all of the functional specialties.  
However, all the operations are used “to achieve the end proper to some particular 
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level.”141  Lonergan identifies eight functional specialties:  research, interpretation, 
history, dialectics, foundations, doctrines, systematics, and communications.  Because he 
envisions two phases in theology, the ends proper to the first four specialties correspond 
to the four operations of conscious intentionality, and the ends proper to the final four 
specialties correspond to the operations of conscious intentionality in inverse order.  It is 
a parabolic movement from data though understanding and judgment to decision, then 
progressing from the foundation of a new horizon through judgment and understanding to 
data again—data to be applied, appropriated, and communicated.  Lonergan explains the 
reason for the inversion: 
In the first phase one begins from the data and moves through meanings and facts 
towards personal encounter.  In the second phase one begins from reflection on 
authentic conversion, employs it as the horizon within which doctrines are to be 
apprehended and an understanding of their content sought, and finally moves to a 
creative exploration of communications differentiated according to media, 
according to classes of men, and according to common cultural interests.142  
 
He describes this movement in theology through the functional specialties as beginning in 
multiplicity culminating in a unified grounding horizon and moving down again into the 
diversity and plurality of human experience.  Lonergan notes, “This descent is, not 
properly a deduction, but rather a succession of transpositions to ever more determinate 
contexts.”143  In the final functional specialty, communications, “theological reflection 
bears fruit.”144  Through the communication of Christ and Christ’s message, the church is 
effected and self-constituted.  For the church to be a community, it necessitates common 
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experiences, common ways of understanding, common judgments, and common values 
and goals.145  “Common” here means shared, not necessarily identical.  These shared 
experiences, understandings, judgments, and decisions come to pass through 
communication. 
 Although Clifford sees all eight functional specialties operative in both theology 
and canon law, she suggests that in the theological specialty of communications canon 
law is most properly placed.146  She upholds, “In this way, the role of canon law might be 
thought of more precisely as mediating theology to concrete practice within the self-
constituting community that is the church.”147  Clifford’s more nuanced approach to the 
relation of theology to canon law encompasses the complexity of this relationship and 
accurately reflects the concerns of practical theology.148  As Clifford warns, we need to 
avoid the danger of associating understanding with theology alone and action with canon 
law alone.  Locating canon law principally within the functional specialty of 
communications highlights the pastoral character of canon law and its function as a 
ministry within the church.149  Clifford describes the theological task of canon law and its 
role within the church: 
Canon law mediates judgments concerning the constitutive elements of the 
Christian community and the demands of faith for Christian living.  By defining 
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rights, obligations, roles, and terms of relations within the church, it effectively 
establishes patterns of relations in the concrete social order.  Thus canon law 
might be understood as mediating theological meaning and values to the concrete 
practical life of the Christian community.  The very consciousness of the whole 
church, permeated with a sense of intelligence and responsibility, must be 
contained in its norms.150  
 
The “distinction and gradation” in the ecclesial sciences with their own methodologies is 
necessary, because “the theologian does not ‘do’ Canon Law, nor the canonist 
theology.”151  Theologians and canonists must rely on each other for their respective parts 
in the process of the church moving from vision to action.  Clifford describes the 
interdependence of theologians and canonists in the Peter and Paul Seminar:152 
Theologians in the Peter and Paul Seminar can and indeed do make practical 
suggestions for the renewal not only of theology, but also of institutional 
structures and praxis.  Yet we must rely on our canonist colleagues to re-imagine 
how such revision might be mediated in the specificity of canonical form through 
the reformulation of various canons, norms and instances of canon law.  The 
insights of theology, while a fundamental source for canon law, are no substitute 
for the insight of a good jurist.153 
 
The particular skill sets of good jurists are irreplaceable in the discipline of 
implementation.  Jiménez-Urresti maintains that canon law, as a “science of 
implementation,” has its own proper logic and method.  He continues, “With this 
systematic conception of theology as unitas scientiae, one can understand the 
implementation made by the Church’s authority in regard to sacramental and 
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ecclesiological matters, as theological conclusions of practical reason and practical 
theology.”154 
2.5.3 The Role of Conversion in Integrating the Ecclesial Disciplines 
In line with Örsy’s theory, Clifford’s approach emphasizes the theological task of 
canon law and the significance of the role of conversion.  Following Lonergan, Clifford 
contends that “the responsible and integrated (or converted) theologian” is concerned 
with concrete practices, actions, and social structures.155  This is consistent with the 
concerns of practical theology previously discussed.  Örsy, too, emphasizes the role of 
conversion.  For Örsy, the canonist’s ability to see canon law within a theological 
horizon, versus a purely juridical one, can be described as a conversion.156  The 
possibility of this transformation in the church is made possible by the Second Vatican 
Council, which Örsy describes as “an event of conversion.”157  An anecdote he recites in 
several publications demonstrates the magnitude of the role of conversion for Örsy (and, 
coincidentally, how concrete historical experience spurs theological reflection).  Örsy 
recounts a conversation he had with Msgr. Alexandre Renard, then bishop of Versailles, 
later Cardinal Archbishop of Lyon, at the Second Vatican Council: 
I mentioned that the reception of the council would depend largely on the new 
canon law.  “Will the council do anything about it?”—I asked.  His response was 
swift and to the point:  “I do not care about canon law;” it is even more to the 
point in the original French “Je m’en fichte de droit canonique.”  Question:  have 
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some bishops (the council?) failed to realize the existential role of law to create 
the freedom necessary for the reception of the council?158  
 
Conversion is necessary for the proper integration of theology and canon law to happen 
in the church.  The values articulated by theologians need to find concrete manifestation 
in the particularity of canon law.  Örsy reiterates, “Hence, only canon lawyers convinced 
of the importance of theology in the interpretation of canon law can bring new life to our 
old institutions.  Everything will turn on their personal conversion.”159  One may add that 
the possibility of theological values being received, appropriated, and lived depends a 
great deal on the conversion of theologians as they recognize the requisite place of canon 
law within a theological horizon.  As asserted in Chapter One, the theologian’s 
consciousness of one’s historical situation and personal worldview are integral not only 
in accurately attending to and understanding the problem, but also in judging the proper 
courses of action and responding in agreement with one’s conscience. 
 
2.6 Canon Law within a Fundamental Practical Theology 
 
 2.6.1 Practice-Theory-Practice Structure of Theological Thinking 
 This study returns now to Don Browning’s proposal that all theology is 
fundamentally practical and the question of how canon law relates to such a theory.  After 
an exploration of the history of canon law and the work of Örsy, Lonergan, and Clifford, 
it is now possible to articulate how canon law relates to practical theology in a way that is 
consistent with the Second Vatican Council which ushered in and solidified the novus 
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habitus mentis.  Through the event of the council, the church moved “from imperium to 
communio,” “from defensive isolation to expansive presence,” and “from a static world 
view to a dynamic one.”160  Such a new attitude of mind enabled the church to move to a 
higher viewpoint, to learn from the human sciences, and to embrace ecumenical 
perspectives.  A theory of canon law within theology must also reflect this new attitude of 
mind.  Canon law envisioned within a fundamental practical theology does just that. 
 Within Browning’s theory of fundamental practical theology, canon law can be 
found as an ecclesial science of its own right and a principal dialogue partner with 
theology.  Again, canon law is not to be confused with theology, nor to be completely 
separated from it.  Canon law interacts with theology in all of the movements Browning 
specifies:  descriptive, historical, systematic, and strategic.  While keeping in mind 
Clifford’s caution that we do not reduce theology to knowledge and canon law to action, 
theologians and canonists can agree on their respective roles in the process of canon law 
appropriating theological values through the identification of roles and rights, the 
implementation of norms and structures, and the resolution of conflicting interests and 
claims. 
 In agreement with Örsy’s work, a fundamental premise of this dissertation is that 
theology has the capacity to judge canon law.  In his 1992 book, Theology and Canon 
Law:  New Horizons for Legislation and Interpretation, Örsy claims that theology 
(specifically moral theology) has priority over canon law.161  This priority consists in 
theology’s capacity to discover values and to set limits for the creation and interpretation 
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of laws.162  However, in his 2009 work, Receiving the Council:  Theological and 
Canonical Insights and Debates, Örsy asserts that the question of priority between 
theology and canon law is “a misconceived query.”163  He reiterates the unified process 
of the church moving from vision to action.  The question of priority does seem 
misplaced as each discipline influences the other, albeit in different ways.  That being 
said, canon law is found within a horizon that is practical and theological.  Örsy 
maintains that other sciences have the capacity to judge canon law partially or under 
determinate conditions.  Specifically, he alludes to the role of the human sciences, 
medicine, and philosophy in judging marital legislation and jurisprudence.164  In contrast, 
theology’s capacity to judge canon law is neither partial nor conditioned, because canon 
law must always adjust to the theological reality. 
 Örsy’s characterization of theology’s relation to canon law as a unified movement 
from vision to action is missing a key element.  Previous explanations of fundamental 
practical theology demonstrated the practice-theory-practice structure to all theological 
thinking.  The theological vision that must be appropriated into canonical norms does not 
come out of emptiness, but out of chaos and conflict.  Interestingly, Örsy provides the 
image of the chaotic turbulence that preceded creation to describe the internal life of the 
church as it struggles to embrace the communion ecclesiology of Vatican II.165  However, 
he misses this crucial element when outlining his theory of the relation of theology to 
canon law.  Theological thinking springs from reflection on crises in current theory-laden 
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practices.  The collision of conflicting practices in church and culture or the clash 
between current ecclesial practices and their intended theological meanings causes the 
church as a community to bring questions to its normative texts and its theory-laden 
practices.  This begins the movement of descriptive theology. 
 Theological thinking begins in the movement of descriptive theology, because we 
cannot escape the influence of the theory-laden practices in which we find ourselves.  In 
addition, frequently, rules, roles, norms, and patterns of behavior emerge prior to their 
explicit theological justification and articulation.  Örsy, aware of this point, explains how 
a practice may precede its theory chronologically, but theory always precedes practice 
ontologically: 
In this context Newman’s explanation of dogmatic development can be recalled:  
the church is in possession of an “idea” that somehow contains all that is in the 
tradition but not in the form of propositions.  As history progresses, the church, 
guided by the Spirit, lets the “idea” unfold and its content be revealed in 
articulated formulations.  Before this unfolding happens, however, the “idea” may 
already inspire practical norms, but this is really nothing else than an intuitive 
vision leading to a decision.  Knowledge, even though implicit, remains the 
mother of action.166  
 
Of course, because of the presence of bias as Lonergan expressed it, such development 
occurs as a result of the grace of the Spirit and the possibility of conversion.  What is 
implicit in Örsy here becomes an explicit movement in Browning.  Descriptive theology 
utilizes the insights of other sciences, namely, psychology, sociology, anthropology, 
economics, ecology, civil law, and canon law to describe what we are doing, why we are 
doing it, and what legitimates such a practice.  Regarding marriage practices in the 
church, canon law is an indispensible dialogue partner in describing the thickness of 
practice. 
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 As explicated in Chapter One, the description of what current practices are is not 
sufficient in theology.  The theologian asks questions about what current practices should 
be.  The movements of historical and systematic theology provide much needed distance 
between current theory-laden practices and the normative texts, events, and themes that 
define the church as community.  Canonical and theological terms overlap here, yet the 
canonical meaning of terms must always adjust to the theological reality.  Within these 
movements, canonical norms and practices are evaluated based upon the theological 
values they are intended to uphold, support, promote, and protect.  In order to understand 
the role of canon law within these movements, a designation of precisely what laws are 
and what laws are for within the church is necessary.167 
 2.6.2 What is Law and What is Law For in the Church? 
 Örsy distinguishes between law in the abstract order and law in the existential 
order.  Aquinas’ delineation of the essential elements of law is accurate and logical in the 
abstract world.  In theory, law is “ordinatio of reason,” that is, “action to create order,” 
“by the one who is in charge of the community for the sake of the common good 
promulgated.”168   While this description works in the abstract, it is missing an important 
element in historical reality.  That element is reception by the community of the faithful.  
A law must be good for it to be law, meaning that it must be moral, fair, possible, and 
useful for the community.169  Nevertheless, it must also be legitimately received by the 
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community for it to be a “vital force in the community.”170  Reception is not the same as 
ratification in the democratic process, primarily because for members of the ecclesial 
community animated by the Spirit of God, reception is a deep, personal response to 
God.171  However, for members of a secular community, reception is recognition and 
acceptance of prudent judgments of the human spirit.172  Ecclesial reception involves the 
whole of the person and one’s relationship with God.  As explained earlier in this chapter, 
all persons and communities (including the church) are unfinished, in need of completion 
and perfection.  Persons and communities need to reach out for those good things that 
contribute to progress and growth in life, both human and divine.  In this context, Örsy 
affirms the role of law.  “The purpose of laws is to prompt the community to appropriate 
those values; the reception of the laws is the process by which the community comes into 
the possession of the same values.  (The laws speak of intended values; reception means 
the acquisition of values.)”173  When received, law in theory becomes law in action. 
 According to Örsy, reception of canon law is a dynamic and integrated process 
consisting of five movements.174  In the first movement, the ecclesial community, which 
is the whole people of God, attends to and becomes aware of the law that has been 
promulgated.175  The lawgiver refers to the pope in matters regarding the universal church 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
170. Örsy, Theology and Canon Law:  New Horizons for Legislation and Interpretation, 45. 
 
171. Örsy, Receiving the Council:  Theological and Canonical Insights and Debates, 67. 
 
172. Ibid., 59. 
 
173. Ibid., 60. 
 
174. Although not explicitly stated, these movements correspond to Lonergan’s four levels of 
conscious intentionality where the fifth movement flows into the action itself. 
 
175. Örsy, Receiving the Council:  Theological and Canonical Insights and Debates, 65-67. 
 
74 
 
and the bishops and their synods for matter regarding a particular church.  The task of the 
lawgiver is to serve the needs of the people of God, to be servant and caregiver, shepherd 
and steward.  The second movement involves the search for the value behind the law, the 
pursuit of understanding.  For such understanding to occur, the ecclesial community must 
be capable, motivated, well informed, and free.  The third movement in canonical 
reception is the presentation of law to conscience and the harmonious acceptance of the 
judgment of conscience that this law is to be followed.  The implementation of canon law 
must pass through conscience.  This is simply a reaffirmation of the primacy or ultimacy 
of conscience whether in canon law or moral theology.  The fourth movement is the 
willingness of the receiver to act in accord with the law and to appropriate the value the 
law upholds.  The receiver judges that the law is in accord with God’s will and decides to 
act accordingly.  The fifth movement is the act of implementing the law in concrete 
historical existence.  In this movement, “life and law meet.”176  This meeting of the 
demands of law and the requirements of life may be harmonious or it may be conflictual.  
Such conflicts may occur because the community is not willing or not able to recognize 
and appropriate the value.  Another possibility is that the law is not well formulated or 
that it is actually destructive of values.177  The divine assistance guaranteed to 
ecclesiastical authority in matters of doctrine is not guaranteed in concrete practical 
matters including legislating.178  A final possibility is that the law may not serve the 
intended value in a particular case.  In such a case, the principle of oikonomia or the 
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virtue of epieikeia may be applicable, but this discussion is best included in the 
movement of strategic practical theology in a later chapter. 
 The necessity of canonical reception for the very existence of a true ecclesiastical 
law emphasizes the communion ecclesiology of Vatican II and the movement of the 
People of God through history.  The duty of the hierarchy in legislating is to serve the 
whole People of God by recognizing the needs of the community and issuing norms that 
aid the community in appropriating the values necessary for its life.  Just as the sensus 
fidelium plays a vital role in doctrinal development, so also does the sensus fidelium 
contribute to the development of canonical legislation.179  Örsy uses the parable of the 
sower to punctuate the vital participation of the church in receiving the practical norms of 
its own community: 
The seed must be received in the soil, otherwise it cannot grow.  The lawgiver 
should find the right seed for the soil, should go out and sow it with care; the soil 
must take it, shelter it, feed the latent life in it, and give growth to it.  If this 
parable can describe the spreading of the Word of God, why could it not enlighten 
us about the creation and implementation of practical norms in the church?180  
 
To further bring to light how an ecclesiology of communio needs to be enfleshed in the 
canonical system of the church, Örsy laments the lack of structure in place for the whole 
people of God to contribute to the canonical system.  He states, “It follows that a legal 
system which leaves no room for the contribution of the people as described in the 
conciliar documents but is built nearly entirely on statutory laws is theologically 
unsatisfactory.”181  Örsy continues, “The very nature of the church postulates that there 
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should be a real and concrete possibility for the people to contribute.”182  Each person 
within the communion has a unique vocation, a specific way of hearing the Word of God 
and responding to it.  The church must be structured in a way not only to allow for each 
to contribute but also to empower each to flourish.  The ancient legal wisdom of the 
church that “custom is the best interpreter of laws” is contained in canon 27, yet with the 
codification of canon law, the authority of custom is usurped when “doubts are decided 
by decrees.”183  
 Although all of canon law is not contained within the Code, the Code is “the 
principal legislative document of the Church, founded on the juridical-legislative heritage 
of Revelation and Tradition.”184  Within the Apostolic Constitution Sacrae Disiplinae 
Leges for the promulgation of the 1983 Code, John Paul II affirms the meaning of law 
within the church, the connection of the Code to the council, and the presence of the 
Code within a communion ecclesiology.  He states that the New Testament writings 
reveal Christ as the fulfillment of the Law and the Law’s connection to Christ’s message 
of salvation.  He continues, 
This being so, it appears sufficiently clear that the Code is in no way intended as a 
substitute for faith, grace and the charisms in the life of the Church and of the 
faithful.  On the contrary, its purpose is rather to create such an order in the 
ecclesial society that, while assigning the primacy to faith, grace and the 
charisms, it at the same time renders easier their organic development in the life 
both of the ecclesial society and of the individual persons who belong to it.185  
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John Paul II clearly states that the purpose of the Code is to ensure proper order develops 
in the church along with faith, grace, and the charisms in the lives of individual persons.  
The Code of Canon Law contains the norms, regulations, structures, procedures, and 
disciplines necessary for church order.  In a critical passage in this apostolic constitution, 
John Paul II verbalizes the relation of the Code to the council and the ecclesiology it 
dwells within:   
The instrument, which the Code is, fully corresponds to the nature of the Church, 
especially as it is proposed by the teaching of the Second Vatican Council in 
general, and in a particular way by its ecclesiological teaching.  Indeed, in a 
certain sense, this new Code could be understood as a great effort to translate this 
same doctrine, that is, the conciliar ecclesiology, into canonical language.  If, 
however, it is impossible to translate perfectly into canonical language the 
conciliar image of the Church, nevertheless, in this image there should always be 
found as far as possible its essential point of reference.186  
 
What the law is and is for within the church is always to be found within the communion 
ecclesiology of Vatican II.  Undeniably, it is a tremendous task to translate the 
theological work of the council into the canonical work of the Code.  When the event of 
the council had completed, nearly twenty years passed before the ecclesiological vision 
of the council took form in the Code.  One may even argue that the task of translation 
continues as conflicts in practice occur, theological thinking arises, and canonical 
decisions are made and interpreted.  
 2.6.3 Values in Moral Theology and Canon Law 
 Although treated only briefly above, questions about the meaning and purpose of 
ecclesiastical law are part of the movements of historical and systematic theology.  
Within these movements, the ecclesial discipline of canon law is an important dialogue 
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partner.  The organic connection between theology and canon law is even more apparent 
in moral theology, which is found within the movement of systematic theology.  While 
this relation has been described previously, some questions within the realms of moral 
theology and canon law remain. 
First, is there a difference between ‘goods’ and ‘values’?  If so, is it significant for 
moral theology and canon law?  Moral theologian, Joseph Selling, deems values to be a 
relational concept associated with the process of valuing and not suitable for canon law.  
Selling maintains, “That is, to refer to something as a value is to have made a judgment 
that an object of perception appears to exhibit certain qualities that are appropriate for 
responding to the needs or desires of specific persons in their cultural and historical 
context.”187  For Selling, valuing is a relational process that assesses the needs of a 
particular person or community, the qualities of the object perceived to be good, the 
capability of the person or community to appropriate the good, and the motivation of the 
person or community to reach out for the good.  Due to the complexity and specificity of 
this process, Selling believes that it is impossible for law to determine values for a 
community, much less for a person.  Selling states, “Law, in the strict sense, then, should 
be understood as promoting the good, rather than promulgating values.”188  Laws may 
promote things as “valuable,”189 meaning that something “might be considered good for 
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some (perhaps even the vast majority of) persons.”190  He holds that law cannot decide 
what is a value for all.  Selling concludes, 
Therefore, I believe that it is more fitting to restrict the role of law to designating 
that which is good and to allow free agents to decide if and whether they can and 
will reach out for those goods.  Simply “holding out” the good does not 
instantaneously create an obligation to realize that good.  In the end, law is never 
in a position to override the conscience of responsible moral agents.191  
 
Such a position upholds the primacy of conscience in canon law and moral discernment 
as Örsy has articulated already.  It is true, as Selling maintains, that “the mere designation 
of something as good will not necessarily move persons to initiate any activity 
specifically aimed at appropriating that good.”192  However, Örsy does not say that law 
overrides conscience or that holding out a value creates an obligation.  The source of 
obligation is always God, because God is the source of all that is good; reaching out for 
the good is essentially reaching out for God.  In that sense, appropriating the good is 
integral to our relationship with God.  The most basic moral obligation is to do good and 
avoid evil.  This is the principal dictate of conscience, where one is alone with God.  
Canonical norms “point to values and ‘order’ (direct) the community to take action to 
obtain them.”193  Canon law is an instrument to help the community intelligently reach 
out for the goods it should in order to grow in communion with God and God’s people.  
If the church community is not capable of living a law or motivated to act upon a law, 
then the law is not received.  Again, reception is crucial in the life of a law.  It seems that 
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one can use the terms, ‘values’ and ‘goods,’ interchangeably in canon law as long as one 
is referring to law that has been truly received by the community.  A law that has been 
received is a mutual acknowledgment by the lawgiver and the community that the law is 
an authentic and necessary instrument in helping the community become what it should, 
that it supports a true value for the ecclesial community.  Örsy does argue that the 
promulgation of a new law requires that “the values the law intends to uphold, should be 
explained.”194  Understanding is necessary for intelligent and free persons to be 
motivated to appropriate the good.  Helping the community to understand the good a law 
intends to promote is the joint work of theologians and canonists.  In this way, the 
community will recognize the good as a value and legitimately receive the law. 
Secondly, what kinds of values (or goods) are relevant to canon law?  Selling 
states that not all values are germane to canon law.  He infers from Örsy that the values 
relevant to moral theology concern the individual, while the values relevant to canon law 
concern the community.195  Whereas it seems inaccurate to claim that Örsy considers 
moral theology to be directed toward the growth and perfection of the individual alone, 
Örsy does state that the values supported by canon law have “social significance.”196  
Furthermore, Örsy asserts, “The initial search is for values, but with a restriction:  the 
legislator is interested in those values only which are necessary or useful for the welfare 
of the Christian community as community.”197  From this, it seems that all the values 
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canon law supports and protects have theological value for the community as a whole.  
However, ecumenist and theologian, J.M.R. Tillard, contends, “It would be absurd to say 
that each one of the canons or leges has theological relevance.”198  As an example of a 
true ordinatio, Tillard lists c. 211, “All the Christian faithful have the duty and right to 
work so that the divine message of salvation more and more reaches all people in every 
age and in every land.”  Obviously, this canon concerns duties and rights within the 
Christian community along with the mission of the church.  Tillard holds that although 
individual canons may not have theological relevance per se, lex ecclesiae is 
theologically significant as it “manifests the specific nature of the koinônia—the Church 
of God.”199  Certainly, it can be stated that some canons may not be properly named 
leges, because they have different literary forms; that being said, to declare the 
theological irrelevance of the majority of canons seems extreme.  If some canons are 
theologically irrelevant, why are they included in the Code?  Furthermore, what impact 
does that have on their reformability?  By what criteria does the church determine which 
are theologically relevant and which are not? 
2.6.4 Canon Law as Ministry 
 The final movement of fundamental practical theology is strategic practical 
theology where theological thinking culminates in questions and proposals for individual 
and social transformation in the concrete particularity of historical existence.  In this 
movement, canon law is most aptly described as a ministry.  Just as religious education, 
liturgics, and pastoral counseling are ministries of the church to build up the Kingdom of 
                                                 
198. Tillard, J.M.R., "Ecclesiology of Communion and Canon Law:  The Theological Task of 
Canon Law:  A Theologian's Perspective," CLSA Proceedings 58 (1996): 29. 
 
199. Ibid. 
82 
 
God, so also is canon law.  Canon law is an ecclesial science that can be studied, but 
more importantly it is a work of the church, something one does.  This is not to say that it 
is the same thing as practicing civil law.  Coriden asserts that the Latin ius canonicum is 
best translated “’the canonical system,’ the norms proper to the church,” because an 
ecclesial society is a significantly different reality than a civil society; therefore, law 
functions differently within each.200  The ultimate end of canon law corresponds to the 
ultimate end of the church itself—the salvation of souls.  Thomas Paprocki commenting 
on the final canon in the Code, c. 1752, intimates that the maxim, salus animarum 
suprema lex, can function as a hermeneutical key to the entire Code. “Just as the Latin 
language often places the most significant word at the end of a sentence for emphasis, the 
Latin Code of Canon Law puts its most important norm in the very last canon:  the 
salvation of souls is the highest law of the Church.”201  He goes on to assert that this 
supreme law of the church has its origins in Roman law as do so many other aspects of 
canon law.  ‘Salvation’ in Roman law may have referred to the safety or welfare of the 
people in Roman culture.202  Alternatively, ‘salvation’ in canon law has an explicit 
theological connotation further reinforcing the position that canonists are ministers in the 
church and the argument that theology and canon law are organically connected.  It is not 
necessary to state as firmly as Coriden does that “canons are not the same as laws.”203  
Not all canons are laws due to their literary form, but some do function as laws with 
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salvation as their ultimate end.  This line of reasoning leads to the question of the specific 
meaning of ‘salvation,’ an indisputably theological question. 
 Tillard provides an unambiguous response to the above question in his 
exploration of the theological task of canon law.  He prefaces his position by arguing that 
jus (right) ontologically precedes lex (law).  In other words, lex ecclesiae exists to 
promote and protect jus ecclesiae.  He affirms that jus ecclesiae is “jus salutis, or jus 
redemptionis, or jus divinae gratiae,” which is in agreement with c. 1752.204  Moreover, 
he specifies the nature of this jus by explicitly identifying the goal and fruit of salvation, 
redemption, and divine grace.  “This goal and fruit is the koinônia, rightly understood.  
For koinônia means inseparably the sharing in the fellowship within the divine trinitarian 
life, through participation in the reality of Christ, and subsequently the fellowship of all 
the baptized believers with one another.”205  This affirmation leads Tillard to conclude 
that “the jus ecclesiae has to be understood as a jus communionis.”206  In the application 
of canon law where law and life meet, the two fundamental values of the good of the 
individual and the common good need to be balanced.  Wijens declares that the 
polarization of the individual from the community creates a “false dilemma.”207  The 
need to properly balance the individual good with the common good in canon law is 
based upon a theological anthropology that situates authentic human fulfillment within 
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communal life.  John J. Coughlin expresses the role of canon law in advancing and 
guarding that harmonious balance between individual and communal goods: 
Canon law is intended to safeguard those social structures that set the optimal 
conditions in which the individual may discover fulfillment through participation 
and solidarity.  Canon law recognizes the natural human need for participation 
and solidarity as well as the spiritual desire for communion.  It attempts both to 
protect individual rights and articulate values that remain central to communal 
life.208  
 
The most fundamental mediating structure where this balance can be learned is the 
family.209  Canon law regarding marriage and family exists to ensure that each individual 
is born or adopted into a family where individual human dignity is affirmed within 
communal participation and solidarity.  Family is the place where that delicate balance is 
either helped or harmed.  Family is the most elemental social association where persons 
can discover that solidarity is possible and necessary to genuine human fulfillment.  
Based upon the writings of John Paul II, Coriden states that solidarity is “a measure of 
the people’s commitment to participate in the life of the community and to promote the 
common good.”210  Solidarity is a virtue acquired in the commitment to pursue the 
common good through recognition of the personal dignity of each and the responsibility 
of each to all.211 
 In order to balance individual and communal goods in the church, the ministry of 
canon law serves to protect and promote the primary values of freedom and order.  
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Freedom, which is vital to human dignity, is supported and shielded by this ministry.  
Coriden delineates the content and limits of freedom.212  Freedom means living in the 
freedom of Christ, a freedom that is personal, yet also corporate.  Living free in Christ is 
being free from sin and free to love.  Canon law helps to create a social environment in 
which this freedom can thrive.  This ministry protects religious freedom in order that 
persons follow Christ out of personal choice and not state coercion.  As previously 
mentioned, canon law protects the primacy of conscience.  For conscience to operate, it 
must be “formed,” “followed,” and “free.”213   The ministry of canon law serves the 
church by guiding the followers of Christ while respecting their powers of discretion and 
their gifts in discerning the Spirit’s movement in their lives.  In addition, canon law 
identifies the rights of individuals and local churches so that their freedom can be 
preserved.  Finally, freedom is promoted and protected through the canonical ministry 
when inculturation or contextualization is recognized and esteemed as a real need so as to 
allow the church to be a communion of communions.  Respecting the historical and 
cultural situatedness of the local church demonstrates a theological commitment to the 
freedom of the Incarnate Christ offered to every person in every land.  Protecting and 
promoting Christian freedom is essential to the very mission of the church.  After 
exploring the theological task of canon law, Örsy concludes, “Our ‘theological task’ is to 
create an environment of freedom where the people have access to the saving mysteries 
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and—more significantly—the unbounded mercy of God can reach the people.”214  This 
freedom is a necessary prerequisite for life to grow.215  
 Secondly, canonical ministry enables good order to exist in the ecclesial social 
body.  According to Örsy, canon law is a “necessary human instrument” to recover, 
establish, and maintain balance and order in the community.216  He presumes it self-
evident that no community can survive without good order.  It is the very nature of a 
living body, whether individual or social, to require order for proper functioning.  
Astutely, Örsy recognizes the perennial concept of taxis even within the divine 
community.  He states, “There is order even in the holy Trinity:  the Son proceeds from 
the Father, and the Spirit from the Father and the Son.”217  The church, Body of the 
Incarnate Christ, needs visible structures and stabilizing norms to continue throughout 
history.  It is spiritual and institutional, and as such, the church is an affirmation of the 
reality and goodness of the Incarnation.218   
 For freedom and good order to be present in the church, authority is necessary; 
that is to say, only a particular kind of authority is appropriate.  Authority in the church 
means not dominance, but service.  From even a cursory look at how Christ exercised His 
authority and power in the New Testament, Coriden confirms that “authority as service 
goes to the very essence of what power is within the church.”219  He notes that the term 
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“hierarchy,” which conjures up images of separation, rank, and supremacy, literally 
means “priestly rule” or “sacred authority.”220  Coriden laments the use of this non-
biblical term, a form of which is used only sparingly in the Code, to describe authority in 
the church.  Authority in the church is not reigning over but guiding with.  From the 
council, authority is understood as “collaborative and cooperative, making use of counsel, 
persuasion, and example, as well as sacred power.”221  For authority in the church to 
follow the trajectory of Jesus and His apostolic church, it must be participative.  Coriden 
claims the most genuine biblical forms of authority are “conciliar” or “synodal.”222   This 
form of government, leadership, and power reflects a communio ecclesiology.  The 
church, in all its particularity and distinctiveness, lives at the local level, and authority as 
participative allows the universal church to be a communion of communions.  In 
addition, authority as serving and participative underscores the irreplaceable vocation of 
each member of the church.  In general terms, the aforementioned participative character 
of authority is not easily challenged; however, the specific mode of this authority is a 
question of continued debate.   The central question of this debate concerns the necessity 
of ordination in exercising the sacred power of governance and the capacity of the laity to 
hold office.223 
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 Ecclesial authority understood as service and ministry to the whole community of 
faith provides a clear connection between the juridical structure of the church and the 
moral life of the church.  Örsy argues, “In fact, in many ways canon law supports the 
moral life of the community.”224  Canon law is an instrument of those in charge of 
pastoral care of the church to ensure that all are able to live in communion, that the 
church is a just community.  Thus, canon law serves as a ‘guarantor’ that justice is 
preserved and promoted in the church.  A just community is a morally good community, 
one in which each member is free and able to flourish and to grow.  In a just community, 
each member shares proportionately in the burdens and benefits of the common good, 
and structures are in place to encourage continuing personal conversion and social 
transformation.  Canonical norms received by the church and freely implemented could 
be described as the “minimum of charity.”225  Örsy expounds, 
If laws are for the well-being of the community, as they should be, then all laws, 
secular and religious, are more than justice.  They are manifestations of the love 
that the scholastics called amor benevolentiae, “love that wants to give” or “love 
that wants to enrich the other.”  Virtues do not exclude each other; they blend and 
integrate into increasingly higher units.  Thus justice becomes love.  Justice could 
be defined as the minimum of charity.226  
 
Canon law provides the minimum standards and structures the church requires in order to 
become a just and loving community, because law is the minimum demand of love.  
Conversely, canon law should be evaluated based upon the extent to which it does (or 
does not) build the church into a more just and loving community. 
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 Canon law can be described as an instrument supporting the moral life of the 
church, but the question of whether or not a juridical context is best for moral, spiritual, 
and sacramental concerns is a legitimate one.  In fact, Örsy makes “a practical proposal” 
for the future.227  As mentioned previously, the Code contains different literary forms, 
only some of which are strictly legal norms (right and duty situations).  In addition to 
other forms, the Code contains spiritual and moral exhortations that Örsy deems more 
suitable for moral theology rather than canon law.  Therefore, he proposes, 
There could be a “code” for strictly right and duty situations, such as legal 
relationships concerning contracts, properties, offices, etc.; and there could be a 
“Book of Christian Way of Life” exhorting the faithful to show their unity with 
the community by the devotional reception of the sacraments and by the 
observance of holy days and seasons.228  
 
The judgment as to whether or not this proposal is indeed practical or advantageous is 
beyond the scope of this study; however, it is worth noting that such a task would require 
the dedication and expertise of canonists, theologians, philosophers, anthropologists, 
psychologists, and historians, that is, experts in their fields from both the hierarchy and 
the laity.  With or without the actualization of Örsy’s proposal, the ongoing critical 
evaluation and reform of the human instrument of canon law is a premise beyond 
refutation.   
 Canon law within the movement of strategic practical theology necessitates 
collaborative creativity.  This is a fundamental premise in accord with the council’s 
communion ecclesiology.  The very concrete and differentiated nature of strategic 
practical theology requires that it be done in critical conversation with many experts.  
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Wijlens concludes her study on the relationship between theology and canon law by 
stating, “At the end of this study we should be able to see how theologians and canon 
lawyers must work together:  they have no other option.”229  Such collaborative creativity 
among experts presupposes the conversion and commitment outlined by Örsy previously.  
In order to interpret and evaluate canonical norms justly, canonists should have 
knowledge of other fields.  Wijlens asserts, “The broader the field of vision of a canon 
lawyer (theology, philosophy, psychology, etc.), the more he or she sees.”230  Such a 
broadening of the canonist’s horizon can occur when there is organized and continual 
collaboration among many experts.  Canonist Thomas Green concurs,  
If the revised Code is to be an effective salvific instrument, it must be 
implemented responsibly and creatively.  This task involves not merely canonists 
but also theologians, other scholars, and pastoral leaders at every level of the 
Church.  Only serious and sustained interaction between them will enable the 
revised Code to serve the Church’s legal-pastoral life authentically.231  
 
Such sustained interaction should include both the hierarchy and the laity.  Örsy argues 
that although ordination gives the power to rule, potestas regiminis, it does not 
automatically confer learning or prudence.232  Purposeful interaction among the ordained, 
the non-ordained, theologians, canonists, scholars, pastoral ministers, and the faithful is 
needed at every level of government within the church.  Örsy notes, “In the church of 
Christ no member can stand and function alone; there is an interdependence among the 
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organs as there is in one human body.  Should this needed interchange be neglected, the 
whole body is bound to suffer.”233  
 An archetype of this sustained interaction is the Peter and Paul Seminar, founded 
by Ladislas Örsy in 1998 to further ecumenical concerns through dialogue between 
canonists and theologians.234  Örsy’s plan for the Peter and Paul Seminar was based on 
the work of the Groupe des Dombes, which is a group of pastors and theologians from 
French speaking Europe of the Reformed, Lutheran, and Catholic traditions committed to 
conversion and Christian unity.  The Peter and Paul Seminar continues the ecumenical 
commitment of the Groupe by scrutinizing the canonical structures of the church to see 
how they may or may not serve the church’s theological vision of Christian unity.  
Wijlens describes the method of the seminar, which serves here as an exemplary model 
of how canon law within the movement of strategic practical theology should operate: 
Methodologically, it becomes clear that a cooperation of experts in the history of 
theology and institutions, of systematic theologians and of canon lawyers (the 
membership of ‘Peter and Paul Seminar’ comprises exactly that!) is required.  
Systematic theologians will identify, through critical theological reflection, those 
institutions which stand in need of reform.  With respect to the identified 
institutions, historians will assist in determining what kinds of modalities have 
been developed in the history of the Christian tradition to implement specific 
theological concepts and ideas.  They (historians) along with theologians and 
canonists will seek to distinguish what belongs to the core of a certain institution 
from the modalities that are shaped and determined by historical and cultural 
circumstances.  Canon lawyers will propose how current institutions might thus 
be reformed in such a way that they better serve the appropriation of the 
theological vision.235  
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Further strengthening two critical elements of practical theology mentioned previously, 
Wijlens emphasizes how the work of the seminar requires personal conversion and 
interdisciplinary cooperation among experts.236  The Peter and Paul Seminar 
demonstrates concretely how the church can move from vision to action while 
exemplifying the communio ecclesiology which is central to the vision itself.  Practical 
concerns determine its work from beginning to end as each uses one’s personal gifts and 
proficiencies to contribute to the common good. 
 Within the movement of strategic practical theology, canon law operates as its 
own ecclesial science yet naturally entwined with all the previous movements of 
theology.  Canon law is a science and ministry in which theological data finds specific 
social-structural and historical form.  This “particularizing” role of canon law demands a 
finesse born from personal conversion from its ministers.  The difficulty and delicacy of 
formulating, interpreting, and implementing theological data into concrete, unambiguous 
norms require conversion, prudence, creativity, and humility.  In many ways canonical 
ministry resembles the Incarnation in which the ethereal, pure, eternal, and ambient 
becomes tangible, contingent, determinate, and contained.  The analogy is imperfect, but 
pointed.  Although both theology and canon law contain divine and human elements, 
canon law is acutely human as its theological kernel is positioned within the particularity 
of space and time conditioned life.  Moreover, canon law’s hermeneutics for restriction, 
as explained by Örsy, demand piercing clarity and directed order for action.  Certainly 
such a task presupposes a humility characteristic of the Incarnation, an openness to the 
good being received.  Canon law authentically received and implemented by the church 
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as communio allows freedom for the people to receive God’s gifts and for God to give 
unimpeded.  The question of reception within a communion ecclesiology is essential to 
the relation of theology to canon law.   
Writing shortly after the promulgation of the Code, Green urges canonists and 
other scholars to take into consideration the theological significance of reception in the 
life of a law.237  He warns that theological development can be precipitately stunted when 
a legislative response is given before a theological question has time to be explored.  
Green notes, 
A concern of some critics of the original sacramental law schema especially was 
its tendency to legislate answers to widely controverted and still unresolved 
theological, pastoral, and canonical questions.  This seemed premature and not 
conducive to judicious legal norms genuinely serviceable to the community.  One 
may sympathize with the Commission’s continuing reluctance to deal with such 
complex issues as the relevance of faith to a genuinely sacramental union, the 
meaning of the dissolution/dispensation of the marriage bond, and the legitimacy 
of significant liturgical adaptation to different cultures, traditions, and spiritual 
needs.  However, it is unfortunate that the Commission has generally chosen 
simply to reaffirm the existing discipline in these and other problem areas.238   
 
If the Code is to be the final document of the council, it needs to be interpreted and 
evaluated within a communion ecclesiology, an understanding of the church in which all 
people have access to the mysteries and the ability to participate in the development not 
only of doctrine but also of canon law.  As the theological understanding of the truths of 
faith and morals develops and refines, canon law should develop and change as well.  
Should the church’s understanding of the “theological kernel” of the mysteries of faith 
advance, then its particularization in the structures and norms of the church must be 
reformed to be true to the one operation of the church moving from vision to action.  
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Örsy concludes his chapter on implementation through reception by stating, “It follows 
that by this sense of faith, God’s people can penetrate the laws by accurate insights and 
apply them correctly to life.  When this happens, the law is received in the 
community.”239  The state of flux and conflict in marriage and family practices suggests 
that the time is ripe for greater theological reflection on the theological vision of 
sacramental marriage.  After exploring this vision and the theological questions 
surrounding it, it is possible to probe whether this vision is adequately supported by 
canonical norms and structures or whether the fullness of the vision is stifled by these 
same structures and norms.  Ultimately the Code should be an instrument to help 
implement the ecclesiological vision of the Second Vatican Council, the novus habitus 
mentis, which is dynamic not static, open not defensive, and conciliar not dictatorial.  
Theological questions regarding the marital sacrament and interpersonal commitment 
along with canonical norms concerning marital consent should be considered and 
correlated within the higher viewpoint of church as communio. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
MARRIAGE AS SACRAMENT 
 
 
3.1 Symbolic Action 
 
 
 So as not to digress from the present purpose, the conclusions of historical and 
systematic theologians regarding the meaning of sacrament can be given at the outset. 
The seven sacraments delineated today are symbolic actions that reveal and make present 
the risen Christ in the lives of his faithful community, the church.  Throughout salvation 
history, seven sacraments have been identified and acknowledged as guaranteed or 
promised manifestations of the work of Christ.  The sacraments do not negate the fact 
that Christ can reveal Himself anywhere; they simply affirm and make present different 
aspects of the paschal mystery throughout the life cycle.  Through these symbolic actions, 
Christ is given to the church and received in faith.  Ultimately, the work of Christ has 
always been to create communion between humans and God, who is perfect Communion 
as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.   
Due to our capacity to reach beyond ourselves in knowledge and love, humans 
can be liberated from isolation and egocentricity through symbols.  Humans are “symbol-
making and symbol-using beings.”1  Etymologically, the Greek origins of the word 
“symbol” connote two realities being “thrown together” or united.2  The symbol unites 
the known with the unknown and the visible with the invisible.  Because we are visible 
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and invisible, body and spirit, we exist symbolically and make ourselves present to others 
through the use of symbols.  Our human bodies are themselves symbolic.  George 
Worgul explains, “Your body, as a symbol, is an agent for the unity of you as a person.  
In and through your body, the disparate elements of your unique reality converge to form 
a whole.”3  As symbolic beings, we use symbolic gestures, actions, and behaviors to 
express who we are and to reach out to others.  Our existing symbolically means we have 
the capacity for love and community. 
We have a need to behave sacramentally, symbolically, and ritualistically 
precisely because we are human.  In other words, sacramental behavior, which is 
symbolic and ritualistic, conforms to our being human.  From a strictly anthropological 
position, ritual, which is “fundamentally a bundle of symbols,” is the primary vehicle for 
the social diffusion of a culture’s root metaphor.4  The root metaphor of a culture gives 
meaning to the many ambiguous experiences of its members.  When the root metaphor is 
at work, life is meaningful and coherent.  Adherence to this root metaphor can provide 
positive meaning to life’s negative experiences, which in turn helps to maintain the 
survival of the culture.  For the Christian community, the root metaphor is the death and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ.  Through the use of this metaphor, death which is the 
ultimate ambiguous experience is resolved and overcome by the resurrection of Jesus and 
the hope of His coming again.  Through ritualized action, the paschal mystery is 
expressed, made present, and transmitted to all members of the church.  Ritual is 
interpersonal, repetitive, and purposeful behavior that expresses the very identity of the 
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culture and connects it with its origins.5  The sacraments as rituals socially transmit and 
intimately express the fundamental identity of the Christian community.  As Lisa Sowle 
Cahill explains, sacraments “ritualize basic experiences which give definition to the life 
cycle (birth, growth, marriage, social vocation, death) and to daily existence (food, 
forgiveness).”6  In and with one’s church community, life is meaningful, directional, and 
hopeful for Christians, because Christ died and rose again.   
The sacraments are ritual celebrations of the church community.  They celebrate 
and make present something real.  In and through the celebration, the “reality-event” is 
expressed and deepened.7  Sacramental behavior must occur within a real faith context 
which presupposes the existence of the reality-event.  The sacraments are communal 
celebrations of the real presence of Christ.  This presence presupposes a real relationship 
with Christ.  Sacramental celebrations are symbolic activities of the church that continue 
the work of Christ which is to bring about union with God.  Through the sacraments, 
which begin in ritualized action, God uses sensate human actions to provide a setting and 
situation where divine friendship and reconciliation are offered.8  Worgul states, “In its 
sacramental activity the Church becomes what it was meant to be i.e., the historical 
presence of Christ in the world offering the Father’s love to humankind.”9  Sacramental 
behavior celebrated in faith effects grace, which is ultimately the possibility of and 
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capacity for union with the triune God.  Utilizing the classic Latin Thomistic phrases, 
Worgul articulates how the sacraments are truly communal celebrations in faith that 
effect grace: 
As ecclesial celebrations of faith, communal dimensions permeate the sacraments.  
Their performance (sacramentum tantum) establishes or intensifies an 
individual’s relationship to or status within (res et sacramentum) the people called 
Church.  Sacraments affect membership and specify an individual’s community 
role.  Sacraments are a medium or vehicle through which God offers his love and 
life (res tantum) to humankind.10  
 
Through participation in these visible symbolic actions, one’s membership in the church 
community is realized or changed so that deeper communion with God occurs. 
 
3.2 Biblical Foundations of Marriage as Sacrament 
 
 
 3.2.1 Old Testament and Covenant 
 The origins of all the sacraments can be found in the earthly ministry of Jesus 
revealed in Scripture.  Before considering specific sacramental behavior related to 
marriage and how marriage is a medium of grace, the biblical foundations of marriage as 
sacrament need to be outlined.  As this task has been worked by biblical exegetes and 
theologians throughout the centuries, this will be only a cursory look at key texts which 
have been and will continue to be decisive in interpreting what it means that marriage is a 
sacrament. 
 The earliest and most basic biblical theme essential to understanding marriage as 
sacrament is covenant.  The Hebrew Scriptures cohere in the covenant God established 
with the Israelites.  It was the Israelites’ experience of their covenant with God in its 
formation, violation, and restoration that shaped their very identity.  Genesis, the first 
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book of the salvation story, begins in the creation of everything in the context of 
covenant.  Genesis 2-3, the earlier of the creation stories, explains in literary myth the 
vast difference between the good intentions of God that all live in right relationship, 
including men and women, and the sad reality begun by humans of discord and fractured 
relationships.  Creation began in relationships of trust, care, and fidelity – covenant.  The 
first man was placed in the garden to care for it, and a suitable partner was given him.11  
In “the nuptial presentation of the bride,” the first man is ecstatic as he recognizes one 
who is other yet equal.12  His loneliness is resolved in her.  As Edward Schillebeeckx 
comments, the woman as man’s helper and partner becomes a “means of refuge and 
support.”13  The woman is called “helper” not as a reflection of the servile status of 
women in that time and culture, but rather as a reflection of the way in which God is our 
helper, one on whom we can lean and find safety.14  God intended that all of creation live 
in interdependent care with man and woman united as servant leaders; this is an 
environment in which God can freely walk about as the breeze blows.15  Theodore 
Mackin explicitly points out the coalescence of these relationships.  “In the beginning and 
according to God’s plan the man and woman were to be most intimate physical and 
emotional partners.  They were meant to live in a covenant of trust.  Living together in 
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this way they were to live also in the intimate friendship of God.”16  Their ability to live 
in solidarity and peace is dependent upon their obedience to God, to refrain from tasting, 
knowing, and experiencing that which is forbidden.  Mackin interprets God’s command 
regarding the forbidden fruit to mean that the first humans “accept the human limitations 
of their experience, of their wisdom and their freedom.”17  Schillebeeckx adds that by 
listening to the serpent, which represented the fertility rites of the ancient world, Adam 
and Eve “dissociated marriage from the hûqqôth, the divinely appointed limits of 
creation.”18  With their loss of trust in God and reliance upon their own ways independent 
of God, the man and woman “entered on a history of sin.”19  With sin came blame and 
shame, and here the subservient situation of woman is interpreted to be a consequence 
and punishment for her role in the sin of the world.20 
 In the creation stories, the laws, the prophetic books, and wisdom literature, God’s 
covenantal relationship with his people is foremost.  Their experiences are interpreted 
through the lens of covenantal love.  The religious creation poem of Genesis 1 affirms the 
goodness of human beings as male and female, so much so that they are called imago 
Dei.21  The designation of them as imago Dei is to differentiate human beings from the 
other animals of creation.  Although many theories abound regarding how humans are 
made in the image and likeness of God, R.N. Whybray asserts their distinction is 
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probably in the human’s “unique capacity to communicate meaningfully with God” or to 
serve as God’s representatives in caring for the rest of creation.22   Both male and female 
are fully and equally made in the image of God.  Gareth Moore argues, “The great dignity 
which God bestows on people is not limited to the male.  In this, the greatest gift which 
we possess, there is no distinction between male and female.”23  To say that male and 
female are complementary does not mean that one completes the other but rather “that 
they go well together, enhancing each other and forming a satisfying whole” “like 
strawberries and cream.”24  Immediately following the declaration of their being made in 
God’s image is the duty of the couple to populate the earth and care for all of it.  From 
the beginning, generativity and care are integral to covenantal life.  This is evident in 
God’s covenant with Abraham and the instances in which God brings forth new life in 
what seems to be impossible situations, namely the stories of Sarah, Rebecca, Rachel, 
stretching forth to Elizabeth and Mary.25  The Mosaic Law is itself the human response to 
divine promise beginning with Abraham.  The various sets of laws in the Hebrew 
Scriptures were needed to direct the people so that they might live in right relationship 
with God and one another.  Many of the laws contain proscriptions and commands 
regarding marriage and sexuality.  Natalie Kertes Weaver states, “Marriage and sexual 
integrity, then, were seen as extensions of the covenant between God and people as well 
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as a place where that covenant should be lived out.”26  The prophets used the example of 
human marriage to reveal both hope and fidelity in the people’s covenant with God and 
betrayal and forgiveness.  Real human marriages offered a comparison with God’s 
covenantal love, the former disclosing both how the God-human relationship ought to be 
and how it really is.  Schillebeeckx describes human marriage as “the prism through 
which the prophets saw the saving covenant of God with his people.”27  Such faithful 
human love could only be sustained within the divine covenant allowing those who 
witness their love to see God’s presence and activity within their relationship.28  The 
wisdom literature offers practical instructions for living as God’s people.  Many of those 
instructions contain advice for the married, since marriage was central to Jewish life and 
the primary way to enter the covenant.  Instructions are directed toward men, and women 
are viewed as “objects of passion, of admiration, of care, of gratitude, of caution, of 
suspicion, of contempt.”29  Such passages glaringly reveal the historical situatedness of 
the Scriptures and the need for careful exegesis.  In contrast, the Song of Songs celebrates 
the beauty and joy of sexual longing and love.  Throughout much of history, this poem 
was interpreted as an allegory disclosing God’s love for Israel and Christ’s love for the 
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church, but in origin the poem evokes images of consuming erotic passion that yearns to 
be permanent.30  
 The theme of covenant in the Old Testament lays the foundation for marriage 
understood as sacrament in Christian history.  Acknowledging how the reality of human 
marriage falls short of the ideal of covenantal love, Weaver gleans three aspects of 
marriage as covenant from the Old Testament.  First, marriage is both a created and a 
sacred reality.  It is not a participation in the divine in the way the fertility cults regarded 
sexuality, but rather a gift from God and a medium through which to experience God’s 
love.  Second, covenantal love is active and faithful.  It is something one does.  Its 
presence can be seen in concrete behaviors that demonstrate forgiveness, patience, and 
constancy.  Third, covenantal love is unconditional and indissoluble.  Weaver expounds, 
Covenants involve the whole person, and the measure of the person’s character in 
a covenanted relationship is the sincerity and commitment one brings to 
upholding the relationship.  As covenant relationships largely define human 
beings, they cannot be rejected without causing permanent damage to the persons 
rejecting them.  In this sense covenants are indissoluble, for they involve the 
entire character and identity of the persons involved.31  
 
The origins of marriage as sacrament begin in the biblical stories of God’s covenantal 
love for Israel, continue in Jesus’ instructions regarding marriage in the gospels, and 
develop in the Pauline tradition. 
 3.2.2 New Testament and Family 
 As previously discussed, the example of human marriage presents similarity in 
difference with the divine-human relationship throughout the Scriptures.  The covenant 
God initiated with the Israelites reaches its culmination in Jesus Christ.  God’s desire to 
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be one with humanity is literally incarnated in his Son.  The human marital relationship 
serves as a sign of how God loves his people.  Walter Kasper describes it in this way.  
“Marriage, then, is the grammar that God uses to express his love and faithfulness.  This 
covenant between God and humanity is realized in a definitive and unsurpassable way in 
Jesus Christ, who is in person God’s covenant with human beings.”32  Human marriage 
points to God’s covenant with his people serving as a symbol of faithful, fruitful, 
permanent love. 
 The divorce and remarriage texts of the synoptic gospels express Jesus’ posture 
toward marriage as interpreted by the first Christian communities.  Although these texts 
have many differences, one can safely conclude that Jesus refused to tolerate divorce.  
Luke 16:18 is the shortest of the anti-divorce texts, while the Marcan text and one in 
Matthew place the sayings within a controversy with the Pharisees.33  The controversy 
surrounds the proper interpretation of Deuteronomy 24:1.  The Pharisees are testing Jesus 
to see if he teaches according to the Law of Moses regarding divorce or if he contradicts 
it.  In response, Jesus places the argument on an entirely new plane and refers back to 
God’s intention from the beginning of creation.  The law is a concession to their hardness 
of heart, whereas the creation stories express God’s saving intention of covenantal love.  
Dale Allison states, “Jesus does not undo Deuteronomy 24:1 but rather distinguishes the 
perfect will of God from the commandments which reflect human sinfulness.”34  Jesus, 
aware of their hardness of heart, transcends the law knowing that the only way this is 
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possible is through his own saving love.  Kasper understands Jesus’ anti-divorce saying 
to be a “prophetic and messianic statement, an affirmation of salvation and grace.”35  
According to Jesus’ teachings, marriage belongs to God’s creation and salvation. 
 Jesus’ pro-marriage ethic is contextualized within his many teachings regarding 
the equality of all in the Body of Christ.  The anti-family strain in Jesus’ teachings points 
to the “penultimate value” of human sexuality and marriage.36  From the accounting in 
Luke of Jesus’ separation from his parents in the temple to the story in Mark of his 
relatives attempting to remove him from the crowds, Jesus clearly teaches the priority of 
spiritual bonds of faith over basic family loyalties.37  Further in Luke, with parallels in 
Matthew, Jesus promotes what Julie Hanlon Rubio terms “an extreme family-denying 
ethic.”38  Jesus proclaims, “Let the dead bury their dead,” and “If anyone comes to me 
without first hating his father and mother, wife and children, brothers and sisters, and 
even his own life, he cannot be my disciple.”39  While the harsh tone of such biblical 
texts may make the contemporary reader cringe, Lisa Sowle Cahill places them within the 
context of the dominant first-century Palestinian family where fidelity to patriarchal 
structures reinforced and advanced social and material inequality among people.  She 
explains, “Loyalty to one’s own group and dedication to the status of that group over all 
others and at the expense of whoever stands in its way are incompatible with a life of 
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mercy, service, and compassion for the neighbor in need or for the social outcasts and the 
poor existing on the margins of society.”40  Rather than embodying patriarchal biological 
structures, families are to be restructured based upon the belief that all are equal in Christ 
and discipleship comes first if conflict between faith and family should occur.  One’s 
biological family must not reign as an idol.41  The new kind of family that Jesus espouses 
is one in which all are united who seek to do the will of God.42  Santiago Guijarro argues 
that there is not a consensus among scholars regarding Jesus’ attitude toward the family, 
and the view that Jesus directly attacked the family to destabilize patriarchy is only one 
view, one that he does not hold.43   
 Guijarro places the contrast between the biblical texts that have a more positive 
evaluation of the family and the anti-familial strain within the context of leadership in the 
Jesus movement.  He contends that Jesus was the leader of a peasant mass movement, in 
which most of the members of the movement came from the peasantry but the leader 
came from another social class, particularly with greater mobility (e.g. an artisan).  
According to Guijarro, it would have been self-defeating for Jesus to directly attack the 
family, because the family was the main source of identity.  However, Jesus did ask his 
closest disciples to break ties with family.  Guijarro explains that the breaking of family 
ties was “a prophetic action coherent with the image of a God who is beside the poor and 
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needy and accompanies those who are victims of injustice.”44  In this way, the breaking 
of family ties was a condition for leadership in the movement.  Jesus’ close group of 
disciples then formed a “surrogate family, in which they could find support, protection 
and identity.”45  Jesus then sent his disciples into households “to announce the good news 
of the kingdom through healing and open table-fellowship.”46  He continues, “The 
purpose of this commissioning was to reconstruct society from its roots, recreating in its 
basic cells, the household, the traditional values of solidarity and hospitality and 
establishing in them new relationships of brotherhood and sisterhood.”47  In this way, the 
anti-family strain originates from Jesus urging his closest disciples to join in leadership, 
and the pro-family strain comes from this Jesus’ new surrogate family (and the 
households that accepted Jesus’ message).  Guijarro concludes that “there exists a 
fundamental continuity in this respect between the pre-Easter and the post-Easter periods 
of the early Christian movement.”48  Carolyn Osiek states something similar, “The 
boundaries of kinship are not removed but reset.  Those who will fulfill the role of true 
family members are those bound together not so much by blood or social structures as by 
Baptism and Eucharist.”49  The two strains regarding the family can coalesce in the New 
Testament , because “family is not abolished but extended.”50 
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“Pro-family” and “anti-family” biblical texts are found in the Pauline corpus as 
well.  In 1 Corinthians 7, Paul defends the goodness and necessity of marriage while at 
the same time clearly acknowledging his preference for celibacy, not only for himself but 
also for everyone.51  This preference could be attributed to the eschatological belief that 
the end is imminent. However, one does not need to believe that the end of the world is 
looming to embrace the moral virtue of singleness of heart.52  Not even biological and 
marital family loyalties should distract one from pursuing the Kingdom of God.  Yet in 
what seems to be an utter contradiction, Paul teaches that an unbeliever can be made holy 
through marriage to a believer.53  In other words, rather than being an obstacle to 
holiness, marriage can be a means to holiness.  In reference to this text, Mackin laments, 
“It is regrettable in light of our search for the earliest elements of sacramentality in 
marriage that Paul says no more exactly what he means here by the Christian spouses’ 
sanctifying the pagan.”54 This text forms the basis for the Pauline Privilege, which allows 
the Christian spouse to remarry if the unbelieving spouse departs.55  Schillebeeckx 
believes this text is “the strongest biblical basis for the sacramental aspect of marriage.”56  
He contends that through the faith and baptism of the Christian spouse the marriage is 
implicitly related to Christ.  Only an explicit refusal of the faith, signified by the 
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departure of the unbeliever, can dissolve the marriage.  During apostolic times, children 
born from the marriage of two Christian parents were not baptized, because through birth 
alone they were “baptized in the baptism of their parents, who formed the Christian 
environment into which the children were accepted and incorporated.”57  Any theology of 
the sacrament of marriage must contain the biblical foundations of family seeking the 
will of God, which is that all be one in Christ.  What appear to be pro-family and anti-
family strains in the New Testament are simply examples of the penultimate value of 
marriage, which is to serve the primary value of becoming one in Christ.  Stephen Post 
argues, “Salvation within Christianity is not dependent on the continuation of a biological 
lineage.  One need not be married and a parent to enter the kingdom of God.”58  
Christianity embraces the theological concept of salvation through adoption.59  All are 
welcome into God’s family where incorporation occurs through faith and baptism and 
hospitality is central. 
 The biblical text which has served as the unparalleled source for the theology of 
the sacrament of marriage is Ephesians 5:21-33.  The first three chapters of Ephesians 
explain God’s plan for salvation through Christ’s death and resurrection so that all will be 
one in Christ. The language is primarily doxology and prayer.  These chapters provide the 
“theological warrant” for the final three chapters of instruction and exhortation.60  
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Ephesians 5:21-33 “is constructed on the framework of a table of rules for good 
management of the household.”61  Since the family was of primary political and 
economic importance in the ancient world, household management was a concern.  Such 
an ethical code of household management was not remarkable in the ancient world; 
however, in this text “the conventional is transformed by the Christian sense that all 
relationships have to be lived ‘in the Lord’ and with unselfish, sacrificial love of Christ as 
the pattern and inspiration.”62  The patriarchal tone of the text reflects the rule of the 
paterfamilias of the time, but for households that are ‘in the Lord’ this rule cannot be 
total and unqualified.  J.D.G. Dunn asserts that the Christian marital relationship occurs 
“within the primary context of mutual discipleship (cf. Mk 10: 42-5).”63  Carolyn Osiek 
points out that whereas other household codes of the era were addressed to the 
paterfamilias because he was to rule all members of the house—wife, children, and 
slaves—this passage addresses the wife first, thus asserting her personal worth.64  The 
similarity the author of Ephesians sees between human marriage and the Christ-church 
relationship is found in the loving service and mutual giving way of family members.  
Christ is the model of love.  Although much debate and controversy has been triggered by 
the “submission” of women in marriage from this text, Osiek contends, “The Ephesians 
passage is not primarily about marriage, however, but about the church, as is the whole 
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epistle, whose major theme is the reconciliation of Jewish and Gentile Christians in their 
common faith in Christ.”65  Referring to the parallel between the husband-wife 
relationship and the Christ-Church relationship, Dunn maintains, 
It is true that the placing of the relationship of husband and wife parallel to that of 
Christ and church (5:23-4) seems to set the wife in an intrinsically inferior status 
(cf. 1 Cor 11:3).  But that again reflects the ethos of the time (the marital law 
which treated wives as the property of their husbands was only changed in Britain 
in the 19th cent.).  And the main thrust of what follows is clearly intended to 
transfuse and transform that given relationship with the love of Christ.  The 
paradigm for the husband is Christ as lover and savior, not as lord and master.66 
 
Christ’s headship essentially means service and unity.  The head-body analogy is used to 
highlight the kind of sacrificial love that imbues Christ’s relationship with the church and 
the absurdity of the idea of one being without the other.  This kind of unity, sacrifice, and 
mutuality ought to characterize human marriage in Christ.  Mackin contends, “The intent 
is to bring the Christian spouses to understand how they ought to love and treat one 
another because they are impelled by the Spirit—love and treat one another in a way that 
may realize the mystérion that is God’s bringing reconciliation through Christ.”67   
Michael Lawler identifies the key elements of a conjugal spirituality and a theology of 
Christian ministry from the use of marriage as a prophetic symbol in Ephesians 5:21-33.  
This covenant is characterized by mutual giving way, mutual service, and steadfast and 
faithful love.68  He states, “Christian marriage is indissoluble because Christian love is 
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steadfast and faithful.  Indissolubility is a quality of Christian marriage because it is, first, 
a quality of Christian love.”69 
 The question may be raised whether the idea of headship is necessary for a 
biblical understanding of marriage.  Maggie Gallagher explains that the idea of male 
headship was assumed indispensable for thousands of years in patriarchal societies, 
because the family was the primary unit of production under the rule of a head in much 
the same way today corporations are the primary means of production under a CEO.70  
Presumably, male headship in the family served to ensure conformity and organization 
for the common good.  Gallagher queries, “One challenge to standard feminist discourse 
about the family, then, becomes this:  why is it that submission to husbands is now almost 
universally regarded as degrading to women while submission to corporate presidents is 
not?”71  That being said, if the family needed a head, why must it be limited to men?  In 
addition, when the economic function of family has so dramatically changed, is headship 
even necessary?  Could it be detrimental to the institution of marriage considering the 
history of misogynistic practices?  The idea of male headship carries with it untold and 
innumerable stories of the unjust treatment of women and the exploitation of their labors.  
Carolyn Osiek contends,  
An overly literal interpretation of any biblical text out of context can lead to an 
impoverishment of symbols.  An over-identification of the analogy of the husband 
as head of wife and Christ as head of church is no exception.  When a symbol or 
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metaphor becomes fixed and no longer points beyond itself, it loses its power to 
reveal the mystery of God.72  
 
In changed cultural and economic circumstances, the similarity between human marriage 
and the Christ-church relationship is found less in the idea of headship and more in the 
understanding of mutual love and service which bring about unity in the Spirit.  In 
addition, the parallel between Christ as head of the church and husband as head of the 
family should be a charge to husbands that more self-sacrifice is demanded of them.  If 
the head-body analogy holds, then the husband must be willing to die for the spouse.   
 
3.3 Historical Development of Marriage as Sacrament 
 
 
 3.3.1 Patristic Era 
 In the first centuries following the death and resurrection of Christ, most 
Christians married according to local customs and did so before conversion.  Marriage 
was a familial celebration and sacred duty with the purpose of producing children and 
procuring economic security.  The father or male guardian, as head of the household 
possessing all legal rights and property, was the natural authority over marriage.  
Marriages were created by the two fathers, in agreement with their wives, consenting to 
the union of their children.  A bride price and dowry were exchanged and the bride was 
ritually and legally transferred from the authority and house of her father to that of her 
husband.  Although in Roman society a girl of the marriageable age of twelve could 
choose to be legally free and marry whom she wanted, the usual wedding custom 
included the handing over of the bride, which still continues to date.  By the second or 
third centuries these secular wedding rituals survived primarily for patrician families.  
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For the matrimonium liberum, the free marriage, three elements created a marriage 
without paperwork, formal legalities, or even a traditional ceremony.  These elements 
included:  connubium (a citizen’s right to marry), maritalis affectio (the desire and will to 
be married to one another), and the external manifestation of this affectio through 
reciprocal consent.73  It was not until the fourth or fifth centuries that a priest or bishop 
gave his blessing, or approval, to the newly married.  Schillebeeckx maintains, “The first 
evidence that we have of a nuptial mass with a priestly solemnization of marriage 
contracted civilly and in the family dates from the fourth and fifth centuries, in the 
Roman church.”74  In fact, it was not until the eighth century that liturgical weddings in 
churches became common, although not universal.   In the eastern empire, the priest’s 
blessing was critical for sacramental marriage, a practice which continues in the 
Orthodox Church today. 
 In the patristic era, ambiguity characterized the relationship between marriage and 
Christianity.  Early on, Christians had to reconcile marriage, which suggested 
permanency and rootedness, with their belief in an imminent eschatology.  Another 
source of such ambiguity was the complexity of Gnostic teaching and other philosophies 
hostile toward marriage.  Although it is more accurate to refer to heterodox Gnostic 
teachings rather than one unified system, Gnostic philosophies in general embraced an 
ontological dualism in which all that is earthly, material, and corporeal was considered 
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evil.  Jaroslav Pelikan summarizes, “Each in its own way, the Gnostic systems all 
included a diagnosis of the cosmological descent of the human spirit into matter and 
sin.”75  Consequently, marriage and procreation, being bodily, were evil for the ascetic 
Gnostics and worthless for the antinomian Gnostics.76  The orthodox Christian reply to 
these teachings was to emphasize the natural purpose and legitimation of marriage, which 
was procreation.  The earliest hints of the future recognition of the sacramentality of 
marriage can be found in the pastoral care given toward the married, the emergence of 
elements of the wedding liturgy, the belief that God offers graces to Christian spouses, 
and the unfolding exegesis of Ephesians 5.77  Despite these early suggestions that 
marriage can be a means to holiness, the belief pervaded that “marriage is the default 
vocation of the weak” and celibacy is the ideal, because how could a sexual relationship 
image the invisible, holy relationship of Christ and His church?78  Such a devaluing of 
sex and marriage was made evident by the disapproval of remarriage by widows.  The 
reason for this devaluing was the belief that sex was infected with concupiscence—
irrational, rebellious, sinful desire. Such bodily, self-centered desire, it was held, 
inevitably distracted one from pure contemplative union with God.79  This view of sex, 
one where sex needed to be bridled and excused, made it difficult to imagine how sex in 
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marriage could be part of the imaging of the Christ-church relationship.  However, this 
devaluing of sex was not a Christian innovation; it was very much a part of the culture 
due to the influence of Stoic principles and rigorous ethics of sexual renunciation of the 
upper classes.80  Shaji George Kachuthara offers a different reason for the emphasis on 
procreation by the early Christians than only a reaction to the Gnostic movement: 
Although norms regarding sexuality were rigorous, a kind of double standard was 
followed.  Women were strictly punished for adultery, whereas men incurred no 
legal punishment for infidelity.  The master had authority over the bodies of the 
slaves, both male and female, and it was a personal option of the master whether 
to have or not a sexual relationship with female slaves.  One of the main 
intentions of the strict discipline in sexual life advocated by Christian authors was 
protecting the rights of the weaker section of the society, slaves, women, children 
etc., who were exploited by the masters and the powerful.  The procreative 
dimension was emphasized and was presented as the valid norm for sexual 
intercourse, because it was thought that it would deter the people from sexual 
promiscuity.81 
 
Kochuthara’s reasoning highlights the inherent interconnection between the sexual and 
the social; the sexual practices of the early church had a social justice component that is 
often omitted from explanations of sex and marriage in the early church. 
 3.3.2 Augustine   
Writing in the time of such rigorous ascetic traditions and the view that marriage 
was an afterthought due to the Fall, Augustine cannot be accused of being the source of 
pessimism toward sex and marriage that lasted centuries.  Against the Manicheans, 
Augustine argued for the goodness of marriage by identifying that which makes it good:  
proles, fides, and sacramentum.  Proles refers to the begetting, rearing, and loving of 
children within the context of the “friendly society created by the marital engendering of 
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children.”82  Augustine begins his treatise, De bono coniugali, by placing the good of 
children within the context of the social dimension of human nature and the marital 
friendship, which is the first natural bond of human society.83   Fides refers to the virtue 
of fidelity that enables spouses to limit sex to the marital relationship.84  The 
sacramentum has a rich and varied usage in Augustine and should be viewed within the 
context of the Roman usage of the term at the time. 
Because Augustine’s works are polemical and not systematic, it is difficult to 
assign a precise meaning to sacramentum in Augustine’s thought.  Mackin summarizes 
Augustine’s varied use of the term: 
The marital covenant is the product (res) of the sacramentum, with the latter 
apparently the observable ceremonial sign; it is a quality or trait of the marital 
bond that prevents its dissolution; as such a trait it is found in all marriages, or 
alternately it is found only in Christian marriages; it is that in the marriages of 
Christian spouses whereby these image the Christ-Church relationship—or is 
perhaps the image itself; as such it is the source of the demand that Christian 
marriages be monogamous; it is analogous to the effect of his ordination in a 
priest that keeps him a priest all his life, as it is analogous to that effect of a 
Christian’s baptism that keeps him a Christian even despite his permanent 
apostasy; it may be identical with the quiddam conjugale, the “certain conjugal 
something,” that remains in the souls of separated Christian spouses and keeps 
them married until one of them dies; it remains in their souls because both are 
members of the metaphoric body of Christ.  The sacramentum was in Adam’s and 
Eve’s marriage as a foreshadowing of the union of Christ and the Church.85  
 
According to Mackin, the sacramentum in Augustine implies monogamy, permanency, 
commitment, and inseparability.  Augustine’s use of the term is particularly ambiguous, 
because sometimes he says it is found only in Christian marriages and at other times he 
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predicates it of all marriages.86  Despite its unsystematic use, sacramentum in Augustine 
“designates the perseverance, the permanence of the marriage commitment, even the 
unbreakable character of the marital bond.”87  The sacrament in Augustine’s thought is 
intimately tied to “the commitment-bond,” which could mean the spouses’ commitment 
to one another or to God or perhaps both.88  Schillebeeckx reinforces this intimate 
connection between sacrament and commitment: 
The basic meaning of this word in secular Latin usage was “religious 
commitment” or “engagement,” and it was from this that all the other meanings 
were derived—sacramentum as an initiation (which, of course, necessarily 
involves personal commitment), as an oath or iuramentum (the oath pointing to 
the legal aspect of this personal commitment), and finally as the legal and sacral 
bond resulting from the obligations undertaken under oath.89  
 
In his study of ancient non-Christian uses of sacramentum, Daniel Van Slyke concludes 
that “the vast majority of non-Christian evidence for the meaning of sacramentum points 
more or less directly to the military oath of the Roman soldiery.”90  The military 
sacrament was highly regarded and its meanings could be transferred to a Christian 
context.  Van Slyke asserts, “The military sacrament put one into a new set of 
responsibilities occasioned by a new set of relationships:  with the emperor, with one’s 
fellow soldiers, with the citizens of Rome, and even with Rome’s enemies.”91  In Van 
Slyke’s translation of the Roman military sacrament into its Christian usage, it becomes 
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apparent how this understanding could prove beneficial in relating the marital 
commitment in consent to the sacrament: 
Through the Christian sacrament, one enters upon a new set of relations and 
responsibilities with Christ, with one’s fellow Christians, and with the enemies of 
Christ.  The very concept of sacrament provided a means of Romanizing or 
Latinizing the covenantal relationship that Christians perceived between 
themselves and their God, and likewise amongst themselves, enabling them to 
express it in the discourse of Roman culture.  Entering into a sacrament with God 
entailed responsibilities on the part of the Christian, but it also entailed promises 
on the part of God, which are manifest in the typology of scripture and the rites of 
early Christian communities.  This may explain why, from an early point in the 
history of Latin Christian literature, so many dimensions of faith came to be 
called sacraments.92 
 
The Christian sacrament, particularly marriage, implies commitment and the assuming of 
new responsibilities due to the creation of new relationships. 
 3.3.3 Middle Ages 
From the time of Augustine until the early Scholastics, minimal development in 
the understanding of the marital sacrament occurred.  Huge socio-political changes in the 
church and Roman civilization did not provide the stability needed for development in 
theological thought.  The invasions of different peoples and encounters with indigenous 
groups along with the fracturing of civilization into feudal society stifled the possibility 
of theological progress.  Marriage continued to be viewed as a good gift from God but a 
lower state compared to consecrated virginity due to the pleasure and irrational desire 
associated with sex.  Development in the theology of marriage was not as important in a 
clerical world in which consecrated virginity is seen as a higher state.93  However, 
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liturgically, at the end of the first millennium, marriage had moved primarily into the 
domain of the church.  Marriages were to be created publicly with the permission of the 
parents and the priest’s blessing.  By this time, Roman government had deteriorated 
causing the bishops to gain jurisdictional control and authority over marriage in the West.  
With the infiltration of largely Germanic peoples, conflict occurred over the legitimate 
procedure for marrying.  Roman law required the consent of the parties alone for its 
creation and maritalis affectio for its sustenance.  European groups and ethnicities 
entering Christian communities had their own customs and traditions for marrying, which 
consisted of multi-step processes.  Variation occurred among different tribes, but a 
general pattern can be delineated.94  The process began with the man’s or his father’s 
petition for the woman’s hand (peititio).  If the petition was accepted, the woman was 
betrothed to the man (desponsatio).  The betrothal was a public agreement between the 
parties’ families that the woman would be handed over to the man (traditio).  Within this 
contractual exchange, the power transferred from the father or guardian to the 
bridegroom to protect and represent the bride, the mundium, was a key element.  In order 
to be effective, provision of a dowry was made to the woman’s family (dotatio).  The 
dowry served as a form of collateral should either party fail to fulfill the promise to 
marry.  For the Germanic peoples, the betrothal was fulfilled in the traditio.  Sexual 
intercourse was a crucial step in the process of marrying.  Mackin states, “Where the 
tradition of the mundium was neglected, the beginning itself of cohabitation replaced the 
traditio as the moment creating the marriage.  In this case it was said of the bride, 
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ambulavit ad maritum—‘she has walked (or gone over) to her husband.’”95  This Roman-
European dispute centered upon whether it is consent or sexual intercourse that creates 
marriage and at what point in a Christian marriage it images the indestructible union of 
Christ and the church. 
 This dispute continued into the eleventh and twelfth centuries with two schools of 
thought representing the divergent positions.  The theologians of the University of Paris 
argued for the Roman position that consent by the parties makes marriage.  The second 
school of thought centered upon the canonists of the University of Bologna.  Gratian 
argued that consent forms an inchoate marriage which is made ratum et consummatum, 
complete and indissoluble, through sexual intercourse.  To this distinction Mackin adds 
that “this completeness is found in its being a sacramentum of Christ and the Church.”96  
Here again is the connection between the sacrament as permanent pledge and 
commitment and sexual intercourse.  The dispute was resolved in the judgments of Pope 
Alexander III in which he ruled that consent de praesenti creates a true marriage, but only 
a marriage consummated by sexual intercourse after consent is truly indissoluble.  His 
judgments and doctrines were confirmed by succeeding popes and concretized in canon 
law. 
 By the beginning of the thirteenth century, marriage was accepted as one of the 
seven sacraments.  With marriage cases under the jurisdiction of the church, clearly 
defined legal and theological categories were needed.  During this period of classical 
canon law, the church’s concept of marriage was systematized, structured, and classified 
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both juridically and theologically.  Although marriage was not deemed a contract in 
ancient Rome, the model of consensual contract from classical Roman law provided such 
seemingly neat legal categories.  As a consensual contract, marriage required no formal 
ceremony and allowed for the freedom of the parties to choose whom to marry.  John 
Witte explains, “Although the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 and later canon laws 
strongly encouraged the couple to seek the consent of their parents, to publish their banns 
for marriage in the church, to solemnize their union with the blessing of the priest, to 
invite witnesses to the wedding, and to comply with the marital customs of their 
domicile, none of these steps were absolute requirements.”97  For Christians, this natural 
and contractual institution of marriage was considered a sacrament, a sign of the invisible 
union of Christ and the church. 
 3.3.4 Aquinas   
Aquinas held that the sacrament is intrinsic to marriage, and although he does not 
specifically identify the minister of the sacrament, he implies that the spouses are.98 
Within Aquinas’s work, the matter and the form of the sacrament of marriage are not 
clearly delineated.  In his Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, Aquinas 
states,  
The words in which the matrimonial consent is expressed are the form of this 
sacrament, not the blessing of the priest, which is a certain sacramental.  The 
sacrament of matrimony is completed by the action of the one who avails himself 
(uti) of this sacrament, just like penance; and thus, as penance does not have any 
                                                 
97. John Witte Jr., From Sacrament to Contract:  Marriage, Religion, and Law in the Western 
Tradition, The Family, Religion, and Culture, ed. Don S. Browning and Ian S. Evison (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1997), 26. 
 
98. Aquinas, In IV Sent., Distinction 28, Question 1, art. 3. Translation is found in Beth M. 
Mortensen, "The Relation of the Juridical and Sacramental in Matrimony According to Thomas Aquinas" 
(PhD diss., Freiburg-Schweiz, 2012). 
 
123 
 
other matter than those sensible acts themselves which are in place of a material 
element, so it is with marriage.99 
 
For Aquinas, the essence of marriage is a non-sensible relation, which is a 
“conjoining.”100  Although the essence of marriage is not sensible, the efficient cause of 
marriage, that is consent, is sensible.  He purports, “But the words expressing consent, 
which are the sacramentum tantum and the cause of the aforementioned conjoining, are 
sensible.”101  In a way that is left unexplained, the sign of marriage, composed of matter 
and form, is the sacramentum tantum, the words expressing consent.  According to 
Mackin, Aquinas identified the matter of the sacrament as each spouse’s expression of 
consent both at the wedding ceremony and also during the life of the marriage as each 
spouse’s will to be married.  For Aquinas, this materia is “in-formed, not by any words or 
actions of the priest, as in baptism, but by the reciprocal consent of the other spouse.”102  
In this way, the words of consent constitute a mutual giving and receiving, which causes 
the res et sacramentum, “the bond of obligation.”103 This bond (vinculum) is the cause of 
grace, res tantum.  By the fourteenth century, much of the nuance and delicate precision 
of Aquinas’s theology had settled into legal terminology.  Marriage was primarily 
considered a contract consisting of the mutual exchange of rights resulting in the creation 
                                                 
99. Aquinas, In IV Sent., Distinction 26, Question 2, art. 1, ad 1, 2. 
 
100. Aquinas, In IV Sent., Distinction 27, Question 1, art. 1. 
 
101. Aquinas, In IV Sent., Distinction 27, Question 1, art. 1, qc. 1, ad 2. 
 
102. Mackin, The Marital Sacrament, 347. 
 
103. Aquinas, In IV Sent., Distinction 26, Question 2, art. 3, ad. 2. 
 
124 
 
of the marital bond (vinculum), which is the very essence of marriage.  The Roman 
understanding of marriage as a union of wills gave way to a solely juridical definition.104    
 3.3.5 The Reformers and the Council of Trent 
 In the sixteenth century Martin Luther and the early reformers questioned the 
Church’s authority to regulate Christian marriage.  Witte claims, “The Catholic Church’s 
jurisdiction over marriage was, for the reformers, a particularly flagrant example of the 
Church’s usurpation of the magistrate’s authority.  The Catholic sacramental concept of 
marriage, on which the Church predicated its jurisdiction, raised deep questions of 
sacramental theology and scriptural interpretation.”105  For the reformers, marriage was 
not a means of grace and redemption, but rather a natural and social estate for the good of 
the earthly kingdom which should be under the governance of civil rulers.106  The 
Catholic Church responded to the claims of the reformers through the Council of Trent 
(1545-1563).  In a series of canons, the Catholic Church anathematized the opinion of 
anyone who denied that marriage is a sacrament and belongs to the order of grace.  
Therefore, the church has the power to regulate the marriages of its people and to grant 
dispensations, dissolutions, and declarations of nullity.  To control the problem of 
clandestine marriages, the council imposed the necessity of the presence of an authorized 
priest and two witnesses at the giving of consent for the validity of the marriage.  Spouses 
were still considered the ministers of the sacrament, now with the priest present to 
witness and record the contract.  Örsy states that “the very idea of adding a ‘canonical 
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form’ to the theological structure of a sacrament was a new departure.”107  Mandating 
canonical form was effectively issuing a juridical response to a practical problem.  The 
practice was difficult to implement at first and raised more theological questions 
regarding the relationship of the contract to the sacrament.  Mackin concurs by stating 
that the theologies of marriage in the centuries following Trent until the Second Vatican 
Council could be viewed as attempts to find theological bases for the Tridentine 
decrees.108  
 3.3.6 The Emerging Personalist Theology of Marriage and Codification 
 By the time of the promulgation of Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical Arcanum divinae 
sapientiae in 1880, changes in “the pre-theological appreciation of marriage” had 
contributed to an emerging personalist theology of marriage.109  Those priests who wrote 
and taught about marriage, while not themselves married, had more frequent and pastoral 
contact with married persons.  Greater real knowledge of the experiences of married 
persons led eventually to a more authentic picture of married love.110  Leo’s Arcanum 
recognized the injustice incurred by women in marriages, the mutual love and 
companionship of spouses, and the ways in which marriage can make the lives of spouses 
better.111  Despite the gradual movement toward a personalist theology of marriage, the 
codification of canon law in 1917 crystallized precise juridical terms and definitions 
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somewhat removed from the real experiences of married persons.  The Code emphasized 
procreation as the primary end of the institution of marriage and the right to one another’s 
acts that lead to procreation (ius in corpus) as the object of marital consent.  According to 
the Code, the essential traits of the marriage contract are unity (meaning sexually 
exclusive monogamy) and indissolubility; both traits are necessary in order that the 
marriage reach its primary extrinsic end, namely procreation and nurture of children.  
While all marriages are indissoluble, this indissolubility gains a “unique firmness” in 
Christian marriage due to the sacrament.112  All of these juridical statements required 
practical application and theological explication and justification. 
 While emphasizing the child as the primary blessing of marriage, Casti connubii 
promulgated by Pope Pius XI in 1930 advanced theological thinking concerning marriage 
by explicitly maintaining that conjugal faith is a holy kind of love that expresses itself in 
action.  Essentially, Pius is arguing that the loving actions of spouses contribute to their 
sanctification and holiness.  Marriage as sacrament can have a truly salvific role in the 
lives of husbands and wives: 
This outward expression of love in the home demands not only mutual help but 
must go further; must have as its primary purpose that man and wife help each 
other day by day in forming and perfecting themselves in the interior life, so that 
through their partnership in life they may advance ever more and more in virtue, 
and above all that they may grow in true love toward God and their neighbor, on 
which indeed “dependeth the whole Law and the Prophets.”113  
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He continues by stating that this mutual effort to perfect each other can be the “chief 
reason and purpose of matrimony.”114  The movement toward a personalist theology of 
marriage becomes even clearer in the work of Dietrich von Hildebrand and Herbert Doms 
who find marriage’s ultimate meaning in the community of love that marriage is.  In 
other words, the most significant value of marriage is intrinsic and not instrumental.115  In 
spite of the fact that Doms’ work was indirectly condemned by the Congregation of the 
Holy Office in 1944, this person-centered theology of marriage found expression in the 
documents of Vatican II.   
 3.3.7 The Second Vatican Council and the Revised Code of Canon Law 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the emerging communion ecclesiology prior to the 
council opened the doors for a new vision of marriage, one that emphasized covenant and 
conjugal love.  In the theology of Vatican II, there is no mention of hierarchically ordered 
ends to marriage, and technical, juridical language is avoided.  Those in the Central 
Preparatory Commission who objected to the use of overly juridical language in the 
schema on marriage (which was eventually rejected) did so due to the “many damaging 
mistakes” in pastoral practice incurred when marriage is treated “in an exclusively 
negative and juridically analytic way rather than in a spirit of charity and concern.”116  
Theology and pastoral practice must come together in a way that meets the real needs of 
the church community.  The need for effective, authentic practical application should 
drive theological thinking. 
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 The theology of marriage and family that can be gleaned from the Second Vatican 
Council was the end result of much debate and innovation, particularly the chapter on 
marriage in Gaudium et spes.  Mackin claims that the absence of contractual language 
and the hierarchy of ends in describing marriage must be intentional.117  The absence of 
such language spurred many questions in the years following the council.  Did traditional 
Catholic doctrine on marriage substantially change at the Second Vatican Council?  Does 
the fact that Gaudium et spes is a pastoral document addressed to the world alter the 
doctrinal weight of its teachings?  Is juridical language regarding marriage essential to 
Catholic doctrine?  Finally, is the traditional way of speaking about marriage really the 
product of an underlying philosophical matrix that no longer makes sense to 
contemporary spouses?  How does theological and canonical language coexist in 
describing the truth of what the marital sacrament is? 
 Nearly twenty years passed before the theology of Vatican II was translated into 
canon law.  Since the promulgation of the new Code in 1983, canonical decisions have 
applied these translations of the meaning of marriage and the sacrament into the concrete 
lives of Christian spouses.  These practical judgments must then make sense within a 
theological horizon.  Identifying and understanding what marriage is, what the sacrament 
is, what consent is, and the what the effects of marriage are—these are the tasks not 
merely of this dissertation but of the living church today. 
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3.4 Consent Creates Marriage 
 
 
 3.4.1 Matrimonium in fieri 
 In articulating the holiness of marriage and family, Gaudium et spes affirms that 
marriage begins in the human act of personal consent.  Matrimonium in fieri, or marriage 
in the act of being constituted or in the time of becoming, is the act of consent which 
brings about matrimonium in facto esse, marriage as it is lived out.  Of course, the 
meaning of “consent” is rich and, therefore, the focus of this study.  Nevertheless, the 
council fathers uphold the fundamental teaching that marriage begins in consent: 
The intimate partnership of life and the love which constitutes the married state 
has been established by the creator and endowed by him with its own proper laws:  
it is rooted in the contract of its partners, that is, in their irrevocable personal 
consent.  It is an institution confirmed by the divine law and receiving its stability, 
even in the eyes of society, from the human act by which the partners mutually 
surrender themselves to each other; for the good of the partners, of the children, 
and of society this sacred bond no longer depends on human decision alone.118 
 
Clearly, something new is expressed in Catholic teaching regarding marriage and family 
at Vatican II.  The personalist vision of marriage earlier deemed suspect is woven into an 
institutional understanding with elements of each remaining.  In the preceding text alone, 
marriage is described as an “intimate partnership of life” constituted by love; yet at the 
same time, marriage is deemed a “state” and an “institution” “with its own proper laws.”  
First, to the objection that Gaudium et spes carries reduced doctrinal weight due to its 
pastoral nature, Huizing replies that such an assertion is antithetical to the intentions of 
John XXIII and the document itself.  His reply is that “the Church’s doctrinal teaching is 
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pastoral” and “its magisterium is predominantly pastoral in character.”119  He continues 
by noting the intermingling of the personalist understanding of marriage with the 
institutional and sees no reason why they should not coexist.120  As the pastoral 
constitution plainly states, marriage is personally good for the spouses and their children, 
and it is good for society as a whole.  An institution is good for society, because it makes 
sense out of complex patterns of behavior causing other behavior to appear chaotic.  In 
this case, marriage as an institution makes sense out of human sexual behavior and 
provides innumerable benefits to all as previously listed in Chapter One.  The personalist 
and institutional aspects of marriage sustain one another so that marriage is beneficial for 
all.  Klaus Lüdicke explains how these personalist and institutional aspects converge in 
consent: 
Considerations directed at the community revolve around its detachment from 
human caprice, especially as regards the indissolubility of marriage, as well its 
institutional orientation towards the procreation and education of offspring.  In 
this way, the institution is not made subordinate to the personal dimension as if it 
were possible for the spouses to change the institution of marriage or to subject it 
to their personal necessities.  But the basis for the existence of the institution is 
the partners’ personal acceptance of one another, the consent for one another.121  
 
The very personal and human act that constitutes marriage is consent.   
The Latin consensus implies that two people are of one mind and will.  The prefix 
“con” signals mutuality, a with-ness.  Consensus means feeling with, sensing with, and 
understanding with.  It is a kind of mutual agreement that creates a bond of commitment 
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or obligation.  Peter Elliott reinforces this point by commenting that “it seems 
tautologous even to say ‘mutual consent,’ although the adjective is added for emphasis, to 
underline the mutuality of this unique kind of consent.”122  To state that consent is a 
human act means that it is done with sufficient awareness and deliberation.  A human act, 
actus humanus, is juxtaposed with an act of a human, actus hominis, based upon the level 
of knowledge and freedom with which the act is performed.  Human acts are the focus of 
moral theology and both civil and canon law.  The difficulty with understanding and 
evaluating human acts, such as consent, is that most acts fall between the two extremes of 
a purely actus humanus and a strictly actus hominis.123  How free are we in any given 
act?  How much awareness do we really have as we act in the world?  Consent can be 
impeded or defective due to some lack in one’s capacity, in one’s knowledge, or in one’s 
will.  These distinctions will be significant as the meaning of consent in canon law is 
articulated more fully in Chapter Five. 
 According to Gaudium et spes, marriage is “rooted in” the spouses’ irrevocable 
personal consent.  Such language implies that the spouses’ consent contains the potential 
for all the marriage is going to be as it grows, or possibly fails to grow.  As Martin Lavin 
points out, matrimonium in fieri and matrimonium in facto esse are not strictly temporal 
categories: 
In Thomistic thought, however, matrimonium in fieri and in facto esse must exist 
simultaneously in their possibility (in potentia) ab initio.  The realization, the 
living out, of the in facto esse comes about temporally after the consent is voiced 
in fieri at the wedding; but the possibility for realizing the in facto esse afterwards 
must be there at the wedding also.  Matrimonium in fieri and in facto esse are two 
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sides of the same coin which—to follow through on the wedding jingle—both 
bride and groom must have on their persons during the wedding.124  
 
Matrimonium in fieri and in facto esse are intimately connected, with the former 
containing all that the latter can be.  Gaudium et spes 48 claims such consent is 
irrevocable.  In other words, although consent is a human act, once it is given, it no 
longer depends upon human will.  This is a decisive and often divisive Catholic teaching 
that will be explored in depth in later chapters. 
 3.4.2 Contract and Covenant 
 Although Flannery’s translation of Gaudium et spes 48 states that marriage is 
rooted in the “contract” of its partners, the Latin foedus is better translated “covenant.”  
Contractual language was not used of marriage until the Scholastic period and later 
concretized in the 1917 Code of Canon Law where the object of the consensual contract 
was named the ius in corpus.  Marriage as a contract depicts a static view of marriage 
centered upon the moment of consent and the exchange of rights and obligations in a 
juridical agreement.  The contractual description of marriage in the 1917 Code was based 
upon a restrictive theology of marriage devoid of any personalist elements of marriage 
that would emerge later.  Because of the prior baptism of the spouses, the contract of 
marriage was declared a sacrament.  Deliberately, the use of contractual language was 
avoided at the Second Vatican Council.  Marriage as sacrament participates in the union 
of Christ and the church, which could hardly be called a contract.  Additionally, the 
council wanted to avoid this term to remain in agreement with the Eastern Church.125  
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Although foedus could be translated “agreement, compact, pact, treaty, or alliance,” the 
more biblical and theological term is covenant.126  
 Covenant expresses Yahweh’s relationship with His people and Christ’s union 
with the church.  It is a relationship begun in a profound promise of fidelity and care.  
Michael Lawler articulates the connection between consent, covenant, and commitment, 
both in marriage and the divine-human relationship.  “To covenant is to consent and to 
promise, so that both parties, equal or unequal in other respects, are mutually committed 
to one another solemnly and radically.”127  Marriage as covenant is a symbol of the 
Christ-church relationship.  Kasper asserts that “covenant is the reality of salvation as 
such.”128  Jesus Christ as the union and unconditional acceptance of humanity with 
divinity is God’s covenant.129  To say that marriage is a symbol or sacrament of God’s 
love is more consistent with marriage as covenant than contract.  Covenants, like 
marriages, are complex, multi-faceted relationships.  They are personal and institutional, 
private and public, theological and legal.130  The marriage covenant is an irrevocable, 
mutual giving and receiving of persons.  Mackin expounds, 
This notion of the reciprocal gifting of persons is a charged one.  It is biblical; it is 
pre-juridical and pre-contractual.  Indeed it excludes contractuality because 
precisely what an act of contracting is not is an exchange of gifts.  What is given 
under contract, or given initially to create a contract, is not intended as a gift.  It is 
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intended either to create an obligation in commutative justice or to fulfill this 
obligation.131  
 
Mackin’s assertion raises an interesting question.  Are covenanting and 
contracting mutually exclusive?  Since covenants, particularly marriages, involve gifts of 
self and love, is contractual language involving rights, obligations, and justice wholly 
inaccurate?  It would be more accurate to say that contractual language alone is 
insufficient rather than inaccurate, because contract expresses the minimum of covenant.  
The contractual elements of marriage can be incorporated into the view of marriage as 
covenant which is richer and deeper.  Örsy articulates this movement in the theology of 
marriage at Vatican II.  “This new relationship between contract and covenant is best 
understood if the move from contract to covenant is considered as a move to a higher 
viewpoint.  Nothing is lost, everything is enriched; contract is contained in the covenant 
but does not exhaust it.”132  Örsy’s language of lower and higher, or minimum and 
maximum, more adequately describes the relationship of contract and covenant.  They are 
not mutually exclusive.  In a similar way, obligation and justice are minimal terms 
pertaining to relationships, whereas gift and love are maximal.  Love includes justice, and 
giving freely of oneself creates rights and obligations, the exchange of which is the very 
minimum of the giving.  The contractual understanding of marriage speaks of the giving 
and receiving of rights and obligations; whereas the covenantal conception proposes the 
giving of persons.  Of course, “the giving of persons” is a very nebulous expression.  
Precisely what that means, particularly in the concrete discipline of canon law, will be 
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fleshed out later.  Kenneth Himes and James Coriden convey the difference between 
marriage as contract versus covenant succinctly.  “When viewed as a covenant, marriage 
asks not the minimum (do not betray me) but the maximum (be devoted to me).”133   
Perhaps the difficulty in the use of contractual language for marriage can be 
traced to the Enlightenment model of marriage in which “the essence of marriage was the 
voluntary bargain struck between two parties who wanted to come together into an 
intimate association.”134  The terms of the contract are in the hands of the parties 
themselves free from any predetermined definition of marriage from church or nature.  
Present debates over same-sex marriage and divorce and remarriage can be seen as the 
direct descendents of the Enlightenment contractual model of marriage.  In this model, 
the terms of the marital contract must respect “the life, liberty, and property interests” of 
the other party while at the same time upholding “general standards of health, safety, and 
welfare in the community.”135  It is this capricious notion of contract that seems at odds 
with marriage as sacrament.  Ordinary married persons often speak freely and without 
trepidation of the contractual aspects of marriage.  Married persons “tie the knot” and 
“get hitched” and know they are in some way bound to one another for life.  Elliott states, 
“Unlike some theologians, they are not uncomfortable with the human dimension of 
contract in this sacrament.  If Our Lord can use bread, wine, oil, water, words, why can 
he not incorporate the human contract into a sacrament?”136  However, this marital 
                                                 
133. Kenneth R. Himes and James Coriden, "The Indissolubility of Marriage:  Reasons to 
Reconsider," Theological Studies 65 (2004): 479. 
 
134. Witte Jr., From Sacrament to Contract:  Marriage, Religion, and Law in the Western 
Tradition, 10. 
 
135. Ibid. 
 
136. Elliott, What God Has Joined:  The Sacramentality of Marriage, 130. 
136 
 
contract has a certain basic structure that the spouses cannot alter for themselves.  
Determining the precise content of this basic structure is the very difficult task of 
canonists together with theologians, both ordained and non-ordained. 
3.4.3 Faith and Intention 
Marriage, which is rooted in the foedus of its partners, is a relationship begun and 
sustained in faith.  Geoffrey Robinson notes “the word foedus comes from the same root 
as fides and fidelitas.”137  It is a covenant based upon faith and trust, in which both 
partners hope for love that is given and received for a lifetime.  All marriages are based 
upon faith in the other partner, while sacramental marriages are founded in faith in God, 
also.  Robinson contends that whereas “contract implies the possibility of revocation,” 
“covenant essentially involves personal commitment and cannot be revoked.”138  The 
possibility of rescinding the commitment once given implies that the relationship is 
something less than a covenant.  The covenant God establishes with His people is created 
to endure for all time.  The biblical understanding of covenant cannot be applied 
unilaterally to marriage, because the God-human covenant exists between unequal 
parties, whereas husband and wife are equal in dignity.  That being said, the biblical view 
of covenant illuminates human marriage through their similarities.  First, the establishing 
of a covenant is a gift.  The offer and creation of a covenant is not an obligation or 
requirement, but rather a free, undeserved gift.  God’s great covenant in Jesus is pure gift.  
In human marriage, the gift of self is mutual as it is a relationship of equals.  However, 
just as God bent low or gave more to remain faithful and loving in His commitment, so 
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also must spouses sometimes give and forgive more in the context of the relationship.  
Second, the covenantal gift of self can only be received in faith.  Each partner trusts the 
other and hopes one’s gift of love will be received and returned.  Indeed, faith is the 
bedrock of a covenant.  Third, in the sacrament of marriage, the spouses believe that God 
will remain faithful to the covenant established with them as a couple.  They believe not 
only in each other, but also in God who can and will sustain their love. 
 Because the sacraments are graced interactions between God and the participant, 
faith is necessary not only for the fruitful reception of the sacraments, but also for their 
validity.  Sacrosanctum concilium teaches regarding the sacraments, “They not only 
presuppose faith, but by words and objects they also nourish, strengthen, and express it.  
That is why they are called ‘sacraments of faith.’”139  Faith is both a virtue and an act, a 
readiness to believe and an act of trusting.  Juan Alfaro describes the “organic 
interrelation” of faith’s many aspects and its fundamental character: 
Faith is not so much an act or a series of acts as a basic and total attitude of the 
person, giving life a new, definitive direction.  It comes from depths of human 
freedom, where man has received the interior invitation of grace to enter the 
intimacy of God; it embraces his whole being—intellect, will, all that he does 
(submission to the mystery, the love, and the law of Christ).140  
 
Faith, as a fundamental life direction, is essential to the sacraments.  So much so that it is 
meaningless to speak of sacramental action without faith.  However, it is not faith alone 
that makes marriage a sacrament.  God’s actions through Christ in the Holy Spirit make 
marriage a prophetic symbol of God’s love for His people.  Faith recognizes that through 
Christ, spouses become capable of loving each other as God intended and of manifesting 
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to the world God’s covenantal love.  The International Theological Commission states, 
“The sacramentality of Christian marriage becomes apparent in faith. . . . .The spouses 
attest within the Church that they are committed to a conjugal life and expect from Christ 
the force to accomplish this form of love that without him would perish.”141   Faith makes 
it possible to see and experience this human relationship as an encounter with the divine. 
 Of critical importance in sacramental theology is the notion of intention.  A 
person must intend to do what the church does in the sacramental rite.  Lawler explicates, 
“The intention necessary to participate in a sacrament is the intention to participate in a 
rite that gives salvation, a God-in-Christ and Christ-in-the-Church event.”142  One’s 
knowledge and freedom must be engaged in order to intend the sacrament as the church 
does.  Persons must cooperate and participate in the sacraments for them to be valid and 
efficacious.  “A sacrament is a sign not only of the gracing action of God in Christ (opus 
operatum), but also of the free faith of the participant cooperating with grace in this ritual 
(opus operantis).”143  The salvific action of God and the faith of the participant work 
together in the sacrament in much the same way that the divine offer and human 
acceptance of God’s love come together in Christ, the primordial sacrament.  Faith and 
intention are not identical but are intrinsically related.  The intention that is necessary for 
sacramental validity “is born from and feeds on living faith.”144  In the sacrament of 
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marriage in the West, the spouses are the ministers of the sacrament, and both must have 
the intention “as an integral element of their consensus or mutual consent, of entering 
into their marriage in the Lord.”145  They must intend to enter a lifelong, exclusive, and 
procreative union. 
 If the validity of sacramental action depends upon right intention, what constitutes 
this intention?  Kasper answers, 
According to the traditional teaching of the Church, it does not need to be 
consciously present at the moment; all that is required is that it should be virtually 
present.  It must, however, not be purely externally orientated towards the 
performance of external actions under the customary circumstances (the place, 
time, dress, and so on).  Nor does it need to be a special or deeply reflected 
intention; . . . It is sufficient to have a general and direct intention to do what 
Christians are in the habit of doing in the rite in question.146  
 
This minimalist explanation of sacramental intention leaves the theological question open 
to further thinking; consequently, an open theological position leads to practical 
uncertainties and pastoral challenges, which then lead to more theological questions.  The 
practical problem this position creates is that of baptized nonbelievers.  According to the 
Code, “a valid matrimonial contract cannot exist between the baptized without it being by 
that fact a sacrament.”147  The difficulty lies in the fact that the baptismal rite alone does 
not guarantee that baptismal commitment will follow.  The practical problem to be 
addressed becomes:  how do we measure faith in order that the faith necessary for 
sacramental intention is assuredly present?  Pope John Paul II declares that the couple’s 
consent to a permanent and faithful union is a sufficient demonstration of their faith: 
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Therefore the decision of a man and a woman to marry in accordance with this 
divine plan, that is to say, the decision to commit by their irrevocable conjugal 
consent their whole lives in indissoluble love and unconditional fidelity, really 
involves, even if not in a fully conscious way, an attitude of profound obedience 
to the will of God, an attitude which cannot exist without God’s grace.  They have 
thus already begun what is in a true and proper sense a journey towards salvation, 
a journey which the celebration of the sacrament and the immediate preparation 
for it can complement and bring to completion, given the uprightness of their 
intention.148  
 
The decision to marry in the church is an implicit act of faith.  John Paul II describes the 
preparation for marriage and the rite as the beginning of a journey of faith.  In the above 
passage, he explicitly identifies consent with a commitment to life-long love and fidelity.  
Consent so understood implies a posture of faith.  Further, he warns that the identification 
of criteria concerning faith would present “grave risks” including making “discriminatory 
judgments” and “causing doubts about the validity of marriages already celebrated.”149  
The only grounds for refusing couples to the celebration of marriage is their explicit and 
formal rejection of what the church intends to do when the marriage of baptized persons 
is celebrated, which essentially means lack of right intention.  Evidence of formal and 
explicit rejection of the faith by one or both of the spouses means participation in the 
sacrament of marriage is impossible; however, as canon law currently exists, a valid 
matrimonial contract cannot exist without the sacrament.  Therefore, baptized 
nonbelievers are deprived of their natural right to marry, because as baptized persons they 
cannot marry without the sacrament, yet as nonbelievers they cannot participate in a 
sacrament of faith.  How this practical problem may or may not be resolved theologically 
and juridically will be addressed in the later chapters. 
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 3.4.4 Ratum et Consummatum 
 As explained previously, consent alone creates matrimonium ratum.  For marriage 
to be considered ratum et consummatum the couple must engage in sexual intercourse 
completed in a human manner that is suitable for procreation and allows the couple to 
become one flesh, a permanent union.  Elliott designates consent as “consent for 
consummation.”150  He describes consent as “a choice for ‘one flesh,’ expressed and 
made permanent by sexual union.”151  In the current law and theology of the magisterial 
church, consent initiates marriage which is then completed, fulfilled, accomplished, that 
is, consummated in nuptial sexual intercourse.  Consent for consummation highlights the 
deeper meaning of marital consent as a choice to give oneself to the other together with 
the choice to accept the other in return.  The giving and receiving of marital love 
expressed in sexual intercourse symbolizes the mutual and reciprocal love of Christ and 
the church.  In nuptial sexual love, spouses accept one another in all their concrete reality 
and specificity and not as “some imaginary ideal figure.”152   
Real concern has been expressed by theologians and canonists as to how the 
fullness of married love can reach its completion in one act of sexual intercourse usually 
occurring within twenty-four hours after consent is expressed.  Bernard Cooke anticipates 
the future of such a theology in practice.  “It is true that for two people deeply in love, 
there is often profound meaning in their first full sexual intimacy, but theirs will be a sad 
married life if they do not progress in their self-giving far beyond this first 
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experience.”153  Himes and Coriden argue for a rethinking of consummation.  In a purely 
contractual understanding of marriage, giving and assuming the ius in corpus constitutes 
matrimonium ratum, and the giving and receiving of those acts suitable to procreation 
constitutes matrimonium ratum et consummatum.  They state, “One act of coitus was 
adequate to bring to completion the legal contract of marriage since the contracted goods 
were exchanged in that one act.”154  In a personalist understanding of marriage as 
covenant, are there other ways of articulating what constitutes consummation?  Himes 
and Coriden continue, 
Of course, there is less precision to the notion of consummation once we move 
away from the canonical standard of coitus.  How does one measure when the 
partnership in life is consummated?  This is an important question from a 
canonical standpoint.  The quest for legal clarity, however, ought not lead the 
Church to accept a reductionist description of the full human experience of 
marriage.155  
 
This is the perennial problem in canonical science:  How does the church support, 
maintain, and protect the fullness of theological values within limited, concrete, specific 
canons?   
Before the translation of theological values into canonical norms can occur, 
agreement needs to be reached on the theological meaning of consummation.  Mackin 
asserts that to consummate a marriage means “to bring the marital relationship to its 
fullness.”156  Lawler concurs and adds, “A marriage and, therefore, a sacrament of 
                                                 
153. Bernard Cooke, “Indissolubility:  Guiding Ideal or Existential Reality?” in Commitment to 
Partnership:  Explorations of the Theology of Marriage, ed. William P. Roberts (New York, NY:  Paulist 
Press, 1987), 73. 
 
154. Himes and Coriden, "The Indissolubility of Marriage:  Reasons to Reconsider," 484. 
 
155. Ibid. 
 
156. Mackin, The Marital Sacrament, 674. 
 
143 
 
marriage reach perfection only when the faith-informed love that undergirds them 
reaches perfection, only when marital love has reached such fullness that the spouses 
would not place it second to any other human reality.”157  Obtaining clarification 
regarding the content and meaning of marital consummation is significant, because only 
marriages consummated as a sacrament are considered intrinsically and extrinsically 
indissoluble.  This is referred to as radical or absolute indissolubility.  The primary reason 
given for this absolute indissolubility is the symbolizing function of sacramental and 
consummated marriage.  Because the bond between Christ and the church is indissoluble, 
the sacramental, consummated marriages of men and women are deemed indissoluble.  
With a greater emphasis on the experience of marriage and its personalist aspects, 
Mackin views marriage, consent, consummation, and indissolubility as processual.  He 
explains, “Just as not all spouses create the sacrament instantaneously by the same one 
act of consent that creates marriage, and just as they do not consummate their 
sacramental marriage by a single intercourse, but may do the first gradually and can do 
the second only gradually, so they build immunity into their marriage only gradually.”158  
He sees a couple’s sacramental marriage as immune to dissolution when the trust and 
love in their relationship are so solid that the marriage is incapable of being destroyed, by 
themselves or any other power.  He argues that the image of Christ’s metaphoric 
marriage with the church does not have a causative, ontological effect on real marriages, 
but rather a deontological effect.  The symbolizing function of the Christ-church 
relationship establishes a moral imperative, not an ontological impossibility of 
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dissolution.  In his view, a marriage that is immune to dissolution is one that has been 
consummated by repeated acts of love and trust over a lifetime creating marital virtues 
that support a “habitual will for the other’s well-being.”159  The union of spouses together 
with God grows to become so strong that it becomes “functionally impossible” for either 
spouse to destroy their union through refusal to love and trust.160   
Rather than viewing consummation as the perfection or fulfillment of the marital 
covenant, other theologians seeking to defend the position of the magisterial Church on 
indissolubility present consummation differently.  In a reply to Himes and Coriden, Peter 
Ryan and Germain Grisez state that the first act of marital intercourse following consent 
is not the “symbol of consummation”161 but rather the completion of the “spouses’ 
contribution to the coming-to-be of their two-in-one-flesh covenantal union.”162  In their 
view, consent signifies the free and total self-giving of the spouses, the full reality of 
which comes into being in the first act of marital intercourse.  Referring back to the 
teaching of John Paul II and the Genesis passage of two-in-one-flesh (Gen 2:24), Ryan 
and Grisez maintain that conjugal intercourse completes consent and joins the couple 
indissolubly to God and one another.  They argue that to uphold the view that 
consummation means the perfection of the love relationship leads to uncertainty, 
ambiguity, and confusion.  It seems that one could argue that in the view of the 
magisterial Church and those that defend her position, consummation occurs at the 
beginning of marriage and constitutes the cause of the marital covenant.  On the other 
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hand, one might infer from the arguments of Mackin, Lawler, Himes, and Coriden that 
consummation is evident (or not) at the end of the marriage, with the death of one of the 
spouses, and is the effect of the growth and development of the couple’s faith and love 
over a lifetime.  Mackin explains, 
To consummate a marriage is not to enter a final marital category.  It is to bring 
the marital relationship to its fullness.  For two reasons this fullness is not a fixed 
and final point.  First, the substance of a marital relationship is the spouses’ caring 
love for one another.  But such love has no fixed and final degree—unless 
perhaps it is the same degree to which Christ took his love by giving up his life.  
Second, for Christians the marital relationship is sacramental in that it participates 
in Christ’s redemptive work.  The only final form and degree conceivable for this 
work is also a replication of Christ’s death.  The move toward completion in both 
senses is always a process, a development that need end only with death.163  
 
Lawler concurs with this position, adding that the criterion for the verification of marital 
consummation is personal rather than juridical and, consequently, inexact.  Lawler states, 
“Both marriage and the sacrament of marriage reach their perfection or consummation, 
and become permanent or indissoluble, only when the faith-informed mutual love of the 
spouses on which they are founded becomes perfect, or consummated and permanent, or 
indissoluble.”164  Is there a way in which these two views may coincide?  Must juridical 
and personalist views of marital consent and consummation be mutually exclusive?  Such 
questions can be better addressed only after completing this study of the theology of 
sacramental marriage and how it relates to canon law. 
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3.5 Encountering God in Sacramental Marriage – Grace 
 
 
 3.5.1 Matrimonium in facto esse 
 As previously explained when discussing Aquinas, the immediate effect of the 
sacramentum tantum, consent, is not supernatural grace, but rather the res et 
sacramentum, the conjugal bond.  The bond of marriage, which is the key or centerpiece 
to a sacramental theology of marriage, has not yet been clearly defined.  Again, the 
importance of theological and canonical precision is paramount “for the sake of those 
who eventually will have to carry in real life the burden of our theoretical 
conclusions.”165  As Kasper explains, the bond “is an intersubjective ontological intention 
and determination made in freedom through which a man and a woman reach their 
definitive status in and through their bond of unity.”166  This ontological change in and 
between the persons is lasting and bears some comparison to the indelible character 
imparted in baptism, confirmation, and orders.  The bond is ontological yet not separable 
from the couple.  Using scholastic terminology, Örsy explains that the bond is not a 
substance, but rather an accident, a relation, that finds its being in the substances of the 
spouses:   
The bond is the specific marital relationship of a man to a woman and vice versa, 
an esse ad; that is, a general orientation in the world of their intentionality; an 
orientation that permeates and dominates their judgments and decisions.  Quite 
appropriately it could be called “conversion” (turning to in a radical sense) to 
another person.  In the case of a sacramental marriage God himself grants a 
special grace-filled dimension to this bond.167  
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Örsy identifies the bond as a “relationship of obligation.”168  The conjugal bond, 
vinculum meaning “chain,” makes the man and woman spouses by binding them to one 
another.  Ultimately, the Holy Spirit effects this bond of unity by consecrating the 
spouses to one another and God.  Through fidelity to their bond (res et sacramentum), 
spouses are able to experience the grace of God (res tantum) in their married lives. 
 Because the conjugal bond is the key link between consent together with 
consummation as the sign of marriage and the continual offer of grace to spouses in the 
lived sacrament, some theological clarity is necessary.  Lawler describes the multi-
faceted nature of the bond as a “triple bond of love, of law, and of sacrament” in which 
“each succeeding dimension of that triple bond strengthens the spouses in the preceding 
bond.”169  He explains, “Their mutual love binds them together in an interpersonal 
relationship, which is a bond and obligation of love.  Their wedding binds them together 
in a civil relationship, which is a bond and obligation of law.  Their marriage as 
sacrament binds them together in a religious relationship, which is a bond and obligation 
of divine grace.”170  These intertwining bonds, like a durable rope, unite the man and 
woman as husband and wife.  The bond inheres in the couple; it is the relationship of 
love, law, and sacrament that orients and unites them for life. 
 The conjugal bond is central to a theology of sacramental marriage, because it is 
in and through their nuptial relationship that the couple is empowered by the Spirit to 
experience grace.  Encountering God in sacramental marriage occurs not only on their 
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wedding day (matrimonium in fieri) but primarily throughout the spouses’ living out of 
their marital commitment in daily life (matrimonium in facto esse).  In Familiaris 
consortio, the bond is described as a “Christian communion of two persons because it 
represents the mystery of Christ’s incarnation and the mystery of His covenant.”171  This 
conjugal communion is total and “aims at a deeply personal unity, the unity that, beyond 
union in one flesh, leads to forming one heart and soul.”172   Theologically, marriage is 
communio vitae, the interpersonal relationship of husband and wife.  Gaudium et spes 12 
affirms, “This partnership of man and woman constitutes the first form of communion 
between persons.  For by his innermost nature man is a social being; and if he does not 
enter into relations with others he can neither live nor develop gifts.”  Human persons, 
being made in the image of God, are created for communion.  The capacity for communio 
forms the most basic criterion for what it means to be a person.  Communio vitae is 
understood in the profound biblical sense in which man and woman have established an 
entire orientation to their lives as one with each other by their personal pledge and 
commitment.   
 3.5.2 Trinitarian Character of Sacramental Marriage 
As sacrament, the communio of married life is reflective of the communio of the 
Triune God, thus enabling the couple to participate in the grace of God.  The human 
person created imago Dei means every person is made capable of real unity with the 
Other (God and human) and ordered to such an end.  John Paul II in his apostolic letter 
Mulieris dignitatem infers that we are made in the image of God through our intellect and 
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will, and we are made in the likeness of God through our vocation to interpersonal 
communion.  “For every individual is made in the image of God, insofar as he or she is a 
rational and free creature capable of knowing God and loving him.  Moreover, we read 
that man cannot exist ‘alone’ (cf. Gen 2:18); he can exist only as a ‘unity of the two’, and 
therefore in relation to another human person.”  Further on John Paul II asserts, “This 
‘unity of the two’, which is a sign of interpersonal communion, shows that the creation of 
man is also marked by a certain likeness to the divine communion (‘communio’).  This 
likeness is a quality of the personal being of both man and woman, and is also a call and a 
task.”173  Human persons are created in the image of God with reason and free will in 
order that we may be made more fully into God’s likeness through communion with God 
and one another.  Being engendered signifies the ontology of personhood which means 
existing in relationship as God does.  This does not mean that God is engendered; rather, 
our bodies as symbols of our selves make present our capacity for interpersonal 
communion and love.  “Being a person means striving towards self-realization (the 
Council text speaks of self-discovery), which can only be achieved ‘through a sincere gift 
of self’.  The model for this interpretation of the person is God himself as Trinity, as a 
communion of Persons.”174   
 Based on the early fathers and the Orthodox tradition, John Zizioulas constructs a 
theology of personhood and communion which can shed further light on the communio 
vitae of marriage, although he does not do so explicitly.  His patristic and Eastern 
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perspective emphasizes the freedom of personhood embedded in the very being of God as 
communion.  Zizioulas states, “It would be unthinkable to speak of the ‘one God’ before 
speaking of the God who is ‘communion,’ that is to say, of the Holy Trinity.”  He 
continues, “The substance of God, ‘God,’ has no ontological content, no true being, apart 
from communion.”175  The communion of God is not the primordial ontological category.  
The communion that is God arises from a Person, the Father, who is not only uncreated 
but also ungenerated: 
Just like “substance,” “communion” does not exist by itself:  it is the Father who 
is the “cause” of it. . . . The fact that God exists because of the Father shows that 
His existence, His being is the consequence of a free person; which means, in the 
last analysis, that not only communion but also freedom, the free person, 
constitutes true being.  True being comes only from the free person, from the 
person who loves freely—that is, who freely affirms his being, his identity, by 
means of an event of communion with other persons.176  
 
Only a person, characterized by self-possession and self-determination, can become a gift 
to another in love.  It is persons that create communion, made possible by God as 
communio, and such communion is life.  Gaudium et spes 24 teaches, 
Furthermore, the Lord Jesus, when praying to the Father “that they may all be one 
. . . even as we are one” (Jn 17: 21-22), has opened up new horizons closed to 
human reason by implying that there is a certain parallel between the union 
existing among the divine persons and the union of the sons of God in truth and 
love.  It follows, then, that if man is the only creature on earth that God has 
wanted for its own sake, man can fully discover his true self only in a sincere 
giving of himself.177  
 
Although much is learned about personhood through the human sciences, priority is 
given to revelation.  We know what it means to be a person based upon God’s revelation 
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of God as communion.  The importance of this thesis will become apparent in a theology 
of marital commitment.  That is to say, we can use the analogical method to learn about 
the Trinity from our experiential knowledge of the family, but in our present context we 
can also use the kataphatic method to learn about the family through the revelation of the 
Trinity.178  It is precisely this point of the freedom and self-determination of the person 
that will prove pivotal for a theology of marital commitment.179 
 The revelation that God is a tri-unity and not only a unity of the two 
communicates something significant about the nature of love in which all are called to 
participate.  The Holy Spirit opens and universalizes the particular love of the Father and 
the Son so that all are welcome.  William Thompson articulates the beauty and relevance 
of trinitarian doctrine: 
The divine ground (Father/Mother) is not mute, but a self-communicative reality 
(Logos/Word), not hoarding its self-communication, but intrinsically a 
participative, inclusivistic reality (Spirit).  The “one” God of Christianity seems to 
be a “Subject” of and through “interpersonal relations.”  If we express this in the 
more traditional terms of love, coming down partly from at least one strand of 
Augustine and Richard of St. Victor, as well as from the Eastern theologians, we 
might say that the reality of the “Spirit” points to the fact that the dialogue 
between Father and Son is not locked up in itself, a kind of exclusive club.  Rather 
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is it inclusive:  sharable love.  The Father’s and Son’s “bond” (the Spirit) is our 
“bond” with them.  The Spirit—the “Third”—points to the non-selfish nature of 
the Divine.  Which is why we, too, can participate in the “great conversation.”180  
 
The bond of marriage, the res et sacramentum, is exclusive and permanent yet at the 
same time it is inclusive and dynamic due to the grace of the Holy Spirit, the 
paradigmatic bond of divine love.  This opening of love must occur for love to be what it 
is.  Because communio is tri-unity, conjugal love becomes other than itself, fruitful.  
Kasper explains, “The fruitfulness of marriage comes from the inner essence of personal 
love itself.  If it is essential for love to empty itself, it must therefore be impossible for 
true love to stay with itself.  It is inevitably impelled to realization, objectivization and 
embodiment in a shared third party.”181  This dynamic tension in marriage between 
exclusivity and inclusivity, giving and receiving, changing and remaining the same is 
present because sacramental marriage is reflective of God’s mysterious communion. 
 3.5.3 Families as Domestic Churches 
 The grace of God offered to spouses in the sacrament is accepted or rejected 
within the living out of the sacrament, matrimonium in facto esse.  It would be 
misleading to translate the preceding Latin phrase as “the state of marriage.”  
Matrimonium in facto esse is anything but a state; rather, it connotes marriage existing in 
actuality as a lived relationship.  While it is true that the marital sacrament is reflective of 
and a participation in trinitarian communion, the marital relationship is decidedly human, 
corporeal, and finite.  A theology of marriage that focuses primarily on the ideal can 
leave real-life spouses feeling disappointed, frustrated, and inadequate.  The biblical and 
                                                 
180. William M. Thompson, Christology and Spirituality (New York, NY: Crossroad, 1991), 33. 
 
181. Kasper, Theology of Christian Marriage, 18. 
 
153 
 
patristic image of family as domestic church, church in miniature, or little church 
provides a beneficial symbolic expression of the reality of marriage.  The family as 
domestic church is an ecclesial reality on mission and embodying the priestly, prophetic, 
and kingly ecclesial functions derived from Christ.182  As Florence Caffrey Bourg states, 
“It should function first and foremost to stimulate imaginations to a deeper appreciation 
of the mystery of the Church and of how family life figures into God’s plan of gracious 
presence in history.”183  The family as domestic church “is a living image and historical 
representation of the mystery of the Church.”184  The image of family as domestic church 
educes from the imagination the varied range of experiences in families.   “Domestic 
churches are characteristically caught up in the tension between ideal and actual, between 
the attractiveness of their life’s goals and the mediocrity of their journey toward those 
goals.”185  Matrimonium in facto esse is a dynamic relationship, a journey, a sacrament 
directed toward the highest goal of communion with God and one another while limping 
slowly there day by day.  Frederick Parrella articulates this tension between the ideal and 
real in domestic churches in his spirituality of the family: 
In the family, too, are the theological ideal of the human person and the paradigm 
of human community, a community which has as its only basis of unity the 
fatherhood of God.  Our individual experiences of family, however, are often very 
different from this ideal.  Families are more often expressions of human fragility 
and estrangement than human models of divine goodness; more often 
communities of competition, self-seclusion, or unspoken hostility than 
relationships of love and mutual concern.  Although this is not as it should be, it is 
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perhaps the way it must be.  Just as the Cross of Christ is both the supreme gift of 
God and the absolute offer of grace, and at the same time the historical 
crystallization of sinfulness, so, too, the family is at once both the image of the 
divine life and of human estrangement and sin.186  
 
Given that families live in the tension between the ideal and actual, Bourg argues that the 
sacramental foundation of domestic church should be marriage and baptism as interlaced 
with baptism being primary.187  “Sacramental marriage is a public renewal and 
specification of one’s baptismal commitment.”188  Bourg states that the “’paschal’ sort of 
love” entailed in living in the reality of married love with dying to self and rising again is 
“best symbolized in baptism.”189  Ideally, faith will be deepened and nurtured in the 
marital sacrament, yet due to our freedom there is always the risk that grace will be 
rejected.  Eschatologically, domestic church is an example of the already but not yet of 
the kingdom.190 
 The image of marriage as domestic church aligns with the understanding of 
church as a pilgrim on earth necessary for salvation.191  The reality is that there are many 
marriages within a marriage, meaning spouses traverse stages over a lifetime together.  
The grace offered in the sacrament is new each day, because each marriage is in a 
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continual process of change and development.  The call and challenge in marriage is to 
embrace “fidelity in change.”192  While change is inevitable, growth and maturation are 
optional.  Persons change due to the complex interaction among transitional life events, 
aging processes, and personal decisions.  As each spouse changes, so does the 
relationship which must adjust to ever new terrain.  Specific experiences of change 
interrupt the flow of life and force the couple to reevaluate and renegotiate so as to move 
to a “new marriage” within their marriage.  These times of transition, or crises, imply 
decision, threat, promise, endings, and beginnings.  “In New Testament terms, a crisis is 
thus a time of decision in which we may expect to lose something and to enter into God’s 
presence.  Crises as religious disruptions are how God gets into our life.”193  Barbara 
Markey states that couples can successfully move through these times of ambiguity 
through remembering and learning from past experiences, enlisting the support of good 
mentors, and committing to the process.194  According to Markey, the stages of the 
marriage life cycle include:  the childhood experience of marriage, adolescent and young 
adult experience of the male/female relationship, leaving home and the decision to marry, 
being newly married, building marriage with young children, refocusing midlife marriage 
with adolescents, launching children and moving on, and shaping later life in marriage.195  
Transitions to each stage “can become either destabilizing events or normative 
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development.”196  Awareness of the many marriages within a marriage through the image 
of domestic church as pilgrim can help spouses to experience peace in the liminal 
experiences of the sacrament. 
 3.5.4 God in Sex—Identity, Vocation, and Intimacy 
The very human and concrete character of marriage is epitomized in sex.  A 
theology of marriage that fails to give due consideration to the meaning of our sexuality 
or the role of sex in marriage is deficient.  In theologies of marriage, there is a tendency 
either to spiritualize our sexuality through the profuse use of terms like ‘self-gift’ or to 
narrowly focus on specific controversial topics in sexual ethics like contraception and 
homosexuality.  From the ecstatic pleasure of sexual union to the shameful 
embarrassment experienced in sexual dysfunction, our sexuality forces us to confront our 
humanity.  Sexual difference and sexual attraction have been the source of profound hope 
and joy and at the same time of exploitation and discrimination.  Our sexual selves serve 
as a constant reminder of our creatureliness and yet our capacity for profound 
communion.  The great difficulty in articulating a theology of sex and marriage or 
making judgments in sexual ethics is finding balance between the spiritual character of 
sex opening one to terrific heights and the determinate, physical character of sex that also 
contains us within our bodies. 
 Sexuality is a key element of personal identity.  In order for sex to be self-gift, 
there must be a self to give.  Personal identity “is a matter of consistency—between my 
present and my past, and between my inner experience of myself and the expectations 
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that others have of me.”197  It means clarity about who I am, and at the same time, 
flexibility, so that rigidity and defensiveness do not enter in when faced with conflict.  “It 
means I am confident that being close to others will not destroy me.”198  Strength in 
personal identity includes knowledge and acceptance of our bodiliness and how we 
should relate to others.  For personal identity is not for us alone, but also for the sake of 
others.  Our vocation, which springs from our identity, is a unique call from God and our 
response to that call in freedom.  “It is the particular way I find myself called to love, to 
care for the world and to witness to Christian faith.”199  In faith, one can gradually come 
to see the invitation to live a certain kind of life through knowledge of Christian values 
and one’s own strengths and weaknesses.  Ideally, strength in personal identity flows into 
vocational awareness and decision.  “Without the strength of a (somewhat) clear sense of 
who I am, my choices and commitments in life will be responses to external pressures.”  
Whitehead and Whitehead continue, “Fidelity to another person is grounded in the ability 
to be faithful to myself.  Often we speak of this as integrity or authenticity, but we may 
also use the word fidelity to describe this faithfulness to my vocation that, in turn, 
prepares me to be faithful to a marriage commitment.”200  
 Although few would question that sexuality is a fundamental element of personal 
identity, there is great debate and little agreement over what it means to be made male or 
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female.201  Does the differential embodiment of males and females influence their way of 
being in the world due to social and cultural forces or due to essential differences in their 
being?  Perhaps an either/or answer confounds instead of clarifies.  Even though 
women’s experiences of self differ based upon geographic and historical location, is there 
not something unique that women know, or a unique way that women know, due to their 
experiences as women?  For example, do the experiences of pregnancy, birth, and 
lactation in any place and time create a distinctive way of knowing?  Bonnie Miller-
McLemore states, 
Women’s embodiment, specifically the bodily and still painful experience of 
birth, as well as pregnancy and lactation, represents a distinct perspective and may 
evoke particular ways of perceiving and thinking. 
 I say “may evoke” because I am not trying to depict a universal or 
essential characteristic of all women and mothers.  Not all birthing, nursing 
women inherently share one distinct mode of knowing.  Nor should this common 
female experience dictate limited social roles which, given human freedom, 
remain extremely malleable.202  
 
Male or female embodiment should not constrain and restrict a person in a way that is 
detrimental to human dignity, yet at the same time it is through one’s particular human 
body that one comes to know and love in a specific way.  For example, the belief that 
women are naturally more nurturing or self-sacrificing serves only to limit and define, not 
only women but also men, in opposing social roles.  Perhaps women have become 
nurturing and self-sacrificing not simply because they are women, but because they have 
been the ones to care for children and those that cannot care for themselves, a role that 
can and should be shared with men.  What it means to be male or female largely depends 
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upon culture, but this meaning cannot become disembodied and indeterminate.  The fact 
that pregnancy, birth, and lactation cannot be shared reinforces the connection to the 
body in defining personal identity.  Discovering one’s identity in the givenness of life and 
creating it in freedom reveal for those called to marriage the invitation to intimacy. 
 Every person is called to intimacy with God, but the vocation to marriage implies 
that this intimacy is intended to occur in and through the relationship between the 
spouses.  The story of Jacob wrestling with Yahweh (Gn 32:24-31) exemplifies the risk, 
vulnerability, conflict, and change involved in intimate encounters.  Similar to Jacob’s 
encounter, marriage is a process in which the spouses may be hurt, but will definitely be 
changed, just as Jacob’s name was changed to Israel.  In an intimate relationship, spouses 
are willing to change and be changed, and in the process, to receive blessing.  “Intimacy 
involves an overlapping of space, a willingness to be influenced, an openness to the 
possibility of change.  It invites me beyond myself.  But only with a strong and flexible 
sense of self can I accept the invitation.”203  True intimacy is only possible when one’s 
personal identity is known and vocation is followed.  Whitehead and Whitehead connect 
intimacy with the commitment that sustains it: 
It is intimacy that makes a particular commitment possible.  I am not married to 
“most men” or to “most women” but to this person.  And over the course of 
marriage I may come to recognize ways in which this person who is my spouse is 
limited and even flawed—just as I am.  If our marriage is to survive this 
realization, I must be able to commit myself to this person in our marriage—
aware of the limitation and incompleteness that are involved.  I draw on intimacy 
resources to make this commitment and, again, to live it out.204  
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In this way, intimacy is both a virtue in marriage and an intrinsic meaning of human 
sexuality.  In a truly intimate relationship, the persons involved are familiar with most 
aspects of each other and continue to persevere in love.  I would alter the Whiteheads’ 
statement by asserting intimacy makes commitment easier, yet commitment makes 
intimacy possible.  The risk of truly being known by another can only happen within the 
safety of a commitment where one is free to reveal even the ugliness of self without the 
fear of rejection or abandonment.  
Lisa Sowle Cahill identifies reproduction, pleasure, and intimacy as the three 
values of human sexuality that should be enhanced in the institution of marriage.205  She 
states,  
Deficient moral behavior or inadequate moral analysis can result from the 
truncation or division of the pleasurable, intimate, and procreative meanings.  
Human sexual experience is complex and complete when all three bodily 
dimensions of sex are developed through the three levels (bodily, personal, social) 
and integrated in relationships over time.206  
 
Marriage protects and promotes these values by providing an environment in which 
physical intimacy can express mutual love, commitment, respect, and care not only for 
each other but for any children brought into the family.  For centuries, procreation has 
been named the primary end of sex, and in the last century Paul VI in Humane vitae 
deemed the procreative and unitive meanings co-equal and essential to the goodness of 
every sex act.207  Conversely, over the centuries, the pleasure of sex was associated with 
the unruly sexual appetite and sin.  Identifying pleasure as one of the intrinsic values of 
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sex could affect canon law, because theological values once identified need to be 
appropriated through norms and structures that contribute to the growth of human persons 
and the spiritual development of the community.  As Moore argues, “Pleasure is not what 
is sought after as the end of the activity, but what is experienced in performing the 
activity.  So to seek a particular pleasure, the pleasure of doing a particular thing, is just 
to seek to do that thing.”208  Seeking the pleasure of sex is a natural human good that 
contributes to our well-being that, like any good, needs to be balanced among other 
goods: 
When the Christian tradition condemns sex for pleasure alone, this is not well 
understood as a condemnation of friends doing something pleasurable together 
because it is pleasurable.  Rather, it is a way of stressing the interpersonal nature 
of shared sexual activity and of reminding us that the pleasures of sex cannot be 
reduced to having a range of sensations; they are, at the very least, the pleasures 
of doing pleasant things together with a friend.  A sexual encounter that neglects 
the importance of friendship is therefore defective, as is the pleasure that is 
derived from it.209  
 
The other values of sexual activity, intimacy and procreation, are interpersonal in essence 
indicating that for sexual pleasure to be a natural human good, the nature, duration, and 
quality of the personal relationship makes a great difference.210  If we begin from the 
premise that sex, like every natural human good, is a gift from God, then it would be 
disrespectful to misuse this gift.211  Sex as an expression of self and of the relationship 
naturally discloses the intimacy shared between the couple.  At the same time, some of 
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those acts lead to the creation of new life.  Sex naturally belongs in a lifelong, committed 
relationship, because it is the most intimate, physical expression of love and friendship 
with another person, which at the same time opens the possibility of children into the 
relationship.  Moore continues, 
It is not natural to us to embrace those to whom we are not close.  In such 
circumstances the embrace would be emptied of its natural significance; it would 
be meaningless.  Because, as I have argued, an embrace has a natural significance, 
the meaninglessness of this particular embrace would not be the absence of an 
optional extra, but a loss of meaning; the embrace would be as it were denatured, 
dehumanized.  And, because meaning is so central to our humanity, that in turn 
would mean that the embracers would suffer loss and be diminished.212  
 
This is not to say that every sexual act must clearly communicate the total self-gift of one 
to another.  Rather, each act, however humanly expressed, should occur within the 
context of a loving, committed, lifelong relationship.  The meaning of those acts derives 
from the overall context of the relationship.  Cahill articulates the risk to couples in 
purporting an overly spiritual and unrealistic theology of sex: 
The idea that each act is a total self-gift depends upon a very romanticized 
depiction of sex, and even of marital love.  Certainly there will be times when an 
act of sexual sharing is hampered or disturbed by factors, intrinsically or 
extrinsically generated, which impinge, either temporarily or permanently, on the 
couple’s relationship.  They are stressed by economic difficulties, an ongoing 
disagreement about a family matter, blind spots in seeing one another’s emotional 
needs, a crying child, lack of sleep, or an important project due at work.  But even 
more than that, in the most ideal of circumstances, human beings rarely if ever 
accomplish “total self-gift.”  And the level of self-gift we do accomplish is rarely 
required to manifest itself, all or nothing, in a single action, much less in every 
one of a series of actions that we perform regularly.213  
 
Instead of offering support and encouragement to couples as they grow in love and 
intimacy, a theology of sex that inordinately focuses on the idea of  ‘self-gift’ places 
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undue expectations and demands on spouses.  The use of idealist language needs to be 
balanced with real experiences and circumstances.  Within a relationship begun and 
sustained in marital commitment, there is room for play, forgiveness, patience, and the 
complex gamut of graced interactions that constitute a loving relationship. 
3.5.5 Love in Marriage 
 In contemporary American marriages, it is plainly assumed that love is the 
foundation, context, motivation, goal, and end of marriage. Marriage without love is 
unthinkable in today’s American mentality.  Without denying the personalist 
understanding of sex and marriage previously discussed, a theology of sex, love, and 
marriage should avoid the danger of what David Matzko McCarthy calls “theological 
romanticism.”214  McCarthy argues that sex and love in marriage has the benefit of fitting 
within the context of ordinary shared life in the household of a multitude of relationships 
with family, friends, and neighbors.  For that reason, “any particular sexual encounter 
need not say anything earth shattering; it need not point to the fullness or full meaning of 
a sexual relationship.”215  Because sex in marriage is “a minor episode in a larger story,” 
spouses are free to celebrate the ordinary.  “The chief problem in this personalist account 
of sex is, not that it goes wrong, but that it says too much to be right.  Every sexual act is 
defined as full and total, so that sex has no room to be ordinary.”216  Conjugal love is 
experienced in sex and in many other quotidian moments of life:  diapering babies, 
sweeping the floor, paying the bills, sharing meals with friends and neighbors, and 
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disciplining children.  Theological romanticism occurs when conjugal love is defined 
solely as sexual intercourse as total self-gift leaving real spouses frustrated and 
disappointed when comparing such a theology to the mundane.  McCarthy expounds, 
The impossible ideal, it seems to me, is a consequence of the idea that marriage is 
a complete communion.  It is impractical to hope that one person can be 
completed by another, or that one’s spouse would be able to receive the “total” 
personality and texture of the other.  We should hope that friends and co-workers 
will tease out and cultivate personal qualities and make demands that our 
husbands and wives cannot.  Even if marriage is a primary source of one’s 
identity, it is quite a different matter to assume that we can exhaust one another’s 
“total” self.217  
 
Marital love is rich with significance so that the various meanings need not exclude one 
another.  Marital love can be common and exceptional at the same time.  It can mean 
extraordinary efforts in forgiveness and the daily sharing of the newspaper.  Because 
marital love is lived over a lifetime, a single act or experience need not define and 
encompass the entire relationship.  That is not to say that there can never be acts that are 
so extraordinary that they define, alter, or reverse the course of a relationship.  This line 
of reasoning is reminiscent of what constitutes one’s fundamental option in moral 
theology.  Those acts of marital love or lack thereof that define a relationship are very 
rare and difficult to identify.  The meaning of sex in marriage is derived from the context 
of the total relationship which has a beginning, middle, and end. 
 Whereas we use one word for the many meanings of love, the Greeks had 
different words to indicate the different ways in which we love.  Contemporary American 
marriages often begin in eros or the love called desire.  Lawler explains, “Eros is love of 
another person for my good.”218  It usually implies sexual desire but need not be limited 
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in that way.  Eros finds something beautiful, attractive, desirable in the beloved causing 
the lover to become pre-occupied but delightfully so.  This attraction or desire can 
become overwhelming which leads to the feeling of falling in love, the passive 
experience of being swept away into a new world which is the beloved.  Eros wants to 
consume and be consumed.  Many associate romantic love with marital love so much so 
that when eros wanes, as it does with the tedium and familiarity of long-term 
relationships, many believe that there is no longer love in the marriage.  Although 
marriage may begin with eros, it is sustained by the other loves, specifically agape and 
philia. 
 Agape is “universal, unconditional, impartial, non-preferential love.”219  It is 
willingly self-sacrificing for the good of the beloved without expectation of reciprocation.  
Customarily, Christian love has been associated with agape; however, love has many 
dimensions that can emerge based upon one’s perspective or during different times in a 
relationship.  Benedict XVI articulates how the respective ascending and descending 
loves of eros and agape are united: 
Even if eros is at first mainly covetous and ascending, a fascination for the great 
promise of happiness, in drawing near to the other, it is less and less concerned 
with itself, increasingly seeks the happiness of the other, is concerned more and 
more with the beloved, bestows itself and wants to “be there for” the other.  The 
element of agape thus enters into this love, for otherwise eros is impoverished 
and even loses its own nature.  On the other hand, man cannot live by oblative, 
descending love alone.  He cannot always give, he must also receive.  Anyone 
who wishes to give love must also receive love as a gift.220  
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Eros and agape meet in mutual love and fulfillment.  Perhaps this meeting place could be 
called philia.  Philia is friendship, that is, love that is particular, mutual, and reciprocal, 
which seeks the good of both persons and the relationship itself.221  It is love that has 
been returned creating a true communion.  Initially friends are drawn to one another 
through a mutual interest or activity, but eventually, in close friendships, the friendship 
itself binds them together.  Lawler points out, “The problem in history, especially post-
Enlightenment history, is that agape was enthroned as the norm of all love and philia did 
not measure up to that norm.  Agape, however, is not the norm of love; God is the norm 
of all love, both agape and philia.”222  God’s universal love for all (agape) is 
particularized in the Abrahamic covenant and even further in the Incarnation.223  God is 
the norm and source of all kinds of love that are present throughout the life cycle of 
marriage.  Todd Salzman contends, “As we shall see, marriage as sacrament can be 
defined in terms of a friendship bond (philia) shared as a lifelong commitment between 
husband and wife in union with Christ, which is universally shared (agape).  It is agape 
which can strengthen the friendship bond, sustain that bond through difficult times, and 
extend it to all human relationships.”224  In exploring eros and agape in Deus caritas est, 
Joann Heaney-Hunter affirms that the union of eros and agape in the sacrament of 
marriage is not for the good of the couple alone; sacramental couples are to be 
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Eucharistic people.225  “In the spirit of Christ’s radical gift of self to all, couples are 
called to create a Eucharistic culture in their homes—a culture of covenantal spirituality 
(blessing), intimacy (which inevitably involves brokenness), and generosity (sharing).”226  
As John Paul II teaches, “Thus, far from being closed in on itself, the family is by nature 
and vocation open to other families and to society, and undertakes its social role.”227  
Sacramental couples are called to transform the world around them. 
All the loves work together for the mutual good of the family in marriage.  The 
ecstatic and overwhelming passion of eros can ignite marital love in the beginning and 
after reconciliation.  Storge, or affection, is the humblest of loves providing comfort in 
the familiarity of one’s family, particularly the relationship of parents and children.228  It 
provides that feeling of “at home-ness” in the voice, eyes, or simple presence of loved 
ones.  Agape does the hard work of forgiveness, self-sacrifice, generativity, and 
hospitality.  Because justice is the minimum of love, agapic love should not encompass 
the whole of married love for either spouse.  Agape repairs and reorients love that has 
become asymmetrical.  Browning offers recommendations for properly integrating self-
sacrificial love with mutual love, essentially agape and philia: 
First, both husbands and wives should take part in the drama of sacrificial or self-
giving love needed to energize families for lifelong commitments.  Second, 
sacrificial love is not the whole of love, even in the Christian tradition.  Sacrificial 
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love is an important moment within a wider context of love as equal regard. . . . 
Third, to keep the proper balance between love as sacrificial and love as equal 
regard, it is useful to see love and marriage as life-cycle phenomena in which love 
takes slightly different form depending on where a family is in its cycle.229  
 
Agape ensures that the marital relationship is always unconditional; eros and storge keep 
it embodied and companionate; philia promises mutuality, respect, and care.  God’s offer 
of the love and grace necessary to sustain the sacrament is always present.  Each spouse 
has the freedom to accept or reject this offer at anytime.  The elements of freedom, 
choice, commitment, and love will be explored in greater detail, then viewed within the 
juridical context of marital consent. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
A THEOLOGY OF MARITAL COMMITMENT 
 
 
4.1 Culture, Commitment, and Freedom in American Life 
 
 
  4.1.1 The Mark of Individualism in Culture 
The explanations for the crisis of marital and family breakup that have 
predominated in theological and social scientific discourse are interrelated and include: 
cultural factors, economic factors, psychological factors, and socio-political factors.  
They interact so intimately that they cannot be completely separated in analysis. Culture 
as a multi-layered construct is inclusive of the other factors.  Robert Bellah and his 
colleagues describe culture as “those patterns of meaning that any group or society uses 
to interpret and evaluate itself and its situation.”1  Culture is constitutive of all human 
action, because a particular group’s worldview and values are embedded and expressed in 
its symbols, stories, myths, customs, rites, roles, language, art, music, entertainment, 
technology, and social structures.  Culture influences social and economic organization 
along with the psychological structures of those living within the culture.  These cultural 
influences can be interpreted through theological lenses in order to better understand and 
respond to the reality of marital and family disintegration.  When considering cultural 
changes that have had a significant impact on family formation and fragmentation, 
individualism stands out as central.   
Individualism differs from individuality based upon the manner in which the 
individual is viewed and ordered in relation to God and others.  A healthy sense of 
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individuality honors the uniqueness and inherent dignity of each human person and works 
against systems of oppression and injustice directed toward minorities.  On the other 
hand, individualism systematically treats the individual as primary with social and 
theological aspects as secondary or insignificant.  A culture of individualism poses the 
constant threat of exploitation and oppression of the vulnerable.  Bellah and his 
colleagues argue that inordinate focus on the self has contributed to a loss of commitment 
and community.  Individualism, the ideology “in which the self has become the main 
form of reality”2 leads to isolation and withdrawal into one’s enclosed sphere of family 
and friends.3  Utilitarian individualism, a worldview based heavily upon self-reliance and 
the pursuit of self-interest in the economy, characterizes public life; whereas, expressive 
individualism, an ideology that overemphasizes the feelings and intuition of the unique 
individual, distinguishes private life.4  In the last two hundred years, the transition from 
an agrarian society to an industrial society accompanied the rise of romantic love, which 
is “the quintessential form of expressive individualism,”5 as the basis for marriage.  
Whether or not they are causally related, both of these historical events factored into the 
retreat of the family into private life in the nineteenth century that continues today. 
 The demarcation and separation of the socio-political and productive world of 
work from the psycho-social consumptive world of family affects the very notion of 
                                                 
2. Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart:  Individualism and Commitment in American Life, 143.  
Because this text was originally written in 1985 (with subsequent revised editions), it could be argued that 
it is a dated commentary on current cultural values in American life.  I disagree.  Although the cultural 
landscape has changed tremendously in the last decades, the threat of individualism has not waned, because 
ultimately it is a theological problem.  The inordinate concern for the self and one’s own immediate 
situation was discussed in Chapter One in relation to Lonergan’s concept of bias and will be related to the 
theology of commitment developed in this study.   
 
3. Ibid., 37. 
 
4. Ibid., 45-46. 
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community and family.  Family becomes a place of psychological self-fulfillment and 
economic consumption and leisure.  Bellah and his colleagues warn that when romantic 
love becomes the basis for marriage, marriage tends to become a “lifestyle enclave.”6  
“Whereas a community attempts to be an inclusive whole, celebrating the 
interdependence of public and private life and of the different calling of all, lifestyle is 
fundamentally segmental and celebrates the narcissism of similarity.”7  The fracturing of 
American society into private and public spheres contributes to alienation between men 
and women.  Not only patriarchal structures but also natural asymmetrical reproductive 
patterns have left women associated with the private world of love, children, and intimate 
relationships.  Alternatively, men have been associated with the public world of work, 
creativity, and technical relationships.  One may argue that in today’s culture of equal 
opportunity legislation and rapid technological communication, there is not so great a 
divide between work and home, public and private, or men and women.  Although the 
gaps may be closing, the history of this fragmentation can still be sensed and 
experienced.  If anything, our mobile forms of communication pose the threat of work 
enveloping family when mothers and fathers are continuously available to engage in 
work-related activities whether at home or work.8  In many families, mothers and fathers 
work increasingly long hours so as to provide financially for the wishes, rather than the 
needs, of their children (or themselves alone).  This critique is directed toward families in 
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8. Mobile forms of communication have been beneficial in terms of ease, efficiency, and 
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digital forms of communication have radically altered the very meaning of interpersonal communication 
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Western, upper-middle and upper classes that live as lifestyle enclaves in which work is a 
mere means to amass wealth for their immediate loved ones. An emphasis on the intrinsic 
value and availability of meaningful work, which is essentially one’s contribution to the 
common good, can aid in transforming the American culture of individualism into a 
culture of community and commitment.9 
 4.1.2 Cultural Decline and Sin   
 The preceding cultural critique presumes the presence of sin and grace.  The 
culture of individualism that contributes to the fragmentation of families exists due to the 
human proclivity to sin.  This is not to deny the countless examples of graced self-
sacrifice, commitment, solidarity, compassion, and care that exist within and between 
families.  The recognition of sin as a theological datum in the cultural situation is to 
clarify that individualism and individualistic tendencies are not the result of a dated and 
oft-repeated cultural critique, but rather that sin is the factor that inhibits personal and 
communal progress.  This social and cultural decline is a result of the three biases 
identified by Lonergan that were discussed in Chapter One.  The complex interaction of 
all three of these biases is the reason why the crisis in sacramental marriage cannot be 
easily explained nor resolved.  Individual bias is a refusal of self-transcendence, that is, 
the refusal to allow concern for others and the common good to direct and order one’s 
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understanding and practical living.  The egoist,10 or individualist, stunts the growth of his 
own understanding by refusing to raise questions beyond those which originate from his 
own desires and fears.  Individual bias is a “self-deception,” although the egoist is not 
totally unaware of such deception.  Lonergan describes it as a “conscious self-
orientation,”11 because sin always involves the will in some way.  Hope for escaping sin 
lies in “the egoist’s uneasy conscience.”12  Recognition and reversal of this individualistic 
slant is grace mediated through the church as community, where conscience is formed 
and strengthened.  What is needed is a redemptive community, because sin is more than 
individual.  Group bias “defines the alienation of group from group and from the general 
social order.”13  The interests of one’s particular group are placed above other groups and 
the common good.  Although a social phenomenon, group bias as sin engages the will.  
“The sins of group bias may be secret and almost unconscious.  But what originally was a 
neglected possibility, in time becomes grotesquely distorted reality.”14  Group bias 
manifests itself in unequal power distribution among groups.  Finally, all human persons 
are subject to the general bias of common sense, which is an incomplete set of insights 
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concerned with immediate, particular practical problems of ordinary, daily living.15  
Though common, there are “differentiations of common sense.”  Lonergan explicates, 
Such, then, is the specialization of common sense.  At once, it adapts individuals 
in every walk of life to the work they have chosen or the lot that has befallen 
them, and no less, it generates all those minute differences of viewpoint and 
mentality that separate men and women, old and young, town and country, until in 
the limit one reaches the cumulative differences and mutual incomprehension of 
different strata of society, different nations, different civilizations, and different 
epochs of human history.16  
 
The general bias means the inability of common sense to judge itself and take into 
consideration “larger issues” and “long-term results.”17  Without incorporation of a long 
and far-reaching view, myopic, uncritical concentration on the immediate leads to decline 
of the social situation in which individuals and groups are self-centered and short-sighted.  
Individual, group, and general bias describe the refusal to look beyond one’s own self, 
group, or immediate situation in order to live attentively, intelligently, reasonably, and 
responsibly. 
   Cultural, social, economic and political explanations of American family 
disintegration and change are insufficient without incorporating a theological lens of sin 
through which to evaluate empirical and historical findings.  From a theological point of 
view, a culture of individualism which bifurcates men from women, public from private, 
work from home, and haves from have-nots is the result of sin.  Browning and his 
colleagues argue precisely this point: 
A theological point of view locates the deeper problem of families in the 
fallibility and fault of the human will:  in the susceptibility of the human spirit to 
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distortion and self-preoccupation.  By fault, we mean the human tendency toward 
inordinate self-protection in the face of anxiety that manifests itself in both pride 
and, as feminists have argued, self-effacement or self-loss.  The language of 
fallibility and fault, borrowed from Paul Ricoeur, is a more abstract way of 
talking about the Christian concept of sin.18  
 
It is necessary to acknowledge the interaction of all factors in order to formulate a more 
effective and pastoral response.  Browning and his colleagues add, “Unless social-science 
explanations are informed by the reality of sin, causes are converted into excuses.  Yet, 
mean-spirited moralism can be avoided if we place the reality of sin within the context of 
the multiple pressures that work upon it.”19  What has changed in American marriages 
and families cannot be explained simply by deterministic cultural or economic forces.  At 
the heart of the situation is freedom.20 
 4.1.3 Freedom From Versus Freedom For 
 For most Americans, freedom is the most treasured value, but unfortunately the 
reigning culture of individualism has skewed the intrinsic meaning of freedom.  In a 
culture that reveres self-sufficiency and autonomy, freedom has come to mean essentially 
freedom from.  Bellah and his colleagues color an accurate picture of the social situation: 
Yet freedom turns out to mean being left alone by others, not having other 
people’s values, ideas, or styles of life forced upon one, being free of arbitrary 
authority in work, family, and political life.  What it is that one might do with that 
freedom is much more difficult for Americans to define.  And if the entire social 
world is made up of individuals, each endowed with the right to be free of others’ 
demands, it becomes hard to forge bonds of attachment to, or cooperation with, 
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other people, since such bonds would imply obligations that necessarily impinge 
on one’s freedom.21  
 
This negative understanding of freedom implies separation and detachment.  Freedom is 
worshipped as an ultimate value or “a virtual end in itself.”22  “The people of our time 
prize freedom very highly and strive eagerly for it.  In this they are right.  Yet they often 
cherish it improperly, as if it gave them leave to do anything they like, even when it is 
evil.”23  However, such freedom is without content and “presumes the existence of an 
absolutely empty unencumbered and improvisational self.”24  Such an understanding is a 
deformation not only of freedom but also of the human person.  What is needed is a 
positive account of freedom and the will. 
 The human person is a knower and a doer.  It is apparent that knowing and doing 
are different operations and that doing does not necessarily flow from knowing the proper 
course of action.  Human lives are filled with inconsistency between knowing and doing.  
Moral and rational life consists in living by the transcendental precepts where deciding 
and doing follow from what one understands and judges to be the right course of action.  
Self-transcendence can only occur when finally “by deliberation, evaluation, decision, 
action, we can know and do, not just what pleases us, but what truly is good, 
worthwhile.”25   Living morally is admittedly a difficult task from which persons attempt 
to escape.  Lonergan identifies three escapes from consistently doing what one knows to 
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be the right thing to do.  The first is to avoid self-consciousness, which is ultimately 
creating an illusion.  In order to know the right thing to do, one must intimately know 
oneself, an arduous discipline.  “How finely tempered must one’s sincerity be if one is to 
know oneself as one is, to know not a character sketch that explains one in terms of 
ancestry and environment, but a moral analysis of one’s deeds, one’s words, one’s mixed 
motives.”26  The second escape from living morally is rationalization, that is, to alter 
one’s knowing to align with one’s doing instead of vice-versa.  Such a tactic is a 
deception in which the person shifts the “inconsistency between knowing and doing into 
inconsistency within knowing itself.”27  The third escape is moral renunciation.  “It is 
ready to confess its wrongdoing, but it has given up any hope of amending its ways.”28  
Here, the person simply gives up.  These three escapes embody the mentality of freedom 
from. 
 True freedom, rather than a faulty notion of freedom from, is possible, because 
essential to the human person is the capacity to choose among objects presented to the 
intellect.  This capacity is the will.  Some may argue that by naming distinct capacities, 
the human person is artificially divided as in faculty psychology.  Admittedly, Lonergan 
has moved beyond faculty psychology to intentionality analysis when examining the 
inner life of the human person: 
From the very first chapter we have moved out of a faculty psychology with its 
options between intellectualism and voluntarism, and into an intentionality 
analysis that distinguishes four levels of conscious and intentional operations, 
where each successive level sublates previous levels by going beyond them, by 
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setting up a higher principle, by introducing new operations, and by preserving 
the integrity of previous levels, while extending enormously their range and their 
significance.29  
 
It is not that Lonergan has completely abandoned the idea of the will.  On the contrary, in 
Insight he describes the will as “intellectual or spiritual appetite.”30  Instead, he argues 
that Aristotelian and Scholastic structures in the stages of the historical development of 
meaning have been surpassed.31  Intentional and conscious operations can be transposed 
into metaphysical terms if needed.32  He is careful to maintain the close connection 
between the intellect and the will in order to avoid intellectualism or voluntarism.33  
Rather than speaking of the will, Lonergan emphasizes the fourth level of consciousness 
and intentionality, “the responsible level on which we are concerned with ourselves, our 
own operations, our goals, and so deliberate about possible courses of action, evaluate 
them, decide, and carry out our decisions.”34  The first three levels of consciousness are 
the empirical (sensing, perceiving, feeling, moving); the intellectual (inquiring, 
understanding, indentifying); and the rational (reflecting, judging, evaluating).35  For the 
sake of clarity, the principal operations of each level can be denoted respectively:  
experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding.36   To elucidate the connection 
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between the fourth level of consciousness and the meaning of real freedom versus 
freedom from, a lengthy quote from Lonergan’s Method is needed: 
The fourth level, which presupposes, complements, and sublates the other three, is 
the level of freedom and responsibility, of moral self-transcendence and in that 
sense of existence, of self-direction and self-control.  Its failure to function 
properly is the uneasy or the bad conscience.  Its success is marked by the 
satisfying feeling that one’s duty has been done. 
 As the fourth level is the principle of self-control, it is responsible for the 
proper functioning on the first three levels.  It fulfills its responsibility or fails to 
do so in the measure that we are attentive or inattentive in experiencing, that we 
are intelligent or unintelligent in our investigations, that we are reasonable or 
unreasonable in our judgments.  Therewith vanish two notions:  the notion of pure 
intellect or pure reason that operates on its own without guidance or control from 
responsible decision; and the notion of will as an arbitrary power indifferently 
choosing between good and evil.37  
 
There is an intricate relation between knowing and doing, so much so that to separate the 
two in analysis or living is to make the person less than human.  Although the operations 
are united, they are distinct and distinguishable. 
 In accordance with the four levels of consciousness and intentionality, Lonergan 
identifies four elements in a positive account of freedom.  The first three elements are the 
“intellectual antecedents” which culminate in the act of the will.38  The first element is 
the underlying sensitive flow consisting of “sensible presentations and imaginative 
representations, of affective and aggressive feelings, of conscious bodily movements.”39  
This is the sensible raw data of human living that is experienced.  When the underlying 
sensitive flow becomes the object of inquiry regarding what is to be done or avoided, the 
second element emerges, the practical insight.  “In other words, while speculative and 
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factual insights are concerned to lead to knowledge of being, practical insights are 
concerned to lead to the making of being.  Their objective is not what is but what is to be 
done.  They reveal, not the unities and relations of things as they are, but the unities and 
relations of possible courses of action.”40  Because action does not immediately follow 
insight, the third element, namely practical reflection, surfaces.  In practical reflection, 
the subject judges and scrutinizes one’s own motives in a possible course of action, 
possible consequences to oneself and others, and one’s willingness to act.  Practical 
reflection is oriented toward doing, yet it is still simply knowing.  Because practical 
reflection has no internal term, that is, no intrinsic capacity to come to an end on its own, 
it may go on indefinitely.  “What ends the reflection is the decision.  As long as I am 
reflecting, I have not yet decided.  Until I have decided, the reflection can be prolonged 
by further questions.  But once I have decided and as long as I remain decided, the 
reflection is over and done with.”41  The fourth element in a positive account of freedom 
is the decision.  Because Lonergan’s explication of this fourth element is critical not only 
to an understanding of freedom, but more importantly to a theology of commitment, his 
argument will be quoted at length: 
It is the decision, and one will do well to distinguish between the decision itself 
and its manifestation whether in execution, or in knowledge, or in expression of 
that knowledge.  For the decision itself is an act of willing.  It possesses the 
internal alternatives of either consenting or refusing.  It may also possess external 
alternatives, when different courses of action are considered simultaneously, and 
then consent to one and refusal of the others constitute a choice. 
 The fundamental nature of decision is best revealed by comparing it with 
judgment.  Decision, then, resembles judgment inasmuch as both select one 
member of a pair of contradictories; as judgment either affirms or denies, so 
decision either consents or refuses.  Again, both decision and judgment are 
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concerned with actuality; but judgment is concerned to complete one’s knowledge 
of an actuality that already exists, while decision is concerned to confer actuality 
upon a course of action that otherwise will not exist.  Finally, both decision and 
judgment are rational, for both deal with objects apprehended by insight, and both 
occur because of a reflective grasp of reasons. 
 However, there is a radical difference between the rationality of judgment 
and the rationality of decision.  Judgment is an act of rational consciousness, but 
decision is an act of rational self-consciousness.  The rationality of judgment 
emerges in the unfolding of the detached and disinterested desire to know in the 
process towards knowledge of the universe of being.  But the rationality of 
decision emerges in the demand of the rationally conscious subject for 
consistency between his knowing and his deciding and doing.42  
 
These four elements are not characterized by necessity.  There is a particular kind of 
contingence distinctive of “the laws of spirit.”43  “But the laws of spirit reside in the 
dynamic structure of its cognitional and volitional operations, and their concrete 
application is effected through spirit’s own operations within that dynamic structure.”44  
This dynamic structure is what Lonergan calls “essential freedom.”45  The human person 
is essentially free, because there is no necessary step between practical reflection and the 
decision.  Deciding does not necessarily flow from the previous intellectual elements, and 
even those insights and judgments are contingent upon time, place, person, or group.  The 
possible courses of action could be otherwise, and until one possibility is chosen through 
rational willing, they remain outside the realm of actuality.  Although the human person 
is essentially free, he is subject to conditions of “effective freedom.”46  Effective 
freedom, the operational range of one’s essential freedom, is limited by one’s external 
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circumstances, one’s psychoneural state, one’s speculative and practical intellectual 
development, and one’s antecedent willingness to do consistently that which one knows 
to be the right course of action.47  Within effective freedom, Lonergan denotes horizontal 
and vertical exercises of freedom.  “A horizontal exercise is a decision or choice that 
occurs within an established horizon.  A vertical exercise is the set of judgments and 
decisions by which we move from one horizon to another.”48  When a vertical exercise of 
freedom is dialectical, meaning the old horizon is repudiated and the new one embraced, 
a moral conversion has occurred and the human person is effectively and essentially 
choosing the person one is to be.  Understood in this way, freedom is not freedom from, 
an arbitrary indeterminism, but rather freedom for, a deliberate self-determination. 
 The notion of effective freedom takes seriously the reality of human finitude and 
sin.  Human persons are conditioned, fragile, and faulty.  At times, effective freedom can 
be so limited that it appears essential freedom is nonexistent.  No matter how narrow the 
operational range that is effective freedom, the human person remains essentially free.  
Essential freedom is a gift in the sense that it is constitutive of our creatureliness.  
Together with this gift is responsibility which is indicative of the fourth level of 
consciousness.  Due to the gift of essential freedom, human persons can be co-creators 
with God in fashioning ourselves and our communities.  It is the responsibility of each 
person to move deliberately and intentionally through the operations of consciousness in 
order to live authentically and consistently in knowing and doing.  The process of moving 
through these operations does not necessitate a certain number of questions or a particular 
amount of time.  In familiar situations or when “willingness to perform such an act has 
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become habitual,”49 one may move quickly and effortlessly.50  Human freedom carries 
with it the looming threat of sin, the irrational and irresponsible use of human 
consciousness.  Lonergan states, 
The reign of sin, then, is the expectation of sin.  On a primary level, it is the 
priority of living to learning how to live, to acquiring the willingness to live 
rightly, to developing the adaptation that makes right living habitual.  On a second 
level, it is man’s awareness of his plight and his self-surrender to it; on each 
occasion, he could reflect and through reflection avoid sinning; but he cannot bear 
the burden of perpetual reflection; and long before that burden has mounted to the 
limit of physical impossibility, he chooses the easy way out.51  
 
The human person was made to live according to the transcendental precepts, yet 
repeatedly, from the beginning, fails to do so.  This inconsistency is, practically speaking, 
unbearable; therefore, the human person resorts to the escapes of self-conscious-less, 
rationalization, and moral renunciation.  Sin becomes embedded in the social situation 
through the persistent failure to attend, to understand, to judge, and to live rationally and 
responsibly.  The cumulative effect that sin creates within the social situation further 
limits one’s effective freedom.  The embodiment of sin in the world (individual, group, 
and general bias) thwarts progress and leads to decline, as explained previously.  A 
culture in decline does not have the tools within itself for recovery.  However, the 
possibility of redemptive recovery given in conversion through the grace of Christ in the 
church community is ever-present.  That hope guards against a reductionist view of the 
cultural decline in which we live. 
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 4.1.4 The Divorce Culture and the Quest for the Soul Mate 
 The principle of decline has manifested itself in the realm of marriage and family 
in what Barbara Dafoe Whitehead names “the divorce culture.”52  In the twentieth 
century, divorce in America became a “mass phenomenon.”53  After World War I, 
wartime separation and mobility along with the rising consumerist economy ushered in 
“vulgar divorce.”54  Divorce became more common, vulgar, due to post-war instability 
and the changing expectations of women and men regarding roles and their family’s 
material standard of living.  Disputes over material support and socio-economic status hid 
deeper issues concerning roles, work, power, and equality.55  With the advent of the Great 
Depression, the luxury of divorce was no longer an option for many as they struggled to 
provide basic needs for their families.56  The divorce rate rose considerably once again 
after World War II.  Wartime separation, the emotional fervor of the war, impulsive 
marriages, and the vast surge of women in the workforce all contributed to this peak in 
divorce.  “The post war campaign for domesticity” waged through popular media and the 
government stabilized marriage throughout the 1950’s and 1960’s.57  Whitehead 
identifies the advent of the divorce culture marked not only by demographic changes, but 
more importantly, by a fundamental ideological change in the meaning of marriage and 
divorce: 
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Indeed, the cultural fault line, the B.C. and A.D. of American divorce, can be 
drawn somewhere in the mid- to late 1960s.  Before that time, divorce was 
contained within a system of marriage and subject to its jurisdiction.  After that 
time, divorce moved outside the government of marriage and established its own 
institutional jurisdiction over family relationships.  Before the mid-1960s, divorce 
was viewed as a legal, family, and social event with multiple stakeholders; after 
that time, divorce became an individual event defined by and responsive to the 
interests of the individual.58  
 
This is hardly surprising given the simultaneity of the sexual revolution, although the 
underpinnings of the separation between sex and marriage began at the end of the 
nineteenth century according to Glenn Stanton.59  However, Shaji George Kochuthara 
sees the origins of the revolution in the work of eighteenth century philosophers such as 
Hume, Rousseau, and Malthus.60  
Several factors coalesced to produce such a cultural change in which the pleasure 
of sex was valued in itself rather than as a part of marriage.  “Taken together, the Flapper, 
the emergence of dating, the smut magazines, and, to a degree, the explicit marriage 
manual (by focusing on pleasure as the aim of sexuality) helped our culture view sex as 
an ‘autonomous domain of pleasure,’ making personal satisfaction the highest goal of the 
sexual act.”61  Certainly the vast and rapid availability and acceptance of artificial birth 
control along with studies devoted to the psychology of sexual behavior contributed to 
the revolution.62  In addition to these factors, Kochuthara highlights the impact of 
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scientific studies into sexual behavior from Kinsey along with Masters and Johnson on 
sexual mores and views.63  People became more open about discussing sexual matters as 
sexuality became more overt in public media.  During the 1960’s and 1970’s protests 
among the youth were ubiquitous, and the second wave of American feminism rolled in 
with the cry for equality in employment opportunity, pay, and advancement.64   It was not 
until the mid-1970’s that “there was a steady growth of feminist scholarship about, rather 
than against, the family.”65  Change in work structure necessarily brings about rethinking 
of family structure.  Interestingly, at the same time work and family were moving to 
separate public/private realms, sex, which is perhaps the most intimate and private act, 
was barreling full-force into the public realm. 
 Although the sexual revolution brought several benefits such as attention to and 
appreciation of women’s sexual experience and the enhancement of marital relationships, 
it brought with it unprecedented changes in the sexual landscape of America and the 
shape of family structure.  These significant trends, indicated at the beginning of this 
study, are worth mentioning again.  The first trend is the significant increase in the 
divorce rate: 
The incidence of divorce began to increase rapidly during the 1960s.  The number 
of children under age 18 newly affected by parental divorce each year, most of 
whom have lost a resident father, grew from under 500,000 in 1960 to well over a 
million in 1975.  After peaking around 1980, that number leveled off and remains 
close to a million new children each year.66  
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The second trend is the dramatic increase in unmarried births.  “Since 1960, the 
percentage of babies born to unwed mothers has increased more than sevenfold. . . . More 
than four in ten births and more than two-thirds of black births in 2011, the latest year for 
which we have complete data, were out-of-wedlock.”67  The third significant trend is 
unmarried cohabitation, which has increased fifteen-fold since 1960.  “Slightly more than 
40 percent of all children are expected to spend some time in a cohabiting household 
during their childhood years.”68  The divergence of sexual relationships from marital 
commitment since the 1960’s is evident.  The relatively new valuation of sexual pleasure 
and satisfaction outside of an institutional framework fails to consider all the stakeholders 
in this new way of thinking, specifically children, precisely those that do not have a 
choice in the arrangement.69 
 One of the more remarkable aspects of these burgeoning trends is that to most of 
the general public they appear unremarkable, even normal.  Whitehead declares, “. . . 
[T]he nation’s most dramatic and sustained divorce ‘high’ was unaccompanied by any 
sense of crisis.”70  The sexual revolution intersected with a period of “sustained material 
affluence” and a “sense of psychological affluence.”71  The same period of time could be 
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called a “psychological revolution,” in which Americans focused on their inner lives, 
emotional self-expression, and personal satisfaction.72  Although it is difficult to 
determine precisely, perhaps the sexual revolution is the psychological revolution of the 
sexual self.  In itself, the turn to the inner life of self and psychological understanding is 
not problematic, and in fact could lead to more just and satisfying relationships.  The 
difficulty arises when the psychological turn becomes expressive individualism.  In an 
individualistic culture, marriage, family, and sexual relationships are largely based upon 
personal choice and individual psychological and sexual fulfillment.  “If love and 
marriage are seen primarily in terms of psychological gratification, they may fail to fulfill 
their older social function of providing people with stable, committed relationships that 
tie them into the larger society.”73  The sexual revolution, which emphasized sexual 
pleasure over reproduction, changed not only sexual practices and sensitivities but also 
the choice of partners.74  In contemporary America, marriage is primarily viewed as the 
natural outcome of a romantic relationship.  In 2001, a national survey of young men and 
women in their twenties was conducted for the National Marriage Project by the Gallup 
Organization.  A staggering 94% of never married singles in their twenties agreed with 
the statement that “when you marry you want your spouse to be your soul mate, first and 
foremost.”75  The survey brought to light that for young Americans the importance of the 
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institutional aspects of marriage, namely economic, family, and religious, are declining.  
Even among Catholics, the soul mate model is prevalent and operative.  According to the 
CARA report, 87% of Catholics in their twenties agreed that “when you marry, you want 
your spouse to be your soulmate, first and foremost.”76  Barbara Dafoe Whitehead and 
David Popenoe summarize the soul mate model of marriage that is viewed not only as 
normal, but also normative: 
Taken together, these findings paint a portrait of marriage as emotionally deep but 
socially shallow.  While marriage is losing much of its broad public and 
institutional character, it is gaining popularity as a SuperRelationship, an intensely 
private spiritualized union, combining sexual fidelity, romantic love, emotional 
intimacy and togetherness.77  
 
Interestingly, Whitehead and Popenoe note that it is possible that the soul mate ideal may 
be the secular, spiritualized replacement for diminishing religious views of marriage.78   
 Unfortunately, this quest for the soul mate in the psychological age has proven to 
be arduous, if not impossible.  Whitehead observes, “Just as rising economic expectations 
had bred material dissatisfaction earlier in the century, so now rising emotional 
expectations fostered a growing sense of emotional dissatisfaction and restlessness in 
marriage.”79  The excessive emotional demands and expectations of the soul mate model 
of marriage weigh heavily on spouses, and when those demands are not met, many 
spouses may feel they have not found “the one.”  A pseudo-mystical journey to find one’s 
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“real” soul mate ensues.  If emotional and psychological expectations are too high in this 
model lacking social-structural supports, spouses may believe divorce is the inevitable 
solution.  When marriage is understood as a private, spiritual union of soul mates, the 
effects of divorce on children, communities, and the economy are not given due weight: 
Indeed, in 1994, a nationally representative survey found only 15% of the 
population agreeing that “when there are children in the family, parents should 
stay together even if they don’t get along.”  And, according to one recent study, 
the meaning of “not getting along” is being defined down.  It’s been estimated 
that more than half of recent divorces occur, not because of high conflict, but 
because of “softer” forms of psychological distress and unhappiness.  
Unfortunately, these are the marriages that might improve over time and with 
help.80  
 
There is further evidence that happiness ebbs and flows, and years later, self-reported 
unhappily married couples identify themselves as happily married.81  These empirical 
findings are manifestations of Lonergan’s general bias of common sense.  A culture of 
expressive individualism makes it more difficult to maintain a broad, long-term view, and 
a long-term view is precisely what is needed to sustain a marriage. 
 4.1.5 The Reversal of Cultural Decline through Grace and Conversion   
The possibility for the reversal of cultural decline in marriage and family practices 
is found in the grace and freedom offered in Christ.  This redemptive possibility is the 
potential for intellectual, moral, and religious conversion.  Through conversion, persons 
have the ability to use their freedom for self-determination, thoughtful decisions, and 
responsible action.  It is only when minds and hearts are turned (metanoia) to God that 
the threat of the culture of individualism can be overcome.  Komonchak expounds, 
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On the Catholic understanding, redemption is the healing of the human mind and 
heart and the restoration of the basic human potentiality for intelligent and 
responsible action through its sublation into a supernatural life in imitation of, 
obedience to, and union with Jesus Christ.  To our tendency to lose faith in the 
powers of our minds to reach the truth (cultural bias) comes the faith which 
receives the unfailing Word of God.  To our tendency to surrender in despair to 
the endless cycle of power and weakness (group bias) comes the hope that rests 
on the assurance of Christ’s victory over even death and on his promise of the 
Spirit and eventual triumph.  And to the egoism that puts our own interests and 
good above all others (individual bias) comes the love which finds its highest 
exemplar in the forgiving and absorbing love of Christ for those who did him 
evil.82  
 
The possibility of overcoming bias, sin, in marriage practices is found in conversion.  
Intellectual and moral conversion enable one to live by the transcendental precepts so that 
one can know and do what is right, real, and responsible, particularly in relationships.  
Only then can one know the real values of marriage and choose them responsibly.  
Religious conversion is a dynamic state of being in love that is experienced as a gift yet 
still operates on the fourth level of intentional consciousness.83  The religiously converted 
person is able to know, decide, and act with an “easy freedom.”84  Lonergan admits that 
“normally it [conversion] is a prolonged process though its explicit acknowledgment may 
be concentrated in a few momentous judgments and decisions.”85  It is within this context 
of conversion that a theology of marital commitment will be explained.  Once a more 
differentiated theology of marital commitment is given, my hope is that it will become 
clearer how greater attention to commitment can aid in the reversal of an individualistic 
culture in decline, where commitment is really defined and lived as “a form of self-
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commitment.”86  Because all Catholic marriages are currently governed by canon law, the 
discussion leads to the meaning and significance of marital consent and how that relates 
to commitment.  A theology of commitment must precede this exercise, because as 
discussed in Chapter Two, theology judges canon law. 
 
4.2 Making a Marital Commitment 
 
 
 4.2.1 Who Can Commit to Love Another for Life? 
 The beginning of the development of a theology of marital commitment is an 
inquiry into theological anthropology.  It is a look into who can make an interpersonal 
commitment to love another for life.  This who is the human person theologically 
understood.  The human person is a whole, a single entity, but not an individual as that 
term has been used to connote an autonomous being separate from location, history, and 
relationships.  The human person theologically understood is body, thought, will, 
experience, emotion, decision, memory, and relationship, one whose ultimate meaning is 
found in relationship to God.  “Man,87 though made of body and soul, is a unity.  
Through his very bodily condition he sums up in himself the elements of the material 
world.  Through him they are thus brought to their highest perfection and can raise their 
voice in praise freely given to the creator.”88  Because of sin, this unity of the human 
person is disturbed and the experience of division becomes reality.  “Man therefore is 
divided in himself.  As a result, the whole life of men, both individual and social, shows 
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itself to be a struggle, and a dramatic one, between good and evil, between light and 
darkness.”89  The human person is the subject of these experiences of division both ad 
intra and ad extra.  The fullness of what it means to be a human person can be discovered 
only when all the parts constitutive of the whole are one, which Christian faith holds is 
only possible when we are one in Christ. 
   The empirical sciences explain, analyze, and dissect the human person according 
to the methods of each particular science.  As it stands, these sciences can only explain, 
however accurately, a small part of human personhood, both collectively and 
individually.  Although each science aims to explain the human person as a whole, each 
is incapable of doing so completely because the human person is a mystery with the 
capabilities of self-presence, self-awareness, self-transcendence, self-determination, and 
self-possession.  Karl Rahner opines, “Man experiences himself precisely as subject and 
person insofar as he becomes conscious of himself as the product of what is radically 
foreign to him.”90  By allowing herself to be the object of questions, the human person 
experiences herself as subject, as the one who questions, knows, or understands.  
Transcendental experience, “the subjective, unthematic, necessary and unfailing 
consciousness of the knowing subject that is co-present in every spiritual act of 
knowledge,”91 is nonreflexive knowledge characteristic of human personhood.  Rahner 
continues, “In the fact that man raises analytical questions about himself and opens 
himself to the unlimited horizons of such questioning, he has already transcended himself 
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and every conceivable element of such an analysis or of an empirical reconstruction of 
himself.  In doing this he is affirming himself as more than the sum of such analyzable 
components of his reality.”92  Succinctly, the human person is more than the sum of her 
parts.  The human person is inherently irreducible to her family history, biochemistry, 
psychological tendencies, or socio-political situatedness.  The human person is capable of 
self-determination: 
Being a person, then, means the self-possession of a subject as such in a conscious 
and free relationship to the totality of itself.  This relationship is the condition of 
possibility and the antecedent horizon for the fact that in his individual empirical 
experiences and in his individual sciences man has to do with himself as one and 
as a whole.  Because man’s having responsibility for the totality of himself is the 
condition of his empirical experience of self, it cannot be derived completely from 
this experience and its objectivities.  Even when man would want to shift all 
responsibility for himself away from himself as someone totally determined from 
without, and thus would want to explain himself away, he is the one who does this 
and does it knowingly and willingly.  He is the one who encompasses the sum of 
all the possible elements of such an explanation, and thus he is the one who shows 
himself to be something other than the subsequent product of such individual 
elements.93  
 
Rahner continues, “To say that man is person and subject, therefore, means first of all 
that man is someone who cannot be derived, who cannot be produced completely from 
elements at our disposal.  He is that being who is responsible for himself.”94  This is the 
mystery of the human spirit:  each human person is an irreducible and irreplaceable unity 
capable of communion with God and others through knowing and loving.   
Rahner, like Lonergan, emphasizes the freedom of the human person.  “When 
freedom is really understood, it is not the power to be able to do this or that, but the 
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power to decide about oneself and to actualize oneself.”95  Self-transcendence in knowing 
and doing differentiates the human person from the rest of creation.  Lonergan relates the 
distinguishing mark of personhood to the fourth level of consciousness: 
But on the final level of questions for deliberation, self-transcendence becomes 
moral.  When we ask whether this or that is worthwhile, whether it is not just 
apparently good but truly good, then we are inquiring, not about pleasure or pain, 
not about comfort or ill ease, not about sensitive spontaneity, not about individual 
or group advantage, but about objective value.  Because we can ask such 
questions, and answer them, and live by the answers, we can effect in our living a 
moral self-transcendence.  That moral self-transcendence is the possibility of 
benevolence and beneficence, of honest collaboration and of true love, of 
swinging completely out of the habitat of an animal and of becoming a person in a 
human society.96  
 
It is on this fourth level of conscious and intentional operations that the human person is 
able to carve out not only her life course but more importantly her core identity.  As 
transcendental knowledge, such knowledge can never be definitively known except by 
God.  The closest one can come to accurate self-awareness is in one’s conscience, “man’s 
most secret core, and his sanctuary,” where “he is alone with God whose voice echoes in 
his depths.”97   
In Scripture, the “heart” refers to the core of the person.  Elliott states, “It [the 
heart] is thus the central organ which integrates the whole person, a rational and 
volitional center for intentionality and commitment: ‘. . . where your treasure is, there 
will your heart be also’ (Matthew 6:21).  The heart is the source of the commitment of the 
whole person.”98  A few biblical examples support this assertion.  “From there you will 
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seek the Lord your God, and you will find him if you search after him with all your heart 
and soul.”99  “So now, O Israel, what does the Lord your God require of you?  Only to 
fear the Lord your God, to walk in all his ways, to love him, to serve the Lord your God 
with all your heart and with all your soul.”100  “Only fear the Lord, and serve him 
faithfully with all your heart; for consider what great things he has done for you.”101  
“Teach me your way, O Lord, that I may walk in your truth; give me an undivided heart 
to revere your name.”102  “Set your heart right and be steadfast, and do not be impetuous 
in time of calamity.”103  “When you search for me, you will find me; if you seek me with 
all your heart.”104  “Let us approach with a true heart in full assurance of faith, with our 
hearts sprinkled clean from an evil conscience and our bodies washed with pure 
water.”105  Thus, there is an intimate connection between what it means to be a human 
person and commitment.  Commitments shape and define the heart of the person. 
The self-awareness and self-determination characteristic of human personhood 
always occur in relationship.  Persons are not autonomous in the sense of being free from 
all “social and historical relations,” and the will does not operate without limitations by a 
smooth and clear application of rationality to moral principles, a view of the moral 
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subject that has been prevalent since the Enlightenment.106  Although the theology of 
commitment being developed here emphasizes choice, self-determination, and decision, 
this view is not so naïve as to fail to take into account the relational quality of being 
human.  To be a human person is to be in relationship.  Proving that point is the fact that 
the ability to mature psychologically and emotionally is very much dependent on the 
level of nurturing care persons receive in childhood.  The capacity for mature self-
determination is intimately related to the presence of loving relationships.  Margaret 
Farley argues, “Moreover, freedom and relationality as features of human persons are 
profoundly connected with one another:  we cannot grow in freedom except in some 
nurturing relationships; and freedom ultimately is for the sake of relationships—the 
loves, the relationships we finally choose to identify with in our deepest selves.”107  As 
indicated in Chapter Three, the divine persons are distinguished based upon their 
relationship to each other and to the world.  Persons are only persons in communion.  
Even the hermit who has seemingly taken himself out of the world of relationships is 
committing to a particular kind of relationship to God and others.  A life of contemplation 
apart from the world places the hermit in a relationship of prayer toward the world.  The 
statement that to be a person means to be in relationship requires clarification regarding 
the nature of the relationship.  Some relationships can annihilate persons, while others 
can enhance and even create persons.  Of particular importance in understanding an 
interpersonal commitment to love another for life is the meaning of love. 
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As discussed in Chapter Three, the kind of relationship that is intrinsic to 
personhood is one of love.  John Paul II teaches,  
God is love and in Himself He lives a mystery of personal communion.  Creating 
the human race in His own image and continually keeping it in being, God 
inscribed in the humanity of man and woman the vocation, and thus the capacity 
and responsibility, of love and communion.  Love is therefore the fundamental 
and innate vocation of every human being.108 
 
Because it is so central to a theology of marital commitment, further nuance and 
clarification needs to be added to an understanding of love.  The assumption that love is 
most accurately described as complete and total, disinterested self-giving has been 
challenged in the last century, particularly in feminist theology.  In her article that served 
as catalyst for further challenges to a one-sided view of love, Valerie Saiving Goldstein 
questions descriptions of love that have been “constructed primarily upon the basis of 
masculine experience and thus view the human condition from the male standpoint.”109  
She argues that despite variations in culture and time, there exist real differences between 
the masculine and feminine experiences that cannot be attributed to conventional and 
arbitrary definitions of the sexes.  Due to these inherent differences, “the temptations of 
woman as woman are not the same as the temptations of man as man, and the specifically 
feminine forms of sin—‘feminine’ not because they are confined to women or because 
women are incapable of sinning in other ways but because they are outgrowths of the 
basic feminine character structure—have a quality which can never be encompassed by 
such terms as ‘pride’ and ‘will-to-power.’”110  Feminine forms of sin, such as 
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“underdevelopment or negation of the self,”111 cannot be redeemed through an 
understanding of love as complete self-giving.  Rather, love as selflessness can only 
further perpetuate feminine forms of sin.  Whether one agrees or disagrees with such a 
characterization of engendered forms of sin, the challenge remains to a unilateral 
specification of love. 
 Using Goldstein’s article as a foundation for rethinking “traditional”112 
articulations of agapic love, Christine Gudorf utilizes her own experience as a mother to 
reimagine love as essentially mutual.  Rather than envisioning the impossible ideal of the 
love of God in Christ as “agape, disinterested, self-sacrificing love,”113 Gudorf argues 
that love is essentially mutual, reflected in the intimate Abba relationship that Jesus 
enjoys and seeks to share with others.114  She asserts, “All love both involves sacrifice 
and aims at mutuality.”115  Instead of elevating self-sacrifice as the highest ideal of 
human and divine love, Gudorf argues that “the moments of self-sacrifice, such as we 
find in the crucifixion of Jesus, are just that—moments in a process designed to end in 
mutual love.”116  According to Gudorf, to understand self-sacrificial love as anything 
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other than a part of a larger relationship of mutual love is “to condone and even 
encourage the worst abuses of human dignity.”117  
Like Gudorf, Sally Purvis uses her experience of mother-love as an alternative 
model for agapic love which replaces the view of agape as disinterested, self-sacrificial 
love.118  Her analysis of the characteristics of mother-love119 and “traditional” views of 
agape lead her to conclude, “If the ‘self’ that the mainstream agapic tradition has 
described as the model for agape is remote, distant, detached, the self that expresses 
mother-love is present, connected, involved, intensely caring.”120   Purvis argues that the 
model of mother-love for agape challenges a view of love in which the lover is 
disinterested, impartial and self-sacrificing.  For Purvis, agape is a love that is intensely 
personal, concrete, particular, and mutual.121  Fleshing out the qualities of mother-love 
that illumine agape, Purvis states that it is inclusive, meaning, “it is dependent upon the 
mother-child relationship but is independent of the specific characteristics of the 
child.”122  It is the relationship that establishes the context for the “fundamental 
commitment” to the good of the other regardless of one’s lovableness at any given 
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time.123  A second quality is “the love is both intensely involved and other-regarding” in 
which “there is no clear line between the needs of the lover and the needs of the 
beloved.”124  Although there are times when the needs of each conflict, the relationship is 
fundamentally cooperative in structure versus competitive.  Rather than understanding 
agape and self-love as oppositional as in Nygren,125 this view of agape claims an 
essential unity of self-love and neighbor love.  Stephen Pope analyzes the relationship 
between self-love and neighbor love in Thomas Aquinas, particularly in the Summa 
Theologiae.  His conclusion coincides with the understanding that they need not 
necessarily conflict.  Pope maintains, 
True self-love for Thomas is the basis of and model for neighbor-love.  The 
neighbor is loved as alter ego (I-II, 28, 1; II-II, 26, 4), as both similar to, or having 
things in common with, the self and in the manner in which the self loves itself.  
A person’s love for herself is the model of her love for another, and since “the 
model exceeds the copy,” Thomas reasons, the former ought to exceed the latter 
(II-II, 26, 4).  If “we have friendship with others it is because we do unto them as 
we do unto ourselves, hence we read in Ethic. ix. 4, 8, that ‘the origin of friendly 
relations with others lies in our relations to ourselves’” (II-II, 25, 4).  Rather than 
eliminating the self, neighbor love builds on and has as it necessary condition 
self-love.  The fulfillment of one person is intrinsically connected to the 
fulfillment of others.126  
 
Pope demonstrates that in Thomas the love of others and the love of self are not 
inherently conflictual.  Pope concludes, “Christian love of the other does not demand 
forfeiting the needs, claims, and value of the self, let alone require servility or contempt 
for the self.  Rather than self-sacrifice, agape calls the self to an ever-increasing 
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participation in the good of communion.”127  Finally, Purvis contends that mother-love as 
a model for agape is unconditional.  Although it is specific to the particularity of the 
beloved, it is not at the mercy of the actions of the beloved.128  Utilizing the Lucan 
account of the Good Samaritan,129 Purvis demonstrates how “neighbor” is a behavioral 
category and not a social category.  The neighbor responds to one in need like a loving 
family member would.130   In this way, agape can be both intensely personal and concrete 
while, at the same time, universal.131 
While these feminist critiques and reconstructions of agape offer much needed 
correctives to “traditional” views of agapic love that do not resonate with the experience 
of all, they can be problematic.  Although Anders Nygren has been widely criticized for 
developing a complete contrast between eros and agape, Colin Grant argues that 
Nygren’s insistence on the uniqueness of agape deserves to be heard.  He claims that 
many critiques of Nygren have led to the complete reversal of the priority of agape so 
that “eros displaces agape.”132  The pendulum swings in the opposite direction and eros is 
overvalued to the disservice of agape.   Gudorf does so explicitly.  She asserts, “Acts of 
no matter how much self-sacrifice, which support or encourage unloving actions or 
attitudes, are not acts of love.  Agape is valuable in the service of eros and does not exist 
                                                 
127. Pope, "Expressive Individualism and True Self-Love:  A Thomistic Perspective," 398-99. 
 
128. Purvis, "Mothers, Neighbors and Strangers:  Another Look at Agape," 27. 
 
129. Lk 10:29-37. 
 
130. Purvis, "Mothers, Neighbors and Strangers:  Another Look at Agape," 30. 
 
131. Admittedly, Purvis does not deal with the problem of finitude, that is, the fact that the needs 
of those close to us may conflict with the needs of others. Purvis, "Mothers, Neighbors and Strangers:  
Another Look at Agape," 31n31. 
 
132. Colin Grant, "For the Love of God:  Agape," The Jounal of Religious Ethics 24, no. 1 (Spring 
1996): 5. 
 
203 
 
otherwise.”133  Because eros is used only twice in Scripture and agape is used over one 
hundred times, eros cannot displace agape in describing God’s love.134    
Another problematic area that Grant draws attention to is the displacement of 
agape by philia.  The focus on love as mutuality can create a utopian view of human 
relationships lacking practical means of achieving such mutuality among sinful human 
persons.  Grant elucidates why philia cannot displace the uniqueness of agape: 
The egalitarian tone of mutuality and the challenge to face our own vulnerability 
evoke a sympathetic response amid the post-modern suspicion of imperialistic 
overtones of hierarchy.  However, the vision of a society of mutually supportive 
persons, sensitive enough to one another’s needs to provide the security for 
people to expose their own vulnerability will be doomed to remain a romantic 
illusion unless there are individuals who are strong enough to initiate these 
exchanges. . . . The point is that such mutuality is elicited and sustained only 
through the generosity of agape.135  
 
Although personhood is constituted by relationships of mutual love, descriptions of love 
as mutual friendship cannot replace agape.  While incorporating philia and eros into an 
understanding of divine love is important, the theological significance of agape cannot be 
lost.136  Agape “represents the divine extravagance of giving that does not take the self 
into account.”137   It is the kind of love that does not make sense within a purely ethical 
horizon, like forgiveness within a relationship.  “The justice orientation of ethics finds its 
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completion in, but is also in fundamental ways contradicted by, religious forgiveness.”138  
God is found in that unfathomable place where justice and mercy meet,139 where divine 
plentitude touches human void.   However, it is not in the God-human relationship that 
mutual love as giving and receiving originates.  The capacity for giving and receiving in 
love is found in God as divine community.  In reimagining love as primarily mutual, 
Gudorf seems to come to a different conclusion.  Gudorf’s conviction that all love is 
directed at mutuality drives and defines her theology of God.  She states,  
If God is love, then he/she needs an object for his/her love; he/she needs us.  The 
community within the Trinity was not alone sufficient, for one person of the 
Trinity, the Son, presupposes in his historical function our existence, and the third 
member of the Trinity, the Spirit, presupposes in her historical function both the 
Son and us.  Moreover, the history of our interaction with God has been one of 
God’s making known to us his/her desire for a relationship of mutual love.140  
 
A theology of God that introduces the need for human persons and the insufficiency of 
the divine community alone presents the danger of reducing love to a necessity rather 
than pure grace.  There is in the totality of love the perfect balance of giving and 
receiving which originates in God alone and not in the God-human relationship. 
 C.S. Lewis provides a useful distinction within his explication of agape, namely, 
Gift-love and Need-love.  He identifies God with Gift-love and articulates a theology of 
God that is in sharp contrast to Gudorf’s theology: 
In God there is no hunger that needs to be filled, only plenteousness that desires to 
give.  The doctrine that God was under no necessity to create is not a piece of dry 
scholastic speculation.  It is essential.  Without it we can hardly avoid the 
conception of what I can only call a “managerial” God; a Being whose function or 
nature is to “run” the universe, who stands to it as a head-master to a school or a 
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hotelier to a hotel.  But to be sovereign of the universe is no great matter to God.  
In Himself, at home in “the land of the Trinity,” he is Sovereign of a far greater 
realm.141  
 
Although Lewis envisions God as Gift-love, he opines that God imparts on us Gift-loves, 
which resemble Himself, and Need-loves, which are opposites.  Lewis expands, “They 
[Need-loves] are rather correlatives, opposites; not as evil is the opposite of good, of 
course, but as the form of the blanc-mange is an opposite to the form of the mould.”142  In 
a sense, the Gift-loves shape the Need-loves, or rather shape the beloved.  Lewis holds 
that God graces human persons with divine Gift-love which enables us to give to God the 
only thing we can withhold, our hearts, and to love in others what is intrinsically 
unlovable.143   In addition, God bestows divine Need-love of Himself and of one another.  
Our need for God is already given in the structure of our createdness, but God graces 
persons with a Need-love by which we can graciously recognize and accept our need for 
God.144  Agape as divine Need-love of one another is the intrinsic correlative of divine 
Gift-love.  Lewis provides an austere example of how divine Need-love is a true grace 
and blessing: 
How difficult it is to receive, and to go on receiving, from others a love that does 
not depend on our own attraction can be seen from an extreme case.  Suppose 
yourself a man struck down shortly after marriage by an incurable disease which 
may not kill you for many years; useless, impotent, hideous, disgusting; 
dependent on your wife’s earnings; impoverishing where you hoped to enrich; 
impaired even in intellect and shaken by gusts of uncontrollable temper, full of 
unavoidable demands.  And suppose your wife’s care and pity to be inexhaustible.  
The man who can take this sweetly, who can receive all and give nothing without 
                                                 
141. C.S. Lewis, The Four Loves (New York, NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1960), 
126-27. 
 
142. Ibid., 127-28. 
 
143. Ibid., 128. 
 
144. Ibid., 130. 
 
206 
 
resentment, who can abstain even from those tiresome self-depreciations which 
are really only a demand for petting and reassurance, is doing something which 
Need-love in its merely natural condition could not attain.145  
 
Although Lewis does not say so explicitly, one could argue that this divine Need-love is 
inscribed in the very structure of God as communion.  This is true not in the sense that 
anything in God is unlovable, but rather that in the graceful, divine perichoresis of the 
Trinity is perfect gift and receptivity.  Christologically, agape, as divine Gift-love and 
Need-love, is revealed.  In the Incarnation, the Son is not only the gift of God to the 
world but also the gracious acceptance of the world’s need for God. 
  This theology of commitment presumes that it is persons, capable of self-
awareness, self-determination, and self-transcendence created to be in relationships of 
mutual love with God and others, who make marital commitments.  Due to finitude and 
sin, sacrifice is inevitable, and the grace of God’s love is evident when such sacrifice is 
given and received generously.  It is in the context of our finite, sinful world that 
commitment is necessary.  However, before exploring why persons make marital 
commitments, an examination into exactly what persons are doing when they make a 
marital commitment is required. 
4.2.2 What Are We Doing When We Commit to Love Another for Life? 
 The question of what persons do when making a marital commitment is explored 
in depth by Margaret Farley, and it is upon her work that I rely heavily.  In her work, 
Personal Commitments:  Beginning, Keeping, Changing, she parses the structure of an 
interpersonal commitment to love another for life.146  Farley specifies that a marital 
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commitment is an example of an “explicit, expressed, interpersonal commitment,” 
otherwise known as “promises, contracts, covenants, vows.”147  A marital commitment is 
not simply an internal decision, but also an explicit choice externally demonstrable to the 
world.  She clarifies that it is not a prediction, where one is not responsible for the future 
outcome, nor is it a resolution, where the obligation concerns only oneself.148  A marital 
commitment or promise is an act of giving my word.  Farley explains, 
To give my word is to “place” a part of myself, or something that belongs to me, 
into another person’s “keeping.”  It is to give the other person a claim over me, a 
claim to perform the action that I have committed myself to perform.  When I 
“give my word,” I do not simply give it away.  It is given not as a gift (or paid like 
a fine), but as a pledge.  It still belongs to me, but now it is held by the one to 
whom I have yielded it.  It claims my faithfulness, my constancy, not just because 
I have spoken it to myself, but because it now calls to me from the other person 
who has received it.149  
 
Etymologically, the word “commitment” derives from the Latin mittere meaning “to 
send.”  In the act of committing, I create a new relationship by means of sending my 
word into another.  Farley elucidates, “When I make a commitment to another person, I 
dwell in the other by means of my word.”150  In giving my word to another, it always 
remains mine yet I hand it over to another:   
What we give to the other in a commitment, then, is something of ourselves—
something that belongs to us or that is part of our very selves.  It remains ours, 
though it is entrusted to another.  “What is mine becomes thine, but it is still 
mine,” and that is why if we “break our word” we stand to lose something that is 
ours—a material possession, a framework for activity, our reputation, our 
integrity.151  
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A commitment implies risk and vulnerability.  The mutual commitment of marriage, this 
reciprocal sending and receiving of one’s word to another, creates a unique bond by what 
is shared, the word of each as a symbol of oneself.152  Because giving our word creates a 
new relationship and marks something new in the history of a relationship, persons want 
to “incarnate” or “concretize” the word itself.153  In marriage, the primary means of doing 
so are the expression of consent at the wedding along with subsequent consummation of 
the marriage.  As body and spirit, human persons need to make real externally what is 
real internally.  Commitment occurs at the fourth level of conscious intentionality.  By 
committing to another, we are doing something new, giving our word to another.  A 
marital commitment is an act of rational self-consciousness and self-determination. 
Theologically, this notion of “giving my word” in a marital commitment can 
uncover a considerable number of parallels in christology, only a few of which will be 
fleshed out here.  In Hebrew, dabar can be translated either “word” or “deed.”154  George 
Worgul maintains, “In the Old Testament, dabar concurrently means word and event.  
The unity of these two elements reaches its climax in the divine dabar, the divine 
proclamation and deed.  When God speaks his word, what is spoken transpires.  Divine 
utterance is, at the same time, a divine happening.  In a real sense the divine dabar is a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Divorce," CLSA Proceedings 54 (1992): 89. 
 
152. The understanding of symbol used here was explained in Chapter Three in reference to 
George Worgul’s work.  A person’s word given to another in a promise is a symbolic gesture or action that 
expresses who he or she is while reaching out to another. See George S. Worgul, From Magic to Metaphor:  
A Validation of Christian Sacraments (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1980). 
 
153. Farley, Personal Commitments:  Beginning, Keeping, Changing, 17. 
 
154. John Macquarrie, "Word and Idea," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1, no. 2 
(Summer 1970): 75. 
 
209 
 
creative reality.”155  John Macquarrie points out the dynamic character of the word.  “A 
time comes when the ideas break out into deeds.”156  The Incarnation is the embodied 
Word, dynamically and creatively enacted into the world.  Christological insights that can 
be gleaned from the Prologue to the Gospel of John give credence to the significance of 
“giving my word” in marital commitment.  The Prologue poetically introduces the key 
themes and concepts of the Gospel narrative regarding Jesus’ identity such as:  life, light, 
truth, preexistence, and revelation.157  These themes are lived out in the works of Jesus, 
particularly the sign-miracles.  Although biblical scholars are not in complete agreement 
about the background of the Logos, or Word, in the Johannine Prologue,158 the Word “is 
essentially about communication.”159  Genesis 1:3 and Isaiah 55:9-11 reveal how the 
creative and effective Word of God is sent by God to accomplish a purpose, to fulfill that 
purpose, and to return to God.160  This same Word of God is specifically identified with 
Jesus Christ in the Prologue.  In exegeting the passage, Herman Waetjen clarifies that the 
English translation, “and the Word was with God,” is inadequate.  The Greek πρός 
indicates a dynamic movement towards or into rather than a static standing alongside.161  
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The Logos is differentiated from God and united with God in an “oscillating 
interaction.”162  Waetjen skillfully articulates the hermeneutical function of the Word sent 
by God into the world.  “If the Logos is God’s activity of speech, and if the light that it 
engenders is identified as its hermeneutical performance, then their opposite, the 
darkness, must symbolize all the powers and usages of language in society which 
suppress the truth, distort reality, and foster false consciousness.”163  The Word, being 
one with God, accurately communicates and interprets God to the world.  Climactically, 
John 1:14 declares that the Word that creates and organizes the world united indissolubly 
with flesh while remaining indissolubly united with God.  In the Incarnation, the Word of 
God heard by the faithful in the Old Testament is the same Word seen in the works of 
Christ in the New Testament.  Waetjen continues, 
Rather, the eye has been integrated with the ear, and together these two physical 
organs of sense constitute the epistemological foundation of the knowledge of 
God.  Consequently, the words and works of the incarnate Logos should be 
interchangeable, manifesting the integrity of the Creator whose words are deeds 
and whose deeds are words.  But that integration and the integrity it displays must 
await their materialization in the day-to-day human existence which the Gospel’s 
narrative world will reveal.164  
 
Although my word is not a distinct person as in the triune God, nevertheless, like the 
Word of God, my word represents me as I entrust it to another.  My word communicates 
who I am as I give it to another in love and trust, and, in many ways, others can interpret 
who I am through my word.  Like the incarnate Logos, my given word seeks to be 
tangible in the world because we are.  In marriage, my word is given in consent expressed 
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and made incarnate through sexual consummation.  In Christ, the Word of God and the 
works of the incarnate Word are perfectly integrated.  As sinful, finite persons, the same 
cannot be said of us, yet that is the goal in Christ.  Through the perfect Word, there is 
hope that our given word will be true so that our words and works will form a cohesive 
whole throughout our own life narrative.  For marriage, that means that our word given in 
consent and consummation will be one with the daily faithful and fruitful works of 
marriage lived over a lifetime.  That is the hope and reason marriage is a sacrament.165  
That hope of integration is made possible by the Word, by the grace of the sacrament.166 
   In his explication of religious meaning and expression, Lonergan expounds upon 
the word.  His discussion teases out the personal, social, and historical aspects of the 
word.  Lonergan holds that God’s word speaks to each one of us immediately “flooding 
our hearts with his love.”167  The prior and immediate word is outwardly expressed, and 
therefore, historically conditioned.  It becomes embedded in a context and language 
which may vary depending upon time and place.  In addition, the word spoken is social, 
because it unites what is disparate not only within us, but also among us.  Through the 
word, God gathers a people.  The word that is historical and social is at the same time 
intensely personal.  Lonergan uses the love between and man and a woman to develop 
this point: 
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One must not conclude that the outward word is something incidental.  For it has 
a constitutive role.  When a man and a woman love each other but do not avow 
their love, they are not yet in love.  Their very silence means that their love has 
not reached the point of self-surrender and self-donation.  It is the love that each 
freely and fully reveals to the other that brings about the radically new situation of 
being in love and that begins the unfolding of its life-long implications.168  
 
Lonergan’s insights into the word call attention to the social and historical aspects of 
marital commitment and consent.  Giving one’s word in marital commitment is social, 
creating a family and uniting families.  Witnesses to the marriage can claim to have a 
stake in the marriage in that our actions are never isolated.  The commitment is also 
historically conditioned.  The words of consent are spoken at a specific time and place.  
Questions regarding the variability of expressed commitment due to our historical and 
cultural situatedness loom large.  What aspects of commitment and consent are perennial 
and which are alterable?  These are significant questions for canon law to be addressed in 
the next chapter; however, at this point I want to call attention to the statement that the 
word is constitutive.  The expression of their love and commitment, Lonergan claims, 
brings about something new in their relationship. 
 Farley explains that what we are doing in making a commitment is creating a new 
relationship in the present in order to direct my freedom in the future.  Making a 
commitment produces a moral obligation.  Farley states explicitly, “What commitment 
does is produce an ‘ought.’  It effects a form of relationship in which I am morally bound 
(not physically, not just legally, not just in terms of pragmatic considerations, but morally 
bound) to keep my word—to act in accordance with the word I have given.”169  She 
continues by explaining that the moral obligation then creates a new relationship 
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characterized by claims of justice.  In the previous chapter regarding marriage as contract 
and covenant, obligation and justice were described as minimal terms, whereas gift and 
love were seen as maximal.  In making a marital commitment, the minimum threshold is 
the relationship as obligating.  Farley states,  
If I, in and through commitment, give someone a claim over me, then it is a 
matter of “justice” that I honor the claim (according to the limits of the 
commitment).  Something now is “due” that person.  What I have given to her is a 
new “right” in relation to me.  If I fail to give what is thereby due, I “violate” her 
right (unless my failure can be “justified” in some way).  I contradict something 
that now is constitutive of the relationship between us.  In “breaking faith,” I 
“break my word,” and so break, contradict, my own integrity as a person.  I wrong 
the other person, failing to acknowledge the true claim that is hers.  I do a kind of 
violence to the bond between us.170  
 
Of course, there are many questions surrounding what are “the limits of the commitment” 
and how failure to give what is due is “justified,” but the point remains that making a 
marital commitment is not simply a matter of love, but also a matter of justice, because 
justice is the minimum demand of love.  The content of what is due will be discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter Five.  Suffice it to say that the essential elements of an 
interpersonal commitment are “an intention regarding future action and the undertaking 
of an obligation to another regarding that intended action.”171  Although all relationships 
have a history, they may or may not have a future.  A commitment to love another for life 
directs my decisions and actions in the present so that the relationship will have a future.  
It establishes a new trajectory on the lifecycle of both persons.  Farley elaborates, “With 
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commitment, a new relationship begins in the present.  And it is this relationship, bound 
by my word, that moves into the future.”172  
 Commitment is a fundamental choice.  Using Lonergan’s language, it is a choice 
effecting action on the fourth level of conscious and intentional operations.  Farley states 
it in this way, “What, then, does free choice effect?  It effects action.  It represents my 
power to take hold of my very understandings and desires and to identify with them by 
my freedom and to translate them into action.”173  Marital commitment is a choice to love 
another for life.  Because love involves deciding, acting, doing, Farley describes love as 
an emotion that includes affective affirmation, affective union, and affective response.174  
Loving is more than feeling, yet it certainly includes various feelings.  Farley maintains 
that it is an affective affirmation of the other’s goodness and well-being.  In love, I affirm 
another in that “I am willing to do the deeds of love insofar as they are called for and 
possible.”175  Secondly, loving is an affective union through which we are attached, 
bonded, connected, and joined.  Again, feelings of being united may come and go, yet 
love remains in the choice to continue to affirm and work toward greater union.  Finally, 
loving is a passive, affective response to the lovableness to another.  This is eros as 
described previously.  Farley answers to the objection that the greatest love is agape, 
loving the unlovable, and not essentially a responding to what we receive and perceive as 
valuable, beautiful, or lovable: 
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To “love the un-lovable” makes sense only if it means that we can or ought to 
love persons whose beauty is not immediately evident to us, whose lovableness is 
hidden by some terrible evil or some superficial distortion that occasions our 
inability to see.  In such instances, we are not enjoined to love what is literally 
unable-to-be loved, but to believe what we cannot readily see—to believe that 
there is worth and beauty, dignity and lovableness, in a person as a person and as 
this unique person who claims our love.  It can be enough for us to receive the 
lovableness of the other through the eyes of faith, human or divine.176  
 
Thus, the deep connection between faith and love is introduced and acknowledged.177  In 
these three aspects Farley identifies, love is “simultaneously passion and action, receiving 
and giving.”178  Even eros, love that is essentially passive and responsive, can “offer 
itself (so to speak) to freedom” by choosing to see what is lovable and good in another.179  
Love includes choice, and love that lasts a lifetime does so in and through commitment, 
which is fundamentally a choice. 
 More specifically, marital commitment can be described as the choice to give up 
other choices.  It is the willful acceptance of our finitude through self-appointed limits.  A 
leading scholar in the study of commitment, Scott Stanley, describes marital commitment 
in this way.  “You are choosing to give up the other options, in the words of the vow, 
‘forsaking all others.’  Hence, commitment involves making the choice to give up some 
choices.  Further, really sticking with your commitment will require you to protect the 
choice you have made in the context of life’s demands.”180  Farley concurs that the choice 
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to give up other choices or options narrows the scope of our freedom in the present but 
does not “eliminate future free choices even in regard to what we promise.”181  That is 
why a marital commitment needs to be protected and nurtured.  My present decision does 
not necessitate future choices.  Farley explains, 
Commitments do limit the possibilities of our future in a serious way, of course.  
For example, as my committed relationship moves into the future, I must choose 
again and again to ratify it or not; but because of my commitment, the choice is 
not a “neutral” one.  Insofar as the commitment remains binding, my new choices 
are qualified as choices of fidelity or betrayal.182  
 
Although limiting one’s freedom through commitment may appear restrictive and 
confining, it opens up new possibilities that would not have arisen had the “de-cision” not 
cut off other alternatives.183  One of the most rewarding and relevant new possibilities 
that opens through commitment is intimacy.  As explained in the previous chapter, 
commitment makes intimacy possible.184  In his empirical research, Stanley has 
discovered that there is more self-disclosure in relationships with greater levels of 
dedication.  He explains, “That’s because commitment in the form of dedication provides 
the fundamental framework of safety and trust that promotes closeness and openness.”185  
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One of the great threats to the quality and longevity of a marriage is “alternative 
monitoring,” which is “the degree to which people think about what it would be like to be 
with people other than their mates.”186  Stanley reports that of all factors “thinking 
seriously about alternatives is the most sensitive to how happy one is with a mate at the 
present time.”187  A vicious cycle can ensue when one in a perceived unhappy marriage 
begins to consider alternatives, and then the evaluating of these attractive alternatives 
leads to greater unhappiness in the marriage.  Failure to choose to give up other choices, 
to cut off those attractive alternatives as a viable option in one’s life course, can lead to 
restlessness and unease.  The de-cision of commitment guards against living in a 
perpetual state of practical reflection weighing options; intimacy with another is simply 
not possible in this state. 
 In describing what commitment is, a valuable distinction is provided by Stanley 
and his colleagues.  The psychological dynamics of “wanting to” and “having to” in a 
committed relationship lend itself to the distinction between two kinds of commitment:  
dedication and constraint, respectively.  Commitment as dedication “implies an internal 
state of devotion to a person or project.  Dedication conveys the sense of a forward-
moving force, a motivation based in thoughtful decisions to follow a certain path and 
give it your best.”188  On the other hand, commitment as constraint refers to the forces 
and factors “that would be costs if the present course is abandoned.”189  The forces and 
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factors that comprise constraint commitment include:  economic investments, material 
possessions, concern for children’s welfare, social pressure, termination procedures, 
moral values regarding divorce, and perceived quality of alternatives.190  In describing 
commitment as the choice to give up other choices, Stanley and his colleagues note that 
“commitment can be seen as an act of choosing to be increasingly constrained because of 
the desire to persist, exclusively, on the chosen path.”191  Constraint is generally not 
perceived by happy couples to be a negative force in their lives.  Those shared resources 
and constraining forces are perceived positively and serve to remind couples of their 
original dedication when dissatisfaction in the relationship sets in.192   If dedication to 
one’s spouse were perfectly realized, then constraints would still exist but would not be 
felt as limiting, confining, obliging, or constricting.  Constraints keep relationships alive 
when dedication falls short, and they are necessary in relationships between finite, 
sinful193 persons.194  There is a key dimension of dedication that Stanley elucidates and 
that is “metacommitment.”195  He describes it in this way:  “In other words, it’s 
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commitment to commitment.  It’s the belief that you finish what you start.  Many people 
strongly hold this value regardless of religious or philosophical background.  It’s a 
commitment to personal responsibility.”196  Some may refer to one who fervently adheres 
to metacommitment as a person of integrity or good character.  Although it is true that 
integrity is not exclusive to Christian faith, the connection between commitment and 
conversion cannot be overlooked in a theology of commitment. 
 4.2.3 Why Do We Commit to Love Another for Life?   
 After clarifying what marital commitment is, the reasons for marital commitment 
need to be understood; in other words, why do persons commit to love another for life?  
First, the great gift of essential freedom and the reality of sin make necessary an 
expressed and explicit interpersonal commitment to love another for life.  The human will 
is unreliable.  As Kasper theorizes, our freedom implies a basic openness to the world so 
that we are capable of self-determination: 
It is, however, freedom that enables human beings to give themselves a definitive 
form.  In this respect, freedom is the opposite of arbitrary choice, which acts in 
the name of freedom, but believes that it is possible always to begin at the 
beginning and again and again to cancel every decision in which people realize 
themselves.  This arbitrary and dissipated bachelor form of freedom is perhaps the 
greatest threat to true freedom, since, if nothing is definitive and everything can 
be changed again and again, everything assumes an equal importance or lack of 
importance and nothing is taken seriously.  It is only when there are really 
irreversible decisions that life becomes a real risk and a genuine adventure.  True 
freedom is realized in faithfulness.197  
 
As argued previously in this chapter, true freedom is not found in arbitrary indeterminism 
but in faithfulness to one’s commitment.  Kasper continues, “The marital bond in 
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freedom makes the partners free in a new way.  Above all, it makes them free from the 
moods and fickleness of the moment.  In this way, faithfulness is a victory over time.”198  
Because there is that separation between knowing and doing, we do not always do what 
we know to be right, and we need commitment to strengthen our wills throughout time.199  
Farley asserts, “Because we know our own inconsistencies, we need a way to strengthen 
ourselves for fulfilling our present intentions in an otherwise uncertain future.”200  
 The second reason why we commit to love another for life in marriage is to 
reassure others of our intentions.  Due to our unreliable wills, commitment not only 
strengthens us to decide and do what we intend, but also provides assurance to others 
regarding what they can expect from us.201  Giving my word to another in a commitment 
creates an obligation and a relationship of trust.  Again, there is no necessary connection 
between knowing and doing; we simply trust that others will do what they say they will.  
Trust is indispensable to every relationship, particularly a marital one, and commitment 
weaves the fabric of trust that supports the possibility of community.  Because this point 
is integral to a theology of commitment, I will quote Farley at length: 
When we fail to be faithful to our promises, we not only wrong one another as 
persons; we can truly harm each other and many others beyond us.  This is the 
central concern of those who argue that promises must be kept because of the bad 
consequences that follow from breaking them.  “Harm” may take many forms, but 
there is one which is always a possibility when a commitment is broken.  That is, 
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commitments provide a basis of trust in our relationships, whether they are with 
individuals or are broadly communal and social.  To the extent that commitments 
are ignored or broken without clearly justifying reasons, trust is eroded.  When we 
fail to keep a promise, those who counted on us may lose faith not only in us but 
in all others who seek their trust.  They may experience themselves (as I have 
already noted) as exploited, used, deceived, as coerced or abandoned because 
their own choices were made in the light of their earlier trust in our promises to 
them.  As a result, alienation, resentment, suspicion can enter in.  Moreover, we 
who break our promises may find ourselves becoming the kind of persons who 
are more and more irresponsible as we attend less and less to the conditions of 
accountability.  Less responsible (that is, more irresponsible), we are 
paradoxically less free to enter into human relationships, less free to collaborate in 
human endeavors.202  
 
Making commitments and keeping those promises is elementary in establishing trust and 
communion.  As Farley notes, a commitment to marry exists to reassure others of my 
intention, not simply my future spouse.203  “But in a Christian construal of what marriage 
is a commitment is also made to God and to a community of persons (to the Church and 
to the wider society).”204  Clearly, marriage is a commitment to persons, but it is also “a 
commitment to a certain framework of life in relation to persons.”205  This framework has 
various levels:  generic form, cultural model, and particular form specific to this couple.  
Farley notes that often the first level is explicitly articulated and the other two levels are 
implicit.206  This can be problematic, because while it may be clear to whom one is 
committing, it may not be as clear as to what they are committing.  Certainly, this is 
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where canon law comes into play in sacramental marriages, and this point will be 
developed in the next chapter. 
 The final reason why we make marital commitments is to express and make 
present the fullness of our love as it grows into completion.  In love, we desire 
affirmation of and total union with our beloved.  It is the reason we use language such as 
total self-gift, because somehow to desire anything less with another seems less than 
love.  An expressed and explicit, interpersonal commitment to love another for life is a 
way to “give” the totality of our lives in the present moment where we live: 
We know that freedom cannot once and for all determine its future affirmation of 
love.  No free choice can settle all future free choices for the continuation of love.  
Yet sometimes we love in a way that makes us yearn to gather up our whole 
future and place it in affirmation of the one we love.  Though we know it is 
impossible because our lives are stretched out in time, we long to seal our love 
now and forever.  By commitment to unconditional love we attempt to make love 
irrevocable and to communicate it so.207  
 
Lawler so intimately ties love to commitment that he states, “As a freely willed act, love 
is a species of promise or commitment, the giving of my word to do something, namely, 
to will the good of another.”208  Within this commitment to love is the intention of 
permanence.  “We mutually commit to one another as lovers to make our love permanent 
and to communicate it as permanent.”209  Because love implies intransience, 
immovability, and eternalness, a marital commitment symbolizes this love, expressing it 
and making it present.  Because our lives are incomplete and open to change, marriage is 
a sacrament, where the eternal touches the temporal. 
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 4.2.4 How Do We Commit to Love Another for Life? 
 Having articulated why we make a commitment to love another for life, I turn to 
how we make such a commitment.  As previously explained, commitment occurs on the 
fourth level of conscious and intentional operations.  It is principally a decision, an act of 
willing that follows from knowing but not necessarily so.  As a conscious and intentional 
operation, commitment occurs internally.  The commitment is mental and spiritual.  
Lonergan states, “For the decision itself is an act of willing.  It possesses the internal 
alternatives of either consenting or refusing.”210    As a practical course of action is 
illumined, namely the possibility of loving another for life, one may either consent to do 
so or refuse.  However, the commitment does not occur only internally.  Commitment 
occurs externally as well.  Physically and socially, the commitment is manifested, 
expressed, and executed.  To say the commitment is a purely internal occurrence is to 
deny our corporeality and sociality.  Until the commitment is born into the world, 
externally, it remains incomplete.  A personal resolution may remain internal, but a 
mutual commitment may not because it occurs between two people.  The external 
manifestation of marital commitment is consent given and received at the wedding (and 
consummation).211 
 Marital commitment occurs in ritual celebration.  In Chapter Three the 
anthropological and theological dimensions of the sacraments were touched upon, 
particularly the significance of ritual celebrations.  At a sacramental wedding celebration, 
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the reality of the couple’s love for each other along with Christ’s love for them (and His 
church) is expressed and made present.  To say that their love is expressed and made 
present assumes that their love and commitment has already begun and is invited to grow 
through their consent.  Through symbolic ritual behavior, the intention to love one 
another completely throughout a lifetime is celebrated, for one can only celebrate what is 
real.212  As finite, bodily persons, the expression and actualization of love that forgives, 
reconciles, and elevates in the death, resurrection, and ascension of Christ becomes real 
through sacramental behavior.  Utilizing a celebration model of the sacraments, one can 
affirm and presuppose the reality-event being celebrated.213  Through the celebration of 
the sacrament of marriage, the reality-event, the love of Christ for His church, “becomes 
more real, more intensely present.”214  The extraordinary pledge, commitment, to love 
another through life and death symbolically re-presents the enduring love of Christ for 
His church.  There is a temporal character to the sacramental celebration of marriage in 
that the unfailing love of God for, in, and through the couple is recalled (anamnesis) and 
realized in the present moment (kairos) with the hope that it will endure forever 
(eschaton).215  In this way, the sacrament gathers up and expresses the fullness of 
conjugal love lived throughout the lifecycle, a task that is only possible in ritual and 
symbolic activity. 
 The significance of the symbolic function of marriage is demonstrated in the work 
of Stanley and his colleagues on commitment and romantic attachment.  According to 
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Stanley et al., the critical distinction between the two is found in one’s intention.  
Whereas romantic attachment “implies depth of emotional connection,” commitment 
“highlights an intention to persist in the relationship.”216  They argue that for couples to 
feel secure in their romantic relationships, expressions of commitment must be mutual 
and clear.  “Commitment cannot secure romantic attachment unless it both exists in each 
partner and is signaled between partners.”217  Couples “signal” to one another their level 
of commitment through “cultural emblems” such as engagement and marriage.  Stanley 
and his colleagues express the significance of the use of cultural emblems of 
commitment, which further highlights the symbolic function of marriage: 
The widespread use of cultural emblems of commitment may be diminishing in 
industrialized nations (a theme discussed in Stanley, 2002).  This should have 
consequences because of the potency of such emblems for securing romantic 
attachment; they move beyond what one person does to what both partners are 
willing to signal to the world.  The commitment level of one partner can be 
miscoded by the other, but it would be much harder for either partner to miscode a 
public, cultural emblem such as engagement.  Therefore, where cultural emblems 
of commitment diminish (e.g., “going steady” has mostly gone away), we predict 
there should be an increase in the situations where one partner misinterprets the 
commitment level of the other. 
 Marriage is a culturally imbued, societally sanctioned emblem with high 
signal value with regard to commitment.218  
 
Both engagement and marriage symbolically express clearly and mutually the intention to 
commit to another for life, the former does so in the future while the latter does so in the 
present.  The significance of the symbolic function of marriage will be further addressed 
in the final chapter in relation to cohabitation and commitment. 
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 4.2.5 When Do We Commit to Love Another for Life? 
 Finally, answering when couples make a marital commitment is not as simple as it 
first appears.  The obvious response is on their wedding day.  During the exchange of 
consent, their commitment is externally and publicly manifested.  For sacramental 
marriages in which at least one partner is Catholic, the ritual is to take place in a parish 
church or another church or oratory with the permission of the local ordinary.219  The 
designation of place is to reinforce that the sacrament is a public expression of the work 
of God and not merely a private, individualized fantasy of the couple.  The liturgical form 
of the wedding is to be celebrated in accordance with The Rite of Marriage with couples 
offered some options in terms of readings, prayers, and blessings.220  The stability of 
liturgical form expresses the belief that couples are being created in the sacrament, within 
something larger than they are.  David Blankenhorn laments the trend of composing 
one’s own vows which often downplays marital permanence, a trend occurring in many 
American Protestant and Evangelical weddings: 
But the essence of this change reflects a dramatic shrinking of our idea of 
marriage.  With the new vows, the robust expectation of marital permanence 
shrinks to frail, often unstated hope.  Marriage as a vital communal institution 
shrinks to marriage as a purely private relationship.  Marriage as something that 
defines me shrinks to something that I define.221  
 
For couples marrying in the Catholic Church, “the vow is prior to the couple,” and in a 
sense, “the vow helps to create the couple.”222  The standardized ritual inserts the couple 
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into a larger story of a faithful God and His people.  An aid to couples preparing for the 
wedding liturgy, Together for Life, clearly articulates why couples are not free to write 
their own vows.  “Although the wedding liturgy that you celebrate belongs to you, it also 
belongs to the whole Church.  While your vows are deeply personal, they are not private.  
Rather, they are public expressions of your love and faithfulness.”223  Unfortunately, the 
meaning of the commitment expressed on the wedding day is often obscured by the 
inordinate focus on the externals of the ceremony itself.  In a work of investigative 
journalism and social critique, Rebecca Mead probes the historical origins and trappings 
of the wedding industry to reveal the culture into which Americans marry and many 
brides, in particular, buy into.  Mead reports that in 2006 the wedding industry was 
estimated to be worth $161 billion to the United States economy, and instead of 
celebrating what is real, the wedding industry is selling a fantasy.224  While watching a 
beachfront, vow-renewal ceremony, Mead evocatively conveys the culture of the 
American wedding, the product of a consumerist economy and a ravenous industry: 
And this, I realized as I watched them on the sand, was the wedding package they 
were really buying into.  It was the same wedding package sold to every 
American bride and groom by the American wedding industry, which provides 
not just the products and services for weddings, but the compelling fantasies upon 
which their use is grounded.  This husband and wife were saying “I do” to the 
long white gown and the tiered cake and the wreaths of flowers—the trappings of 
the traditionalesque, bizarrely transferred in their case to the tropics.  They were 
saying “I do” to the sentimental murmurings of a minster-for-hire, an official with 
whom they had no past and no future; “I do” to being, for a fleeting moment, the 
center of attention, and to having that moment ritually preserved by the flashing 
of cameras.  They were saying “I do” to their celebration as individuals whose 
own tastes and desires were paramount, trumping the practices of the past and the 
oversight of religious institutions and familial authorities; and “I do” to their 
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consecration as a world unto themselves, there in romantic isolation at the water’s 
edge, about to invent their future together.  And they were saying “I do” to the 
wedding industry’s own assumptions of nuptial authority, administered through 
bridal magazines, bridal stores, department-store wedding registries, and all the 
other avenues in which romance and commerce have become inextricably 
entwined.225  
 
Although some of these entrapments are avoided by couples marrying according to the 
Rite, the consumerist culture has invaded even Catholic weddings, and a conscious effort 
needs to be made by those preparing couples for marriage that the heart of the wedding is 
the commitment, covenant, and sacrament. 
 A marital commitment is publicly manifested in one day, yet the possibility for 
making a true lifelong commitment arises previously, once we are prepared.  After 
teaching on the nature, dignity, and purposes of marriage, Pius XI instructs unreservedly 
on the fundamental necessity of proper formation in the faith and marital preparation.  
“All these things, however, Venerable Brethren, depend in large measure on the due 
preparation remote and proximate, of the parties for marriage.  For it cannot be denied 
that the basis of a happy wedlock, and the ruin of an unhappy one, is prepared and set in 
the souls of boys and girls during the period of childhood and adolescence.”226  Before 
their commitment is made on their wedding day, couples should be “well disposed and 
well prepared, so that they will be able, as far as they can, to help each other in sustaining 
the vicissitudes of life, and yet more in attending to their eternal salvation and in forming 
the inner man unto the fullness of the age of Christ.”227  Pius XI highlights one of the 
most important aspects of marriage preparation, one that has been sorely neglected and 
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left in ambiguity in theological instruction and pastoral practice.  “To the proximate 
preparation of a good married life belongs very specially the care in choosing a partner; 
on that depends a great deal whether the forthcoming marriage will be happy or not, since 
one may be to the other either a great help in leading a Christian life, or, a great danger 
and hindrance.”228  The place of discernment of one’s vocation, and if it be marriage, 
one’s specific partner, cannot be overlooked.   
In Familiaris consortio, John Paul II delineates the stages of marriage 
preparation:  remote, proximate, and immediate.229  Beginning in early childhood, remote 
preparation involves the forming of character through the instillation of authentic human 
values in the family and through catechetical formation.  Proximate preparation builds 
upon this earlier stage and “involves a more specific preparation for the sacraments, as it 
were, a rediscovery of them.”230  In Familiaris consortio, the role of discernment and the 
placement of engagement within the stages of marriage preparation are not clearly 
presented.  Immediate preparation takes place within the weeks and months prior to the 
wedding celebration and includes the prenuptial canonical investigation of the freedom to 
marry, evangelization and catechesis in the knowledge of the love of Christ for His 
church, and preparation for active participation in the wedding liturgy.231  In 1988, the 
NCCB (now named the USCCB) expanded greatly upon these stages in a workbook for 
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the pastoral help for marriage preparation, Faithful to Each Other Forever.232  Within the 
stage of proximate preparation, adolescents and young adults should be formed in the 
Christian understanding of love, intimacy, and sexuality.  The text specifically addresses 
the question of discernment in proximate preparation.  “How does one find or pick a 
partner with whom we can enter into such a loving, intimate, and committed 
relationship?”233  Although most Americans have the freedom to marry whom they 
choose, the disturbing divorce rate reveals we may need help in choosing whom to marry 
and staying married to whom we chose.  The NCCB concludes, “Consequently, the more 
we understand the essence of love; the conscious and unconscious factors operative in 
any developing relationship; the expectations that are fostered, even from early 
childhood; the nature of intimacy; and the true character of the other person, the better 
chance there is for a lasting love and successful match.”234  Proximate preparation is the 
opportunity to dispel the myth of “The One” soul mate theory of dating and to raise 
awareness regarding the transitory and illusory character of romantic love.  During this 
time, young people learn that a developing relationship requires a balance of autonomy 
and relatedness and that there are characteristics of a healthy, intimate relationship that 
should be recognized, namely, authenticity, mutuality, growth, and inclusivity.235   
Bypassing the question of how well these pastoral guidelines have been utilized 
programmatically, I call attention to the lacuna in the Church’s documents on the role of 
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discernment and dating in marriage preparation.  In 1996 the Pontifical Council for the 
Family detailed the stages of marriage preparation, and stated specifically, “Proximate 
preparation takes place during the period of engagement.”236  Although the council states 
that these stages “are not rigidly defined,”237 the role of dating and discernment is too 
quickly passed over.  The council asserts, “The young people should have already been 
helped to discern their vocation through their own personal efforts and with the aid of the 
community, and above all pastors.  This discernment must take place before any 
commitment is made to get engaged.”238  The when of marital commitment needs to be 
more specifically fleshed out.  To do so would require a theology of dating and 
vocational discernment.  The recent pastoral letter of the USCCB on marriage assumes, 
“By the time of immediate preparation, the couple has developed a conviction that God is 
calling them to marriage with a particular person.”239  The letter continues,  
Prayer, especially for the guidance of the Holy Spirit, and the help of wise 
mentors are crucial in this discernment process.  Discernment also involves an 
honest assessment of qualities that are foundational for the marriage.  These 
include an ability to make and keep a commitment, the desire for a lifelong, 
faithful relationship, and openness to children.  The couple will also want to 
reflect on the values they share, their ability to communicate, and agreement on 
significant issues.240  
 
Although the stages of marriage preparation may not be rigidly defined in timing or 
duration, there needs to be greater clarity on when and how a commitment forms in a 
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dating relationship.  When the pressures of the wedding industry weigh down on an 
engaged couple, it is too late to begin questions of discernment.  In her longitudinal 
research with children of divorce, Judith Wallerstein makes a similar conclusion:  
Most programs that give marital advice are aimed at engaged couples who belong 
to churches and synagogues.  These are very good beginnings that should be 
expanded.  But many offer too little and arrive too late to bring about changes in 
any individual’s values or knowledge.  Nor is the excitement that precedes a 
wedding the best time for reflection on how to choose a lifetime partner or what 
makes a marriage work.241  
 
Wallerstein opines that the best time for discussion of mate selection, sex, love, intimacy, 
and morality is mid-adolescence.242  This coincides with the NCCB’s discussion on 
proximate preparation.   
This stage of proximate preparation requires the most theological and practical 
work in order to support and strengthen marital commitment.  The Pontifical Council for 
the Family brings to light the phenomenon of prolonged or extended adolescence.  “The 
pastoral care of youth should also keep in mind that, because of various kinds of 
difficulties—such as a ‘prolonged adolescence’ and remaining longer in one’s family (a 
relatively new and troubling phenomenon), young people today tend to put off the 
commitment to get married for too long.”243  Adolescence, in itself, is an ambiguous state 
somewhere between childhood and adulthood; adolescents exist on a continuum of 
physical, sexual, intellectual, moral, and spiritual development that cannot be defined 
simply by age.  This ambiguity is further exaggerated by the phenomenon of extended 
adolescence, which could range anywhere from age 10 to 29 or beyond.  Bonnie Miller-
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McLemore states, “Contemporary childhood has doubled or even tripled, from seven to 
fourteen to twenty-one years.  At the same time, the age of puberty has dropped, creating 
an odd period of physical maturity in the midst of emotional and social dependence.”244  
Marital commitment used to serve as a demarcation of growing up, a rite of passage.  The 
rise in the age of first marriage and the dramatic growth in cohabitation have contributed 
to a wide range in the ambiguous adolescent period.  In order to prepare young people for 
marital commitment, greater attention and precision need to be given to the stage of 
proximate marriage preparation. 
 Finally, the when of marital commitment occurs every day after the wedding 
celebration.245  As Farley notes, “As my committed relationship moves into the future, I 
must choose again and again to ratify it or not.”246  Marital commitment is the choice to 
keep on choosing one’s spouse day after day.  Because change is an inevitable part of 
marriage and life, couples need to renew promises within a continually shifting context.  
Herbert Anderson argues for the necessity of promising again within marriage: 
In order to accommodate the inevitable and sometimes necessary changes that 
occur in marriage, couples need to practice making promises that are time-limited, 
situational, circumstantial, and frequently renegotiated.  Obviously, these 
promises build on the primary promises of love, respect, and mutual recognition 
that are foundational for marriage. . . . Promising again and again is an 
intentional, relational act that defines the self and honors the other.  It is an act of 
mutuality that rests on the willingness of two people to recognize each other as 
people of worth, each with particular gifts and a unique story.247  
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The basic interpersonal commitment to love another for life is then particularized within 
the flow of everyday life.  Anniversaries can be a fertile opportunity to deepen the marital 
commitment within a ritual particular to the couple, family, or church.  With each change 
and movement, the hope is that the commitment will grow and strengthen so that at the 
end of one’s life, the commitment will be tested, true, and tough, a testimony to the 
unfailing love of God. 
 
4.3 Sustaining a Marital Commitment 
 
 
 Within the present context of individualism and a cultural lack of commitment, 
marital commitment is made even more difficult to sustain.  Throughout childhood and 
particularly adolescence, persons are either well or ill prepared to make such a 
commitment as adults.248  Consequently, the possibility of making such a profound 
commitment may be enhanced or limited by the experiences of these early years.  
However, commitment manifested on the wedding day is an act of freedom, even though 
it is subject to the conditions of effective freedom.  The significance of choice and self-
determination has already been demonstrated.  Although marital commitment may be 
prepared for liturgically, emotionally, intellectually, and spiritually, only consent de 
praesenti creates marriage.  Marital commitment expressed at the wedding changes the 
reality of the couple.  Every day following the wedding, this commitment needs to be 
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sustained.  Browning’s five dimensions of moral reasoning can reveal the multi-faceted 
structure of marital commitment sustained over a lifetime. 
 4.3.1 Visional Dimension of Practical Moral Reasoning 
 The visional dimension of practical moral reasoning uncovers the role of 
community, narrative, tradition, and identity.  Spouses make a marital commitment 
within a complex of communities with narratives and traditions that have shaped their 
current worldview, or prejudices as explained in the first chapter.  Marital commitment is 
an act of freedom within a context.  Although belonging to many communities, persons 
may primarily identify with one so that the history and beliefs of that community become 
one’s own.  Bellah and his colleagues name such a community a “community of 
memory.”249  These communities of memory retell their stories, stories of hope and 
suffering, so that the traditions of the past become the constitutive narratives of the 
present.  The church is a community of memory offering stories of men and women who 
have lived in covenant relationship with God and one another.  As retold in the previous 
chapter, marriage is integrally woven throughout the history of the church providing a 
living tradition for the community to interpret. 
 One of the ways in which the rich theological tradition of the church makes the 
sacramental commitment of marriage sustainable is through the vision of marriage as 
eschatological sign.  Theologically, marriage has penultimate value, because the church, 
as well as marriage, is to serve as a sign of the eschatological hope of the heavenly 
wedding feast at the end of time.250  Because marriage alone is not meant to satisfy the 
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deepest needs and desires of the human person, marital commitment is more easily 
sustained as a symbolic instrument pointing toward the hope of ultimate fulfillment in 
God: 
By being classified as a penultimate rather than as an ultimate value, marriage is 
demythologized, demystified and desacralized, and in this way its immanent 
beauty and inner wealth are more perfectly expressed.  If, on the other hand, 
exaggerated expectations are projected onto marriage and the partners in 
marriage, the inevitable result is almost always disappointment.  No partner can 
give the other heaven on earth.  A person’s urge to make such penultimate values 
absolute and his tendency to do violence to them in this way can only cease when 
he recognizes God as the ultimate reality.  A person can only be fully human 
when he or she sees God fully as God.  The eschatological glorification of God is 
the final humanization of humanity.  The eschatological reservation regarding 
marriage is therefore the source of freedom in marriage.  It binds both partners to 
God and prevents them from becoming enslaved to each other.251  
 
In this way, the church’s theological vision of marriage supports the continuance of the 
commitment.  Spouses who believe that they should be completely fulfilled by the other 
will surely be disappointed and tempted to break their commitment.  Stanley addresses 
how expectations affect the marital relationship.  He purports, “The losses you feel in 
your marriage will be made up of the difference between what you expected and what 
you have.”252  He urges couples to have reasonable expectations within marriage and an 
accurate assessment of what most marriages are like.253  The theological vision of 
marriage as a human reality pointing to and participating in a greater divine love allows 
for reasonable expectations within marriage. 
 The church as community is able to protect and sustain marital commitments 
through its prayers, presence, and structures.  Faith is necessary for the sacrament of 
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marriage, and it is precisely in times of discouragement and doubt that spouses believe in 
the power and grace of God to support their commitment, however weak it may feel.  As 
a public ritual and symbol, marriage is nurtured through the prayers of the wider church 
community.  Members of the faith community are to act, not only spiritually through 
prayer, but also socially through real physical presence.  In difficult times, spouses need 
to talk and listen to others who share in the same constitutive stories of the Christian 
faith.  Finally, canon law, that is the structures, rules, and procedures of the church, 
prevents spouses from easily breaking their commitment.  Canon law protects and 
supports the values of the church regarding marriage, specifically the importance of 
fidelity, unity, life, and love. 
 4.3.2 Obligational Dimension of Practical Moral Reasoning 
 By looking at the obligational dimension of moral thinking, we can see the role of 
principles and virtues in sustaining a marital commitment.254  The thought of moral 
principles and duty may not seem to fit with the contemporary view of romantic 
marriage, but nonetheless it has a significant role in marital commitment.  Basic moral 
principles such as the obligation to keep one’s commitments and the duty to be faithful to 
one’s spouse serve as anchors in the changing course of marriage over a lifetime.  At 
times, the pure conviction that spouses should be true to their vows, that they have an 
obligation to keep their commitment, can keep the marriage intact.  The “should” of 
moral principles can maintain the marital commitment.  Farley expounds, “Duty can hold 
us in relation when all else fails.  When our hearts are dry and our vision clouded, when 
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our memory is confused and our hope is eclipsed in the day, then duty—our sense of 
obligation in relation to the word we have given—holds us to the deeds of love and to 
attentiveness to new springs of old love within us.”255  Basic moral principles guide and 
direct spouses to choose again to commit and remain faithful to that commitment.  
Nevertheless, duty alone cannot sustain a marriage, certainly not a happy one.  Farley 
describes the role of duty in marriage in this way: 
No, the overarching role of duty in our commitments to love is more likely to be 
the indirect and paradoxical one whereby we are obligated to find ways to 
continue loving, but ways that are not themselves dependent only on the 
obligation we have undertaken.  There is a wisdom for faithful loving, a wisdom 
to which duty calls us but which duty itself does not provide.256  
 
The moral obligation to keep one’s commitment to love another for life becomes the 
decision to find creative ways to continue loving for life. 
 4.3.3 Tendency-Need Dimension of Practical Moral Reasoning 
 Because discussions of virtue address human nature and human goods, virtue can 
be classified under both the tendency-need as well as the obligational dimensions of 
practical moral reasoning.  Virtue theory certainly touches upon psychology and 
anthropology while moving beyond it.  In agreement with Yves Simon, I would argue 
that “psycho-technology” is not a substitute for virtue.257  For human tendencies deemed 
undesirable, we primarily look to psychological and/or medical techniques to solve the 
problem.  Certainly, psycho-technology aids in understanding and transforming 
destructive tendencies, passions, behaviors, and relationships, but chemical and 
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psychological techniques cannot substitute for moral virtue.  Simon supposes,  “Few 
people stop to think that beyond the problem of diseased emotions, twisted passions, 
destructive compulsions, and so on, there awaits the real problem of the use and abuse of 
healthy tendencies and sound emotions, which is a problem for everyone, those in need of 
psychological help not excluded.”258  Simply put, psychological theories and the 
application of their results are not a replacement for moral and religious theories of the 
flourishing of human personhood and relationships.   
The adherence to moral principles and the acquiring of moral virtues are both 
essential to sustaining marital commitment.  Indeed, there are connections between 
commitment and virtue that can be elucidated.  Both the acquisition of virtues and the 
making of commitments are ways of assuring human dependability.  As explained 
previously, we make commitments to assure others of our intentions to act in certain 
ways in the future.  Commitments created and kept foster a sense of trust and 
dependability.  Virtues do the same in that virtuous persons act consistently and reliably.  
Simon contends that “the only way to assure human dependability is by acquisition of 
virtues.”259  Virtues enable spouses to remain faithful, forgiving, and loving throughout 
the changing circumstances of life.  Exactly how the virtues are operative in marital 
commitment can be seen by looking more closely at what virtue is. 
A virtue is a habitus, or “state of character.”  Habitus has been incorrectly 
translated as habit, which would imply that acts proceeding from virtues are done without 
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freedom.260  Simon explains, “For while, as we have seen, even as they serve specific 
ends, habits operate automatically or mechanically, the operation of habitus is 
characterized by unmistakable vitality.  Habit relieves us of the need to think; but habitus 
makes us think creatively. . . . Compared to habit, habitus represents thought that is truly 
alive.”261  Through the repetition of right actions, certain virtues develop allowing the 
person to be ready and willing to do the right thing at the right time regardless of the 
circumstance.  According to Romanus Cessario, “the acquired virtue enables the one who 
develops it to act after the fashion of a habitus-formed act, that is, promptly, easily, and 
with a measure of satisfaction and joy.”262  He continues,  
Virtue establishes in us a kind of second nature, since it provides a steady 
inclination for freely performing good actions in the same way nature itself 
operates with respect to necessary actions, such as sight and digestion.  But even 
acquired virtue, since it observes the general rules of habitus development and 
operation, respects the person’s freedom in determining the conditions for 
performing or refraining from a particular action.263  
 
Actions proceeding from virtue are fully human acts engaging one’s freedom and 
responsibility.  They simply arise more easily like traveling a well worn path.  Virtue is 
essential to marriage due to the magnitude of the moral demands pressed upon spouses 
together with the vast change and unpredictability of married life.  Virtues acquired 
through chosen repeated actions and infused through the grace of Christ at baptism 
enable spouses to be ready to love rightly. 
                                                 
260. Simon, The Definition of Moral Virtue, 57. 
 
261. Ibid., 60. 
 
262. Romanus Cessario, The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 100. 
 
263. Ibid., 101. 
 
241 
 
 Using a Kantian account of virtue, Hayden Ramsey articulates explicitly the 
connection between commitment and virtue.  Although he conceives of habit and 
disposition differently than previously described, his theory of virtue can disclose the 
importance of virtue and commitment for the moral life, specifically marriage.  Whereas 
Simon describes virtue as the “deliberate disposition of the dynamic parts of the psyche 
that would make us existentially ready to do the right thing at the right time,”264 Ramsay 
holds that “dispositions are a matter of (largely unchosen) personal endowment, situation 
and temperament, or if they are pervasive or enduring, personality.”265  For Ramsay, 
“habits are a matter of character, and imply presence of commitments, life plans and 
identificatory beliefs which identify certain values with agents.”266  This view of habits 
seems more in line with habitus as previously described.  Nevertheless, Ramsay states, 
“Virtue on my account is distinct both from dispositions and from virtuous habits. . . . 
The experience that is Virtue creates forms of harmony or achievement through 
commitments to fundamental aspects of our own well being.”267  Ramsay views the 
commitment to basic human goods as virtue.  The virtuous person experiences oneself as 
committed and liberated at the same time.  For Ramsay, virtue is not something that 
happens through repeated action but something one chooses:   
To be committed is to have a certain sort of experience:  constraint of will but 
experienced as the will’s freedom to determine itself.  To be virtuous is not just 
being disposed to behave in certain ways—as any animal or machine could be—
but having a certain sort of experience:  virtuous persons constrain themselves in 
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accord with fundamental features of the human good, and they experience this as 
self-determination.  Virtue, therefore, does not consist in experiencing morality as 
difficult and effortsome, but precisely the opposite:  virtue is experiencing 
morality as freedom, as not being imposed upon by external or internal (emotional 
or imposed rational) factors.268  
 
This alternate account of virtue highlights the importance of commitment in the whole of 
the moral life.269  Commitment and virtue assure others of human dependability, and both 
commitment and virtue constrain the will in a way that actually leads to greater freedom, 
satisfaction, and ease in living.  Ramsay’s account of integrity,270 or commitment to all 
human goods, is reminiscent of Stanley’s concept of metacommitment.  Persons of 
integrity are committed to being committed.   
 Central to virtue theory is the concept of life-planning.  In agreement with 
Aquinas271 in the Summa Theologiae, Jean Porter describes how a fully human life is 
structured and properly ordered around the true end of human life.  “Aquinas . . . insists 
that in order for human life to be truly successful, it is not enough that it be structured 
around some goal.  The goal must be the correct goal.  Most properly speaking, this goal 
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can only be the direct vision of God (I-II.3.8).”272  In order to attain this supernatural end 
of human life, one needs the theological virtues, the infused moral virtues, and the gifts of 
the Holy Spirit.273  Additionally, human persons have a natural end, which incorporates 
an aggregate of goods into an ordered unity.  In ST I-II.94.2, Aquinas lists the human 
inclinations of self-preservation, reproduction through procreation, living in society, and 
knowing the truth about God.274  Porter explains, 
What Aquinas offers in I-II.94.2 is an outline of what a human life should 
properly look like, what goods it will incorporate, and what relation those goods 
should have to one another.  That is, he offers an inclusive life-plan, which . . . 
can serve as the aim by which an individual can bring the diverse activities of his 
life into a unified whole. 
A normative human life, as Aquinas’ account of the inclinations indicates, 
is one in which the goods of all the inclinations (except, in some cases, 
procreation) are pursued in an orderly way, with the pursuit of the lower 
inclinations being subordinated to the pursuit of the higher inclinations.  Clearly, 
the natural end of human life, so understood, allows for considerable variety in 
the way in which these pursuits are combined into a complete life.275  
 
Freedom is found in embracing an inclusive life-plan that is ordered yet flexible in the 
specific details of one’s life.  One’s life-plan is inclusive in the sense that serious moral 
commitments are made to human goods without those goods becoming idols.  Something 
similar happens in marital commitment.  Although the details of life can never be known 
or decided beforehand, marital commitment focuses and orders one’s future actions, so 
that the marriage is always a penultimate value.  Through the grace of God, the moral and 
theological virtues enable and empower spouses to be faithful to their commitment.  The 
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acquired moral virtues aid in achieving natural human happiness, whereas, the infused 
moral virtues and theological virtues empower spouses to experience union with God 
through their sacramental union. 
 The cardinal virtues are “hinge” virtues, because they “are those on which human 
life is founded, by which the gate may be entered.”276  Following the suggestion of 
Simon, I will refrain from using “the impossible names of irascible and concupiscible 
appetites”277 when referring to the virtues that govern the emotional life.  The virtue of 
fortitude or courage disposes the person to face and fear the right things, from the right 
motive, in the right way, in the right circumstances.278  Although Aquinas refers to the 
virtue of courage in reference to remaining firm in the presence of mortal danger, courage 
is relevant and necessary in making and maintaining a marital commitment.279  Great risk 
is involved in promising to remain faithful and to love another for the whole of one’s 
unknown future.  Courage empowers one to face that risk and make the commitment.  In 
addition, when spouses cause each other pain in the midst of their emotionally 
vulnerable, intimate relationship, the urge to flee and seek refuge may be 
overwhelming.280  Again, the virtue of courage holds them firm in the commitment 
already made.  The virtue of temperance is the “rational disposition of the drive toward 
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the pleasurable and away from the unpleasant.”281  The virtue of temperance in marriage 
orders the sexual drive and the basic need for touch within the marital commitment 
toward one’s spouse.  Temperate spouses embrace a healthy and satisfying sexual life 
with one another and refuse the temptations of sexual pleasures outside of marriage.  
Courage and temperance, the affective virtues, are particularly important for the 
contemporary view of marriage as interpersonal, emotional relationship.  In today’s 
understanding of marriage as a SuperRelationship, rational control and ordering of 
emotional responses are paramount: 
In particular, the affective virtues of fortitude and temperance are both possible 
and necessary because of the special character of the passions that they rectify 
(namely, fear, desire, and anger [I-II.59.2, 4, 5; I-II.60.1]) What characterizes 
these passions is that they are not rational in the full sense, and yet they have a 
cognitive component that is amenable to rational direction. . . . The formation of 
the affective virtues consists precisely in the reeducation of one’s emotional 
responses in this way.  Hence, to the extent that this process has been successfully 
carried out, the individual’s immediate emotional responses, his likes and dislikes, 
will accord with what his more considered rational judgments on the matter would 
be.  And that is precisely why the truly virtuous person does not require constant 
conscious deliberation on his final end in order to act in accordance with it.  His 
immediate responses will reliably direct him to act appropriately, at least in 
normal circumstances.282  
 
The minefield of emotions involved in an intimate relationship like marriage requires the 
affective virtues, which are acquired through right action and infused through the grace of 
God. 
 The virtue of justice is the cardinal virtue of the rational appetite, or the will.  
Justice is concerned with right relations among persons or between a person and the 
community.  The will naturally seeks the good of the person as understood; however, the 
will needs to be disposed and ordered to seek the good of the other through the cardinal 
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virtue of justice and to the ultimate norm of charity.  As virtues of the will, both justice 
and charity direct the relation of spouses one to another.  The theological virtue of charity 
is “the mother of all virtues,” 283 the root and principle of all the virtues directing one to 
her ultimate end of union with God.  The relation between justice and love has been 
discussed previously as minimal and maximal terms.  Here, love or charity is the 
foundation, end, and principle of the moral life.  The moral virtue of justice disposes one 
to give the other her due.  In many ways, canon law regarding marriage seeks to protect 
the rights of spouses and ensure each is given his or her due.  The next chapter will 
explore the complexity of identifying and legislating justice in relationships when rights 
and promises are exchanged rather than goods and services. 
 The final cardinal virtue, prudence, is the form of the other moral virtues and a 
virtue of the practical intellect.  Right thinking in relation to what is to be done or avoided 
is the work of prudence.  The virtue of prudence is the judgment of conscience working 
well in concrete situations.  Regarding prudence, Aquinas avers, “From this the rectitude 
and completion of goodness in all other virtues comes.”284  The relation of prudence to 
the other moral virtues is relevant to my impending discussion on the incapacity of 
consent and the simulation of consent; therefore, prudence deserves ample consideration.  
Prudence and the moral virtues operate in a circle of interdependence.  As Aquinas 
argues, “[No] moral virtue can be had without prudence nor can prudence be had if one is 
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lacking moral virtue.”285  How does one break into this “vicious circle”?286   The answer 
is simply:  Reality breaks in.  Cessario explains, 
But practical wisdom itself discovers its rule and measure in conformity with 
reality.  Of course, by this we understand reality in all of its dimensions.  All in 
all, only a realist moral theology can express such confidence about the 
relationship of morality to the created order.  In effect, abusive use of human 
capacities bumps up against reality, even if reality does not always respond 
immediately.  It takes time, for example, before a society which does not respect 
the value of the human word sees what ill effects the consequent breakdown in 
human communication causes.287  
 
Josef Pieper concurs, “The content of prudent decision is, rather, determined by the ipsa 
res, by reality, which is the ‘measure’ of all cognition and decision.”288  To live prudently 
means to love the good and approach it through the concrete and particular circumstances 
of one’s life.  The beginning of living prudently is to desire the good.  “Only one who 
previously and simultaneously loves and wants the good can be prudent; but only one 
who is previously prudent can do good.”289  In other words, the prerequisite for 
responding appropriately emotionally, knowing the right moral action, and actually doing 
it is to desire and love what is good.  The health of our human affective responses and our 
capacity for practical moral reasoning are dependent upon our wanting what is good and 
right and true.  In marriage, the capacity to make a marital commitment (a serious moral 
obligation and decision) along with the ability to live up to the obligations of marriage 
once created will be greatly dependent upon the desire and intention toward the goods or 
values of marriage.  The infused moral and theological virtues affirm that God graces 
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spouses with the capacity to know and love God and one’s spouse through the sacrament, 
and the acquired moral virtues equip spouses with the facility to live the marital vocation.  
However, spouses must first and continually want the good for the marriage.  The virtues 
that are given and cultivated are what make a person capable and consistent.  In 
understanding the capacity for marital commitment and the ability to sustain one’s 
commitment, it is not enough to look at purely psychological theories, for desire for the 
good and cultivation of virtue actually shape one’s psychological capacities. 
 4.3.4 Environmental-Social Dimension of Practical Moral Reasoning 
 The environmental-social dimension of practical moral reasoning reveals the 
constraints that help sustain marital commitment.  Constraints placed on spouses help to 
organize conflicting wants and needs revealing what is possible within the limits of the 
situation.  Finitude dictates that human persons cannot have every need and desire met at 
all times.  Constraints uncover which needs and wants can be actualized within this 
context.  Certainly, there are a number of material constraints that aid in sustaining 
marital commitment.  Marriage carries with it certain financial benefits, such as the 
power of specialization for goods produced and consumed in the home and the benefit of 
economies of scale.  Married men tend to earn more than single men and experience 
faster wage growth during marriage.290  Husbands tend to specialize in making money 
which they then share with their families.  Married men, through the support of their 
wives, tend to lead more settled lives which increases career success and financial 
growth.291  Married women receive a financial advantage over single women as well; 
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however, it is not nearly as significant as that for men.292  In addition, married men and 
women can share household duties and divide them according to time and talent.  The 
fact that these benefits would be lost in the case of divorce serves as a constraint keeping 
some marriages intact.  Moreover, married persons benefit from economies of scale, 
meaning spouses share resources by living in one household.293  For women, “the 
motherhood penalty” can also add to constraint commitment.294  The costs for married 
mothers who have forsaken or limited career possibilities to devote time to their children 
are very great.  These costs may be deemed too immense to warrant breaking one’s 
marital commitment.  The financial costs of legal termination proceedings and custody 
arrangements are also factors associated with constraint commitment. 
 The public nature of marriage witnesses to the role of community in constraint 
commitment.  The communities to which spouses belong can aid in sustaining marital 
commitment through social pressure, that is, through concern over the disapproval of the 
community should divorce occur and the effects of the divorce on children and the wider 
community.  Tying in with the visional dimension of practical moral reasoning is the way 
in which communities link spouses to their original commitment, thus keeping the 
commitment alive.  Farley describes the role of community in holding persons to their 
commitments: 
. . . [W]e are upheld in our otherwise fragile commitments by the very fact that 
others (whether a family or a network of friends or a church or a voluntary 
association) know about these commitments and share them with us.  We are 
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importantly carried by the momentum of the activity of others.  We are confirmed 
in our intentions by the ability of others to ease our doubts.  Our memories make 
more sense as they are rooted in the story of a people or group.  Our hopes seem 
more real when we see them shining from the hearts of others whom we love and 
respect.  Our seriousness is tempered by a community’s recurring humor and 
play; our foolishness is balanced by a communal sense of purpose.  We can afford 
the risks of both greater joy and suffering when they are never ours alone.295  
 
Although the role of community is presented as a factor in constraint commitment, in 
essence, communities lessen the burden of commitment by sharing it, supporting it, 
respecting it, and celebrating it. 
 4.3.5 Rule-Role Dimension of Practical Moral Reasoning 
 Finally, by considering the rule-role dimension of practical moral reasoning, we 
see how concrete and specific rules and practices can sustain marital commitment.  This 
is the level of canon law where church structures, rules, and procedures exist in order to 
support, protect, and promote theological values.296  Canon law of marriage and the 
family, specifically consent in canon law, is the focus of the next chapter and will be 
addressed there.  Here, some concrete rules and practices that can effectively strengthen 
and sustain a marital commitment will be identified briefly.  These concrete rules, 
practices, and patterns of commitment can be classified under three fundamental aspects 
of commitment:  choices, permanence, and unity. 
 The first aspect of commitment, choices, has already been discussed at length in 
this chapter.  “Commitment involves making choices, protecting choices from other 
options, and arriving at ongoing decisions that reflect the priorities of your 
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commitments.”297  Because life is filled with competing demands for our time and 
attention, spouses need to decide that their marriage is a priority and then dedicate, or set 
apart, time to focus on this relationship.298  The threat of attractive alternatives and the 
danger of the practice of alternative monitoring have already been addressed.  Some 
practical strategies to overcome this threat include:  setting and adhering to specific 
boundaries in relationships with the opposite sex, identifying positive qualities in your 
own spouse, recognizing negative qualities in alternatives and those harmful 
consequences, and actively grieving over losses from expectations that may not be met.299  
 Concrete strategies and practices regarding the permanence of marriage can 
promote stability in marital commitment.  To be committed to marriage as a permanent 
relationship requires a long-term view.  Stanley holds that “a fundamental erosion of a 
sense of eternity has occurred among people living today.”300  This is another way of 
describing the general bias explained previously which leaves us excessively focused on 
the immediate.  Because marriage is a relationship that lasts a lifetime, spouses need to 
practice lengthening and broadening their perspective to include not only the course of 
one’s own life but also the whole of another’s life.  This is certainly not an easy task, and 
the practice of doing so could be described as an ascetic discipline of the imagination 
calling for effort and prayer.301  Particularly when faced with the threat of attractive 
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alternatives to the permanence of marriage, couples must train their minds to think in 
ways that foster fidelity.  Farley explains, “It [decision] is the recognition that there are 
certain ways I cannot allow myself to think.  The key is more in my imagination than in 
my will.”302  Finally, commitment to the permanence of marriage necessitates a positive 
vision of marriage.  A vision “provides meaning, motivation, and inspiration for the tasks 
ahead.”303  Stanley continues, “A vision is more than seeing a certain kind of future; it is 
seeing the future so clearly that you act on it.”304  Having a positive, yet realistic, view of 
marriage ties into the concept of life-planning already discussed.  This vision can be 
nurtured through prayer, setting common goals, sharing hopes and dreams, celebrating 
ordinary family rituals, and playing together.305  
 Finally, there are practices that can foster the unity of marital commitment.  To 
become truly united with another in marriage requires a resilient yet sure sense of 
personal identity.  Identity and its relation to vocation and fidelity were addressed in the 
previous chapter.  Identity here at the rule-role dimension of practical moral reasoning is 
intimately connected to the visional dimension where persons come to identify with the 
stories and traditions of their communities.  Here, the role of remote and proximate 
marriage preparation is paramount where intentional practices and instruction help to 
form personal identity and to discover vocational direction.  To be able to remain unified 
in marriage, spouses should have established a keen sense of self in the formative years, 
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so that as persons of integrity, they can remain faithful to their commitments.  Fidelity 
means continuing commitment to love another through change.  Whitehead and 
Whitehead expound, 
Because we are neither totally changeable nor totally finished, we must learn the 
difficult virtue of fidelity to growing and changing persons—ourselves and others.  
In marriage I am called to be faithful not only to the person I married but to the 
person I am now married to.  As I change and grow, my partner can be expected 
to do the same.  Fidelity is not a virtue which allows me to hold doggedly to a 
remembered commitment; it is a virtue which provides resilience in responding to 
continuing commitment.306  
 
In the critical area of fidelity, many of the dimensions coalesce.  Fidelity is a vision, an 
obligation, a virtue, a constraint, and a rule.  It moves along with the changing course of a 
lifetime of married love.  It is connected to the past, active in the present, and moving 
toward the future. 
 As human reality and sacrament of divine love, the marital commitment cannot be 
sustained without forgiveness.  Footnoted in the previous chapter is the story of Hosea.  
The prophetic book of Hosea began the tradition of expressing God’s covenant with His 
people through the human reality of marriage.  Through the infidelity of Gomer and 
Hosea’s steadfast love and forgiveness, the enduring love and forgiveness of God is 
revealed.307  It is striking that the first prophetic use of marriage as symbolic of the 
relation between God and His people is one of infidelity and forgiveness.  What this 
means for human marriage and commitment is that forgiveness is indispensible.  It is the 
                                                 
306. Evelyn Eaton Whitehead and James D. Whitehead, Marrying Well:  Stages on the Journey of 
Christian Marriage (Garden City, New York: Image Books, 1981), 215. 
 
307. Kochuthara points out how the uniqueness of this story dramatically and prophetically 
reveals Yahweh’s unfathomable love as no Israelite law had provisions for taking back an adulterous wife; 
on the contrary, the adulterous wife was severely punished.  This story reveals the kind of fidelity Yahweh 
has toward His people.  See Kochuthara, The Concept of Sexual Pleasure in the Catholic Moral Tradition, 
56-7. 
254 
 
concrete practice of forgiveness and acceptance of forgiveness from both spouses that 
sustains a marriage.  Farley articulates this point: 
Without its offer [forgiveness] in some form at critical junctures in the process of 
living out a commitment, probably no commitment-obligation remains possible of 
fulfillment in the long run.  The trouble with recommending forgiveness is, 
however, that its own possibility depends (like the possibility of fidelity 
generally) on the capacities of the persons involved and on the corrigibility or 
ultimate bearableness of the problems in the relationship. . . . At its best it is 
active, not passive, and it serves to mobilize the human spirit.  It is the opposite 
both of hardening one’s heart and of allowing oneself to be victimized.  Though it 
requires an inner surrender, it is ultimately an expression of inner power.308  
 
Asking for forgiveness means admitting of fault, making reparation in whatever ways are 
possible and relevant, deciding to change one’s ways, and doing so, so that one is proven 
trustworthy again.  The process of forgiveness is a cycle in which one asks for 
forgiveness and the other does so.  Forgiveness is neither denial of wrongdoing nor 
magical disappearance of hurt.  It is a very real human process intrinsic to any 
relationship involving finite, sinful human persons.  God’s example and actions 
throughout salvation history provide the means for spouses to do the same through the 
grace of God. 
 In addition to practices of fidelity and forgiveness, certain patterns of 
communication can work to sustain the unity of marital commitment.  Through clinical 
observation, John Gottman and Nan Silver have identified specific patterns of 
communication during an argument that serve as indicators of the future breakup of 
couples.  These indicators include:  harsh startup to an argument, criticism, contempt, 
defensiveness, stonewalling (disengaging), flooding (feeling overwhelmed by spouse’s 
negativity), physiological signals of stress, failed repair attempts (actions that prevent 
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negativity from intensifying), and bad memories overshadowing the good.309  Gottman 
and Silver identify these patterns of communication in arguments, not as causes of 
divorce, but rather as signs that the end is likely to come.  “After intensely studying 
happily married couples for as long as sixteen years, I now know that the key to reviving 
or divorce-proofing a relationship is not in how you handle disagreements but in how you 
are with each other when you’re not fighting.”310  Although healthy and effective patterns 
for conflict resolution can prove helpful in strengthening marital commitment, the key 
practices and strategies revolve around building up the friendship that is the heart of 
marriage.  These friendship-enhancing strategies and guides include:  heightening 
emotional attunement, nurturing fondness and admiration, offering attention and 
affection, being disposed to be influenced by the other, recognizing unsolvable problems, 
solving solvable problems, recognizing the hopes and dreams of the other, and creating 
shared meaning through rituals, roles, and symbols and communicating personal goals.311  
Just as all of the dimensions of practical moral reasoning interconnect in living the moral 
life so also do they connect and reveal the varied dimensions involved in sustaining a 
marital commitment, not an easy task. 
 
4.4 Release from an Interpersonal Commitment to Love for Life 
 
 
 Current canon law upholds the belief that valid, sacramental and consummated 
marriages are intrinsically and extrinsically indissoluble.  The only way that release from 
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the obligations of marriage may occur is if some basic flaw can be identified and proven 
in the original commitment.  This flaw could be a lack of freedom (impediment), a lack 
of canonical form, or a defect of consent.  As Farley notes, “Strictly speaking, however, 
this kind of release from obligation is not a ‘release’ but a recognition that no marriage 
ever existed.  The obligation was never truly undertaken; the marriage was in an 
important sense invalid from the start and therefore nonbinding all along.”312  Before 
addressing questions of defect of consent in the next chapter, I will consider Farley’s 
challenge to current canonical teaching and procedure.  She proposes that there are three 
conditions under which the obligation to sustain a valid, sacramental and consummated 
marriage cease to bind.  She makes this claim by proposing that “a marriage commitment 
is subject to release on the same ultimate grounds that any extremely serious, nearly 
unconditional, permanent commitment may cease to bind.”313  Since she does not believe 
that an ontological change occurs in marital commitment, Farley holds that every marital 
commitment is subject to the norms of justice and should it fail to be a just love, then 
spouses may be released from the moral obligations of marriage and may be free to 
remarry.314  For Farley, just love is an emotion that is true to the concrete reality of each 
participant in the relationship and the nature of the relationship itself: 
[T]he emotion of love is not the same as “feelings” that come and go, whether we 
like it or not, in the mode of physiological disturbances and sensations, and that 
may importantly accompany emotions but are not required for them.  Love is 
spontaneously receptive but not a passive reaction; it is active in response, 
constituted in union, shaped by perceptions and understandings, and engaging of 
myself in affirmation of what I love.  It is true and just when and insofar as it 
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accords with the concrete reality of what is loved, the one loving, and the nature 
of the relationship between them.315  
 
She identifies three situations in which things have changed within a committed 
relationship in such a way that the obligations arising from the commitment no longer 
hold.  Farley admits that these situations or conditions are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive and may be different ways of describing the same situation.316  Farley’s three 
criteria for release from the obligations of marital commitment will be explained, and 
subsequently four cases317 that pose serious questions to the traditional doctrine of 
indissolubility will be addressed in relation to Farley’s criteria.  These four cases include:  
adultery, abuse, addiction, and abandonment.318 
 4.4.1 Impossibility 
 First, “when it truly becomes impossible to sustain a commitment-relationship, it 
may belong to a just love to change or break the commitment.”319  In a marital 
commitment, the impossibility referred to is primarily psychological or moral, such as 
when the relationship has broken down irretrievably and reconciliation is deemed 
impossible.  Farley admits that “impossibility, when it is not ‘physical,’ is less like an 
objective, incontrovertible ‘fact’ and more like a judgment that we make or even a 
decision.”320  The difficulty and ambiguity involved in judging when the criterion of 
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impossibility applies is severe.  Farley concedes that “there are obvious critical questions 
to be asked about the accuracy of the analysis of any given situation and about the 
integrity in the personal motivation of those who are discerning and deciding.”321  There 
are many factors that contribute to determining if a marital commitment is truly 
impossible to sustain including physical, psychological, moral, cultural, and economic 
limitations or incapacities.  Some of these incapacities are simply given while others are 
the consequences of past choices.  Unlike current canon law, Farley does not specify that 
these incapacities need to be present at the moment of consent in order for one to be 
released from the commitment.  The impossibility may have arisen during the course of 
the marriage.  Moreover, determination of the possibility or impossibility of a marital 
situation is not simply dependent on one’s own capacities or lack thereof.  “In 
relationships that are meant to be mutual, that essentially involve interaction between 
myself and another person, what the other does or can do and what happens between us 
may make all the difference.”322  In this way, each spouse’s limitations and incapacities 
have the potential to create an impossible situation for the other.  However, the 
interesting question is what is it about some marriages that keep them from the threshold 
of impossibility despite arduous challenges while others seem to quickly cross it and 
crumble?  Although seemingly tautological, one of the key factors is the nature, quality, 
and strength of the commitment itself and those that create it.  Through openness to the 
possibility of forgiveness, change, and fidelity, those committed couples may prevent an 
impossible situation from developing. 
                                                 
321. Farley, Personal Commitments:  Beginning, Keeping, Changing, 87. 
 
322. Ibid., 88. 
 
259 
 
 4.4.2 Loss of Meaning 
 Second, “when a specific commitment no longer fulfills the purposes of the larger 
and more basic commitment that it was meant to serve, it may be a part of a just love to 
change it or break it.”323  In this situation, the commitment has lost its intrinsic meaning, 
not just the experience or feeling of its purposes.  Farley admits that marriage has 
multiple meanings making the occurrence of any given marriage losing all its meaning 
extremely rare.324  Again, the ultimate criterion Farley uses to judge whether a particular 
framework for love is morally binding is its relation to just love.  She states, “If this 
framework (this marriage) turns out to block the love, because it places it in a shared life 
for which they are tragically unsuited, etc., then the obligation to the particular form of 
committed love may no longer hold.”325  According to Farley, the framework (marriage) 
is always in service to the unconditional commitment to a just love.  When the particular 
framework fails to support the original commitment to a just love, then “the special right 
of the other at least obligates us, to the extent we are able, to change the commitment 
with care, without violence on our part, with some form of fidelity to the love we 
originally promised.”326  As in the first criterion of impossibility, the ambiguity involved 
in applying this criterion cannot be underestimated.  “A just love, committed 
unconditionally, may require that its framework be lived to the end; but it may also 
require that its framework be changed.”327  Farley does not give a clear picture of when 
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just love requires that the framework be abandoned and when it requires that it be 
maintained, because her analysis is so couple specific. 
 4.4.3 Alternate Superseding Obligation 
 Finally, “when another obligation comes into conflict with and supersedes the 
obligation to keep a commitment, a just love may require that the commitment be broken 
or changed.”328  Farley contends that when the demands of another essential love conflict 
with the obligations of a marriage, the marital commitment can be broken or changed in 
service to just love.  “Still, there are times when other fundamental obligations can take 
priority—obligations to God, to children, to society, even to one’s spouse (when, for 
example, ironically commitment to the well-being of the spouse conflicts with continued 
commitment to the relationship within the framework of marriage).”329  In addition, 
obligations to oneself can take priority over the marital commitment.  It is not that self-
love and love of another are incompatible; on the contrary, it is through self-sacrificial 
love that one comes to self-possession and self-determination.  However, there are “limits 
to the sacrifice that is required or even morally allowed.”330  These limits are based upon 
the norm of just love.  Farley clarifies that “while we may sacrifice everything we have, 
we may not sacrifice everything we are.  We may not sacrifice in a final sense our 
autonomy.  We may not sacrifice our capability for union and communion with God and 
human persons.”331  In addition, she argues, “No person’s good is achieved by the 
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destruction of another person as a person.”332  Although recognizing that self-sacrifice is 
necessary in every marital relationship, Farley addresses questions of the limits of self-
sacrifice in terms of power and inequality: 
When a disproportionate burden of sacrifice is laid on one person in a 
commitment-relationship, and when the person who bears it is the one with the 
least power, the duty of self-sacrifice is morally suspect.  This suggests that where 
there is an imbalance of power, the expectation ought to be that the one with the 
greater power will be obligated to the greater self-sacrifice.333  
 
In real marital relationships, identifying who possesses greater power can be difficult and 
problematic, and judging when self-sacrifice is actually destructive of personhood is a 
delicate moral analysis.  Some may argue that the unconditional commitment to marriage 
is the decision to give all to one’s spouse.  Ultimately, this reverts back to the question of 
the meaning of conjugal love.  Indefinable, love resurfaces throughout this study making 
a clear-cut moral analysis of marital relationships nearly impossible. 
 4.4.4 Questions of Adultery, Abuse, Addiction, and Abandonment 
 In the case of adultery, the matter of what actions qualify as adultery is the first 
question.  If what is exchanged in marital consent is the ius in corpus, then sexual 
intercourse outside of marriage constitutes adultery, for it is a violation of a right.  
However, if marital consent is understood as the giving and receiving of persons through 
an irrevocable covenant, it is not so clear what constitutes adultery.  Is it possible that an 
intensely emotional interpersonal relationship with someone of the opposite sex (without 
sexual contact) could constitute adultery?  Is it possible to give oneself totally to another 
outside of marriage without sex in a way that violates the marital commitment?  Those 
questions aside, does adultery fulfill one or more of Farley’s conditions for release from 
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the obligations of commitment?  There are far too many variables to answer unilaterally.  
If the adultery is pervasive, continual, and recurrent, it may be impossible to sustain the 
commitment-relationship, because the relationship is truly intolerable and unjust.  In such 
a situation, the commitment has lost all intrinsic meaning.  A marital commitment lacking 
even the most basic form of fidelity over an extended period of time seems nonsensical 
and utterly meaningless.  Is a commitment that is broken egregiously truly a commitment 
undertaken?  I would argue it is not.  More likely, it seems to be a flaw in the original 
commitment or the capacity of the one attempting to make a commitment and not a 
release from the obligations of a valid commitment.  The case of adultery may also fulfill 
the condition of superseding obligation to another.  Remaining in a relationship of 
repeated and flagrant infidelity could be viewed as a failure to love and respect oneself 
enough to refuse to be disregarded in that way.  The framework of marriage could be an 
obstacle to being loved justly.  Again, I would argue that the superseding obligation to 
love oneself does not release one from the obligations of marriage but points to an unjust 
situation stemming from the incapacity or unwillingness of one or both of the spouses.  
Here I am referring to rare cases of clear and continual infidelity, and still there is no 
unmistakable application of Farley’s conditions.  Even greater ambiguity is introduced 
when considering the repentant adulterer and emotional affairs.  In the case of adultery, 
Farley’s conditions for release from the obligations of a commitment are not useful. 
 In the case of abuse, the question of what qualifies as abuse is forefront.  Marital 
relationships that involve the infliction of bodily harm or sexual assault334 clearly qualify 
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as abusive; however, marital relationships in which the actions of one or both spouses 
result in mental anguish are less clear.  Terms such as emotional abuse or psychological 
violence encompass a wide variety of specific behaviors.  Are behaviors like name-
calling, belittling, threatening, yelling, intimidating, and manipulating always abusive?  Is 
there a threshold that must be crossed?  Can the withholding of attention or affection be 
considered abusive?  There is no clear answer or consensus among legal or clinical 
professionals.  That being said, in situations of sustained and pervasive physical, 
emotional, or sexual abuse, it may be impossible to sustain the marital commitment due 
to the superseding obligation of self-protection and self-love.  In addition, a truly abusive 
marital relationship is essentially contradictory and meaningless.  Marriage is a 
relationship of love and life, whereas abuse is the complete opposite.  Thus, abuse seems 
to meet the criteria of all of Farley’s conditions for the release from the obligations of 
marital commitment.  However, similar to the first case of adultery, here it seems more 
fitting to speak of lack of true commitment undertaken rather than release from the 
commitment.  The abuser is either incapable of committing to a lifelong relationship of 
love and fidelity or unwilling to do so.  Because marriage is a mutual commitment, the 
abused spouse cannot be released from a commitment that has not really been made.  The 
difficulty with Farley’s position is that some abused spouses may observe the necessity of 
upholding the obligations of their “commitment” in spite of the abuse due to their own 
integrity while thinking that their sacramental marriages continue to witness to Christ’s 
love and fidelity.  Remaining faithful to one’s obligations in a commitment regardless of 
the failure of the other to live up to his or her side of the commitment is a necessary part 
of a healthy relationship.  However, in the case of abuse, it can be detrimental to human 
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personhood and the basic human need for safety.  Arguing against the position of Himes 
and Coriden that an abused spouse may be free to divorce to experience peace and 
freedom, Ryan and Grisez make just such an absurd argument.  In a footnote, they state, 
“HC [Himes and Coriden] are mistaken in claiming that some marriages regarded by the 
Church as indissoluble simply ‘cannot witness to the fruits of life in Christ.’  Even if one 
spouse is abusive and unfaithful, the other’s lifelong fidelity can bear witness to Christ’s 
unconditional fidelity to his sinful people.”335  How does the fidelity of an abused spouse 
make present God’s love?  What kind of a god would want a person to remain faithful 
and present in an abusive situation?336  God remains faithful to His unfaithful people, 
because He is the only one who can offer salvation.  God is not abused by our un-love.  
Unlike human marriage, the God-human relationship is not equal, nor is it intended to be 
so.  It is beyond unhealthy and unwise to ask a spouse to “save” another.  It is simply 
impossible.  Moreover, it is highly unlikely that the continual presence and fidelity of an 
abused spouse in a marriage will witness to the love of Christ.  If anything, it may signify 
to the world the presence of an archaic institution out of touch with reality.  Therefore, it 
is better to judge the commitment as not truly made rather than risk an abused spouse 
remain in an unsafe situation.  Commitment is not control or coercion, because marital 
commitment is inherently mutual. 
                                                 
335. Peter F. Ryan and Germain Grisez, "Indissoluble Marriage:  A Reply to Kenneth Himes and 
James Coriden," Theological Studies 72 (2011): 386n88. 
 
336. Perhaps in the situation of a repentant and reformed abusive spouse, the fidelity of the abused 
spouse could witness to Christ’s love and fidelity; however, I would not argue that an abused spouse should 
ever stay in such a situation in the hope that the abuse will stop.  To argue that the abused spouse has a free 
choice whether or not to stay in the marriage does not take seriously the nature of abuse and the effect it has 
upon one’s effective freedom.  In addition, the abuse is an affront to the sacrament; those outside of the 
tradition could interpret the continuation of the marriage as an example of the burdensome and restrictive 
institution of marriage and/or religion. 
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 In the case of addiction, the object of addiction could vary from alcohol and other 
substances to sex or gambling.  The criteria of what constitutes an addictive disorder 
continue to evolve as evidenced by the multiple editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders produced by the American Psychiatric Association.337  
Suffice it to say, there is ambiguity surrounding the diagnosis of an addictive disorder 
and the severity of said disorder.  Assuming there is agreement regarding the presence of 
addictive disorder in one or both of the spouses, does the case of addiction satisfy any of 
Farley’s conditions for release from the obligations of marital commitment?  Regarding 
the conditions of impossibility and loss of meaning, addictive disorder can damage the 
affective functioning and the maturation process of the person so that an intimate, loving 
interpersonal relationship becomes effectively impossible and counter to an essential 
purpose of marriage, that is, growth in holiness.  In reference to alcoholism and marital 
commitment, Patrick Morris describes the impact of alcoholism on the affective 
functioning of the alcoholic.  The alcoholic may abuse alcohol to escape reality and 
responsibilities by numbing oneself from feelings of pain, frustration, or inadequacy.  “If 
an individual is chronically anaesthetized with alcohol, the experiences of reality that 
normally allow for personality maturation, the development of self-knowledge and 
knowledge of the other are not processed.”338  Morris articulates how the alcoholic’s 
affective capacity then impinges upon the marital relationship: 
When individuals agree to, consent to, commit themselves to marriage, they must 
be capable of and are committing themselves to the development of a unique 
                                                 
337. See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, 5th ed. (Arlington, VA:  American Psychiatric Publishing, 2013).  It is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation to delve into the exact criteria for diagnosis of addictive disorder for various substances or 
behaviors.  It is enough to note that critics of the manual question its objectivity, reliability, validity, and 
possible biases. 
 
338. Patrick S. Morris, "Alcoholism and Marital Consent," Studia Canonica 34 (2000): 163. 
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interpersonal relationship.  If this relationship does not emerge, the marriage may 
become intolerable.  Through the process of living through both the constricting 
and liberating experiences inherent in a marital relationship, there can be an 
arousal and development of consciousness so that the partners become 
increasingly aware of the purpose of their marriage.  A long-term and exclusive 
association with another human being involves a confrontation with the great 
awakener, reality.  When the original “in-loveness” wears off in daily marital 
existence, what comes next depends entirely on the quality of the original 
commitment as well as perseverance in commitment.  If the capacity to make the 
original commitment was present and if the desire and capacity to persevere in 
commitment exist, love will change and become a true devotion to the partner as 
well as an inner personal, purposeful and liberating experience. . . . If alcohol is 
used to escape from the experience of reality, it could indicate an incapacity to 
experience marital reality and hence an incapacity to commit the self to marriage.  
An equitable and just answer to the question of capacity/incapacity for 
commitment demands an assessment of the individual’s level of emotional 
maturation, affective, cognitive and motivational functioning in light of the 
requirements for commitment and perseverance in commitment.  Commitment to 
marriage is not only a commitment to one’s partner but also a commitment to 
movement through a unique type of interpersonal relationship.339  
 
What is said of alcoholism could apply to other addictions as well.  Addictive behavior is 
a means of escaping or avoiding reality to alleviate pain and produce pleasure.  The 
addict then becomes relatively powerless to control the behavior in spite of negative 
consequences.  It is apparent how addictive disorder could make the marital commitment 
impossible to sustain.  In addition, the addictive behavior thwarts one of the essential 
purposes of marriage, which is the sanctification of the spouses as described in Casti 
connubii.  However, rather than applying Farley’s conditions for the release from a 
marital commitment, Morris places the problem of addiction within the category of 
incapacity.  Although Morris’ analysis is psychological and juridical rather than moral, I 
would agree that once again Farley’s conditions are not functional.  The more appropriate 
place for the consideration of addiction is within discussions of incapacity.  Is the addict 
capable of forming a lifelong commitment to grow in love with another?  To better 
                                                 
339. Morris, "Alcoholism and Marital Consent," 164-65. 
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answer that question, one needs to consider the “antecedence, severity, perpetuity, and 
relativity” of the addiction.340   When questions of capacity or incapacity are most 
relevant, then Farley’s conditions become unnecessary. 
 Finally, of the four cases, abandonment seems most fitting to Farley’s conditions 
for release from the obligations of marital commitment.  When one spouse truly abandons 
another, that is, leaves the marriage without the consent of the other spouse, it is 
impossible to sustain the marriage relationship.  In addition, a marriage in which one 
spouse is abandoned by the other has lost its intrinsic meaning.  Moreover, the obligation 
of self-love and self-respect may take priority over the obligations of the marital 
commitment.  Although these conditions certainly seem applicable, the investigation into 
a particular case of abandonment may reveal that the spouse that left was incapable of 
making a true marital commitment or only appeared to commit.  The subsequent 
unwillingness to work on the marriage may reveal that one or both of the spouses never 
really committed in the first place.  In the four cases of adultery, abuse, addiction, and 
abandonment, it is more fitting to examine the original commitment and the subsequent 
lack of perseverance in the commitment rather than release from the obligations of 
marital commitment.   
 
4.5 Synthesis of Marital Commitment in Theology 
 
 
 The contemporary American culture of individualism that has developed over 
many years creates a situation in which making and keeping a marital commitment is 
particularly challenging.  This culture of individualism is a result of the individual, group, 
                                                 
340. Morris, "Alcoholism and Marital Consent," 194. 
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and general biases as described by Lonergan.  This cultural environment characterized by 
division and an inordinate focus on the immediate, the short-term, and one’s own 
individual needs has had tremendous effects on marriage and family.  The very notion of 
freedom has been skewed.  In American culture in general, freedom is often viewed as 
freedom from instead of freedom for, that is, freedom from obligations, freedom from 
institutions, and freedom from commitments.  In contrast, freedom for means freedom for 
making decisions for oneself on the fourth level of conscious and intentional operations.  
Freedom is the gift of self-determination in relationship with God and others.  In spite of 
the presence of sin in culture, the human person is not denied the grace of essential 
freedom.  In fact, many people use what Lonergan has deemed the three escapes from 
living morally and exercising true freedom.  These are self-conscious-less, 
rationalization, and moral renunciation.  When human persons experience discomfort and 
anxiety because there is lack of consistency between their knowing and doing, they resort 
to one or more of these three escapes.  Culture may make commitment difficult, but not 
impossible.  The redemptive community of the church and other civic associations 
provide their own cultural structures and symbols to help the human person to develop in 
communion. 
 To be a person means to be capable of self-awareness, self-determination, and 
self-transcendence in mutually loving and life-giving relationships made possible by 
commitment. The significance of commitment for permanent relationships is evidenced 
by the fact that God’s relationship with humanity is in the form of a covenant.  A marital 
commitment is made in and from the heart of the person, the center of who a person is.  A 
commitment is a mutual giving and receiving of one’s word, a promise to be held by the 
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other.  To make a marital commitment means creating a new relationship in the present to 
direct one’s freedom in the future.  It is the choice to give up other choices, to 
intentionally limit one’s freedom in a relationship that is characterized by love and 
justice.  Dedication commitment refers to the wanting to and devotional aspects of 
commitment, whereas constraint commitment refers to the factors and forces that would 
be costs if the commitment were abandoned.   
 Marital commitments are made to strengthen one’s unreliable will, to reassure 
others of one’s intention, and to express and make present the fullness of love as it grows 
and develops over time.  Commitment is an internal, psychological, and spiritual act on 
the level of responsible personhood.  At the same time, because marital commitment is 
mutual, it must be expressed externally and socially.  It can happen incrementally in 
ritual, such as “committed dating” and engagement, but it is fully manifested at the 
wedding celebration in community.  Martial commitment should happen once the couple 
has been prepared, a task that begins in early childhood with greater attention to the role 
of discernment in dating.  This commitment is made once, yet it continues to be nurtured 
and chosen every day thereafter.  It is imperative that the church be pastorally present to 
support married persons throughout the lifecycle.  The ways in which marital 
commitments can be sustained correspond to the five dimensions of practical moral 
reasoning.  The visional dimension emphasizes the importance of community, narrative, 
tradition, and identity in nurturing a marital commitment.  The obligational dimension 
refers to the role of principle and duty, and the tendency-need dimension refers to the role 
of psychology and virtue.  Most efforts at sustaining marital commitment have focused 
on psychological techniques while overlooking the significance of virtue, both acquired 
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and infused, as a means of assuring human dependability.  The environmental-social 
dimension includes the role of constraints, both natural and social, and community.  
Finally, the rule-role dimension emphasizes the importance of certain practices and 
patterns of communication that sustain marital commitment.  Of particular importance for 
this study is the role of canon law in establishing structures and norms that maintain 
Christian freedom and good order and justice, which is the minimum demand of love. 
 Finally, Margaret Farley has proposed three conditions under which the obligation 
to sustain a marital commitment ceases to bind.  In short, these conditions are 
impossibility, loss of meaning, and alternate superseding obligation.  These conditions 
were applied to four general cases to see if any of the cases fulfill Farley’s conditions so 
that one may be released morally from a marital commitment.  In the cases of adultery, 
abuse, and addiction, Farley’s categories were too ambiguous to apply and considered 
impractical, because in such cases it is more likely that a true commitment was never 
made than that the obligation no longer binds.  Such cases would be more appropriately 
dealt with canonically in annulment hearings.  Abandonment may be the only case of the 
four in which all three conditions may apply.  However, even abandonment should be 
handled on a case by case manner, which is the procedure of canon law. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
MARITAL CONSENT IN CANON LAW 
 
 
5.1 Marriage in the 1983 Code of Canon Law 
 
 
 5.1.1 The Values of Sacramental Marriage 
 As explained in Chapter Two, canon law is the church’s system of structures, 
norms, and procedures that enable persons to reach out for and appropriate the goods or 
values identified by theology in order that the church may grow in faith, hope, and love 
for the salvation of souls.  The salvation of souls fundamentally implies communion, 
sharing in the trinitarian divine life through Christ and with one another in faith and 
baptism.  Communio is substantively related to salvation.  Of course, this communio has 
not been perfectly expressed or realized due to the pervasive character of sin.  The 
pilgrim church is the instrument and sacrament of Christ in the world to continue the 
redemptive work of Christ.  In the trinitarian divine life, there is perfect freedom, 
reciprocity, order, and love.  The church, as human and divine redemptive community, 
cannot claim the same.  The ministry of canon law exists to protect and maintain a 
harmonious balance between individual and communal goods.  Polarization of the 
individual from the community that manifests itself historically and repeatedly creates a 
false and unnecessary antagonism.  The fullness of human flourishing can only occur 
within interdependent relationships.  The refusal to look beyond one’s own self, group, or 
immediate situation in order to live attentively, intelligently, reasonably, and responsibly 
was previously described as individual, group, and general bias.  Bias continues to be a 
force in the world, and even in the church.  Therefore, canon law aims to promote and 
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protect the freedom and good of the individual within an ordered whole.  As an 
instrument for the promotion of a just community, canon law ideally works to promote 
the salvation of souls, a task which is ultimately the work of the Holy Spirit. 
 While canon law in general seeks to promote and protect the values of freedom 
and good order, there are values (or goods) specific to marriage that need to be 
appropriated, because they contribute to human flourishing and connect us to the divine 
life.  John McAreavey maintains, “The most significant values are the stability of 
marriage, its protection against human weakness and sinfulness, respect for the 
seriousness of human commitment in marriage, the freedom of the parties in entering 
marriage, respect for the intimacy of human sexuality and the sacramentality of the 
marriage bond.”1  Marriage is perhaps the most intimate and vulnerable relationship, 
loaded with the potential to devastate or fortify persons.  It can contribute to great 
holiness and great sin.  The intimacy and vulnerability involved in a sexual relationship 
necessitate the stability and constancy of the marital commitment in order to safeguard 
the union and strengthen it.   At the same time, because marriage is a relationship 
between human persons created with dignity and the capacity for self-determination, the 
freedom of persons needs to be protected.  Therefore, the canonical framework for 
marriage should promote and protect these values of marriage.  While there are numerous 
goods of marriage, I will concentrate on the three traditional goods of marriage first 
identified by Augustine. 
 
 
                                                 
1. John McAreavey, The Canon Law of Marriage and the Family (Portland, OR: Four Courts 
Press, 1997), 16. 
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 5.1.2 The Three Augustinian Goods of Marriage 
The traditional bona of marriage have been utilized significantly in canon law in 
designating what is essential to marriage.  In the original use of the bona, Augustine 
defended the goodness of marriage against the Manichees by identifying those goods or 
blessings of marriage, subsequently to be known as the three traditional bona of 
marriage.  Eventually, these bona came to specify that which is constitutive of marriage, 
the inclusion of which is absolutely necessary for a valid marriage.  For Augustine, sex 
was suspect but could be excused if engaged in for the purpose of producing and raising 
children.  Therefore, proles is the first good of marriage.  The bonum prolis designates 
the procreativity of the couple that welcomes persons into the family, the church2 and the 
world.  In a worldview where all that exists is created by God and enveloped in grace, the 
welcoming and raising of children is an obvious good.  The existence of a new human 
person is simply good.  Moreover, the bonum prolis is good for the married couple.3  
While there is a certain degree of maturity that couples should possess before becoming 
parents, the daily acts of parenting well contribute to a couple’s maturing.  In other 
words, children are a gift and a good in themselves and a blessing and a good to the 
                                                 
2. The bonum prolis is a good for all married couples, but for sacramental marriages this good 
means that invaluable persons are added to the faithful as well.  See Leo XIII, Arcanum, no. 10 and Pius 
XI, Casti Connubii, no. 12, 13. 
 
3. Joseph Selling objects to the contention that canon 1055 §1 designates and legislates 
procreation as a value for everyone at all times.  Procreation may be deemed valuable for the community 
and the church, but it may not be so for the couple “who carry a serious genetic defect, who already have a 
large family, who have a shortage of resources to provide a responsible upbringing for (more) children, or 
who live in an overpopulated situation.”  He continues, “Procreation is a ‘good’, but it is not an appropriate 
good for all persons in every circumstance; i.e., it is not always valued; nor can it be said to be valuable for 
persons with no interest in or need for it.  Law, then, cannot and should not attempt to determine or even 
advise what is ‘of value’ to the community or its individual members.  Law can only address what the 
community finds to be ‘good’.” Joseph Selling, “Values, Goods and Priorities:  Can Law Determine the 
Pattern?” Louvain Studies 20 (1995): 61. 
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couple as they contribute to their own parents’ growth and maturation.4  Still, even if 
procreation is not physically possible, fides makes marriage good.  The sexual fidelity of 
the couple brings about and makes possible the communio personarum.  The good of 
fidelity, or the sexual exclusiveness of the marital relationship, is a blessing of marriage, 
because it affirms the unique status that spouses have in relation to one another.  
Augustine Mendonça states, “Therefore, for St. Augustine, bonum fidei denoted total 
mutual dedication, the sustaining element of conjugal union and the means by which 
marriage comes to completion.”5   The bonum fidei assures spouses that each is loved, 
respected, and cherished in a relationship that is exclusive, distinctive, and irreplaceable.  
Msgr. Cormac Burke articulates precisely this point.6  “The good or value of fidelity is 
expressed in the affirmation, ‘You are unique to me, and I to you,’ which is the first truly 
personalized affirmation of conjugal love.  No lover is content to be just one among the 
loved one’s lovers.”7  In a marital relationship where spouses are faithful to the 
commitment they have made to one another, the communio personarum can come to be 
in an atmosphere of trust and love.  Equally inherent in conjugal love is the desire for 
permanency. As indicated in Chapter Three, Augustine’s use of sacramentum as a good 
of marriage is ambiguous yet decidedly connected to commitment, perseverance, and 
indissolubility.  Burke continues by expressing the commonly shared experience of 
                                                 
4. The rising median age for first marriage is linked to an increase in cohabitation prior to 
marriage, but it could also indicate for some the erroneous belief that couples must be unrealistically 
“mature,” emotionally satisfied, and financially secure before getting married and becoming parents.  The 
maturation of persons through marriage will be developed later in this chapter in conjunction with 
discussions of the bonum coniugum. 
 
5. Augustine Mendonça, "The Theological and Juridical Aspects of Marriage," Studia Canonica 
22 (1988): 292. 
 
6. Judge-Auditor of the Roman Rota, 1986-1999. 
 
7. Cormac Burke, "Personalism and the bona of Marriage," Studia Canonica 27 (1993): 404. 
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human love.  “Lovers wish to belong truly to each other, with a ‘belongingness’ that is 
for always.”8  The experience of love evokes promises of forever and the desire for 
permanence.   
Because the bona are blessings of conjugal love, all of the matrimonial bona are 
related to one another.  Thomas Doyle claims, “For Augustine these three converge to 
realize the total good of marriage.  They cannot be rightly studied except as they relate to 
each other and to marriage as a whole.”9  William Woestman summarizes how these 
goods of marriage are integral to the whole of marriage and related to conjugal love: 
The three bona are not something extrinsic or external to marriage, but are by 
their nature essential to the totius vitae consortium, to the communio vitae, to true, 
real, marital love between husband and wife.  True and real conjugal love by its 
very nature is permanent—not temporary, e.g., not “for as long as we live in 
peace,” not “for as long as I do not find someone else more attractive.”  Thus, we 
have bonum sacramenti, a permanent union.  True and real conjugal love by its 
very nature excludes infidelity, e.g., marital love and affection and acts with a 
third party; it also excludes considering one’s spouse as a mere object of lust and 
sexual pleasure through acts that are demeaning of one’s spouse because they are 
contrary to sexual morality insofar as they are not performed in a human fashion 
and apt in themselves for the procreation of offspring.  Thus, we have bonum 
fidei.  Finally, true and real marital love does not exclude the natural fruit of 
marriage, the procreation and education of offspring.  Thus, we have the bonum 
prolis.10  
 
These Augustinian bona have influenced theological thinking and canonical praxis for 
over 1,500 years.11  Canon law should continue to protect and promote these goods or 
values for the development of human persons and communities.  Throughout years of 
jurisprudence, the Augustinian bona have been used to identify the juridical essence of 
marriage.  While the Code does not explicitly define the essence of marriage or provide a 
                                                 
8. Burke, "Personalism and the bona of Marriage," 405. 
 
9. Thomas Doyle, "A New Look at the 'Bonum Fidei'," Studia Canonica 12 (1978): 8. 
 
10 .William H. Woestman, "Simulation Revisited," CLSA Proceedings 65 (2003): 247. 
 
11. Burke, "Personalism and the bona of Marriage," 403. 
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definition, the essential ends, properties, elements, and rights/obligations can be 
extrapolated from several canons. 
 5.1.3 The Ends of Marriage 
 The goods of marriage, that is, the inherent features that demonstrate marriage’s 
goodness, are not necessarily the same as the ends of marriage.  As previously discussed, 
the goods of marriage identify the blessings of marriage or that which make marriage 
good, or more accurately, that which reveal marriage’s essential goodness.  Marriage is 
good, because it is characterized by procreativity, fidelity, and permanence.  The ends of 
marriage denote its intrinsic finality.  They are the good purposes of marriage, plainly, 
the goals toward which marriage is directed.  The ends are embedded in the structure of 
marriage (fines operis) independently of the goals or intentions of the spouses (fines 
operantis).  In a teleological understanding of marriage, the ends denote that toward 
which marriage naturally and intrinsically moves if not thwarted by the will of the 
spouses or another cause.  The ends of marriage are identified in canon 1055, which 
provides a description or “working definition” of marriage garnered from Gaudium et 
spes 48.12   This canon is a theological statement in juridical language, the content of 
which specifies what marriage is essentially13 regardless of the particular mind or will of 
the spouses.  Canon 1055 §1 reads, 
The matrimonial covenant, by which a man and a woman establish between 
themselves a partnership of the whole of life and which is ordered by its 
nature to the good of the spouses and the procreation and education of 
                                                 
12. John P. Beal, James A. Coriden, and Thomas J. Green, eds., New Commentary on the Code of 
Canon Law, Commissioned by the Canon Law Society of America (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 2000), 
1240. 
 
13. The question of whether or not it is appropriate or even possible to specify the essence of 
marriage in a postmodern context is a valid one.  However, that question will be addressed in the final 
chapter. 
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offspring, has been raised by Christ the Lord to the dignity of a sacrament 
between the baptized. 
 
“Which is ordered by its nature” clearly expresses finality.  “The term ‘end,’ finis, is not 
used, but the verb ‘ordered,’ ordinatus, expresses the same thought:  there is a built-in 
finality in the institution of marriage.”14  In contrast to the 1917 Code, the ends are not 
ranked hierarchically here.  Canon 1013 of the 1917 Code delineates the primary end of 
marriage as the procreation and nurture of children and mutual help and remedying of 
concupiscence as the secondary ends.15  Mackin notes, “Strange as it may seem it is 
nevertheless certain that Canon 1013.1 is the first document of the Church that lists these 
ends and arranges them hierarchically. . . . This canon is also the first document of the 
Church to use the terminology ‘primary’ and ‘secondary.’”16  Whether or not this is the 
first use of the hierarchical ordering of the ends in official church teaching need not be 
argued here.17  Clearly, the procreative purpose of marriage has been emphasized for 
centuries until the explicit ordering of the ends in the 1917 Code cemented this ranking.  
Although Pius XI reiterated the teaching of Leo XIII that the principal ends of marriage 
                                                 
14. Ladislas Örsy, Marriage in Canon Law:  Texts and Comments, Reflections and Questions 
(Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1986), 52. 
 
15. Theodore Mackin, What is Marriage? Marriage in the Catholic Church (New York: Paulist 
Press, 1982), 209. 
 
16. Ibid., 213. 
 
17. Michael Lawler and William Roberts state explicitly that the 1917 Code did not “invent this 
hierarchy of ends” but “merely repeated it from a long history.” See Michael Lawler and William Roberts, 
Christian Marriage and Family:  Contemporary Theological and Pastoral Perspectives (Collegeville, MN:  
The Liturgical Press, 1996), 32.  In addition, Michael Prieur questions this claim due to the use of “primo” 
and “secundo loco” regarding the ends of marriage in the encyclical Arcanum of Pope Leo XIII.  See 
Michael Prieur, “The Articulation of the Ends of Marriage in Roman Catholic Teaching:  A Brief 
Commentary,” Studia Canonica 33 (1999): 528. 
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were set in God’s command to “increase and multiply,” he furthered the nascent theology 
of the bonum coniugum as an equal end of marriage:18  
This mutual molding of husband and wife, this determined effort to perfect each 
other, can in a very real sense, as the Roman Catechism teaches, be said to be the 
chief reason and purpose of matrimony, provided matrimony be looked at not in 
the restricted sense as instituted for the proper conception and education of the 
child, but more widely as the blending of life as a whole and the mutual 
interchange and sharing thereof.19 
 
The meaning and significance of the bonum coniugum must be given due consideration 
bearing in mind the relative newness of the term.  Cormac Burke calls it “a totally 
innovative importation, practically never to be found in canonical or ecclesial writing 
prior to its appearance in the new Code.”20  
 In agreement with Burke, Klaus Lüdicke rejects the theory that the bonum 
coniugum is a fourth bonum alongside the three Augustinian bona:   
The bona of Augustine are in their origin distinguishing characteristics of 
marriage, those that make marriage morally and socially valuable.  It was only in 
the history of law that they took on the role of criteria for the nullity of marriage, 
and then as properties (bonum fidei—unity, bonum sacramenti—indissolubility;  
see c. 1056) or as an end (bonum prolis—end of marriage; see CIC17, c. 1013 
§1).  The welfare of the spouses is not a characteristic of the quality of marriage; 
and the correspondence between “good” (valor) and “welfare” (bene esse) in the 
same Latin term bonum leads here to a false use.21  
 
Lawrence Wrenn argues that the famous Jemolo case22 necessitates a fourth bonum  
                                                 
18. Pius XI, Casti Connubii, no. 8. 
 
19. Ibid., no. 24. 
 
20. Cormac Burke, "Challenges to Matrimonial Jurisprudence Posed by the 1983 Code," Studia 
Canonica 41 (2007): 447. 
 
21. Klaus Lüdicke, "A Theory of Bonum Coniugum," The Jurist 69 (2009): 713. 
 
22. In 1941, the Italian jurist A.C. Jemolo presented the fictitious case of a man who marries a 
woman to carry out a vendetta.  If the man intends to have children with his wife (bonum prolis), to remain 
sexually faithful to her (bonum fidei), and to live with her until death (bonum sacramenti), yet be cruel and 
unloving to her, is such a marriage valid?  All of the Augustinian bona have been intended and included in 
marital consent, yet the thought that such a marriage could be considered valid flies in the face of common 
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equally essential to marriage to be included in marital consent.23  For Wrenn, the 
exclusion of this fourth bonum from consent, the bonum coniugum, makes the marriage 
invalid.  He develops his argument by identifying the content of the essence of the bonum 
coniugum as the ius ad amorem, the right to love.24  Wrenn defines love as “an affective 
tendency toward another person which is dialogical in nature and which involves union 
with the other.”25  Such a definition emphasizes passion, heart, emotion, and mutuality 
clearly associated with marriage. However, the assertion that one has a right to love 
seems antithetical to love understood as a gift.  One must ask if love is essentially a gift 
or a right.  Similarly, in reference to the other end of marriage, to claim that one has a 
right to children betrays the reality of the gift of children to parents.  In addition, Burke 
takes issue with Wrenn’s explication of the bonum coniugum: 
Reference could be made here to the thesis that sees a ius ad amorem at the heart 
of the bonum coniugum.  This, it seems to me, tends to invert the matter:  the 
point is not that the bonum coniugum gives a right to love, but rather that the duty 
to love tends to the bonum coniugum.  The bonum coniugum does not consist in 
love, but (if my tentative line of reasoning is correct) in that maturing of the 
persons and characters of the spouses which comes from fidelity to the married 
commitment, from living marriage in accordance with its essential properties.26  
 
According to Burke, the Augustinian bona are properties of marriage inherent in its 
structure which demonstrate its goodness.  On the other hand, the bonum coniugum 
“relates to the spouses, and expresses (just as does procreation) a purpose or an effect that 
                                                                                                                                                 
sense. 
 
23. Lawrence G. Wrenn, "Refining the Essence of Marriage," The Jurist 46 (1986): 535. 
 
24. Ibid., 545. 
 
25. Ibid., 543. 
 
26. Cormac Burke, "The Bonum Coniugum and the Bonum Prolis:  Ends or Properties of 
Marriage?" The Jurist 49 (1989): 708. 
 
280 
 
should (but may not) result from marriage; the good effect intended here is that of 
making the spouses into better persons.”27  He continues, “It is by responding to the 
demands inherent in the fundamental properties of marriage (which they accepted in 
proffering matrimonial consent) that the spouses will achieve the goodness that God 
wishes for them and assigns as one of the ends of their married commitment.”28  The 
juridical relevance of this distinction is that whereas the non-achievement of the actual 
ends of marriage does not affect validity, the intentional exclusion of any or all of the 
properties invalidates marriage.  However, there is no need to designate the bonum 
coniugum as a fourth bonum in order to demonstrate why the Jemolo case could not 
possibly constitute a valid marriage.  It is enough to term the ordinatio ad bonum 
coniugum as an essential element of marriage, along with the ordinatio ad prolem, 
neither of which can be excluded from consent without invalidating.29   
Geoffrey Robinson describes the interrelatedness of the two ends of marriage as 
“complementary parts of one and the same good.”30  He emphasizes that marriage is 
necessary for the education and nurture of children and not simply their generation.  
Faithful and life-long marriage nurtures children, while at the same time maturing 
parents.  Robinson clarifies how the two ends form a unity: 
If the good of the spouses is destroyed, then the good of the children will be 
harmed, for then the children will often not be properly educated.  On the other 
hand, in most circumstances, if children are excluded from a relationship which of 
its very nature tends towards children, then the good of the spouses will be 
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affected.  The purpose of marriage is therefore one.  It is the bonum totius 
familae—the good of all members of the family.  The good of each is dependent 
on the good of others.  They cannot be separated and none of them can be made 
subordinate to the others.  It was God himself who created this interdependent 
unity of the family.31  
 
This is a prime example of how the ministry of canon law exists to protect and promote 
the harmonious balance between individual and communal goods.  Marriage is governed 
by canon law, because in family relationships both kinds of goods are at stake.  
 5.1.4 Covenant and Consortium totius vitae 
According to canon law, marriage has intrinsic ends, essential properties, and 
essential elements.  The essential elements of marriage derive from the ends and 
sacramentality and cannot be excluded from consent without invalidating the marriage.  
Canon 1101 reads, 
§1. The internal consent of the mind is presumed to conform to the words 
and signs used in celebrating marriage. 
§2. If, however, either or both of the parties by a positive act of the will 
exclude marriage itself, some essential element of marriage, or some essential 
property of marriage, the party contracts invalidly. 
 
Simulation, addressed in c. 1101, as a caput nullitatis will be explained in depth later in 
this chapter.  Presently, I call attention to the fact that the essential elements are nowhere 
explicitly listed in the Code but can only be extrapolated from various canons and 
ongoing jurisprudence.   
 In addition to outlining the ends of marriage, the juridical description of marriage 
in canon 1055 §1 provides a foundational standard by which to judge and compare 
particular, real marriages.  This canon establishes matrimonium in fieri as a covenant 
which brings about matrimonium in facto esse, described juridically as partnership of the 
whole of life, consortium totius vitae.   The theological implications of covenant and its 
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relationship to contract have already been brought to light in Chapter Three.  Beal 
comments that “covenant” and “contract” were intended by the drafters of the Code to be 
used interchangeably.32  The higher or more inclusive viewpoint of covenant is juridically 
significant as Örsy explains: 
Covenant, however, was not used by the Council to exclude altogether contractual 
elements in the marital promises (the more can contain the less), but the Council 
wanted the strictly legal elements to be incorporated into a sacred context.  
Accordingly, contractual elements can be still recognized in the exchange of the 
promises, but that exchange can no longer, not even in canon law, be adequately 
defined as a contract.33  
 
The use of covenant expresses the deep connection between theology and canon law and 
how theological articulations of marriage should drive canonical thinking.  Mendonça 
reiterates, “The term expresses the theological and juridical content of marriage in 
biblical language and provides a universal basis for doctrine and jurisprudence to focus 
their research and study on the personalistic, religious, and sociocultural aspects of 
marriage.”34   
Contained in c. 1055 §1 is another term central to understanding the essence of 
marriage, that is, consortium totius vitae.  Mendonça explains that during deliberations on 
the 1980 Schema of the Code, the coetus working on marriage legislation replaced the 
conciliar term, communio, with consortium.  “Therefore, the Pontifical Commission for 
the Revision of the Code of Canon Law introduced it in the 1981 Relatio in order to 
remove the ambiguity surrounding the expression communio and also to express the 
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notion of marriage in a juridically more precise term because of its traditional roots.”35  
Örsy expounds upon the meaning of the term: 
Consortium is virtually impossible to translate correctly; it has no equivalent in 
English.  Literally, it means a close association of persons sharing the same 
fortune, fate, and destiny.  It is less than communio, which is the closest of 
intimate relationships.  Yet it is more than societas, which can be a loose 
partnership for business purposes.  In choosing the word consortium, canon law 
tries to strike a middle course between the ideal of a perfect union of minds and 
hearts, and the unsatisfactory state of merely external association, so that the 
legitimate marital customs and traditions of various peoples could be 
accommodated.36  
 
Michael Lawler claims that the use of consortium applies better to the diverse cultural 
situations in which people marry throughout the world.  “It is at this point that we might 
attain the virtual impossibility of translation claimed by Örsy, a virtual impossibility of 
finding, not a verbal translation, but a universal cultural one.”37  As a legal term, 
consortium is not and should not be steadfastly defined.  As Örsy notes, “Life can be 
taken out of a foundational concept by a precise definition.  The ancient Romans were 
aware of this; they never defined the meaning of equity, natural justice, or of good 
faith—concepts which were both legal and inspirational.  Thus they succeeded in keeping 
their laws flexible and human.”38  Such a practice respects and honors the humanity of 
the ministry of canon law as it exists in a variety of cultural situations.  Canon 27 states, 
“Custom is the best interpreter of laws.” This principle is rooted deep in canonical history 
and “is a particularly useful principle for interpreting a universal law in the diverse 
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particular churches.”39  Accordingly, Lawler holds, “The precise meaning of consortium 
has always been and should continue to be interpreted not by the law, but by the customs 
of a particular culture.”40  Mendonça arrives at a similar conclusion regarding the 
flexibility of the term. “Therefore, we must say that the concept of consortium remains 
open-ended so that doctrine and jurisprudence will have ample scope to gradually 
identify its constitutive elements.”41  Mendonça concludes that consortium totius vitae “is 
the juridical equivalent of marriage itself” and “represents the totality of rights and 
obligations of marriage.”42  The naming of these rights and obligations is not explicit in 
the Code, but like the essential elements, must be deduced from relevant canons and 
jurisprudence. 
 5.1.5 The Inseparability of the Contract and the Sacrament 
 Canon 1055 §2 pronounces, “For this reason, a valid matrimonial contract 
cannot exist between the baptized without it being by that fact a sacrament.”  
Although the canon seems straightforward in legislating the inseparability of the contract 
and sacrament, variation in jurisprudence and theological conclusions indicates that the 
matter is far from closed.43  As the canon now stands, the contract cannot be separated 
from the sacrament between baptized persons.  The theological reasoning often purported 
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is that the baptized have entered a new ontological reality so that it is impossible for them 
to enter a valid marriage without the sacrament.  Örsy identifies an example for which the 
inseparability doctrine does not apply.  “The canon speaks of baptized persons; if, 
however, a baptized person marries legitimately another who is not baptized, the official 
position of the church is that the baptized one is bound by the contract but does not 
receive the sacrament.  This is an officially acknowledged case of the separation of the 
contract and of the sacrament.”44  In such a case, the baptized person is ontologically “in 
Christ,” yet able to marry validly outside of sacramental reality.  Even if one were to 
bypass the theological inconsistency of such an example and hold firmly to the 
inseparability doctrine, dispute remains over whether sacramentality is an essential 
element of marriage, an essential property of marriage, or marriage itself.45  For instance, 
Burke argues,  
Sacramentality is not a sort of supernatural superstructure added to the natural 
reality of marriage.  It is a mistake to regard it as an essential “property” or a 
constitutive “element” of Christian marriage.  A property, such as indissolubility 
or unity, describes one aspect of the essence, whereas sacramentality transforms 
the whole essence of marriage.  Sacramentality is not a matrimonial property or 
element, but coincides with marriage itself:  matrimonium ipsum, as it exists for 
those whose souls bear the character of Baptism.  It is simply marriage considered 
from the supernatural point of view.46  
 
For Burke, the sacrament is marriage itself for the baptized.  However, he does not 
explain how a baptized person who is ontologically inserted into a new reality, that is, 
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“definitively placed within the new and eternal covenant”47 who marries an unbaptized 
person does not receive the sacrament.  In addition, it is difficult to reconcile 
theologically the assertion that two baptized nonbelievers (those who are completely 
indifferent to faith or the sacrament) receive the sacrament, yet a baptized person fervent 
in faith who marries an unbaptized person is not able to receive the sacrament.  From this 
example, c. 1055 §2 seems to imply an “automatic sacramentality” for the baptized 
irrespective of active faith.  To counter this mechanistic view of sacramentality, recourse 
can be made to the distinction between valid reception and fruitful reception of the 
sacraments and the significance of intention.  For validity one must intend what the 
church intends by that action.  Susan Wood articulates,  
Thus the religious marriage is valid when the prevailing will is to marry, and this 
will includes those characteristics of marriage intended by the Church:  
indissolubility, exclusivity, and openness to procreation.  When a couple intend 
such a marriage, they intend to receive what the Church intends as the sacrament.  
Because the will of the couple is actively involved in this intention, the sacrament 
is not in any way “ceremonial” or “automatic.”48  
 
This intention contains an “inchoate and implicit faith.”49  According to the scholastic 
distinction mentioned above between valid and fruitful reception, the valid reception of 
the sacrament depends upon intention.  Wood expounds, 
The reception of the sacramental character, the res et sacramentum, does not 
depend on the faith of the recipient.  The res et sacramentum is the sign of the real 
existence of the sacrament, which has an objective reality and whose existence 
depends on an act of the Church and its ministers, not on the act of the one who 
receives it.  Only a direct intention against the reception of a sacrament negates its 
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reception.  The absence of faith does not have a similar effect on the reception of 
a sacrament.50  
 
Wood explains that faith is not simply “an explicit and conscious act of faith,” but rather 
encompasses “the habit of faith” acquired “through the moral order and, most especially, 
through baptism.”51  The indelible character of baptism consists of “an ordination of the 
baptized to worship, the expression and public witness of faith.”52  One could argue that 
language involving sacraments being “received” assumes a dispensational account of the 
sacraments that is no longer suitable in a postmodern context.53  This critique is primarily 
theological and will be explored further in the final chapter.  The practical problem of 
sacramental marriage and baptized nonbelievers stems from theological ambiguity that 
needs further resolution.  Simply proffering a juridical response to a theological problem 
is insufficient.  Burke asserts, “Canonical ‘solutions’ that give rise to significant doctrinal 
difficulties are to be treated with great reserve and examined most thoroughly and 
prudently.”54  According to Wood, the concern over automatic sacramentality could 
indicate deeper questions in sacramental theology: 
These deeper roots may lie in the larger theological question of whether 
sacraments are fundamentally viewed as Christ’s free act on us and thus as 
primarily a theocentric activity even though they are only efficacious to the extent 
that they encounter the opus operantis of the believer, or whether the emphasis on 
subjective disposition reflects the anthropocentric turn in theology.55  
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Because theology informs and judges canon law, these theological questions need some 
resolution before canon law can effectively and accurately be applied to real marriages. 
 5.1.6 The Essential Properties of Marriage 
 According to c. 1056, “The essential properties of marriage are unity and 
indissolubility, which in Christian marriage obtain a special firmness by reason of 
the sacrament.”  This canon is effectively borrowed from the 1917 Code.  As essential 
properties, unity and indissolubility are descriptive, necessary qualities of the essence of 
marriage.  “Essential properties are qualities that flow from the very nature of marriage 
in itself, so that without them there can never be a real marriage.  There is question here 
then, not of an ideal to be aimed at, nor even of a moral imperative, but of ontological 
fact.”56  These properties are necessary for the intrinsic finality of marriage.57  “The 
integrity of the ontological ends (procreation/education, and the good of the spouses) 
requires that marriage be one and indissoluble.”58  Simply, a union of one man and one 
woman that lasts a lifetime is good for the growth and development of the spouses and 
the children that may come from their union.  Although both codes listed only these 
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properties as essential, Burke argues that the three Augustinian bona are all essential 
properties of marriage: 
With regard to canon 1056, it should be observed that there is nothing in the Latin 
text to indicate that the enumeration of essential properties is meant to be 
exhaustive.  Vernacular translations, however, do tend to give this impression.  It 
might eventually prove opportune to rephrase the Latin so as to avoid any 
impression that the third Augustinian bonum is not to be ranked among the 
essential properties of matrimony.  Thus legislation would be brought more in line 
with theological thinking.  For its part, jurisprudence, which is already at home 
with the scheme of the triple bona, may well wish to tighten its understanding of 
the bonum prolis.59  
 
He clarifies that the confusion that occurs surrounding the term, bonum prolis, “is the fact 
that offspring can be considered not just as a matrimonial good or value, but also as an 
end of marriage.”60  He continues, “Precision of terminology, in other words, asks that we 
distinguish ‘proles’ as finality from ‘proles’ as property; or, better still, that we 
distinguish procreation (end) from procreativity (property).”61  Although this distinction 
does clarify such an ambiguity in theology and canon law, one could ask why in neither 
code procreativity is specifically listed as one of the essential properties.  In my 
estimation, it adds greater confusion to assert, as Burke does, that procreativity is an 
essential property of marriage and that the exclusion of offspring invalidates on the 
double ground of exclusion of an essential property and exclusion of an end.62  Perhaps 
procreativity is not specifically listed as one of the essential properties of marriage, 
because c. 1084 §3 states that “sterility neither prohibits nor nullifies marriage.”  In a 
case where sterility is at least morally certain, if not medically certain, the marriage 
                                                 
59. Burke, "The Bonum Coniugum and the Bonum Prolis:  Ends or Properties of Marriage?" 713. 
 
60. Ibid., 711. 
 
61. Ibid., 711-12. 
 
62. Ibid., 713. 
 
290 
 
continues to be possible and valid.  In such a case, does it make sense to say the marriage 
is characterized essentially by procreativity?  For procreativity to be an essential property 
means that without it there is no marriage.63 
 The essential property of unity “means one partner and no more, either 
simultaneously or successively; hence polygamy, polyandry, remarriage after divorce 
while the first party is still alive, are all excluded.”64  Unity does not exclude remarriage 
when the previous bond of marriage has been declared invalid or has been dissolved by 
legitimate means.  Because marriage is a consortium totius vitae ordered to the bonum 
coniugum and bonum prolis, husband and wife must be one.  “Without unity the total 
self-giving essential to marriage is impossible:  a person with several spouses cannot give 
totally to any of them.”65  This unity implies a fundamental equality necessary for the 
fulfillment of both ends.66  As expressed in c. 1135, “Each spouse has an equal duty and 
right to those things which belong to the partnership of conjugal life.”  Klaus Lüdicke 
explains, “A respect for this equality of spouses (in rights and obligations) is the 
necessary and sufficient condition for marriage to serve the good of the spouses.”67  
Ignatius Gramunt explains how polygamy and polyandry do not embody the essential 
property of unity, because in the former, equal partnership is denied the woman in raising 
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her children and in the latter the lawful paternity is denied the man.68  In plural marriage, 
the equality implied in the concept of consortium is lacking, because there is not an equal 
sharing of lives and destinies among spouses. 
 As previously explained, indissolubility is an essential property of all marriages.  
Once entered validly, the marital relationship is perpetual, “which not only should not be 
terminated but cannot be terminated, even if the couple’s existential relationship is 
irretrievably broken.”69  This means that regardless of the current relationship of the 
spouses (separated, divorced, and/or civilly remarried), the rights and obligations 
incumbent upon them remain.  Therefore, consent makes marriage for the whole of life.  
That is why the juridical essence of marriage is the consortium totius vitae. Vincent 
Pereira explains how this consortium, characterized by unity and permanence, leads to 
the bonum coniugum, which is tied to commitment: 
This consortium empowers the contractants to share their physical and spiritual 
entities while committing themselves to each other for the whole of life, seeking 
their own good and the good of the other spouse.  The partnership fosters their 
process of maturation whereby the partners learn to negotiate and compromise as 
they carry out the essential marital obligations.  As the partners negotiate and 
compromise, this relationship solidifies their conscious commitment.70  
 
It is this commitment that sustains the marriage and leads to the bonum coniugum.  Thus, 
the marital commitment is necessary in fulfilling marriage’s salvific purpose, and, 
according to c. 1752, the salvation of souls is the supreme law of the church.  Burke 
opines, 
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As in all of God’s doings, his purpose is to prepare (i.e., to mature) us for eternal 
life.  What matures the spouses most in marriage is precisely their faithful mutual 
commitment, their loving each other in good times and in bad, their persevering 
dedication to their children; very often, it is the “bad” or harder times (serious 
illness, financial hardship, the drawn-out experience of mutual defects, the cares 
of family life, etc.) which most mature a person because they can indeed lead a 
person out of themselves and teach them to love.  That, after all, is the ultimate 
purpose of everything God has created in regards to human beings:  to lead us to 
heaven and prepare us for it.  What is truly good here on earth is to learn to love.  
There are few better schools of love than marriage.  Marriage is a particular call 
for two people to learn to love each other (with their defects), and to love the fruit 
of their mutual love and union, their children (also with their defects), and so to 
grow towards the infinitely perfect love of God.71  
 
The mutual commitment of one man and one woman (unity) lived in faithful love for life 
(indissolubility) molds and perfects them for eternal life with God.  According to c. 1056, 
the essential properties of unity and indissolubility “obtain a special firmness by reason 
of the sacrament.”  As Örsy notes, this qualification is difficult to explain “because 
neither unity nor indissolubility admits degrees.”72  Presumably, this distinction is in 
place to account for the dissolution of marriages where neither or only one party is 
baptized.73 
 
5.2 Marital Consent in the Code 
 
 
5.2.1 Consent Makes Marriage 
 
Canon 1057 §1—The consent of the parties, legitimately manifested between 
persons qualified by law, makes marriage; no human power is able to supply 
this consent. 
 
 This canon is the juridical expression of the resolution of the medieval debate 
surrounding the efficient cause of marriage.  The decretals of the twelfth century, 
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beginning with that of Pope Alexander III, affirmed that consent de praesenti creates 
marriage.  Although marriage usually involves parents, family, church, and state, the 
consent of the parties alone makes marriage.  Accordingly, should there be some defect 
of consent, the marriage would be invalid.  In addition, this consent must be “legitimately 
manifested.”  Marriage is a social institution with many stakeholders; therefore, the 
manifestation of consent must be public.  Should there be some defect of canonical form, 
the marriage would be invalid for Catholics.74  Finally, the persons must be “qualified by 
law,” that is, legally capable of marriage.  Canons 1073, 1083-1094 identify the 
impediments to marriage “which disqualify persons either from any marriage (e.g., the 
impediment arising from sacred orders) or from particular marriages (e.g., the 
impediment of consanguinity).”75  Should there be a diriment impediment that applies to 
either party, the marriage would be invalid.  From c. 1057 §1 the three ways in which a 
marriage may be declared invalid can be deduced:  defect of consent, lack of canonical 
form, and existence of a diriment impediment.76  
Canon 1057 §2—Matrimonial consent is an act of the will by which a man 
and a woman mutually give and accept each other through an irrevocable 
covenant in order to establish marriage. 
 
 In this canon, consent is identified as an act of the will.  Although here the 
legislator purports to make a universal statement about what makes marriage, such a 
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statement presupposes a philosophical system that is specific to a certain period of time.  
The view that consent makes marriage derives from ancient Roman law; however, the 
statement that consent is an “act of the will” would be foreign to the Roman 
understanding of marriage where the existence of a marriage was identified by visible 
displays of the spouses’ desire to be married (maritalis affectio) not an abstract juridical 
or metaphysical formulation.  This phrase, an “act of the will,” is evidence of “the code’s 
reliance on the rational psychology originated by Aristotle, Christianized by the 
Scholastic theologians, especially Thomas Aquinas, in the Middle Ages, and enshrined as 
the privileged vehicle for communicating Catholic doctrine as least since the neo-
Scholastic revival of the nineteenth century.”77  The designation of consent as an act of 
the will can lead to the misunderstanding that mind, will, and emotion are separable 
(versus simply distinct) and that they operate independently of one another.   
In his 1999 Address to the Roman Rota, John Paul II explicitly links consent and 
commitment, and when this text is read in light of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis 
previously discussed, we can come to understand the relation of consent to commitment 
and the inadequacy of the Code’s “definition” of consent.  John Paul II’s text is a linchpin 
in this study as it unambiguously links consent, commitment, and conjugal love:   
Here we sometimes encounter the misunderstanding in which marriage is 
identified or at least confused with the formal, outward rite that accompanies it.  
Certainly, the juridical form of marriage represents a civilized advance, since it 
confers both importance and efficacy on marriage in the eyes of society, which 
consequently undertakes to safeguard it.  But you jurists cannot overlook the 
principle that marriage consists essentially, necessarily and solely in the mutual 
consent expressed by those to be married.  This consent is nothing other than the 
conscious, responsible assumption of a commitment through a juridical act by 
which, in reciprocal self-giving, the spouses promise total and definitive love to 
each other.  They are free to celebrate marriage, after having chosen each other 
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with equal freedom, but as soon as they perform this act they establish a personal 
state in which love becomes something that is owed, entailing effects of a 
juridical nature as well.78  
 
Örsy describes consent as “a deep seated act in the spirit of a human person.”79  A 
commitment is made and accepted through consent in the mysterious depth of the human 
spirit.  Commitment is a fundamental choice effecting action on the fourth level of 
conscious and intentional operations.  As a decision, commitment is an act of rational 
self-consciousness.  “Man is not only a knower but also a doer; the same intelligent and 
rational consciousness grounds the doing as well as the knowing; and from that identity 
of consciousness there springs inevitably an exigence for self-consistency in knowing and 
doing.”80  Lonergan describes decision as an act of willing,81 but his positive account of 
freedom emphasizes the intimate connection between knowing and willing.  There is an 
interrelation between the cognitional and volitional operations of the human spirit but not 
a relation of necessity.  In a marital commitment, something new is created out of the 
complex relationship between knowing and doing.  Spouses consent to a present and 
future way of life, course of action, pattern of behavior, form of relating that could be 
otherwise.  Consent is internal, rational, conscious, creative, and intentional.  John Paul 
II’s reference to consent as “the conscious, responsible assumption of a commitment” 
demonstrates that consent is an act of rational self-consciousness effecting action on the 
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fourth level of conscious and intentional operations.  Mendonça reiterates precisely this 
point.  “Marital consent is truly human, when, by means of the conjugal pact, the life of 
those marrying is decided and profoundly changed.  Such an act flows from the synergy 
of intellect and will, that is, through the psychological mechanisms involved in forming a 
truly human act.”82  Consent is a juridical act, but it cannot be reduced to its outward 
expression.  The internal and intentional act with psychological, moral, social, and 
juridical effects is presumed to be in accord with the external act (c. 1101 §1).  Jurists 
need to be cognizant of and considerate of the intricate nuances of this psychological 
process of consenting in order that just sentences are delivered. 
Many, if not most, challenges encountered in marriage nullity cases based upon 
defects of consent can be traced to two primary sources of confusion.  Both have been 
alluded to already.  The first difficulty is the fact that a specific philosophical theory is 
implicit in the canons on matrimonial consent.  Örsy asserts, 
The fact stands that a philosophical theory has become the touchstone for the 
validity and invalidity of the sacrament, and it was used to determine the fortune 
or misfortune of many human persons.  This is all the more surprising because the 
Church in its official acts always refused to “canonize” a philosophy, that is to 
raise it to the level where it became an integral part of Christian doctrine.  Yet 
when the very existence of Christian marriages is judged by a philosophical 
theory, and the faithful are compelled to abide by such judgment, the theory is 
given in effect the importance of an article of faith.83  
 
In the translation of philosophical theory to canon law, a great deal of the nuance and 
intricacy of Aristotle and Aquinas have been lost, particularly in this canon which 
describes consent as an act of the will.  Örsy describes this translation as a “crude 
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reconstruction of a subtle theory.”84  He continues, “The fundamental problem with it is 
that it misrepresents the human spirit.  Its natural unity becomes fragmented.  The 
faculties, the mind and the will, are presented as more or less autonomous agents acting 
independently from each other.”85  For Örsy, the definition of consent as an act of the will 
is insufficient.  His understanding of consent, decision, and commitment is more in line 
with Lonergan, and he describes the mind/will dichotomy as an “intellectual straight-
jacket.”86  He notes that canons that are truly new to the 1983 Code, such as c. 1095 and 
c. 1098, bring mind and will closer together in canon law, yet the problem remains: 
There is movement in the right direction, but it will have to go further.  The real 
solution would be to free the law from an abstract metaphysical hypothesis and 
accept the common sense truth substantiated by voluminous research in 
psychology:  a human person is a whole, his operations in understanding, judging, 
and deciding form an integral process where the parts have no autonomous life.87  
 
As the law stands, it is difficult for just sentences to be given in marriage nullity cases 
when a philosophical system is crudely simplified yet universally enshrined. 
 The second source of confusion stems from the complex relation between the 
world of spirit and the world of law.  As discussed in Chapter Two, the two worlds are 
distinct yet integrated.  Canon law is a necessary human instrument, a concrete system of 
structures and norms, which exists to secure freedom for the Spirit to operate in the 
church.  It is this delicate and complex relationship between the two worlds in marital 
consent that is the focus of this study.  Örsy clarifies this difficulty encountered by 
judges, advocates, defenders of the bond, and spouses: 
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But it is not so easy for the law to handle consent.  The world in which consent is 
given or withheld is distinct and separate from the world where laws are made 
about it.  Consent operates or fails to operate in the internal world of the human 
spirit; legal norms regulate external social relationships in a visible community.  
The legislator can do no more than catch some glimpse of the mysterious world of 
the human spirit and set up some sensible norms which help to conjecture the 
presence or absence of consent.  It follows that to handle the issue of consent 
intelligently, the understanding of two distinct worlds is required:  that of the 
human spirit and that of the law.88  
 
Necessarily, the law is “an imperfect instrument” in dealing with consent, because the 
law can only be applied to the external evidence of consent or lack thereof.89  Consent, 
which operates in the world of the spirit and the world of law, is “internal and 
ontological” as well as “external and legal.”90  Örsy continues,  
The legal system can handle only facts which are ascertainable in the empirical 
world.  The only way the law can reach the world of the human spirit is through 
presumptions, using the external signs to come to conclusions about the internal 
reality.  If we wanted to use really precise language, we should never say “there 
was consent” or “there was no consent”; only “there is evidence of consent” or 
“there is no evidence of consent.”  Indeed, the time-honored language of tribunals 
is a similar one:  they never say “there is a valid marriage” or “there is no valid 
marriage”; they state only that “there is evidence for nullity” or “there is no 
evidence for nullity”:  constat or non constat de nullitate.91  
 
Marriage nullity cases dealing with defect of consent have to contend with the challenge 
of trying to fit complex psychological processes into overly simplistic, narrow 
philosophical categories along with the challenge of defining what kind of external 
evidence to accept in proving the invalidity of marriage in a particular case. 
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 5.2.2 The Object of Consent 
Canon 1057 §2 establishes that the essence of the covenant of marriage is the 
exchange of consent.  The mutual consent of the man and the woman is the true efficient 
cause of marriage.  Through consent, the man and woman give and accept each other to 
form a marriage.  This canon identifies the object of consent as the mutual giving and 
accepting of persons.  This is the sese mutuo tradunt atque accipiunt, borrowed from 
Gaudium et spes 48.  Marriage is rooted in the conjugal covenant of mutual consent, “the 
human act by which partners mutually surrender themselves to each other.”92  Burke 
argues that Flannery’s translation of the conciliar text lessens the force of the original 
Latin in which “the perfection and totality of the conjugal commitment” is demonstrated 
through the notion of “the mutuality of acceptance.”93  Translating the phrase as 
“mutually surrender themselves” omits the idea of accepting the other as juridically 
essential.  As we have seen, commitment involves sending one’s word unto another and 
that person’s receiving of that promise.  The human act of consenting is described as a 
covenant with all the biblical and theological connotations previously mentioned.  In the 
1917 Code, the ius in corpus was specified as the object of consent, whereas in the 
present Code the object of marital consent is not so clear.  Although glaringly physicalist 
in reducing marriage to a sexual relationship for the primary purpose of procreation, the 
formulation of the object of consent in the old Code was juridically precise lending itself 
to clearly defined rights and duties.  Because canon law must deal with the external and 
that which can be proven, the ius in corpus as the object of consent certainly had its 
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advantages but at the expense of being reductionist and objectifying.  The giving over of 
a right in the 1917 Code has been replaced with the giving over of persons in the current 
Code. 
 Analysis of the object of marital consent deserves further attention because it is 
critical in the relationship between a theological understanding of marital commitment 
and a juridical articulation of marital consent.  Burke states precisely this point: 
Canon 1057 §2, which expresses the object of marital consent, is the main 
reference point for the juridical analysis of what is essentially involved in marital 
commitment.  It therefore calls for a thorough analysis; all the more so inasmuch 
as its formulation, strongly marked by conciliar personalism, seems to offer one 
of the most striking changes which the 1983 Code introduced within the whole 
field of matrimonial law.94  
 
Burke articulates this change in formulation.  “The ‘traditio iuris,’ the granting of a right 
‘over the body’ (the ius in corpus) of the 1917 Code has given way, so it seems, to a 
traditio suiipsius:  the mutual ‘gift of self.’”95  Although the present Code’s formulation 
of the object of consent corresponds better theologically with marriage as covenant, a 
great deal of ambiguity exists over its precise juridical meaning.  Burke notes how in 
jurisprudence the change has been ignored by some and discarded as “juridically 
meaningless” by others.96  Gramunt distinguishes between the material object (the giving 
and accepting of each other) and the formal object (in order to form marriage).97  
However, as Burke notes, locating the object of consent in the “finality of this self-
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giving” is rather tautological and fails to advance juridical thinking.98  Following the 
advances in theological thinking regarding the bonum coniugum and the emphasis on 
marriage as a covenant relationship, it must be admitted that something more is meant by 
the object of consent than simply the ius in corpus or the establishment of marriage itself.  
Nevertheless, the mutual giving and accepting of persons cannot imply the donation of 
self in a way that destroys the personality or robs spouses of human dignity and freedom.  
To identify the object of consent as the spouses themselves may be an accurate 
theological statement, but as Burke questions, “Is a total gift of self a workable legal 
notion?”99  
 Because a literal gift of self is impossible and theologically contrary to 
personalism, Burke argues that the traditio suiipsius implies “an element of metaphor.”100  
Juridically, what is given and accepted in marital consent is a right.  “A true gift, after all, 
implies the transfer from the giver to the receiver of ownership—the dominium—of what 
is given.  But it is obvious that each spouse does not transfer ownership of his or her 
person to the other.”101  In marital consent, what is given and received is a right “over 
something so proper to the person, so ‘representative’ of him or her, that its 
traditio/acceptatio constitutes the conjugal gift of self, measurable in juridical 
parameters.”102   For Burke, this most unique and personal right that is exchanged in 
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marital consent is the right over one’s procreativity.  What is shared permanently and 
exclusively is one’s procreative power.103   He summarizes his position as such: 
We could synthesize these considerations by saying:  the distinctive self-gift 
which is the object of matrimonial consent, consists in the gift of conjugal 
sexuality; and this gift; a) in order to be sexual—i.e., in order to actualize shared 
and complementary sexuality—must be open to life; and, b) in order to be 
conjugal, must be exclusive and permanent.  So, the marital self-gift—the traditio 
coniugalis—is the donation of one’s sexuality, in its concretely procreative 
aspect, made in a permanent and exclusive way.104  
  
He designates the object of consent as such, because a “gift implies a definitive and 
permanent donation of something, with a concession of proprietary rights.”105  This gift is 
a conjugal gift, meaning it is sexual, exclusive, permanent, and open to procreation.  In 
Burke’s reasoning, the object of consent involves procreativity as a constitutive element, 
because in true conjugal intercourse something real has been shared with the other 
spouse, that is, the male and female “generative element.”106  Thus, according to Burke, 
the object of marital consent is specified by the three Augustinian bona, which he 
considers essential properties of marriage.  “Procreativity, exclusivity, permanence—the 
Augustinian bona—define the essence of the conjugal commitment.”107  Consequently, 
the Augustinian bona constitute the essential aspects of the marital self-gift. 
 One of the central problems with Burke’s position is that his explanation of the 
object of consent is simply the ius in corpus of the 1917 Code transformed into 
personalist terms without any expansion in meaning.  Although he does not explicitly 
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equate the objects of consent108 in the two codes, he clearly demonstrates their continuity 
by translating the ius in corpus into personalist language: 
So strikingly different are the 1917 and the 1983 formulations that it seems hard 
to discover any relationship, any logical connection, or any evident point of 
development between the two.  Science however seldom proceeds by total 
ruptures with the past.  True progress—in canonical science no less than in other 
fields—usually shows many points of continuity with what has gone before; a 
point that could helpfully be borne in mind as we pursue the scope of our study.109  
 
Burke endeavors to explain how a personalist understanding of marriage evident in the 
pre-conciliar and conciliar documents is in continuity with an institutional conception of 
marriage manifest in the previous Code.  Some see the two views of marriage represented 
in the two ends of marriage: 
For a large part of this century, theologians, canonists and anthropologists have 
been engaged in a vigorous debate about the ends of marriage, and at times about 
its very nature.  On the one hand was the traditional (often termed the 
“procreative” or “institutional”) understanding, which presented the ends of 
matrimony in a clear hierarchical manner:  a “primary” end (procreation) and two 
“secondary” ends (mutual help and the remedy for concupiscence).  On the other 
hand, there had a emerged a new view which, without necessarily denying the 
importance of procreation, wished at least equal standing to be given to other 
personalist values linking husband and wife:  mutual love, the conjugal union in 
its spiritual and not just physical aspect, etc.110  
 
In his reasoning, the two ends identified in c. 1055 §1, procreative and personalist, are 
both institutional ends.  Burke sees in Genesis 1 the procreative end instituted.  This text 
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emphasizes “man’s relative perfection” in the complementarity of the sexes ordained “to 
carry on the work of creation by procreation.”111  In Genesis 2, the personalist end is 
highlighted by demonstrating how both sexes need one another in order that their union 
lead to the bonum coniugum.  Burke correctly acknowledges that these ends are 
interrelated and should not conflict.  He states, “The gift of procreativity has, in 
particular, a unique capacity to express the gift of self and the desire for union with one’s 
spouse.  Here we can see how a personalist and procreative view of marriage are not in 
opposition, but are rather inseparably linked within a truly human understanding of 
conjugality.”112  The difficulty in Burke’s articulation of the object of consent comes to 
light in many of his studies.  Although I strongly agree with many of his points 
(particularly those affirming the relationship between commitment and the conjugal 
good113), his studies often reduce to moral arguments against contraception.114 
A delicate balance needs to exist between the moral order and the juridical order.  
Moral questions and juridical questions are related, but they are not identical.  His 
juridical explanation of the object of consent turns into a moral prohibition of 
contraception.  Juridical questions regarding consent concern matrimonium in fieri, 
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whereas moral questions regarding contraception concern matrimonium in facto esse.115  
John Coughlin explains the difference between canon law and moral norms: 
Whether the origin of the law is an Ecumenical Council, the pope, the diocesan 
bishop, or the chapter of a religious community, the law differs from other moral 
norms in the church on the ground that this particular norm has been officially 
promulgated as law.  The subject of canon law is disposed to obey the law in no 
small part because the law originates in some person or persons who are vested 
with the sacred power of governance. . . .  
. . . As with any dogma or moral norm of the church, the believer’s 
adherence to canon law is in no small part attributable to the consequences for 
eternal salvation.  However, canon law is distinguishable from other norms on the 
ground that it constitutes the rule of law.  Canon law is not a mere copy of divine 
and natural law.  Canon law has its own positive character that is designed to 
advance its natural and supernatural goals.  In choosing to be obedient to the law, 
the subject of canon law may perceive the inner meaning of canon law’s purpose 
in advancing some goal.  Not only may the subject have insight about the purpose 
of an individual canon, but the subject may have insight about the function of 
canon law as the rule of law in the life of the church.  The subject who obeys 
canon law appreciates that life in the church would suffer absent canon law’s 
function as the rule of law.  The subject understands that canon law is essential to 
the church’s natural peace, justice, fairness, and order.  The subject regards canon 
law as an indispensible aid to the facilitation of grace in the life of the church.  
The function of canon law as the rule of law means that canon law cannot be 
reduced merely to theology.116  
 
The prohibition of contraception is a teaching of the church, whether reformable or 
irreformable is under theological debate; it has not been promulgated as canon law.  
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Burke takes a controverted theological issue and attempts to give it the force of law, thus 
leading to greater confusion. 
The question of consummation is relevant here, because the specification of what 
consummates marriage is dependent upon a clear understanding of the object of consent.  
To what do spouses consent exactly?  The answer to that question will specify what 
completes or concludes consent.  Burke’s position regarding the conjugal self-gift and 
contraception reveals unsettled theological questions which cause even greater confusion 
in the juridical order.  Canon law requires a “hermeneutics for restriction” through which 
commentary on a particular legal text focuses on the intended action with “classical 
brevity and clarity.”117  There is no brevity or clarity regarding consummation.  Burke 
argues that contraceptive intercourse cannot realize the conjugal self-gift “since one or 
both spouses in fact rejects any true sharing of conjugal sexuality.”118    Burke fails to 
explain how spouses who limit sexual intercourse to the infertile periods for the purpose 
of avoiding pregnancy are making a total conjugal self-gift, whereas those who use 
contraception to avoid pregnancy reject “the other precisely in his or her personal and 
conjugal sexuality.”119  According to Burke, contraceptive intercourse cannot be truly 
conjugal, because “there is an aspect to the other’s proper conjugal self-gift—his or her 
procreativity—which each does not want to accept.”120  Again, he does not explain how 
sexual intercourse engaged in precisely when spouses know it cannot be procreative 
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signifies and effects conjugal union, whereas contraceptive intercourse (also purposefully 
non-procreative) “frustrates the marital union.”121  His argument seems based purely on 
the physical structure of the act.  Clearly, these are unsettled questions for moral 
theology.  The consequence of blurring juridical and moral questions is found in his 
conclusion that contraceptive intercourse cannot consummate a marriage.  “It is precisely 
because it is not a conjugal act that a contraceptive copula is not capable of 
consummating matrimony.”122  Theologically and juridically, this position is not settled.  
Prior to the 1983 Code, the position traditionally held was that consummation did not 
occur through coitus interruptus or intercourse using a condom, due to failure to ejaculate 
semen into the vagina, yet other types of contraception which did not prevent ejaculation 
of semen into the vagina did consummate marriage.  Beal argues that “the revised code 
has defined the conjugal act by which marriage is consummated as one ‘which is suitable 
in itself for the procreation of offspring.’”123  Thus, c. 1061 seems to imply that a 
conjugal act performed using any kind of contraception does not consummate the 
marriage.  Beal continues, “Thus, despite the protestation of the code commission to the 
contrary, the revised code seems to have introduced a radical revision of the traditional 
understanding of the consummation of marriage.”124  He considers this revision 
“unintended” and “canon 1061 §1 should be emended so that the mind of the legislator is 
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expressed clearly in language consonant with the canonical tradition.”125  Additionally, 
the commentary from the Canon Law Society of Great Britain and Ireland expresses the 
lack of clarity regarding consummation and conjugality: 
The Revision Commission expressed the view that if the contraceptive means 
employed affect the act of intercourse itself, e.g. “coitus interruptus,” the marriage 
would not be consummated, whereas it would be if the means did not affect the 
act.  This leaves unresolved the question as to whether or not a marriage is 
consummated if e.g. a condom or a vaginal sheath is used:  is this a “human 
manner” of the exercise of the procreative act ordained by God in the context of 
marriage?:  it is the view of this commentary that it is not.  This and allied matters 
are ones which have yet to be more extensively explored and clarified by 
jurisprudence and practice.126  
 
In the New Commentary on the Code of Canon Law by the CLSA, Lynda Robitaille, 
commenting on c. 1142 regarding the dissolution of ratified but non-consummated 
marriage, holds that sexual intercourse which prevents the ejaculation of semen into the 
vagina does not consummate marriage, including coitus interruptus and intercourse using 
a condom or vaginal sheath.127  However, the 1977 decree of the Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith does not require the ejaculation of semen for the completion of the 
conjugal act.128  In such a case there is not a sharing of the procreative elements, yet the 
CDF has deemed such an act a true conjugal act in order that sterile persons are not 
considered impeded from marriage.  The preceding analysis demonstrates that theological 
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questions regarding the object of consent and consummation need further study and 
investigation before juridical conclusions can be drawn.129 
Burke’s near equation of the objects of consent from both codes fails to take 
account of the development that occurred in the twentieth century regarding the marital 
relationship.  His position inflates the significance of procreative intercourse in the lives 
of married persons.  He sermonizes, “A husband and wife never so fully become ‘one 
flesh’ as in the child born of their union; and if they are truly in love, they realize this.”130  
Of course, such a statement may very well be experienced as true for spouses; 
nevertheless, this experience of conjugal sexuality is limited to a handful of sexual acts 
over a lifetime.  What then is the theological and juridical significance of the vast 
majority of sexual acts spouses engage in knowing they will more than likely not be 
procreative?  When the uniqueness of the marital relationship is reduced to sharing one’s 
procreative power with one’s spouse, then the “fullness” of the marital relationship is 
limited to the child-bearing years.  Burke states, “The gift of procreativity has, in 
particular, a unique capacity to express the gift of self and the desire for union with one’s 
spouse.  It is in fact the first element that truly specifies and distinguishes the object of 
matrimonial consent.”131  If the gift of procreativity is the distinguishing element of the 
object of consent, how does such a statement apply to sterile couples?  He addresses this 
objection in another article by arguing, “Actual procreation, however, is not essential to 
marriage, and at times of course does not occur, as in the case of the marriage of sterile 
                                                 
129. Compounding the confusion is the question of a broader notion of consummation as 
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personalist theology of marriage?  It does not. 
 
130. Burke, "The Object of the Marital Self-Gift as Presented in Canon 1057, §2," 416-17. 
 
131. Burke, "The Essential Obligations of Matrimony," 382. 
310 
 
persons.  But even in these latter cases, marital intercourse still signifies the mutual self-
giving of the spouses, for it ratifies their intention to bestow on each other the gift of 
conjugal procreativity.”132  Such a statement regarding signification is meaningless, 
because how can there be intention when there is impossibility?  His redressing of the ius 
in corpus into the right to the other’s procreative power as a more personalist term is 
clear in this statement:  “This brief examination of the donative sense of the conjugal act 
offers in effect a reinterpretation of the bonum prolis, in a personalist key.  It shows how 
many insights, when adequately analyzed, do not break with tradition but rather link into 
it and enrich it.”133  In seeking to find continuity (and, in my opinion, equivalence) 
between the objects of consent in both codes, he fails to explain how the change is “one 
of the most striking changes which the 1983 Code introduced within the whole field of 
matrimonial law.”134  
Clarification regarding the object of consent will bring with it clarification 
regarding the ensuing essential rights and obligations, because from a juridical point of 
view the explicit rights and duties deriving from consent will be dependent upon one’s 
understanding of the object.  Although designating the object of consent as the spouses 
themselves is entirely accurate and theologically sound, such a statement is juridically 
insufficient and imprecise.  Identifying the object of consent essentially defines and 
specifies the content of marriage.  Gramunt declares, “To consent means to confirm a 
choice, and a choice is an elementary and most personal, nontransferable human act 
which, in the case of marriage, ‘no human power can replace’ except the spouses.  What 
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defines a particular choice, however, and makes it different from any other choice is the 
object that is chosen.”135  To designate the object of consent as the “right over one’s 
procreativity” as Burke does,136 freezes the juridical articulation of marriage to the time 
of the 1917 Code, despite the development of the theological understanding of marriage 
over a century.  The charge of physicalism is appropriate; the debate concerning the 
bonum fidei demonstrates the implications of such a theory. 
Prior to a “watershed decision” of Msgr. Arturo De Jorio in 1963, the bonum fidei 
was identified juridically with the property of unity.137  This meant that the exclusion of 
the bonum fidei could only occur by reserving to oneself the right to have more than one 
spouse (polygamy) or by reserving to oneself “the right to have more than one person 
with whom the ius in corpus for acts suitable for the generation of children was 
exchanged.”138  In such a view, the intention to abuse the right to fidelity did not 
invalidate consent, only the intention to hand over to a third party conjugal rights to acts 
per se apt for the generation of children.  Jenkins describes the consequences of this view 
in jurisprudence: 
A corollary of this traditional doctrine was that a person who frequented 
prostitutes before marriage and swore he would do so afterwards did not place his 
consent in danger.  Nor did a person who intended to engage in homosexual acts.  
Neither obviously intended to hand over the right to the body for acts per se apt 
for the generation of children.  Indeed, the rare instances in which an exclusion of 
the bonum fidei applied almost always involved a man retaining a lover before 
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marriage, and continuing to live with her after consent as if with another wife, in 
more uxorio, as the phrase went.139  
 
In a 1978 article, Thomas Doyle summarizes the kinds of examples in Rotal 
jurisprudence in which the evidence of the case did not indicate to the tribunal that the 
right had been vitiated, including the will to commit adultery and the intention to 
continue a homosexual relationship.140  Writing before the completion and promulgation 
of the revised Code, Doyle states, “The object of consent is the right to procreative acts, 
not the fulfillment of this right.”141  He continues, “In giving consent then, a person 
promises fidelity to a right but not to the exercise of that right.  Therefore, one can 
assume the obligations of marital fidelity and at the same time not intend to fulfill the 
obligation assumed.  If the reader finds this distinction difficult to grasp, he should be 
consoled in the knowledge that he is one among many.”142  In 1963, De Jorio challenged 
this theory by arguing that the property of unity is not identical to the bonum fidei, 
because fidelity can exist even in polygamous unions.  Secondly, rarely does a person 
committing adultery explicitly intend to hand over conjugal rights to a third party.  More 
likely, the adulterer intends to be free of conjugal obligations rather than taking on more.  
Thirdly, he argued that unity is a property of marriage that encompasses more than the 
conjugal act.  The bonum fidei implies that spouses exchange the right to exclusive sexual 
relations.143  This position gained widespread acceptance in Rotal jurisprudence with 
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Cormac Burke criticizing this view.144  Burke argues that De Jorio’s thesis rests upon the 
object of consent of the 1917 Code rather than the 1983 Code in that the exclusiveness 
demanded refers not to the ius in corpus of the old Code but to the marriage bond (c. 
1134).  Burke claims, 
The result is that the whole canonical basis to the De Jorio thesis would seem to 
have been undermined.  The exclusiveness of the conjugal relationship, in its 
juridical relevance, is now clearly referred to the bond, not to the copula (the 
right/obligation of an exclusive copula retains of course all of its moral 
importance).  It is the intention not just of having illicit relations, but of creating a 
pseudo-marital bond, with another, that is incompatible with the constitutional 
exclusiveness of a real conjugal bond, and so vitiates the unity of marriage.145  
 
He continues, 
The De Jorio thesis tends to reduce the bonum fidei to its physical dimension of 
the right to exclusive intercourse, with scarcely any further qualification.  In other 
words, it focuses attention on the exclusiveness of the physical act, and tends to 
abstract it from an overall consideration of “conjugality.”  In this it is notably out 
of harmony with the new code, where a clear change of emphasis is evident:  
away from a juridic notion of marriage centered on the “right to the body” (ius in 
corpus) considered in it mere physical entity; and toward a deeper and more 
human understanding of what is involved in a true conjugal relationship and 
bond.146  
 
In reference to the bonum fidei, Burke accuses the “new” position of conflicting with the 
revised Code by focusing on the physical act and reverting to the old Code’s definition of 
the object of consent.  Ironically, this is precisely what Burke does in regard to the bonum 
prolis as discussed previously.  Burke opines, “The identification of the bonum fidei with 
the moral concept of fidelity rather than with the juridic concept of unity, can lead to 
                                                                                                                                                 
83. 
144. Jenkins, "Faithful in All Things Conjugal:  Recent Developments in the Bonum Fidei," 185. 
 
145. Burke, "The Content of the Bonum Fidei," 142. 
 
146. Ibid., 142-43. 
 
314 
 
elitist theories of what is necessary for valid marriage.”147  Easily, Burke’s understanding 
of the marital self-gift can lead to elitist theories, particularly for sterile couples or 
couples practicing artificial contraception.  Whereas in regard to the bonum prolis Burke 
tends to blur moral and juridic distinctions, here he tends to separate the moral and juridic 
orders to the impoverishment of both.  Explicitly he does so by concluding, “Prescinding 
from the moral question, I maintain that there is no juridical incompatibility between the 
intention to take a husband or a wife, and the intention to continue seeking other sexual 
outlets [emphasis mine].”148  Although he argues that he includes the new Code’s concept 
of conjugality in his thought while his opponents have not, in my estimation he has done 
the opposite.  His understanding of the object of consent as the right to one’s procreative 
power shared exclusively for life with one’s spouse leads him to the following statement:  
“The retention of a ‘right’ to have contraceptive (or other unnatural) intercourse with a 
third party would not constitute an exclusion of the bonum fidei.”149  Jenkins states that 
Rotal jurisprudence continues to separate unity and fidelity, where the bonum fidei is 
considered an essential element of marriage that cannot be excluded without invalidating 
consent.150  The difficulty inherent in this debate is maintaining the delicate balance 
between the moral and juridic orders and the difficulty in articulating the object of 
consent in a way that is juridically precise and yet faithful to the tradition, to 
developments in the theology of marriage, and to the experience of married love. 
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5.3 The Juridical Effects of Marriage 
 
 
5.3.1 The Bond of Marriage 
 
Canon 1134—From a valid marriage there arises between the spouses a bond 
which by its nature is perpetual and exclusive.  Moreover, a special 
sacrament strengthens and, as it were, consecrates the spouses in a Christian 
marriage for the duties and dignity of their state. 
 
 Canon 1134 refers to matrimonium in fieri, that is, the irrevocable conjugal 
covenant whereby spouses mutually give and accept each other in order to form an 
intimate partnership of life and love which is permanent.151  This canon is foundational in 
establishing the canonical effects of marriage, because it establishes that the principal 
effect of the valid exchange of consent is the bond.  As with many of the foundational 
canons (such as c. 1055), its literary form is a philosophical and theological statement 
with legal implications.152  Örsy explains, 
Marriage here means the act of the initial commitment, the exchange of promises, 
the very act of creating a lifelong right-and-duty situation, natural or sacramental.  
In classical canon law this act was described as “marriage coming into existence,” 
matrimonium in fieri, distinct from “marriage in existence,” matrimonium in esse.  
The distinction should not be pushed too far; the moment of birth cannot be 
separated from the life that follows it.153  
 
As described previously in Chapter Three, matrimonium in fieri and in facto esse exist 
simultaneously in their possibility.  The lived reality of marriage grows out of the initial 
making of the marriage in the conjugal commitment.  The original covenant establishes a 
lifelong covenant.  In continuity with c. 1056, this canon describes the bond as perpetual 
and exclusive.  The bond of marriage has the essential properties of unity and 
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indissolubility.  The conjugal bond was explicated theologically in Chapter Three, and it 
is this theology that informs this canon.  Through the marital covenant, spouses have 
chosen definitively to be bound to one another giving their life “a new orientation.”154  
Gramunt describes the bond as a “relation of unity, that is to say, a relation which unites 
the persons by the common end or purpose.”155  He continues, 
The marriage bond is a moral entity formed by a mutual and permanent 
commitment to seek the common good proper to marriage.  Insofar as this 
commitment sets the will to seek the good of another person, it is a habit of love, 
and insofar as it sets the will to seek the same good as due by virtue of the same 
commitment, it is a habit of justice.  The capacity to love, which is a capacity to 
give the goods of one’s life to another person, finds its roots in the human 
person’s spiritual likeness of the Creator which, embodied in masculine and 
feminine person, is expressed through the human person’s bodily constitution.156  
 
Spouses are bound together of their own volition through consent for the bonum 
coniugum and the bonum prolis, and according to Gaudium et spes 48 for the bonum 
societatis, thus revealing the theology of communio.  For these goods to be realized, the 
bond needs to be perpetual.  In Chapter Four, I outlined the reasons for making a marital 
commitment:  to strengthen one’s own inconsistent will, to reassure others of one’s 
intentions, and to express and make present the fullness of love as it continues to grow 
throughout a lifetime.  For these reasons, the bond is perpetual and exclusive as well. 
 According to c. 1134 for Christians, “a special sacrament strengthens and, as it 
were, consecrates the spouses.”  This special consecration is “for the duties and dignity of 
their state.”  Lawler’s description of the “triple bond of love, of law, and of sacrament” is 
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illuminating here.157  Each succeeding bond “enhances and strengthens” the previous 
bond.158  “From Christian marriage, then, arises an interpersonal, a civil, and a religious 
relationship, bond, or obligation.  None of this happens in any autonomous physical 
reality.  It happens, really and ontologically, only in human reality, only in the 
interpersonal sphere of the human spirit.”159  In sacramental marriage, the Holy Spirit 
effects and consecrates their union empowering them to experience the grace offered to 
live the marital commitment.  Kasper opines that the sacramental bond is “an ontological 
expression of the lasting aspect of promise and grace contained in sacramental marriage.  
It points to the constant claim that the partners can make on each other and their openness 
to each other.”160  The bond is considered ontological, because it changes spouses in their 
being by uniting them permanently in such a way through their own promises along with 
God’s promises to be faithful.  Through consent, spouses are bound to one another in a 
way that creates certain rights and obligations.  The indissolubility of the bond means that 
those rights and obligations are permanent regardless of the existential state of the 
relationship of husband and wife.161 
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 5.3.2 Equal Duties and Rights in Marriage 
Canon 1135—Each spouse has an equal duty and right to those things which 
belong to the partnership of conjugal life. 
 
From this bond, through which spouses are permanently bound to one another, 
there arise particular rights and obligations that pertain to married life.  Despite cultural 
differences in the specific ways in which families live, c. 1135 affirms the basic and 
inherent equality of husband and wife.  In Familiaris consortio, John Paul II avows, 
“Above all it is important to underline the equal dignity and responsibility of women with 
men.”162   Although men and women may have different roles that vary from culture to 
culture or even family to family, this canon establishes the basic equality of the spouses 
in the consortium vitae.   
Knowledge of the essential rights and obligations of the consortium vitae 
presupposes an understanding of the object of marriage. The difficulty in clarifying the 
object of consent in a way that is canonically meaningful and functional has already been 
addressed.  Mendonça explains, “In law the material objects of consent are the spouses 
themselves, who ‘mutually give and accept each other in order to establish marriage’ (c. 
1057, §2).  However, the formal object, that is, the juridic aspect under which the spouses 
mutually exchange each other, is the complex of essential rights and obligations of 
marriage.”163  The essential rights and obligations of marriage derive from the essential 
elements (which are not explicitly listed in the Code), the essential properties of unity and 
indissolubility previously discussed, and sacramentality.  Mendonça holds that the 
essential elements can be derived from c. 1055.  Marriage is a consortium, an 
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interpersonal relationship for the whole of life, ordered to the bonum coniugum and the 
bonum prolis and characterized by fidelity and indissolubility (and sacramentality for the 
baptized).164  From these elements, jurists can infer essential rights and obligations.  
Because the essential elements, and consequently essential rights and obligations, 
are nowhere specifically listed in the Code, Mendonça considers prior jurisprudence 
including that of Bishop Antoni Stankiewicz.165  From Stankiewicz’s description of the 
essential obligations of marriage, Mendonça concludes the following: 
First, there is the “obligation” to conjugal love; second, the “obligation” to orient 
this “conjugal love” to the “procreation” and “education” of offspring; third, the 
“obligation” to share with the partner this “conjugal love” (a) “perpetually,” (b) 
“exclusively,” and (c) in a “human way”; fourth, the “obligation” to establish and 
preserve “conjugal communion,” which “demands total fidelity and indissoluble 
unity.”166  
 
Raymond Burke provides a similar explanation of the essential rights and obligations of 
marriage.  He implies that the Augustinian bona are the focus of these rights and 
correlative obligations within a personalist perspective: 
The essential rights and duties are described in canons 1055 §1; 1056; and 1057 
§2, and can be summarized as the right to receive and the duty to give love which 
is exclusive or faithful, indissoluble or permanent, and procreative or life-giving.  
Any further specification must be related directly to the three essential rights and 
duties described above, for they identify the qualities proper to the love of 
marriage.167  
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Ignatius Gramunt identifies the object of consent as “the right over those acts that 
are necessary to attain the common good of marriage (ius in operations coniugales).”168  
In this way, the object of consent encompasses more than the ius in corpus; rather, it is a 
right to the acts that lead to both the bonum coniugum and the bonum prolis.  From an 
analysis of Rotal jurisprudence regarding the bonum coniugum, William Varvaro 
concludes, “This jurisprudence shows that the partnership of the whole of life is ordained 
to the good of the spouses and so must be considered an essential element of 
marriage.”169  In one of the few Rotal decisions directly related to the bonum coniugum, 
Msgr. Renzo Civili reasons that although the exact duties/rights related to the bonum 
coniugum have not been resolved, prior doctrine and jurisprudence indicate that the 
distinct, yet complementary personhood and the equal dignity of each spouse are inherent 
elements of the bonum coniugum.170  This complementarity relates to “not only the 
generative fact but also the psychological difference in sex.”171  Yet, created in the image 
and likeness of God, man and woman are not the “completion of the other.”172  
Consequently, there is no duty/right to complete the other or to rule over the other given 
that man and woman are equal in dignity and worth in their personhood.  Civili’s 
judgment regarding a case of exclusion of the bonum coniugum demonstrates how care, 
respect, and equality are essential duties/rights of the consortium vitae: 
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A positive act of the will against the ordination of marriage toward the good of 
the spouses is verified when the will of those who marry is directed contrary to 
both the human and Christian commitment for continued growth in communion 
toward a more fruitful unity of bodies, hearts, minds and wills.  This daily growth 
cannot occur unless one, by respecting the dignity of the other, gives him/herself 
to the other with total love that is unique and exclusive.  Human dignity is based 
on fundamental rights.  Therefore, one who intends by a positive act of the will 
not to recognize the fundamental rights of the other, excludes the good of the 
spouses.173  
 
The recognition in Rotal jurisprudence that the ordination of marriage to the conjugal 
good is an essential element with corresponding fundamental rights and obligations 
clarifies the possible ground of invalidity in the Jemolo case.  In fact, this case coram 
Civili judged affirmatively on the ground of exclusion of the bonum coniugum was a case 
of domestic violence of the man (respondent) toward the woman (petitioner).  Marriage is 
intrinsically directed toward a mutual, loving union so that the intention to grow and 
develop continually in fruitful communion must be included in consent.174  To marry 
validly, spouses must order their wills to the ends of marriage and assume the obligations 
there implied.  In agreement with the work of Archbishop Mario Francesco Pompedda, 
Lynda Robitaille identifies some of the specific rights and obligations directly related to 
the bonum coniugum.175  “To summarize, some concrete aspects of the good of the 
spouses are:  physical living together, the duty of assisting in the vital necessities of the 
other spouse, conjugal dignity of common life, participation of both in the matrimonial 
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decision, it is only in marriage that this exists.”176  Valid marital consent includes a 
commitment to the good of the other spouse, a commitment to the good of the couple, 
and a commitment to of the children that may come of the union. 
 5.3.3 Duties and Rights of Parents 
Canon 1136—Parents have the most grave duty and the primary right to 
take care as best they can for the physical, social, cultural, moral, and 
religious education of their offspring. 
 
This canon flows from c. 1055 §1 which states that marriage is ordered to the 
good of the spouses and the procreation and education of offspring.  After reviewing the 
theological understanding of educatio prolis throughout the Christian tradition, Kenneth 
Schmidt summarizes this right and obligation that is an effect of marriage and a part of 
the bonum prolis: 
Education strives for the full maturity of the offspring, including their physical 
growth, intellectual instruction, moral and religious formation, and social and 
civil development.  The sacrament of marriage deepens and strengthens the 
parental obligation and reinforces the demand to provide—for the children’s 
spiritual and moral welfare—a specifically Christian upbringing.177  
 
The parental right and obligation to educate children is incorporated into the 1983 Code 
in c. 793 §1 and further specified in c. 795.178  In c. 1136, these rights and obligations are 
considered some of the canonical effects of marriage.  Because the ordination of marriage 
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to the bonum prolis (both procreative and educative aspects) is an essential element of 
marriage, certain rights and obligations are principally related to consent.  Through an 
examination of Rotal jurisprudence, Schmidt admits there is considerable variation in the 
canonical understanding of the educatio prolis and how exactly it relates to consent.179  
Schmidt contends that obligations related to the physical education of children have been 
upheld in Rotal jurisprudence as essential to marital consent such as the obligation to 
protect, feed, and care for children whether unborn or born.180  In addition, he argues that 
the essence of a sacramental marriage must include assuming the obligation to provide a 
Christian education for children including baptism.181  Acknowledging that there are 
many issues related to the educatio prolis that require greater study and elucidation, 
Schmidt lists several indicators of possible nullity relative to the educatio prolis that 
should incite further investigation.  Some of these that may be more common in 
contemporary American culture, yet difficult to pinpoint, include:  “emotional distance, 
neglect, or abuse of a child”; “self-centeredness of a parent to the neglect or harm of a 
child”; “parents pass all responsibility for raising the child to others”; “parents leave all 
religious decisions for the child to make later”; and “neglect or refusal of parent to 
present a child for baptism, religious formation, or preparation for reception of 
sacraments.”182  By no means do these behaviors or attitudes automatically indicate proof 
of invalidity.  Rather, their consideration here points to the fact that marriage is 
essentially consortium totius vitae for the good of the whole family. 
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5.4 Bilateral and Unilateral Dimensions of Consent as Complementary 
 
 
 5.4.1 What is the Bilateral Dimension of Consent? 
 As previously described, the Latin consensus implies with-ness, mutuality, and 
reciprocity.  Garrett Roche traces the original meaning of the word in etymology and 
early Roman usage.  He summarizes his position that the bilateral dimension of consent 
was dominant in common usage and Roman law: 
While there is evidence that in early times “consent” was used to denote the 
agreement of different senses or faculties within the one person, there is no 
evidence that this usage was common or widespread.  But there is ample evidence 
in early Roman usage, in Roman Law texts, and in the Vulgate translation, to 
show that “consent” originally primarily denoted harmonious agreement between 
two or more persons.  It denoted a concurring of minds, a sympathetic feeling 
together with another person, agreement with the opinions or actions of another 
person, and at times denoted sinful collusion with another.  If “consent” must be 
described in terms of the will, then, unilateral consent denoted at minimum 
“willing agreement with the acts or opinions of another,” and the full bilateral 
consent such as involved in contracts denoted a “union of wills.”  Nuptial consent, 
being contractual by nature, is then properly described as being a union or a 
concurring of wills.183  
 
Roche distinguishes between consent and assent in classical Roman usage.  “If the 
Romans wanted to speak of an individual agreeing to a venture or an obligation that 
concerned himself alone, then the proper word was assensus (also spelled adsensus), 
assent.  One assented to an object, one consented with a person.”184  He elucidates a 
similar distinction in early Roman Law between stipulation and consent.  “Stipulation 
could take the form of being a binding verbal agreement, it could manifest consent, but it 
did not create consent.  If there was no actual consent, no concurrence of minds, then the 
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stipulation on its own was null.”185  In classical Roman marriage, “consent was not just a 
stipulatory will-act; rather it was the harmonious union of wills of the parties themselves 
and of their families.”186  Consent was manifest not only at one moment but also 
throughout the process of creating and forming the consensus.  This bilateral dimension 
of consent helps to make sense of the role of maritalis affectio in classical Roman 
marriage.  Consent as a harmonious union of wills is another way of saying that the 
desire and will to be married is present throughout the process. 
 Roche describes how the bilateral dimension of consent continues to be present in 
canon law, although less so after the thirteenth century.  In the medieval debate regarding 
what creates marriage, Gratian held that consensus was completed by copula.  Roche 
argues that for Gratian it was not the intention to unite in a spiritual and carnal union that 
made a valid marriage but the actual union of wills and bodies in a spiritual and carnal 
joining together.  He adds, “It is also noteworthy that Gratian does not speak of the 
‘object’ of consent.  This is a term that only becomes popular later in history when the 
emphasis had changed from the actuality of the union-of-wills to the intentionality of the 
will-act.”187  This is in accord with the classical Roman use of consensus:  one consented 
with a person, not an object.  Although the twelfth century canonists continued to 
emphasize the bilateral dimension of consent, the need to ensure verification that consent 
had indeed been formed drove the shift toward emphasis on the unilateral dimension of 
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consent as a will-act.188  By the thirteenth century, this shift was evident.189  In response 
to the question of whether consent is of the appetitive or apprehensive power, Aquinas 
distinguishes between assent and consent.  “’Assentire’ [to assent] is, to speak, ‘ad aliud 
sentire’ [to feel towards something]; and thus it implies a certain distance from that to 
which assent is given. But ‘consentire’ [to consent] is ‘to feel with,’ and this implies a 
certain union to the object of consent.”190  He adds that the will is said to consent, 
whereas the intellect is said to assent.  For Aquinas, consenting implies a certain union 
with the object of consent.  In response to whether consent is the efficient cause of 
marriage, Aquinas identifies the object of consent:  
Just as marriage is one on the part of the object to which the union is directed, 
whereas it is more than one on the part of the persons united, so too the consent is 
one on the part of the thing consented to, namely the aforesaid union, whereas it is 
more than one on the part of the persons consenting. Nor is the direct object of 
consent a husband but union with a husband on the part of the wife, even as it is 
union with a wife on the part of the husband.191 
 
Although the bilateral dimension of consent is implied in that both husband and wife 
consent to the union, the focus is clearly on the unilateral dimension of consent.  Aquinas 
refers to each spouse’s consent and the object of consent for each.  The object of consent 
is union with the other. 
By the first codification of canon law in 1917, the unilateral dimension is 
forefront given that consent is described as an “act of the will” and the object of consent 
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is the ius in corpus.192  In the 1983 Code, the bilateral dimension of consent receives 
greater attention.  Canon 1057 §2 continues to identify consent as an “act of the will,” but 
the addition of “by which a man and a woman mutually give and accept each other 
through an irrevocable covenant” suggests the bilateral dimension.  Roche describes how 
the bilateral and unilateral dimensions are complementary and how awareness of this fact 
has both juridical and pastoral significance: 
The canonical descriptions of matrimonial consent then do not exclude the 
bilateral dimension, though jurisprudence has tended to stress the unilateral 
dimension.  There must indeed be a concurring of wills if there is to be a true 
valid consent.  This concurring of wills is a fact of juridical importance no less 
than the individual contributions of each partner to that concurrence.  Consent is 
not just a stipulatory will-act intending towards an object, it is the willful action of 
giving and accepting.  However this union of wills cannot be a static or semi-
conscious consensus, it must be a deliberate and conscious unanimity directed 
towards, and initiating, a lifelong exclusive partnership.  The unilateral dimension 
brings a necessary emphasis on the fact that each partner is accountable for his or 
her contribution to the consensus, a contribution that must be deliberate and 
conscious.  The unilateral and bilateral dimensions are then complementary, 
ensuring that there is a true concurring of personal will-acts, forming a valuable 
consensus.193  
 
Roche’s description of the complementary nature of the bilateral and unilateral 
dimensions of consent corresponds to the when of marital commitment.  Just as 
commitment is expressed during the wedding and yet must continue every day after the 
wedding celebration, so also consent is expressed during the wedding liturgy yet each 
spouse must continue to will consciously and deliberately the union as consortium totius 
vitae.   
Roche brings to light the pastoral and juridical significance of the bilateral 
dimension in other cultures, specifically African cultures, and within modern 
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psychology’s stress on the interpersonal relationship where marriage is viewed as a 
dynamic process: 
Emphasis on the fact that mutual consent should be a harmonious “union of wills” 
allows for a greater appreciation that consent itself is formed through a temporal 
process.  The union of wills is formed over a period of time by the interaction of 
the betrothed parties, it becomes decisively permanent and exclusive at a certain 
stage in the temporal process and is then given juridical status by legitimate 
manifestation.194  
 
Greater attention to the bilateral dimension of consent pays heed to the diversity of 
marital customs throughout the world church and to the temporal character of the 
existential marital relationship from dating through a lifetime together.  Consent as a 
union of wills points to the fact that internal consent occurs prior to its explicit 
manifestation at the wedding.  Roche argues that “if the nature of the marriage covenant 
as being a ‘partnership of the whole of life’ is examined, it is clear that some form of 
concurrence is fundamentally required to initiate that covenantal partnership.”195  Such a 
consideration could shed light on the bond of marriage as well.  The bond, vinculum, is 
not a juridical fiction external to the couple but a psychological, moral, and juridical 
reality.  “Jurisprudence on ‘incapacity’ has already implied the inadequacy of separate 
consents that do not or cannot concur.  It is also clear that the actuality of the concurrence 
of wills can form a psychological bond that intentionality without concurrence cannot 
form.”196  The bilateral dimension of consent highlights the actuality of the lived 
relationship.  A man consents with a woman and a woman consents with a man.  The 
union of their wills is what makes marriage.  Mendonça articulates this point precisely 
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and references Roche’s work.  “This consent is primarily an act of the will of each spouse 
and only when there is legitimate expression of their ‘wills-together’ or ‘union of wills’ 
to enter into a life-long marital relationship, is there a valid marriage.”197  When 
discussing the possibility of relative incapacity as a ground of nullity, he adds, “Marriage 
as a union between two persons comes into being when their consents meet.  Both in the 
aspect of ‘union’ and in the aspect of ‘consent’ marriage is an interpersonal reality.”198  
 5.4.2 Consent as Temporal Process Given Permanent Juridical Status 
 Renewed attention to the bilateral dimension of consent in canon law can help 
make sense of how a temporal process of marrying is given permanent juridical status.  
The bilateral dimension incorporates the theology of interpersonal commitment.  It helps 
to bring consent in canon law closer to the lived reality of marital commitment.  Without 
explicitly referring to the bilateral dimension of consent per se, Peter Huizing proposes a 
reevaluation of consent as it has been conceived canonically.  “There are two subjects 
striving after nothing else than themselves, giving themselves and accepting each other in 
a perfectly immanent covenant.  The community of common life and love is not the 
immediate content of the consent, but the commitment to it.”199  Since the arrival of 
scholastic philosophy, consent in canon law has been envisioned primarily in static terms; 
however, a return to acknowledgment of the bilateral dimension of consent moves the 
juridical articulation of consent closer to the dynamic, interpersonal process that it is 
existentially.  Huizing continues, 
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The notion of consent as ‘act of the will’ should be developed to the existentially 
more correct and more appropriate notion of interpersonal conjugal engagement 
or commitment.  There is no abstract act of the will referring to equally abstract 
qualities or properties like indissolubility, exclusivity or procreation, but an 
authentic attitude of persons giving themselves and accepting the other self into 
the most intimate community of life.  That would be an indispensible attitude for 
a Christian marriage.  The notions of aptitude-capacity-attitude, as well as the 
notions of immaturity-incapacity-exclusion of real marriage, would come nearer 
to each other.200  
 
Canonical structures and norms need to be reflective of real life and address pastoral 
concerns in order for canon law to be recognized and utilized as a ministry.  A canonical 
re-articulation of consent as a dynamic union of wills more accurately reflects the 
theology of commitment previously discussed.  The continual, dynamic, lifelong, 
interpersonal process of consenting is manifested and given permanent juridical status at 
one moment in time.  Certainly, the expression of consent at the wedding makes possible 
the verification of consent in the external forum, but the expression of consent is much 
more than a juridical formality.  It is a public means of reassuring others of the 
commitment made in a relationship of faith and trust.  The “moment of consent” 
presupposes a loving union already being made and the promise to continue in this loving 
union for life.  The juridically necessary “moment of consent” seals and confirms love 
that exists in a temporal process.  Farley’s theology of commitment coincides with this 
understanding of consent: 
Commitment is our way of trying to give a future to a present love.  It depends 
upon the power of the past (promise) to influence the present (fulfillment).  It 
aims to strengthen us, so that our love will endure through time; to assure us, so 
that we may trust within time; to integrate love, so that one day’s fears do not 
threaten another day’s desires, or one year’s weakness overwhelm another year’s 
strength.  Yet it is not immediately obvious whether commitment is, therefore, a 
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way of resisting time (of making love endure in spite of time, as if there were no 
time) or of embracing time (giving love a history by giving it a future).201  
 
Marital commitment publicly celebrated in the expression of consent seems to embrace 
time and the process of a loving relationship. 
  If the bilateral dimension of consent is to be taken seriously in canon law, so also 
must the canonical importance of marriage preparation.  Evelyn Eaton Whitehead and 
James Whitehead develop a theology of the lifecycle of marriage that is true to life 
experience and the theology of commitment purported here.  In their view, marriage is a 
sacramental passage composed of ritual celebration as well as an interpersonal process 
and transition: 
Such a reflection begins with the now common insight that marriage is not a state 
that we suddenly enter on our wedding day.  The sacrament of marriage cannot be 
understood in terms of a single ritual which magically transforms us from two 
into one forever.  The sacramental celebration of marriage in the rites and 
ceremonies of the Christian Church must be the celebration of a process already 
well under way and of a process which has still some considerable way to go.202  
 
In such a process, the ambiguity of the dating and engagement period requires particular 
pastoral care.  This first stage in the passage into marriage is ambiguous, because “the 
couple are committed to marry, but are not yet committed in marriage.”203  While consent 
de futuro does not create marriage, as consent de praesenti does, still it is a stage in the 
process of marrying.  The duty of the Christian faithful to prepare persons for marriage 
and care for married couples is of such importance that it is a canonical obligation. 
Canon 1063—Pastors of souls are obliged to take care that their ecclesiastical 
community offers the Christian faithful the assistance by which the 
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matrimonial state is preserved in a Christian spirit and advances in 
perfection.  This assistance must be offered especially by: 
1̊  preaching, catechesis adapted to minors, youth, and adults, and 
    even the use of instruments of social communication, by which the 
    Christian faithful are instructed about the meaning of Christian 
    marriage and about the function of Christian spouses and parents; 
2̊  personal preparation to enter marriage, which disposes the spouses 
    to the holiness and duties of their new state; 
3̊  a fruitful liturgical celebration of marriage which is to show that 
    the spouses signify and share in the mystery of the unity and 
    fruitful love between Christ and the church; 
4̊  help offered to those who are married, so that faithfully preserving 
    and protecting the conjugal covenant, they daily come to lead holier 
    and fuller lives in their families. 
 
 The canonical obligation to provide marriage preparation through all of its stages 
rests upon those who have the responsibility of caring for the Christian faithful.  
According to c. 1064 this responsibility falls ultimately upon the bishop, or local 
ordinary; however, the entire community shares in this task “in solidum with its 
pastors.”204  The ways in which various programs and means of preparation are structured 
are dependent upon the particular needs and resources of each local church.  In addition, 
each local church should utilize the experience and expertise of married couples and 
those who work in fields related to marriage.205  Fintan Gavin explains that the use of the 
phrase obligatione tenentur indicates a most serious canonical obligation.206  Because 
marriage is both a private relationship affecting the most intimate and profound aspects 
of persons and also a public institution influencing entire communities, both ecclesial and 
secular, bishops must take leadership in making certain this preparation is ample and 
effective. 
                                                 
204. Fintan Gavin, "Canon 1063:  Marriage Preparation as a Lifetime Journey," Studia Canonica 
39 (2005): 186. 
 
205. Beal, Coriden, and Green, New Commentary on the Code of Canon Law, 1262. 
 
206. Gavin, "Canon 1063:  Marriage Preparation as a Lifetime Journey," 187. 
333 
 
 The particular stages of marriage preparation outlined in the previous chapter are 
represented in c. 1063.  Remote preparation (c. 1063, 1̊) occurs primarily in the family, 
school, and faith formation during infancy, childhood, and possibly adolescence.  Lynda 
Robitaille argues, “Effective marriage preparation must begin in childhood.  Children and 
young people who learn what the obligations of marriage are, and who learn to appreciate 
the importance of the sacrament, will be better able to apply those teachings to their own 
lives when they marry.”207  Unfortunately, as Gavin notes, “The difficulty with remote 
preparation is that it is so broad and vague that very often it doesn’t happen in any kind of 
a structured or systematic way.”208  The particular rights and obligations of marriage are 
not delineated in canon law and are still being fleshed out in jurisprudence.  The fact that 
the contemporary experience and structure of families is so varied and fluctuating makes 
it particularly difficult for remote preparation to happen in any systematic manner.   
The ambiguity of proximate preparation (c. 1063, 2̊) is not clarified in canon law.  
Gavin states that proximate preparation “takes place in the period of engagement.”209  
Due to the fact that they rely on the document, Preparation for the Sacrament of 
Marriage from the Pontifical Council for the Family, Lynda Robitaille and John 
McAreavey hold that this stage concerns the engaged couple as well.210  If proximate 
preparation is limited to pre-marital courses for the engaged, then the role of discernment 
and dating needs to be clearly addressed in the stage of remote preparation.  Gavin points 
to this difficulty without explaining why this problem exists: 
                                                 
207. Beal, Coriden, and Green, New Commentary on the Code of Canon Law, 1263. 
 
208. Gavin, "Canon 1063:  Marriage Preparation as a Lifetime Journey," 189. 
 
209. Ibid. 
 
210. Beal, Coriden, and Green, New Commentary on the Code of Canon Law, 1263; McAreavey, 
The Canon Law of Marriage and the Family, 64. 
334 
 
One very practical difficulty with these courses is that couples tend to do them in 
the months or indeed the weeks leading up to their wedding when the decision has 
already been made and the preparations are already in place for the wedding.  It 
means that these courses or programmes are too late to help people with the 
making of this critical decision to marry.211  
 
This pastoral problem exists in part because a theology of dating and discernment has not 
been developed and then applied in canon law.  The bilateral dimension of consent has 
been neglected with one of the outcomes being this lacuna in canon law and pastoral 
practice.  The Pontifical Council for the Family alludes to consent as a union of wills that 
begins in the engagement period.  “The proximate preparation of young people should 
make them understand that the commitment they take on through the exchange of their 
consent ‘before the Church’ makes it necessary for them to begin a path of reciprocal 
fidelity in the engagement period.”212  Throughout their preparation, a couple is on a path 
of committing, which is made public and explicit at the wedding.  Once a theology of 
dating, discernment, and betrothal is developed, canonical structures can be created and 
utilized in practice. 
 Immediate preparation (c. 1063, 3̊) is the “culmination of a catechesis which helps 
engaged Christians to retrace their sacramental journey intelligently.”213  If there has not 
been adequate preparation in the previous stages, immediate preparation is absolutely 
necessary to prepare couples to participate actively in the rite.  Unfortunately, the 
common perception of marriage preparation is reduced to this stage alone, which occurs 
in the weeks and months prior to the wedding.  Immediate preparation is meant to be a 
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review of the moral, doctrinal, and spiritual formation and a deepening in their 
relationship with Christ and with each other already begun.  It is but one step in the 
process.  During this stage, the local ordinary, usually the bishop, may prohibit a 
particular marriage for a grave cause as long as the cause endures (c. 1077 §1).  
According to Beal, 
This authority, which is an exercise of the executive power of governance in the 
form of a personal precept (c. 49), derives from the obligation of ecclesiastical 
authorities to promote the common good of the particular and the universal 
Church and to prevent abuses of ecclesiastical discipline, especially in the 
celebration of the sacraments (c. 392).214  
 
Although prohibitions affect only the lawfulness and not the validity of the marriage, this 
canon is a prime example of how canon law exists to promote order and the common 
good as well as protect individual freedom.215  Marriage is a public institution with 
compounding effects.  In the past, this canon has been employed to prevent marriages 
that in all probability would be declared null due to defective consent or an impediment 
in order to protect involved parties.216  At the same time, since this canon affects the 
fundamental right to marry (c. 1058), it must be interpreted strictly (c. 18) with care that 
ecclesiastical authority is not abused.  Pastoral ministers preparing couples for marriage 
have the very difficult task of investigating canonical freedom to marry (c. 1066).  Should 
the possibility of defective consent be expected, a prohibition could prevent the eventual 
judicial procedure declaring nullity.  In such a situation, the complementarity of the 
pastoral and canonical aspects of the church is evident.  In his address to the Tribunal of 
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the Roman Rota on the inauguration of the judicial year 2011, Benedict XVI articulates 
the inseparability of the juridical and pastoral dimensions of canon law in marriage 
preparation: 
Among the means for ascertaining whether the project of the engaged couple is 
truly conjugal the prematrimonial examination stands out.  This examination has a 
mainly juridical purpose:  to ascertain that nothing impedes the valid and licit 
celebration of the wedding.  However juridical does not mean formal, as though it 
were a bureaucratic step, like filling up a form based on set questions.  Instead it 
is a unique pastoral opportunity—one to be made the most of with the full 
seriousness and attention that it requires—in which, through a dialogue full of 
respect and cordiality, the pastor seeks to help the person to face seriously the 
truth about himself or herself and about his or her own human and Christian 
vocation for marriage.217  
 
He explicitly mentions how preemptive pastoral preparation can circumvent possible 
juridical investigations of nullity: 
It is necessary to make every effort to interrupt, as far as possible, the vicious 
circle that often exists between a predictable admission to marriage, without an 
adequate preparation and a serious examination of the prerequisites for its 
celebration, and a legal declaration sometimes equally facile but of a contrary 
nature, in which the marriage itself is considered null solely on the basis of the 
observation of its failure.218  
 
That being said, the prohibition of the fundamental right to marry due to the possibility of 
defective consent in a first marriage requires such tremendous discretionary and 
predictive powers that it might be completely impractical. 
 The final stage of marriage preparation is continued pastoral care after marriage 
(c. 1063, 4̊).  When the bilateral dimension of consent is appreciated, the aftercare of 
married couples as an essential stage in marriage preparation becomes even more 
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apparent.  An invitation to a wedding is essentially an invitation to support the couple in 
prayer and counsel and any way possible, particularly in the early years of marriage.  The 
church as communio is responsible for helping the couple to live out their fruitful, loving 
union for life.  The specific means for doing so is left to the creativity and resources of 
the local church.  Canon 1063 is included in the Code to ensure that structures and 
procedures are in place so that the values of marriage are appropriated in the church.  
While admitting the many challenges pastoral ministers encounter in marriage 
preparation, Gavin articulates the interconnection between the juridical and the pastoral 
aspects evident in this area of ecclesial life: 
While acknowledging that there is always going to be a certain tension between 
the vision worked towards and the reality as it is practiced, the first thing required, 
if the Church’s vision is to become more than just a theoretical vision, is a belief 
in that vision.  There must be conviction about its value from the Bishop to the 
priest to the members of the church community.  The Church must be prepared to 
set up structures and provide adequate trained personnel and resources.  If more 
resources were invested in preparation for marriage then perhaps less expenditure 
would be necessary for or marriage tribunals.219  
 
Investment in marriage preparation is a most serious obligation; the church must spend 
adequate time, money, and resources in pastoral measures to build and fortify strong 
marriages or continue to use those resources in judicial measures to deal with failed 
marriages. 
 
5.5 The Unilateral Dimension of Consent and Invalid Marriages 
 
 
 5.5.1 Personal and Responsible Contribution to the Consensus 
My recommendation that the bilateral dimension of consent be explored in greater 
depth in both canon law and theology in no way diminishes the need for greater 
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understanding of the unilateral dimension of consent.  The bilateral and unilateral 
dimensions are complementary.  The unilateral dimension, or will-act of each person, 
corresponds to Lonergan’s fourth level of conscious intentionality.  The fourth level of 
conscious and intentional operations is where freedom operates, where human persons 
not only decide upon courses of action but also choose the kind of person one wants to 
be.  The fourth level presumes the other three levels of experiencing, understanding, and 
judging.  Marital consent is a conscious and intentional operation, an act of rational self-
consciousness, in which spouses choose a course of action or way of life that could be 
otherwise.  Essentially, that is what is meant by—consent makes marriage.  The unilateral 
dimension of consent signifies that each person is accountable for and responsible for his 
or her contribution to the consensus.  Historically, canon law has emphasized the 
unilateral dimension, particularly since the emergence of scholastic philosophy.  As 
argued previously, consent as will-act is evident in the Code, and each person’s capacity, 
knowledge, and responsibility regarding the marriage is considered juridically significant.  
Here, the canons particularly relevant to a theology of marital commitment and consent 
will be addressed.220 
 During the internal process of consenting, a serious deficiency or defect occurring 
at any or all of these steps has the possibility of vitiating consent.  This process of 
consenting corresponds to Lonergan’s levels of conscious and intentional operations and 
the elements of a positive account of freedom.  Although listed sequentially and 
distinctly, these steps happen organically in relationships and real human experience.  
The first step in consenting happens on the experiential level when a person gathers 
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information about marriage in general and the person he or she is considering for 
marriage specifically.221  It corresponds roughly to the element of freedom termed “the 
underlying sensitive flow.”  The second step occurs as a person comes to understand 
“what marriage is, what values it represents, and what this marriage with this person is 
likely to be, what values this partner is likely to bring to the marriage.”222  These 
intellectual acts of understanding and judging (when one’s understanding of marriage in 
general is applied to marriage with this particular person) correspond to the elements of 
“practical insight” and “practical refection.”  The third step occurs when a judgment 
regarding marriage to this particular person is accepted.  Örsy describes it as an act of 
surrender.  “After the absorption of information, after the understanding of its content, the 
person must surrender himself with all that such surrender entails to the reality of this 
marriage.  ‘This marriage is for me!’”223  This step is the element of “decision.”224  It is 
an act of rational self-consciousness, an act of willing, an act of consenting.  Örsy argues, 
“But it is not enough to know something or someone conceptually; there is an element of 
‘surrender’ after the judgment, an element not mentioned in our new code!  It is through 
this surrender that the whole human person (not just his cognitive faculties) gives himself 
to reality.”225  The fourth step occurs as the person takes the concrete steps to marry, that 
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is, to express consent in action.226  Because consent is an internal process, this consent 
needs to be expressed into the external world both at the wedding and in living out the 
marital covenant.  Örsy’s integral vision of the process of consenting is succinctly 
articulated as the following:  a “four-fold process of moving from information, to 
understanding, to a value judgment, to surrender, and to action.”227  The element of 
surrender in consent has not been adequately featured.  Consent is an active choice and, 
at the same time, a surrender to what is and what will be.  As commitment is the choice to 
give up other choices and love is simultaneously passion and action, so consent is letting 
go in acceptance of a radical new direction to one’s life and set of obligations.  Örsy 
mentions a danger at the third level of surrender I believe to be prevalent, almost 
rampant, in marriages in the United States: 
Subtle deficiencies may arise at this stage.  A person may remain in a dream 
world, contemplating the “idea” of marriage and the “idea” of the chosen partner 
somewhat á la Plato, but never committing himself to this marriage with this 
partner.  Clearly such a defective stage is possible; it is usually betrayed by the 
person seeking his fulfillment, not the fulfillment of the other; asking studiously 
what he can get, not what he can give.228  
 
Certainly, this is tied to the soul mate model of marriage, which perhaps could lead to 
defective consent as this element of surrender is absent or inadequate.229 
 As these canons are addressed, the difficulty mentioned earlier regarding the 
distinction between the world of spirit and the world of law becomes even more obvious.  
The complex and intricate psychological and spiritual process of consenting needs to find 
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expression in juridical language.  The canonical meaning of consent must always be 
adjusted to better reflect the psychological and theological reality of consent: 
Because of its incapacity to penetrate into the internal world of human persons, 
and its capacity to regulate and judge external actions, the law stands partly 
impotent, partly competent before the issue of consent.  It stands impotent 
because it has no means of knowing how the human spirit works in general, or 
what it has done in a particular case; for such information the law must turn to 
other sciences.  It stands competent because the manifestation of consent is an 
external act with far reaching social consequences. . . . 
Thus, the canons on matrimonial consent reflect in manifold ways the 
impact of several diverse sciences on canon law.  Rightly so since canon law must 
turn to other sciences to learn what consent is in its ontological reality.  The 
“canonical” idea of consent, therefore, is a special construct, composed by 
informed lawyers.  It may be close to its ontological counterpart but it cannot be 
fully identical with it.  Precisely because of this difference, the canonical idea is 
subject to corrections as we advance in the knowledge of the operations of the 
human spirit.  Some such corrections are found in the new Code.230  
 
The difficulty of translating theological values and realities into canonical norms and 
structures is particularly concentrated in the issue of consent thus calling for periodic 
reconsideration.  For example, canon 1095 is completely new to the 1983 Code as the 
legislator incorporates the insights of empirical psychology into the canonical meaning of 
consent.  The relatively recent addition of this canon into a juridical structure of consent, 
which is about six hundred years old, lends itself to an awkward placement and 
ambiguous wording.231  
 5.5.2 Consensual Incapacity 
 Canon 1095—The following are incapable of contracting marriage: 
  1̊  those who lack the sufficient use of reason; 
2̊  those who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment 
    concerning the essential matrimonial rights and duties mutually to 
    be handed over and accepted; 
3̊  those who are not able to assume the essential obligations of 
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    marriage for causes of a psychic nature. 
 
 This “new” canon on defective consent demonstrates true development in canon 
law along with deviation.  The addition of this canon to the Code reveals the movement 
of canon law toward a more nuanced theology of marriage fueled by the more recent 
insights of empirical psychology.  However, with this movement come some dangers, 
particularly in the ways in which these new insights are applied in annulment cases.  John 
Paul II’s annual allocutions to the Roman Rota for the years 1987 and 1988 specifically 
addressed these dangers. “From this perspective, I wish to devote particular attention 
today to psychic incapacities, which especially in some countries have become the 
ground for a high number of declarations of nullity of marriage.”232  While appreciative 
of the advances in psychology, John Paul II cautions that contemporary discoveries in 
psychology “are not capable of resolving on their own the fundamental questions 
concerning the meaning of life and the human vocation.”233  Underlying these 
psychological theories are anthropological assumptions, some of which are irreconcilable 
with the canonical and theological understanding of marriage.234  Therefore, expert 
testimony must be used guardedly and weighed carefully according to cc. 1578-1579.  
The judge is the peritus peritorum, the expert of the experts, which means “it is for the 
judge and for him alone to consider the nullity of marriage.”235  The human sciences 
alone provide an incomplete picture of the human person, because they are limited to the 
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earthly and natural dimensions of human life, whereas an integrated Christian 
anthropology considers the human person in all aspects—“terrestrial and eternal, natural 
and transcendent,” “internally wounded by sin, and at the same time redeemed by the 
sacrifice of Christ.”236   
In his 2009 Annual Address to the Roman Rota, Benedict XVI questions whether 
the interventions of John Paul II regarding the overuse, or possibly abuse, of psychic 
incapacity as a cause of marital nullity have been received.237  John Paul II declared the 
ecclesiastical tribunal to be “a ministry of charity towards the ecclesial community which 
is preserved from the scandal of seeing the value of Christian marriage being practically 
destroyed by the exaggerated and almost automatic multiplication of declarations of 
nullity of marriage in cases of the failure of marriage on the pretext of some immaturity 
or psychic weakness on the part of the contracting parties.”238  Over twenty years after 
these allocutions, Benedict XVI laments that this continues to be “a concrete and pressing 
problem.”239  To combat the problem, Benedict XVI asserts the need to recall some 
significant distinctions in order to respond to “the need for procedural precision.”240  The 
first distinction is between psychological maturity and canonical maturity.  “With the use 
of expert evidence, psychic maturity which is seen as the goal of human development 
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ends up being confused with canonical maturity which is rather the basic minimum 
required for establishing the validity of marriage.”241  The second key distinction John 
Paul II sought to clarify in these addresses is the difference between the incapacity to 
give consent and the difficulty in giving consent: 
For the canonist the principle must remain clear that only incapacity and not 
difficulty in giving consent and in realizing a true community of life and love 
invalidates a marriage.  Moreover, the breakdown of a marriage union is never in 
itself proof of such incapacity on the part of the contracting parties.  They may 
have neglected or used badly the means, both natural and supernatural, at their 
disposal; or they may have failed to accept the inevitable limitations and burdens 
of married life, either because of blocks of an unconscious nature or because of 
slight pathological disturbances which leave substantially intact human freedom, 
or finally because of failures of a moral order.242  
 
The third distinction is between a canonical approach to normality and a clinical 
approach: 
It follows, therefore, that while for the psychologist or psychiatrist every form of 
psychic illness can appear contrary to normality, for the canonist who is inspired 
by the aforementioned integrated vision of the person, the concept of normality, 
that is to say, of the normal condition in this world, also includes moderate forms 
of psychological difficulty.  Consequently it includes the call to live in accordance 
with the Spirit even in the midst of tribulation and at the cost of renunciation and 
sacrifice.  Where such an integral vision of the human being is lacking, normality 
on the theoretical level can easily become myth and on the practical level, one 
ends up denying to the majority of people the possibility of giving valid 
consent.243  
 
The final distinction of John Paul II, which is recalled by Benedict XVI as necessary for 
resolution of the problem, is between “the minimum capacity sufficient for valid consent” 
and “the ideal of full maturity in relation to happy married life.”244  
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 Canon 1095 reflects the threefold capacity that all persons must possess in order 
to elicit valid consent.  Mendonça summarizes that the capacity to marry “concerns the 
very person of the spouses as subjects of consent, the object of consent (marriage), and its 
constitutive (essential) elements.  This capacity is threefold:  to understand the object 
sufficiently, to choose it freely, and to realize it in married life; it must be present in the 
parties at the moment of exchanging consent.”245  For this reason, there are three species 
of consensual incapacity as listed in c. 1095.  The first species of consensual incapacity, 
lack of sufficient use of reason, has been recognized (although minimally utilized) in 
canon law before the promulgation of either code.246  Those incapable of placing a human 
act due to serious mental disorder, amentia, cannot possibly elicit valid consent to 
marriage. The severe mental impairment must be present at the time of consent, although 
it may be “habitual, such as schizophrenia, or temporary such as epileptic seizure, acute 
alcohol intoxication, etc.”247  The first species of consensual incapacity seems 
superfluous, because cases applicable to the first species would definitely apply to the 
second species.  Mendonça concurs, “In my opinion, for all practical purposes, this norm 
is preempted by the norm of ‘lack of discretion of judgment,’ the second species of 
consensual incapacity.”248  
 The second species of consensual incapacity concerns the critical faculty, or the 
third level of conscious intentionality, the rational.  Although identified as a defect of 
discretion of judgment, the defect can originate on the empirical level of experiencing 
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and attending as well as the intellectual level of inquiring and understanding.  Örsy 
opines, “Judgment is the final outcome of a long process towards reaching the truth, or 
towards appropriating a value.”249  Due discretion means the ability to make a decision 
that is “informed, prudent, and free.”250   
This critical faculty, a function of the practical intellect, is the capacity to evaluate 
knowledge of one’s self, one’s prospective partner, and the complex rights and 
obligations constitutive of the partnership of the whole of life by comparing, 
integrating, and deducing new judgments.  In short, the critical faculty is the 
capacity to make a prudent judgment about this marriage with this person at this 
time.251  
 
The fourth level of conscious intentionality is working as well, because it is the principle 
of self-control which is responsible for the proper functioning of the first three levels.  In 
the previous chapter, the virtue of prudence was explored in relation to a theology of 
marital commitment.  Prudence, a virtue of the practical intellect, is the judgment of 
conscience working well in a concrete situation.  In order for prudence to develop in a 
person, that capacity must be present.  Due discretion of judgment does not mean that the 
virtue has been perfectly cultivated, but rather that the capacity is present to make a 
mature decision.  Ignatius Gramunt and Leroy Wauck explain, “Discretio means both the 
power to discern and its exercise by means of differentiation and distinction:  in both 
senses it is often used as synonymous with prudence.”252  In c. 1095, 2̊ the grave defect of 
discretion refers to “a grave defect of a person’s psychological power to make that 
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particular judgment which forms the choice of the will.”253  Mendonça explains how due 
discretion of judgment has come to be identified canonically with maturity of will: 
In rotal jurisprudence, the term “discretion” has finally come to mean “maturity” 
understood in the canonical and not psychological sense, and, therefore, when it is 
used with “judgment” as “discretion of judgment,” it basically signifies “maturity 
of judgment” or simply “mature decision” or “mature choice.”  In relation to 
matrimonial consent, “discretion of judgment” means “maturity of decision” to 
enter into a permanent and exclusive interpersonal heterosexual relationship 
ordered by its very nature to the good of the spouses and of the offspring.254  
 
Practical reasoning always involves concrete decisions; therefore, due discretion means 
the ability or capacity to make concrete decisions regarding one’s own life, marriage with 
a particular person and the rights and obligations inherent in a marital covenant with this 
person. 
 For defective consent to invalidate according to c. 1095, 2̊, it must be grave.  
According to the instruction Dignitas connubii from the Pontifical Council for 
Legislative Texts, in causes of defect of discretion of judgment, the judge should ask the 
expert “whether one or both parties suffered from a particular habitual or transitory 
anomaly at the time of the wedding; what was its seriousness; and when, from what cause 
and in what circumstances it originated and manifested itself.”255  Since consent refers to 
matrimonium in fieri, the psychic anomaly may be habitual or transient as long as it is 
present at the time of consent.  From an examination of Rotal jurisprudence, the 
allocutions of John Paul II and Dignitas connubii, Richard Reidy concludes that the 
psychic anomaly, either habitual or transient, must be serious; it must be the cause of the 
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lack of discretion of judgment; it must be present at the moment of consent; and it must 
relate to the essential rights and obligations of marriage.256  Reidy adds a significant 
distinction: 
It is critical to bear in mind that the presence of a psychic anomaly, even a serious 
one, in a party at the moment of consent does not necessarily translate to a defect 
of discretion of judgment or a lack of consensual incapacity.  Rather, it is the 
effect of the psychic anomaly on one’s discretion of judgment in relation to the 
essential rights and duties of marriage that determines the invalidity of 
marriage.257  
 
 The psychic anomaly itself is not the cause of nullity, but rather it causes the lack of due 
discretion which invalidates consent.  Reidy lists some examples of psychic anomalies 
that have been cited in affirmative Rotal sentences as the cause of invalidating consensual 
incapacity according to c. 1095, 2̊.  “These include:  neuroses, psychic immaturity, drug 
dependence, alcoholism, schizophrenia, bipolar disturbance, affective immaturity, and 
various personality disorders, including obsessive-compulsive personality disorder, 
narcissistic personality disorder, anti-social personality disorder, and dependent 
personality disorder.”258  The preceding causes are internal and psychological.  However, 
underlying causes may be external to the person such as a crisis pregnancy, a difficult 
family background, or socio-cultural influences which are contrary to a theological 
understanding of marriage like the “hippy culture.”259   
The proof of these underlying causes does not mean an automatic declaration of 
nullity.  Judges must decide with moral certainty if a person is truly incapable of giving 
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consent or made an imprudent decision in marriage and is now struggling in the 
difficulties of marriage.  “Neither incomplete marriage preparation nor a failure to weigh 
all the consequences of the religious, social, ethical, public and private aspects of 
marriage constitute a defect of discretion of judgment.”260  Reidy delineates how the 
gravity of lack of due discretion is determined in Rotal jurisprudence: 
Gravity is measured first by the subjective impact of the psychic anomaly upon 
the person’s ability to know, evaluate, and freely choose.  Secondly, the objective 
impact of the defect is evaluated by examining the proportionality of those 
impacted faculties with minimum levels of discretion necessitated by the 
seriousness of the essential rights and duties of marriage to be mutually given and 
received by the parties.261  
 
The issue of proportionality is significant, as explained by McAreavey, “What the Church 
requires is that parties have reached a level of maturity proportionate to the seriousness of 
the commitment involved.”262  This refers to a canonical level of maturity necessary for 
intending and realizing the marital commitment and not psychological maturity, which is 
the goal and term of human development.  The complexity of this assessment demanded 
of judges cannot be underestimated.  As previously indicated, the essential rights and 
duties of marriage are not specifically outlined, and the internal psychological processes 
do not lend themselves to clear juridical analyses.  Burke argues that in no way does 
consensual incapacity offer easy grounds for a declaration of nullity.  “Arriving at moral 
certainty about the nullity of marriage on the grounds of defective consent is never easy, 
for it means a present pronouncement on the validity of an internal act placed five, ten or 
twenty years ago.  The judicial evaluation of external facts always offers difficulties; but 
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if the fact to be established is internal, the difficulties are immensely increased.”263  In 
addition, lack of clarity and uniformity in jurisprudence, including Rotal jurisprudence, 
further compounds the challenges this ground of nullity poses to judges and canon law.  
Reidy concludes, 
The lack of canonical definitions in canon 1095, 2̊ presents challenges to 
interpretation.  While a deliberate decision to avoid definitions in canon 1095 may 
have been made to await the further determination of Rotal jurisprudence, the lack 
of definitions and the inconsistent application of terms in jurisprudence and 
canonical commentary can give rise to a lack of uniformity in tribunal practice.264  
 
 These challenges are equally applicable to the third species of consensual incapacity, the 
incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage. 
 The third species applies to persons who are incapable of consenting to marriage, 
because due to causes of a psychic nature they are unable to assume the obligations of 
marriage.  Örsy asserts that these essential obligations “certainly include whatever 
belongs to the substantial fulfillment of the consortium and of the procreation and 
education of children.”265  Gramunt and Wauck list the essential obligations that must be 
assumed in consent as the following:  “a) the exclusive and indissoluble community of 
life and love; b) the help to be given to one’s spouse in the common purpose of raising a 
family; c) the conjugal acts directed to procreation.”266  Unfortunately, they do not 
specify how they arrived at this list or if any canons were given more consideration than 
others.  Assuming these truly are the essential obligations of marriage, this list does not 
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give concrete and practical expression to what exactly spouses must be capable of doing.  
The ability to assume the essential obligations of marriage is a “psychological strength 
[which] must be there at the moment of the promises.”267  Örsy does admit that the 
wording of this canon is “very broad” and “defies any precise definition.”268  The basis of 
this species of consensual incapacity is the principle called upon in the law of contracts, 
namely, “’ad impossibile nemo teneatur’ (no one can be bound to what is impossible).”269  
This principle applies when it is truly impossible for a person to assume the essential 
obligations of marriage.  The promises of marriage can only be binding creating a valid 
union if one is capable of honoring what is promised.270  Beal clarifies, “What is at issue 
is not the person’s capacity for critical deliberation, but his or her inability to put into 
effect one or more of the rights and obligations given and accepted in consent.”271   
In Chapter Four, making a commitment was described as creating a new 
relationship in the present in order to direct one’s freedom in the future.  For consent to 
be valid, one must be capable of taking on presently those responsibilities intrinsic to 
married life that will be required in the future.  Mendonça explains why the canon 
concerns the inability to assume versus the inability to fulfill.  “The incapacity to assume 
is intrinsic to the person, whereas the incapacity to fulfill may be either intrinsic (psychic) 
or extrinsic.  Here ‘instrinsic’ means it pertains to the content of the very act of consent as 
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its object.”272  All of the species of consensual incapacity concern a defect in the subject, 
although in different ways.  Burke maintains that c. 1095, 2̊ concerns “defects of the 
mind; of the estimative-critical faculty, whereas c. 1095, 3̊ concerns “defects of the will; 
of the elective-executive faculty.”273  Such a definition seems to introduce too great a 
division in the subject through use of scholastic terms or faculty psychology.  However, 
jurisprudence continues to employ such terms, and Lonergan continues to speak of the 
will, the nuances of which have been discussed previously. Burke articulates the 
distinction between 2̊ and 3̊ in another way, “Under 3̊ of the canon, then, a person 
understands the essential obligations sufficiently but, due to weakness of the will, is 
unable to carry them out; and therefore cannot validly assume them.”274   This weakness 
of the will must be due to causes of a psychic nature.  In his 1987 allocution to the 
Roman Rota, John Paul II states that “real incapacity is to be considered only when an 
anomaly of a serious nature is present.”275  The following year he reiterates that “only the 
most severe forms of psychopathology impair substantially the freedom of the individual 
and that psychological concepts do not always correspond with canonical.”276  Mendonça 
interprets these documents to mean that the psychic cause is not synonymous with a 
diagnosed mental illness.277  James Provost maintains that psychic cause means that it is 
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“beyond the will or control of the affected party.”278  Gramunt and Wauck emphasize that 
this psychic cause creates an inability to assume the essential obligations.  “Some 
psychopathologies can be great obstacles to the attainment of those conditions which 
contribute to a reasonably happy or successful marriage, as a human relationship, but 
happiness or success is often beyond the power of human beings and, consequently, 
cannot be the object of juridic rights and obligations.”279  Such a psychic cause must be 
present at the time of consent, but whether the incapacity must be perpetual in order to 
invalidate consent is a matter of debate.280  Beal offers a summary of the debate: 
Since the ground of incapacity to assume essential marital obligations emerged by 
analogy to the impediment of impotence, some canonists have maintained that, in 
order to invalidate marriage, the incapacity must be perpetual or incurable by 
ordinary means, like the incapacity involved in impotence.  This position has not, 
however, been embraced by the mainstream of Rotal jurisprudence, which has 
treated the incapacity to assume essential marital obligations as a ground of 
nullity distinct from impotence.  Adherents of this position argue that, although 
the essential obligations of marriage bind perpetually, an incapacitating disorder 
need not be perpetual or incurable.  It is enough that the person be incapable of 
assuming essential obligations of marriage at the time of consent.281  
 
The question of the perpetuity of incapacity is related to the ground of relative incapacity, 
which requires greater attention. 
 Burke refers to two senses in which relative incapacity may be understood.  One 
sense in which “relative” applies to incapacity is in the sense of temporary or partial 
incapacity.  This is the debate referred to above.  Burke holds that the incapacity must be 
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perpetual or permanent, that there must be no hope of a cure by ordinary means.282  He 
distinguishes c. 1095, 3̊ from c. 1095, 2̊ in this way:  “Now the ‘incapacitas assumendi’ 
must similarly be present at the moment of consent; but unlike the grave lack of 
discretion, it is of its nature projected towards the future, being a present incapacity to 
fulfill future obligations.  The proof of the ‘incapacitas assumendi,’ therefore, depends far 
more on ‘a posteriori’ deductions.”283  Although he admits that the causes of a psychic 
nature admit of degrees, he argues that “there is no such thing as a ‘relatively’ or 
‘partially’ valid consent.”284  Burke maintains that incapacity is absolute or it is not a true 
incapacity.  In a similar way, Burke argues against the second sense of relative 
incapacity, “the thesis according to which capacity for marriage must be judged not just 
in the abstract, in relation to marriage itself, but in the concrete, in relation to the union 
with the particular spouse chosen.”285  His conclusion is the following: 
I find no solid basis in law, or in Christian theology or anthropology, to justify 
this theory.  Consensual incapacity is incapacity relative to the objective 
rights/obligations of marriage in their juridic essence.  It is incapacity regarding 
marriage considered essentially, in itself; not existentially, insofar as concern the 
concrete partner chosen.  Consensual incapacity relates to marriage, not to spouse.  
The incapacity is person-to-institution, not person-to-person.286  
 
Burke holds that relative incapacity as it has been used in jurisprudence really means 
incompatibility, which translates to “the ‘extreme difficulty’ which a person, given his or 
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her character, experiences in doing or observing something.”287  As discussed previously, 
incapacity invalidates consent, not mere difficulty, however great.   
On the other hand, positions in favor of relative incapacity take seriously the 
interpersonal nature of the marital relationship, that is to say, that the decision to commit 
to marriage is not an abstract choice to be married but a commitment to a particular 
person; therefore, each marriage is unique and dependent upon the individuality of each 
spouse.  When explaining the conditions for release from an interpersonal commitment, 
Farley discusses the mutuality of relationship, in which each person’s limitations have the 
potential to create an impossible situation for the other.288  An example of incapacity 
relative to the particular spouses is the observation that two persons suffering from 
hypersexuality may have a satisfactory marriage, whereas one person with that condition 
may be incapable of assuming the obligation of fidelity with a person without that 
condition.289  Conversely, positions against relative incapacity take seriously that the 
commitment to marriage is a commitment to a person within a particular framework.  
Although each marriage is unique, marriage is a certain kind of relationship, and spouses 
must be capable of assuming the obligations involved in that kind of a relationship with 
the particular person chosen.  Relative incapacity certainly poses the danger of abuse 
should the ground be applied to the difficult, but not impossible, situation of incompatible 
personalities or character flaws.  Mendonça offers direction in resolution of the dispute: 
Marriage as a union between two persons comes into being when their consents 
meet.  Both in the aspect of “union” and in the aspect of “consent” marriage is an 
interpersonal reality.  This union cannot arise in the presence of serious 
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psychopathology either in one or in both parties together.  Incompatibility of 
personalities is a psychological fact.  Persons are not alike, nor are all persons 
compatible.  This is a normal phenomenon.  We can live together in spite of 
differences in our personalities.  Moreover, from a Christian anthropological point 
of view the strength of grace can enable persons to overcome the differences or to 
learn to live together productively despite the differences. 
 But serious incompatibility between two personalities is likely to amount 
to true incapacity for a lifelong (perpetual) marital union.  Only when real 
psychopathology, and not merely character differences, underlies such an 
incompatibility in a concrete situation can we admit true “relative incapacity” for 
assuming the essential obligations of marriage.290  
 
 Mendonça mentions the bilateral dimension of consent, thus demonstrating the 
interpersonal and mutual character of the marital relationship; however, he is clear that 
normal incompatibility between personalities does not invalidate consent.  There must be 
evidence of real psychopathology. 
 In cases utilizing c. 1095 as a ground of nullity, canon 1060 must be kept in mind.  
“Marriage possesses the favor of the law; therefore, in a case of doubt, the validity of a 
marriage must be upheld until the contrary is proven.”  The basic presumption of law is 
that people are capable of marriage.  Jerry Sherba observes, “So the wide use of canon 
1095 in declaring marriage null is contrary to the overarching presumption that people 
are capable to enter into marriage.  Canon 1095 is an exception and must be understood 
as such.”291  The overwhelming use of this canon implies “that we have made the 
exception the rule.”292  In his allocution of 2009, Benedict XVI asserts “the need for a 
new and positive appreciation of the capacity to marry belonging in principle to every 
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human person by virtue of his or her very nature as a man or a woman.”293  He warns that 
we “risk falling into a kind of anthropological pessimism which, in the light of today’s 
cultural context, would consider marriage as practically impossible.”294  The same could 
be said of marital commitment insofar as the cultural context is not conducive to an 
appreciation of marital commitment and the real possibility of remaining in a faithful, 
loving, generative union for life.  It must be emphasized that the incapacity to make a 
marital commitment is the exception, not the rule.  Therefore, the high incidence of 
marital breakdown must be found in grounds other than incapacity or no grounds for 
nullity at all.  According to Sherba, “The use of traditional grounds for nullity takes into 
consideration that people are basically capable of entering into marriage but for some 
reason did not.”295  The traditional grounds have been associated with the Augustinian 
bona of marriage and with a more static understanding of intentional psychology:  
“something intended or excluded here and now, entirely or in part, seriously or lightly, 
forever or for a time, conditionally or unconditionally, erroneously but not affecting the 
will or erroneously and affecting the will.”296  The insights of empirical and relational 
psychology can be applied to more than just c. 1095.  Sherba adds, “We need to utilize 
what we have learned using canon 1095 and see how these insights and understandings 
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can be applied to traditional grounds, opening up a rainbow of opportunities to use, and 
thus develop, jurisprudence based upon traditional grounds.”297   
 5.5.3 Ignorance 
Canon 1096—§1. For matrimonial consent to exist, the contracting parties 
must be at least not ignorant that marriage is a permanent partnership 
between a man and a woman ordered to the procreation of offspring by 
means of some sexual cooperation. 
  §2. This ignorance is not presumed after puberty. 
 
 In this canon, ignorance is lack of speculative or abstract knowledge of marriage.  
Because marriage is “a true, bilateral, consensual contract,” the parties must know what 
they are giving and accepting in consent.298  The presumption of canon law is that after 
puberty persons are capable of knowing that marriage is a heterosexual, permanent 
partnership that is ordered to the bonum prolis by means of some sexual cooperation.  
According to this canon, the knowledge required for a valid marriage is minimal.  The 
age of puberty is not specified, although c. 1083 stipulates that a man cannot enter a valid 
marriage before completion of his sixteenth year and a woman cannot before she has 
completed her fourteenth year.  Consent is invalid if either person is substantially 
ignorant regarding the personalist element or the procreational element.  Regarding the 
procreational element, it is presumed that after puberty persons know that children are the 
result of sexual intercourse.  Although the procreational element is rather vague, it is the 
personalist element related to this canon that deserves greater attention.  The presumption 
in canon law is that the parties know that marriage is a permanent consortium.  Örsy 
questions, “Permanency certainly means stability; but does it include lifelong 
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commitment, that is, indissolubility?”299  He reasons that just as error (wrong knowledge) 
concerning the indissolubility does not invalidate unless it determines the will (c. 1099), 
so also ignorance (lack of knowledge) regarding indissolubility does not invalidate.  One 
does not need to know the “doctrine of indissolubility” in order to validly consent to 
marriage.300  The technical distinction need not apply here.301  According to Sherba, “This 
canon is more geared toward ordinary people’s understanding of marriage and we, as 
canonists, need to see it as that rather than place layers of canonical interpretations upon 
it, which we are quite prone to do.”302  Nevertheless, he warns that the ease, availability, 
and culture of divorce could lead to ignorance that marriage is a permanent commitment 
and the consortium requires self-sacrifice.303  In reference to the presumption of law in c. 
1096 Sherba concludes,  
We cannot, as canonists, presume that couples marrying today understand, let 
alone know, what consortium is, given the high incidence of and our society’s 
acceptance—and at least placid encouragement—of divorce; the media’s 
fascination with lust and love outside the marital union; the high number of 
unchurched people and under-educated Catholics sitting in our pews.  The 
utilization of ignorance as a ground for nullity is there; we need to open our 
canonical eyes, ask the right questions, and come to the realization that persons 
were capable of entering marriage, but their consent was defective, not the 
person.304  
 
The relation of culture to presumption in the law can only be discussed after addressing 
error, simulation, and conditional consent. 
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 5.5.4 Error about the Person 
 
 Canon 1097—§1. Error concerning the person renders a marriage invalid. 
§2. Error concerning a quality of the person does not render a 
marriage invalid even if it is the cause for the contract, unless this quality is 
directly and principally intended. 
 
   Like ignorance, error concerns knowledge; however, ignorance is lack of due 
knowledge, meaning this knowledge is presumed to exist in a person after puberty, 
whereas error is “false judgment of the mind.”305  Örsy distinguishes the two in the 
process of coming to know something.  “In the case of error there is a judgment, in the 
case of ignorance there is not.  In the case of an error the process of knowing started and 
went astray, in the case of ignorance it has not even started.”306  Error can occur at the 
empirical level through inattention to all the facts or at the intellectual level through 
misunderstanding or at the rational level culminating in a false judgment. Since the levels 
are sublated, a false judgment will occur if something has gone wrong at any of the 
levels.  Canon 1097, §1 concerns simply the physical identity of the person.  A person 
cannot marry another person who is not the one intended.  In cultures where arranged 
marriages or marriage by proxy are normative, this canon is relevant.  Conversely, in the 
United States where couples date and even cohabit for an extended period of time, the 
first paragraph of this canon scarcely applies. 
 Error that causes the contract, or motivating error, does not invalidate unless it is 
directly and principally intended.   “A quality is an enduring characteristic of person that 
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significantly defines who that person is.”307  Some examples of qualities that have entered 
into Rotal jurisprudence include:  marital status, social status, political affiliation, age, 
physical health, mental health, virginity, procreative capacity, and moral qualities.308  For 
invalidating error of a quality of a person to occur, “the quality, erroneously believed to 
be present, must be an intrinsic part of the object of consent.”309  Motivating error alone 
does not invalidate, because it is “an error which leads a person to act, but does not 
necessarily influence the substance of the act itself.”310  A quality is directly intended 
“when it constitutes the immediate object of the will-act.”311  It is principally intended 
“when the will seeks it ‘prevalently’ or ‘before the person,’ and not secondarily or 
incidentally.”312  An invalidating error is one in which the quality intended is so 
important to the one in error that if the quality is not present, then the marriage (and 
consequently, the person) is not wanted.313  To directly and principally intend a quality 
means the existence of the quality is a sine qua non condition to the marriage.314  The 
distinction between a quality that causes the contract (but does not enter the will) and one 
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that was directly and principally intended is a fine, technical, and theoretical distinction 
which can lead to practical difficulties in the courts: 
The dividing line between the two situations must be drawn in the field of the 
operations of the human psyche, obscure and complex beyond telling.  Moreover, 
those who intended to marry have not made their decisions according to our fine 
distinctions.  The judges will have to decide if one set of facts (as narrated to them 
often many years after the event) falls rather into the one than the other category.  
It is doubtful that the non-technical report of the parties and their witnesses in 
matters so subtle and delicate can ever provide them with enough evidence to 
make a well grounded choice instead of a vague conjecture. 
It is not prudent to make the validity of marriages to depend on such 
refined theoretical distinctions that even the experts find them hard to explain.315  
 
This criticism could pertain to many of the canons on consent.  The juridical distinctions 
are subtle and technical, so much so that it may prove practically impossible to apply 
them to real marriages as recounted through the parties’ understanding of the marital 
relationship.  That being said, should it be proven that a person valued a quality of a 
person over the person, then clearly an interpersonal commitment to love another for life 
has not been made, and the consent is invalid. 
 5.5.5 Error of Law or Determining Error  
Canon 1099—Error concerning the unity or indissolubility or sacramental 
dignity of marriage does not vitiate matrimonial consent provided that it 
does not determine the will. 
 
 In both c. 1097 and c. 1099, the scholastic dichotomy between the mind and the 
will is evident.  Although the categories of error simplex (error that remains in the 
intellect) and error pervicax (error that is so deeply ingrained that it becomes a second 
nature) of the earlier Code are not used here, the mind/will separation is apparent.  This 
theoretical distinction between error that does not determine the will and error that does 
determine the will is hard to imagine in practice: 
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Of course, one can admit in theory that if there is knowledge that is so purely 
cerebral that it does not affect the decisions and action of a person, then, that 
knowledge should be discounted in evaluating a decision.  But the question is 
precisely if such an internal split between knowledge and decision can ever occur 
in a normal person.  The answer of the Code is:  yes it can.  The answer of depth 
psychology is:  no, it is not likely; if it does, a serious personality disorder may be 
hiding below the surface.316  
 
Örsy brings to light another discrepancy with this canon.  “It implies that a human person 
can commit himself or herself to a lifelong obligation without knowing about it.”317  If a 
person erroneously believes that marriage is dissoluble in a way that does not determine 
the will, how, in fact, does that same person make a commitment to an indissoluble 
marriage?  Örsy adds, “The ordinary assumption should be rather that every person wants 
marriage as it is known to him:  indissoluble or otherwise.”318  Error that determines the 
will occurs when the person intends the distorted object of consent and is unaware of the 
erroneous judgment.  One explanation for the plausibility of error that does not invalidate 
could be if a person thinks that marriage is dissoluble and divorce is an option, yet upon 
learning of the church’s teaching on indissolubility, the one in error persists in consenting 
to marriage; in conjunction with c. 1098, if awareness of one’s erroneous judgment does 
not gravely disturb the consortium of conjugal life, then it was not determining error, and 
the marriage is valid.  However, in the Church in the United States today where marriage 
preparation is required, it is hard to imagine how one could be unaware of the church’s 
teaching on marriage.  Robitaille suggests a scenario where error determining the will is 
possible in this context: 
                                                 
316. Örsy, Marriage in Canon Law:  Texts and Comments, Reflections and Questions, 141. 
 
317. Ibid. 
 
318. Ibid., 142. 
364 
 
Thus, as an example, a person might truly believe that marriage is dissoluble; he 
or she might go to marriage preparation classes and learn the Church’s teaching 
on indissolubility, but that teaching does not affect him or her because that person 
truly believes that the Church’s teaching has nothing to do with him or her.  In 
this sense, the person is in error not of the Church’s understanding of 
indissolubility in itself, but of the fact that the Church expects this understanding 
to apply to him or her and the marriage about to be entered.319  
 
Marital consent is not a generic intention (a general disposition, attitude, or preference) or 
a habitual intention (an enduring, intellectual tendency), because it is an intention 
directed toward marriage, which is characterized by unity, indissolubility, and possibly 
sacramental dignity with a particular person.  A person’s generic or habitual intention 
may “remain in the intellect” if he or she tries to escape living morally by avoiding self-
consciousness.  Effective freedom can be limited by one’s culture and even through one’s 
previous decisions to live self-conscious-less.   
To invalidate consent according to the ground of determining error, the person 
chooses a distorted object of consent, yet does so unknowingly.  This is one of the 
reasons identifying the object of consent is significant and, at the same time, challenging.  
Provost denotes three approaches to identifying the object of marital consent.320  First, 
one may look to the canons on marital consent, specifically c. 1055, §1, c. 1056, and c. 
1057, §2.  This was the main approach used in this study.  The second approach is by 
looking to the canon on simulation, that is, c. 1101, §2.  This canon was referred to 
briefly, and will be addressed in depth shortly.  The third approach to identifying the 
object of consent is to look at the canon on ignorance, c. 1096, which offers a very 
minimal sketch of what marriage is.  Provost asks, “Given that there are three approaches 
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in the law stating what the object of matrimonial consent is, is there any one of the three 
which is imposed over the other two, and hence establishes the requisite element in order 
for error about the object of consent to invalidate marriage?”321  Assuming the object of 
consent can be identified through a combination of all three approaches, we need to look 
more closely at the canon on simulation. 
5.5.6 Simulation of Consent 
Canon 1101--§1. The internal consent of the mind is presumed to conform to 
the words and signs used in celebrating the marriage. 
§2. If, however, either or both of the parties by a positive act of the 
will exclude marriage itself, some essential element of marriage, or some 
essential property of marriage, the party contracts invalidly. 
 
 Canon 1101 states another legal presumption, which according to c. 1584 is thus 
defined:  “A presumption is a probable conjecture about an uncertain matter; a 
presumption of law is one which the law itself establishes; a human presumption is one 
which a judge formulates.”  This presumption so central to the validity of marriage “is 
really a confession on the part of the law of its incapacity to judge the presence or 
absence of an internal act such as consent.”322  A person’s internal consent is presumed to 
correspond to the external, public expression of consent unless contrary evidence proves 
otherwise (see c. 1585).  Because there is no definitive and absolute way to know that the 
external words and signs expressing consent are true to the act of internal consent, it is 
possible that one may simulate consent.  Simulation occurs by a positive act of the will, 
meaning that “something is posited (an act takes place).”323  The corollary of this is that 
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“mere inadvertence or non-inclusion of the essential elements or properties of marriage 
does not constitute simulation.”324  The key to understanding this distinction is “positive 
act of the will” versus “inadvertence.”  Örsy clarifies the distinction:  “to exclude 
positively implies an act of rejection; it implies that a person who has become aware of a 
value decides to reject it.”325  Again the technical distinctions can be nearly impossible to 
apply to real cases.  “The question can also be raised, and pertinently so, as to what is the 
difference between a person not intending indissolubility and another positively 
excluding it.  The two situations can be so similar that to attribute to them different legal 
effect may not be sound jurisprudence.”326  On top of the distinction between exclusion 
and non-inclusion, a myriad of additional technical distinctions are piled: 
On the other hand, an act of the will need not be actual, absolute, or explicit to 
invalidate marriage; it is sufficient that the act be virtual, hypothetical, or implicit.  
An act of the will is actual if it is, in fact, elicited at the time of the wedding; it is 
virtual if it is formulated prior to the external exchange of consent, even a long 
time prior to it, and never retracted.  An act of the will is absolute if it excludes 
marriage itself or one of its essential elements or properties without qualification; 
it is hypothetical when it excludes marriage or one of its essential elements or 
properties only if certain conditions are met.327  
  
Because the term “implicit simulation” is central to this study, it requires greater analysis 
to be conducted shortly.   
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Simulation can be total (exclusion of marriage itself) or partial (exclusion of an 
essential property or essential element).  Total simulation occurs when one excludes 
marriage itself from consent.  A person can simulate totally in the following ways: 
(1) By not intending to contract marriage at all, i.e., by reducing the ceremony to 
an empty show; 
(2) By undergoing the ceremony solely to obtain an end absolutely extrinsic to 
marriage itself; 
(3) By excluding from the object of his/her consent the very core of marriage, i.e., 
the exchange of the perpetual and exclusive right over the body;328 
(4) By excluding sacramentality from the marriage;329 
(5) By substituting for the Christian idea of marriage some other notion which is 
genuinely antithetical to marriage.330  
 
Partial simulation occurs when a person excludes from consent an essential property or 
an essential element.  The essential properties of unity and indissolubility (c. 1056) have 
already been discussed, and the question of what constitutes the essential elements of 
marriage has been explored as well.  Örsy reasons, “The ‘elements’ in all probability 
stand for the ‘ends.’”331  Provost cites different lists of essential elements from various 
canonists before concluding with “a more practical listing of essential elements listed in 
the canons as belonging to the very nature of marriage, such as the following:  the good 
of the spouses (c. 1055, §1), the procreation and education of children (c. 1055, §1), the 
right to conjugal acts which are per se suitable for the generation of children (c. 1061, 
§1), the perpetuity and exclusivity of the marital bond (c. 1134), and for baptized person, 
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the sacramental dignity of their union (cc. 1055,1134).”332  Although exclusion of an 
essential element is listed as a ground for nullity, jurisprudence has focused on the three 
Augustinian bona (contra bonum prolis, contra bonum fidei, and contra bonum 
sacramenti).333  Due to the focus on the three bona, exclusion of the bonum coniugum has 
been met with resistance; the first sentence judged on this ground did not occur until the 
year 2000, seventeen years after the promulgation of the revised Code.334  In order to 
understand these grounds of partial simulation, particularly exclusion of the bonum 
coniugum, it is necessary to examine implicit simulation. 
 Implicit simulation (implied exclusion) involves a positive act of the will.  
Provost explains how an implicit act of the will can be, at the same time, a positive act of 
the will: 
A positive act of the will can be explicit or implicit.  An explicit act is a direct act; 
e.g., someone externally consents to marry, but internally refuses marriage.  The 
person lies at the altar.  An implicit act is folded into something else (“implicit’—
in plico, in the fold).  It is implicit because it is contained in another act; e.g., one 
who simulates by willing something incompatible with marriage.335  
 
Robitaille articulates the distinction in another way: 
There has to be the knowledge of what the Church believes marriage to be, and a 
positive rejection of that belief.  Even though there must be a positive rejection of 
the Church’s understanding of marriage, that rejection can be an implicit one.  In 
other words, the rejection does not have to be so explicit that if the petitioner does 
not say “I do not believe in the Church’s understanding of marriage,” then the act 
of the will has not been proven.  No, the act of the will can be implicit:  it can be 
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understood by the court through the person’s actions, not only through his or her 
words.336  
 
Marital consent is an act of rational self-consciousness in which one chooses to give 
oneself and accept the other in order to form a communion of life and love.  The wedding 
liturgy is an external expression of the giving and receiving that is promised for life.  
However, it is possible that in either or both of the spouses resides an implicit will 
contrary to the explicit will expressed.  Again, the legal presumption is that the spouses 
are willing together a lifetime commitment to one another that is faithful, fruitful, and 
forever.  In cases of implicit simulation, the actual will of the spouse or spouses does not 
conform to the expressed intention, and this contrary will is revealed through his or her 
actions.   
Robert Sanson affirms the canonical meaning of consent.  The very minimal 
description of what is promised in marriage makes possible the fullness of conjugal love 
theologically understood: 
There is no doubt, however, that the minimal commitment and consent must be 
mutual, marital, and loving.  The reciprocal giving of self and receiving of the 
other cannot include any reservations that would exclude any essential elements 
of marriage.  The gift of self must be minimally given and effective enough to 
form a basis for a lifelong, stable commitment.  It may not be enough for a person 
to intend marriage as personally conceived, or to be “in love.”  The actual 
intention reveals itself in behavior that must include all the essentials of marriage.  
For marriage to have a chance of success, both parties must wholeheartedly give 
and accept that minimal type of consent adequate to support a marriage.  Each 
party must be willing to accept the other realistically, as is, without demand or 
expectation of remaking the other person according to one’s own wishes.337  
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Sanson notes that the total gift of self mutually exchanged in consent does not imply an 
unattainable ideal.  He continues, “Jurisprudence must distinguish in the concrete case 
whether a person has made even the minimal necessary gift of self.  Yet unless the initial 
commitment is wholehearted, the proper love and motivation will not be there to sustain 
them through difficult times.”338  This point resonates with Lavin’s assertion garnered 
from Thomistic thought that matrimonium in fieri and matrimonium in facto esse are not 
strictly temporal categories.339  The possibility for realizing a marriage characterized by 
unity and indissolubility (and sacramentality) and ordered to the bonum prolis and bonum 
coniugum must be present at the time of consent.  That possibility is found in the initial 
commitment.  However, he clarifies that there is a difference between defective consent 
due to implied exclusion and failure to remain faithful to a valid commitment.  “There is 
also the problematic popular mentality growing in the United States that regards 
individualism and self-fulfillment as a higher value than lifetime commitment and 
obligation.  Judges must carefully discern whether a specific case is one of simulation, or 
merely a subsequent refusal to maintain the commitment once validly made.”340  Simply 
because a marriage has failed does not necessarily mean that consent was defective.  
Implicit exclusion requires proof of a positive act of the will.  Arriving at the judgment 
that an implicit act of exclusion has been proven with moral certainty is a demanding and 
somewhat tricky juridical analysis of the evidence. 
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 An interesting phenomenon in canon law occurred during the time between the 
Second Vatican Council and the promulgation of the revised Code in 1983.341  Beginning 
in 1971 with a decision from John Humphreys, British jurisprudence began to take an 
interest in the ground of implicit simulation.  Ralph Brown employed and advanced this 
ground which was formulated using various names such as:  inadequate consent, lack of 
commitment, non-inclusion, and defective consent amounting to simulation.342  In a 1976 
article titled, “Lack of Commitment in Consent,” Humphreys argues that the fact that 
exclusion required proof of a positive intention against an essential property was due to 
the presumption that “when people marry they wish to do what human beings usually do, 
and therefore that they wish to enter a union which is indissoluble, implies fidelity and is 
open to children.”343  This presumption dates from 1767 when Benedict XIV in De 
synodo dioecesana expressed the presumption that when people marry, they have the 
intention to marry as Christ wills, and this intention overcomes any personal error they 
may have regarding marriage.344  This presumption is the source of the distinction 
between simple error which does not invalidate and determining error which does.  
Humphreys, along with many jurists including Brown, questions the reliability of this 
presumption in the rising culture of divorce.  In addition, Brown seriously questions the 
presumption that people inwardly intend and mean what they outwardly express and 
say.345  Using examples, Brown explains implicit simulation as a kind of “non-inclusion” 
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rather than an explicit exclusion of one or more of the Augustinian bona.346   “That is to 
say the person directly and explicitly intends this sort of marriage; and no other.  But 
within this thing which is directly and explicitly willed (this sort of union) there is an 
accompanying non-existence of one of the essential elements of marriage.”347  Sanson 
explains that this non-inclusion is not mere inadvertence in that it is still a positive act of 
the will, although an implicit one: 
Authors such as Brown situated the grounds under the classic heading of 
simulation.  Even his concept of “non-inclusion” is not an absence of a positive 
will, but a very positive plan to enter a marital arrangement that effectively 
excludes the consortium or one of its essential elements or properties.  The fact 
that it may be virtual and implicit does not make it any less effective in vitiating 
consent.348  
 
Brown focused on the object of consent as being defective rather than a lack of 
commitment or inadequate consent in the subject due to the difficulty in assessing the 
quality or degree of consent.  Brown states, “The term I first had problems with was lack 
of commitment.  I felt the term seemed to imply the necessity of a device to measure the 
consent in terms of the amount of its ‘thrust.’”349  He questions, “What could possibly be 
the yardstick for measuring such thrust?”350  In a 2001 article, Brown explains the shift in 
formulation: 
Practically speaking, it was impossible to determine from the individual 
circumstances of the case whether the necessary consent had been given.  Was the 
ordinary man’s concept of marriage present or not?  How was the “volume” of 
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consent measured?  One term employed at this time was “white hot commitment”; 
but was his commitment more white or more hot than her commitment?  It 
became clear that this (i.e., the nature of the proof required) was not going to be 
an easy nor profitable area to cultivate.  Hence the direction of the investigation 
turned back once more to examine more closely the concept of what was included 
or not included in a person’s consent.351  
 
Brown notes that at the time the ground of implicit simulation (inadequate 
consent, lack of commitment, non-inclusion) was being developed, a “new toy” was 
occupying the attention of English-speaking canonists.  This “new toy” was the 
development of the grounds of lack of due discretion and the inability to assume the 
essential obligations of marriage, which were eventually “canonized” in c. 1095, 2̊ and c. 
1095, 3̊ of the 1983 Code.352  Brown believes the misleading formulation of implicit 
simulation as either inadequate consent or lack of commitment was due to 
misunderstanding the burgeoning concept of lack of due discretion and misconstruing the 
ground of total simulation.353  “I had understood (and I don’t think I was in a minority of 
one) that total simulation always took with it an element (if not considerably more than 
that) of malice in a person simulating.”354  Therefore, in a case where malicious intent 
was not found, total simulation was not considered.  Both the development of the ground 
of implicit simulation and the development of the grounds of lack of due discretion and 
the incapacity to assume occurred during the rising culture of divorce, with the divorce 
rate peaking around 1980.  Juridically, the church seemed to be trying to make sense of 
the rapid breakdown of the institution of marriage and find a practical way to deal with 
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the reality of so many divorced and remarried Catholics.  Once the grounds of consensual 
incapacity were canonized, attention to simulation waned, at least in the United States 
which accounts for the majority of the world’s declarations of nullity.  The overuse of c. 
1095, 2̊ and c. 1095, 3̊ in the English-speaking countries was the subject of the 
allocutions to the Roman Rota of John Paul II in 1987 and 1988 as already described.  
Brown relates that there were comments from the Apostolic Signatura contained in 
unpublished documents to tribunals regarding too many cases judged under c. 1095.355  
Peter Kitchen suggests, “One possible explanation why the possible influence of lack of 
commitment on validity has not been of greater concern to canon lawyers could be that 
cases brought to our tribunals where there are indications that the commitment of the 
parties is suspect, are frequently dealt with under the title of ‘lack of due discretion’ or 
‘incapacity.’”356  Cultural attitudes can exert an influence on both grounds of simulation 
and incapacity, yet Kitchen maintains there is a difference between one who cannot elicit 
valid consent and one who did not elicit valid consent but “who could have, and should 
have.”357   It is my argument that greater attention to implied exclusion, particularly 
exclusion of the bonum coniugum, could encourage greater understanding of what is 
happening to marriages in the United States, even sacramental marriages. 
 According to Kitchen, some of the ambiguity surrounding implicit simulation or 
lack of commitment in consent can be clarified by focusing on intention.  “The ‘right 
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intention,’ for the canon lawyer, is that which the law requires to produce the juridical 
effect.”358  The general norm regarding the validity of juridic acts is found in c. 124:  
Canon 124—§1. For the validity of a juridic act it is required that the act is 
placed by a qualified person and includes those things which essentially 
constitute the act itself as well as the formalities and requirements imposed 
by law for the validity of the act. 
§2. A juridic act placed correctly with respect to its external elements 
is presumed valid.  
 
Canon 124 is the general norm stating the presumption that the “manifested will” is in 
congruence with the “intended will.”359  This presumption can be overturned by sufficient 
proof.  If the intended will is contrary to the manifested will, then the juridic act is 
invalid.  During a wedding, the spouses intend something; the legal presumption is that 
they intend to form a lifelong, faithful, and fruitful (sacramental) union with the other.  
The ground of inadequate consent is misleading, because it does not make sense to say 
that they lack intention or that the intended will is absent.  In the act of getting married, 
the couple intended something; however, their internal, intended will may be contrary to 
their external, expressed will.  Implicitly, they may intend an erroneous view of marriage 
lacking in some essential element or property.  In addition, the ground of inadequate 
consent or lack of commitment was used for couples who seemed to drift into marriage 
without the degree of commitment that is due a relationship of this importance.360  As 
Brown suggests, such a case could be adjudicated on the ground of lack of due 
discretion.361  Of course, each case is heard and judged individually, and so it is 
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impossible to make a general conclusion.  That being said, the ground of lack of due 
discretion should not be used as “a kind of umbrella under which one can put 
everything.”362  Marriages declared invalid due to a lack of due discretion should involve 
a true incapacity.  In advocating for the ground of lack of commitment in 1976, 
Humphreys agrees that there is great difficulty in measuring one’s degree of 
commitment, yet such difficulties should not discourage further investigation.  He 
mentions cases in which those who knew the couple were convinced the marriage would 
not last.  He concludes, 
We are not seeking to establish that everyone who marries must do so in a white-
hot heat of passion—but we all know that there is a minimum which must be 
there if it is to be a full commitment of the person in the most intimate 
relationship possible.  We may not be able to describe it positively or give any 
yardstick to measure it, but we are aware when it is absent and this, I submit, is 
sufficient.363  
 
Although written nearly forty years ago, such cases where one or both spouses lack the 
commitment necessary are prevalent today.  Greater attention to the role of intention will 
aid in understanding these cases from both a juridical and theological perspective. 
 5.5.7 Intention and Consent 
 Peter Kitchen argues that a shift in focus to “the essential elements of matrimonial 
intention places the emphasis on the personal and qualitative determining factors.  
Intention connects the motivating force for the consent and elective choice with the 
consequence.”364  The subjective and objective aspects of consent are related through 
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intention.365  The presumption that people always intend what they say is not always the 
case: 
However, the choice, consent, and the will could all be quite adequate for what is 
intended but that which is intended does not correspond to the meaning of 
marriage.  The meaning of the words of the marriage ceremony may not coincide 
with the intended meaning.  Where this disparity originates in the intention of one 
of the parties, it seems appropriate to speak in terms of simulation.366  
 
The focus on intention seems particularly appropriate considering the tenet previously 
discussed that it is intention that is constitutive of the sacrament of marriage.  From the 
time of Aquinas it has been the teaching of the church that the validity of sacramental 
action depends upon right intention.367  For sacramental action to be efficacious, the 
intention of the participants must be in accord with the intention of the church.  In its 
Propositions on the Doctrine of Christian Marriage, the ITC states, “The intention of 
carrying out what Christ and the Church desire is the minimum condition required before 
consent is considered to be a ‘real human act’ on the sacramental plane.”368  In his study 
on exclusion of the sacramentality of marriage, Mendonça concludes,  
According to the prevailing doctrinal and jurisprudential positions on the issue, a 
person who, for lack or absence of faith, is not properly disposed to receive the 
sacrament may either explicitly or implicitly exclude the sacramental aspect and 
thereby cause the nullity of marriage.  It is the positive contrary intention, and not 
the lack or absence of faith per se, which would underlie the nullity.369  
 
From this teaching, Kitchen brings to light that there is an obligation to right intention: 
                                                 
365. Kitchen, "Matrimonial Intention and Simulation," 353n21. 
 
366. Ibid., 353. 
 
367. Wrenn, "Sacramentality and the Invalidity of Marriage," 225. 
 
368.  International Theological Commission, Propositions on the Doctrine of Christian Marriage. 
1977, prop. 2.3, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith 
/cti_documents/rc_cti_1977_sacramento-matrimonio_en.html (accessed Feb 23, 2013). 
 
369. Mendonça, "Exclusion of the Sacramentality of Marriage:  Recent Trends in Rotal 
Jurisprudence," 47. 
 
378 
 
The situation to be considered is that of a person who fails to meet the 
requirements of “right intention” but not because of an incapacity to form the 
proportionate discretionary judgment required for marriage.  The person could 
have and should have the “right intention” but fails in their duty with respect to 
some essential element or elements of intention.  In such circumstances it seems 
appropriate to investigate and suggest responsibility for an exclusion when one 
has occurred.370  
 
From this, Kitchen finds a parallel in the tradition of English common law regarding 
responsibility by negligence using the heuristic device of mens rea/actus reus.371  Here 
mens rea does not refer to a “moral assessment but a legal one of imputability.”372  
Recalling the difference between inadvertence and negligence in English common law, 
Kitchen argues that “there could be a mens rea of culpable neglect if it can be established 
that the bride and groom have a duty with respect to the intention of certain elements.”373  
Using this heuristic device, one need not attribute malice to the simulator as Brown 
admitted he had mistakenly done in the past.374  Mens rea refers to the judgment of the 
court that the evidence proves affirmatively that the person is responsible for the 
exclusion, actus reus.375   It has been explained that consent makes marriage, and one 
must be capable of eliciting valid consent; this has been developed in jurisprudence.  
What needs further development is the prevalence of many cases where persons are 
capable of right intention and yet fail in the “duty of genuine intention to give oneself and 
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receive the other.”376  The undue focus on incapacity has been to the detriment of 
intention.  Kitchen continues, “Capacity to bring to term and fulfill the matrimonial 
consent was developed in psychological terms.  Capacity alone does not effect the 
achievement.  Also required is an intention towards such an achievement.  The 
irrevocable and personal and faithful covenant to be achieved requires beyond capacity, 
an intention to perpetuity and fidelity.”377  Intention is pivotal in understanding what an 
action means for the subject.  Just as matimonium in fieri was described as containing all 
that matrimonium in facto esse can be, so the content of the intention determines the 
living out of the intention throughout the marital relationship.378  Intention drives 
meaning and directs not only the present act of consent (whether valid or invalid) but also 
the future of the marital consensus (whether valid or invalid). 
 The lines of demarcation, which differentiate the various grounds of nullity one 
from another, are quite fine.  Calling it “an epistemological exercise,” Kitchen asserts the 
extreme difficulty of distinguishing among these grounds, both in theory and in 
practice.379  Among jurists, the criteria for differentiating among the grounds are varied 
as well.  After analyzing a few significant Rotal decisions, Brown concludes, “From this 
little selection of cases with reasonably comparable facts and circumstances, it shows that 
it depends very largely on the judge as to how the circumstances are to be viewed and 
how the grounds seem to vary from total simulation, both explicit and implicit (whether 
by reason of error pervicax or not) to the lack of due discretion.  The same can be said of 
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conforming sentences.”380  An example of how the same juridic facts can lead to 
affirmative judgments yet on different grounds is Robitaille’s study of the “Bologna 
hippy case.”381  In this case two seemingly incompatible grounds of nullity, total 
simulation and grave lack of due discretion, were judged to be substantially conforming 
because the tribunals relied on the same juridic facts.382  Traditionally, these grounds are 
considered mutually exclusive, because incapacity means one is unable to give consent, 
whereas simulation means one is able to give consent but for a reason (causa simulandi) 
did not give consent validly.  In Sean Sheridan’s study of equivalently or substantially 
conforming sentences regarding incapacity and simulation, the complexity of the 
evaluation of specific cases under various grounds of nullity is revealed.383  Sheridan 
concludes that the proper use of equivalent or substantial conformity of sentences “can be 
a welcome and time saving resolution of cases,” thus allowing persons full participation 
in the sacramental life of the church.384  One may well wonder if such a complex system 
open to a great deal of interpretation is the most suitable structure for promoting justice 
and sacramental participation.  Perhaps concentrating on intention can help differentiate 
the various grounds of nullity relating to defects of consent. 
 Anthony Kerin differentiates among the various grounds through a look at the 
intentions that would cause defective consent.  Invalidating consent due to determining 
                                                 
380. Brown, "From Total Simulation to Error Determining the Will," 166. 
 
381. Robitaille, "Simulation, Error Determining the Will, or Lack of Due Discretion?  A Case 
Study." 
 
382. Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts, Dignitas Connubii, art. 291 §2. 
 
383. Diagrams are utilized for each case to designate the decision of each tribunal up to the fourth 
instance court for some cases. 
 
384. Sean O. Sheridan, "Incapacity and Simulation:  Mutually Exclusive Grounds or Key Juridic 
Facts Underlying Conforming Sentences?" The Jurist 70 (2010): 367. 
 
381 
 
error (c. 1099) occurs when a person conveys through words and/or actions, “’I want 
marriage as I understand it.’  I don’t know that I am wrong.  I am not even aware that I 
am in error.  I want what I consider to be marriage.”385  This person intends one’s own 
particular marriage as he or she understands it unaware and inadvertently in error.386  
Invalidating consent due to partial simulation (c. 1101, §2) occurs when a person 
conveys through words and/or actions, “’I want marriage but without the children, or 
without the permanence or fidelity.’”387  In partial simulation, one has intentionally 
chosen marriage devoid of one or more of the Augustinian bona, essential properties, or 
essential elements.388  Included in that which could be excluded is sacramental dignity.  
Traditional jurisprudence considers exclusion of sacramental dignity to be total 
simulation, because the contract and the sacrament are inseparable for the baptized.389  
Some jurists consider sacramentality an essential property that inheres to the essence of 
marriage for the baptized, thus making possible the exclusion of the property of 
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sacramentality.390  Still others consider sacramental dignity an essential element added on 
to the natural institution of marriage as symbol of grace.391  In either case, it is “the 
positive contrary intention, and not the lack or absence of faith per se, which would 
underlie the nullity.”392   Partial simulation can occur when the bonum coniugum is 
excluded as well, because the ordination of marriage to the bonum coniugum is an 
essential element.  Invalidating consent due to total simulation (c. 1101, §2) occurs 
when a person conveys through words and/or actions, “’I want a wedding but I don’t 
want a marriage.’  They want a wedding for some other effect such as residency, a work 
permit, inheritance or legitimacy of offspring, but they do not want a lifelong union of 
man and wife.”393  Total simulators “intend a wedding while pretending a marriage.”394  
Finally, invalidating consent due to condition (c. 1102) occurs when a person conveys 
through words and/or actions, “’I want a marriage but I want it on my terms.’  These are 
the ground rules for this union.  If they are not fulfilled, then the marriage is off.”395  
Canon 1102—§1. A marriage subject to a condition about the future cannot 
be contracted validly. 
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§2. A marriage entered into subject to a condition about the past or 
the present is valid or not insofar as that which is subject to the condition 
exists or not. 
§3. The condition mentioned in §2, however, cannot be placed licitly 
without the written permission of the local ordinary. 
 
Örsy explains, “When the act of consent is conditioned, the covenanting party intends, 
with the very same act, to commit himself and to suspend the effect of the 
commitment.”396  Marital consent subject to a condition seems like an oxymoron.  “There 
is something absolute in the marital promises; to give them away conditionally verges on 
the absurd.”397  
 5.5.8 Exclusion of the bonum coniugum:  A Consideration 
 Of these grounds the exclusion of the bonum coniugum is a source of nullity 
worth further exploration in relation to commitment and the reality of so many failed 
marriages today.  Robitaille offers such an exploration suggesting “that the exclusion of 
the bonum coniugum occurs more than we recognize today.”398  As mentioned 
previously, until the year 2000 not a single case had been judged by the Tribunal of the 
Roman Rota on exclusion of the bonum coniugum.399  Although the rule of case 
precedent is not recognized in canonical jurisprudence, these cases make clear that the 
ordination of marriage to the bonum coniugum is an essential element of marriage, and 
therefore, can be the object of partial simulation, either explicitly or implicitly.  We have 
already discussed how the consortium totius vitae fosters maturation and sanctification 
when spouses are committed to one another in a life together characterized by unity and 
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permanence (and sacramentality).  Marriage itself does not spontaneously mature and 
sanctify the spouses, but rather, the spouses’ commitment to the good of the other as well 
as oneself within the marital relationship moves the consortium toward the bonum 
coniugum and the bonum prolis.  Conjugal love (as any love) leads to its own perfection 
while at the same time expanding generously for the good of children that may come and 
the good of the wider community.  It is this commitment, a deliberate, conscious human 
act of responsibility, expressly made and continually lived that effects marriage’s salvific 
purpose.  The presumption of law is that spouses intend their marriages to lead to the 
bonum coniugum, that their consent is truly an act of love.  Cases judged on the ground of 
exclusion of the bonum coniugum must demonstrate proof that in a particular case such a 
presumption can be overturned.  Using the two Rotal cases from 2000 and another 
decided in 2004, Robitaille explores how this is a real possibility in contemporary 
American culture. 
 Due to the nature of the ground of exclusion of the bonum coniugum, it would be 
rare indeed for the exclusion to be explicit; the Jemolo case would be an example of the 
explicit exclusion of the bonum coniugum and such a case is quite outrageous.  However, 
cases on the ground of implicit exclusion of the bonum coniugum could become quite 
prevalent due in part to the ethos of contemporary American culture, particularly the rise 
of individualism as described in the previous chapter.  The intended exclusion is implicit 
in the simulator’s actions, attitudes, and lifestyle.  Robitaille argues, “Nevertheless, I 
think there is an exclusion of ordination to the good of the spouses that we see in our 
North American society fairly frequently, the exclusion that is seen when a person puts 
him or herself and his or her own needs first before and above any needs of the couple, 
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and certainly before any needs of the spouse.”400  Here we can recall Lonergan’s 
explication of the three biases causing cultural decline in which individuals are short-
sighted and self-centered refusing to look at the larger issues and the long-term view 
necessary for marital commitment.  In a marriage, each spouse accepts responsibility for 
his or her unilateral contribution to the consensus.  Consent is bilateral, a mutual giving 
and receiving of persons, and should one person fall short (through choice, not 
incapacity) by intentionally choosing a marriage bereft of the giving necessary for the 
consortium, the marriage could be invalid: 
What I am highlighting as a possibility, rather, is the case where there is not a 
psychic anomaly so grave that it affects the person’s ability to consent.  Rather, a 
person who is so self-centered—not to the point of illness that is going to remove 
the possibility of consenting validly—that the choice he or she makes is to choose 
a unilateral ‘partnership’ marriage for the sake of his or her own betterment or his 
or her own purposes, with no regard for the betterment or purposes of the other, or 
for themselves as a couple.401  
 
 Just as the possibility of making prudent decisions rests upon the prerequisite desire for 
the good, so also in marriage, the possibility of living up to the obligations of marriage 
once created will be greatly dependent upon the desire and intention toward the goods or 
values of marriage.  One must intend the goods of marriage initially in order to be able to 
experience those goods throughout the marriage.  This includes the bonum coniugum.  
According to a recent decision of the Canadian Appeal Tribunal coram McCormack, the 
necessary elements for the “perfection of the spouses precisely as spouses” (the bonum 
coniugum) consist of “the right to the dignity of the person, the right to fundamental 
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human rights, which include the right to one’s physical, moral, spiritual, sexual, 
psychological integrity, etc.”402  
Marriage is inherently ordered to the conjugal good of BOTH spouses.  The real 
danger in the myth of “The One,” the soul mate theory, and the view of marriage as a 
SuperRelationship is that marriage is believed to be that extraordinary relationship where 
all MY needs will be met.  In this view, marriage is intended primarily for self-
fulfillment.  In the process of consenting, the crucial step of surrender to what is and what 
will be is missing.  The consent is defective, because a “commitment” is made to an ideal 
instead of a real, human person.  John O’Rourke interprets this view as a sign of 
immaturity.  He states, “In much of North American society the expectations fostered by 
society concerning personal fulfillment are out of hand; these expectations are transferred 
to marriage by many and they simply cannot be met.  To have unreal expectations is a 
sign of immaturity.”403  This is not surprising considering the phenomenon of extended 
adolescence described previously.  It is precisely in accepting our responsibilities and 
meeting challenges that persons mature.  Adolescence prolonged into one’s late twenties 
or even thirties means spending many years postponing responsibilities and focusing 
purely on oneself.  This cultural phenomenon of extended adolescence has the potential 
to breed immaturity.404  Maturation is a continuum with immaturity and maturity as the 
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poles on either end in which most people are located along the line of “not yet mature.”405  
As mentioned previously, psychological maturity is the terminus of human 
development.406  Mature persons are characterized by integrity, self-possession, and self-
determination.  Robert Guiry defines maturity as the following:  “Maturity is, within 
reasonable limits, the age appropriate to the concordance of autonomous behavior, 
response, emotion, and cognition, in accord with the cultural, familial and gender milieu 
of the individual.”407  A key characteristic of maturity is the “ability to defer 
gratification”408 and the ability to see things from another person’s point of view.409  In 
many ways, maturity corresponds to virtue.  The mature person responds to others, rather 
than impulsively reacting.410  In a mature person, there is a proper and proportionate 
ordering of behavior, emotions, thoughts, and relationships reminiscent of virtue 
previously discussed.  However, people may be mature in one area and not in another.411  
One’s level of maturity can be deduced from a person’s ideas, attitudes, and behaviors in 
five areas:  money, sex, children, family, and planning.412  Levels of maturity may differ 
among all the areas so that one may be mature in his or her profession but not so in 
family relationships.  In addition, the process of maturation can be stunted by various 
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factors and circumstances including poor education, child abuse, addiction, and lack of 
affection.413  If one is lacking in the canonical minimum of maturity relative to the 
seriousness of the marital commitment, then consent may be invalidating on the grounds 
of consensual incapacity, determining error, simulation, or condition.414  It should be 
remembered that the canonical level of maturity necessary for marital consent is found in 
most people.  When intended as a lifelong, faithful, fruitful relationship, marriage itself 
matures people.  The duty to love inherent in the marital commitment tends to the bonum 
coniugum.  The bonum coniugum is that maturing of the persons and characters of the 
spouses which comes from fidelity to the obligations of the married commitment. In a 
case from the Brooklyn Tribunal in 1973, Leon Salzman, a psychiatrist called as a peritus 
in the case, articulated the connection between commitment and maturity: 
I feel that many people grow up marriage.  You don’t have to be grown up before 
you get married.  If that was the case, there would be very few around.  People 
who get married and grow in the marriage are already people who have made 
some kind of commitment in a mature way to begin with, one of love, one of 
understanding, one of desire for intimacy . . . That is one marked evidence of 
immaturity, the inability to give.415  
 
Factors such as extended adolescence, the myth of “The One,” lack of or delay of 
commitments, and immaturity have a direct effect on the validity of marriages.  The great 
difficulty for judges is evaluating in a particular case whether one has elicited 
invalidating consent or one has simply failed to live up to a commitment truthfully made. 
Marital consent is a human act of choosing together (a union of wills) that which 
could be otherwise, a life lived for and with another faithfully.  Of course, there are those 
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cases where one or both spouses are truly incapable of eliciting valid consent, but 
Robitaille wants to draw attention to those cases in which a person intends from the 
beginning “marriage on his or her own terms (the definition of any kind of partial 
simulation).”416  Although exclusion of one or more of the Augustinian bona may apply 
as well, exclusion of the bonum coniugum is evident when one does not intend, will, 
choose a marriage that will involve real self-sacrifice throughout a lifetime.  Robitaille 
offers examples: 
Think of the examples we see regularly:  people who have never had to work for 
anything in their lives, or sacrifice for anything in their lives; people who expect 
that everything they want, the way they want it, will come to them.  People who 
see the world superficially, for its wealth, beauty, material goods.  Do we not see 
examples of such people who enter a commitment which they expect to be 
lifelong, faithful and open to children, but who also expect that marriage will not 
expect anything of them that they do not choose to give?  They are willing to take 
from their spouses, but they are not willing to give of themselves, to let 
themselves die to the reality of the couple that they are becoming in the marital 
partnership.  I suggest that at times with such cases we witness an exclusion of the 
good of the spouses.417  
 
Demonstration of selfish character alone does not prove this ground of partial simulation. 
In a case of simulation, proof usually involves “the confession of the simulator (whether 
judicial or extra-judicial), the reason for marrying (the causa contrahendi), the reason for 
simulating (the causa simulandi), the positive act of the will—explicit or implicit—by 
which the bonum coniugum was excluded.”418   
 Although the line between them is very fine and blurred, implicit simulation and 
error can be differentiated.  Regarding implicit simulation Robitaille states, 
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One point that must be highlighted here:  in traditional jurisprudence regarding 
exclusions, the positive act of the will must be a conscious choice.  However, 
more and more there has been an understanding that the choice can be made 
through an implicit act of the will, a choice made by the person because it is the 
only reality he or she knows.419  
 
Error that is deeply rooted, intransigent, and tacitly accepted can become an implicit act 
of exclusion, but I would argue that there must be, at least minimally, some 
consciousness that this choice differs from what the church teaches regarding marriage, 
its essential elements, or essential properties.  However, as Sanson states, “Persons may 
be unconscious as to nullifying implications and effect, but are conscious as to what is 
wanted or demanded, and what will clearly not be tolerated or acceptable.”420  Robitaille 
says as such in an earlier article.  “It cannot be merely an habitual opinion; rather, there 
must exist at least an implicit, actual intention against marriage.  There has to be the 
knowledge of what the Church believes marriage to be, and a positive rejection of that 
belief.”421  The key difference between error and simulation is awareness, however slight; 
in cases of simulation some evidence of awareness of a contrary intention should be 
found in order to demonstrate one was responsible for the exclusion (mens rea).  
Robitaille notes that determining error does not invalidate concerning the bonum 
coniugum; therefore, intransigent error regarding the bonum coniugum can only 
invalidate through a case of partial simulation or incapacity to assume.422  The person 
who is truly unaware of his or her selfishness and lack of concern for others would 
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probably elicit consent that would be invalid under c. 1095, 3̊.423  It is important to 
distinguish among the sources of nullity, because those seeking an annulment do so 
(almost in every case) in order to obtain a declaration that one is free to marry.  
Consequently, if the marriage is judged invalid, it is vital to understand what went wrong 
in the first relationship.  In fact, this is a critical part of the ministry of canon law.  
Robitaille adds, “Notice also, the consequence of this invalidity:  if the person suffers 
from an incapacity due to a psychic anomaly, then that person may not marry again in the 
Church until that incapacity has been addressed (if it ever could be addressed).”424  If a 
marriage is declared invalid due to total or partial simulation on the petitioner’s part, then 
great pastoral and judicial care should be directed to the future marriage.425 
  These canons related to consent and the sources of nullity demonstrate the 
complexity of what it means to make a marital commitment.  The initial commitment is 
central to and determinative of the resulting relationship.  The juridic concept of consent 
has been explicated while always keeping in mind the internal, psychological, and 
interpersonal reality of consent as the standard for the canonical concept.  Beal explains,  
Consequently, consent cannot be adequately understood merely as a disembodied 
juridic act.  An adequate understanding of consent must also include an 
appreciation of its personal and interpersonal dimensions and its concreteness.  
Thus, one can never overlook the influence of culture, society, family, and 
personal experience on individual couples’ consent.426 
 
Trying to capture the rich psychological and interpersonal concept of consent in juridic 
categories is like trying to recreate the sunset in a paint-by-number picture.  The picture 
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may resemble the reality, but something is surely lost.  However, that loss does not mean 
that it should not be attempted, only that it can be improved upon.  The fact that the Code 
is written in various literary forms combining biblical terms with philosophical theories 
and psychological contructs reveals that the law is human and can be amended to better 
serve the good of the faithful.  In addition, the elaborate distinctions that are even 
difficult for canonists to understand, much less for the faithful being served by the law to 
comprehend, reveal the need to evaluate and revise the canons on consent and the 
matrimonial processes so that the picture comes closer to the reality and justice may 
come. 
 
5.6 Synthesis of Marital Consent in Canon Law 
 
 
 Canon law of marriage and family is the church’s system of structures, norms, 
and procedures that enable persons to reach out for and appropriate the values of 
marriage identified by theology in order that the church may grow in faith, hope, and love 
for the salvation of souls.  It serves to protect and promote the goodness of marriage 
while balancing both individual and communal goods of the family.  Traditionally, the 
three Augustinian goods of marriage have been upheld in theology as that which makes 
marriage good and thus utilized in canon law to designate what is essential to marriage.  
The bonum prolis, bonum fidei, and bonum sacramenti are values of marriage that should 
be protected and promoted in canonical structures and norms.  These inherent features 
that demonstrate marriage’s goodness are not the same as the ends, that is, the intrinsic 
finality of marriage.  Marriage is ordered to the bonum prolis and the bonum coniugum, 
which are identified in c. 1055 §1.  In a teleological understanding of marriage, the ends 
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are like promises or gifts that are hoped for, yet not entirely within the control of the 
spouses.  Children are a gift just as the maturation and sanctification of the spouses is a 
gift as well.  Marriage is created in covenant which brings about the partnership for the 
whole of life, consortium totius vitae.  The content of this consortium may vary from 
culture to culture and time to time; therefore, the term is left open to the development of 
jurisprudence.  According to c. 1055 §2, there is an inseparability between the marital 
contract and the sacrament for the baptized.  This inseparability is encapsulated in canon 
law, although it is not at all clear that the difficulties inherent in this assertion have been 
resolved theologically.  Finally, c. 1056 identifies the essential properties of marriage as 
unity and indissolubility, which flow from the essence of marriage.  From these instances 
of doctrinal law, it is clear that the church teaches that there is an essence, however 
loosely defined, to marriage that needs to be protected and promoted.427   
 Canon 1057 denotes that consent creates marriage; consequently, consent is of the 
essence of marriage.  All that marriage is to be in the consortium totius vitae must be 
present in consent given and received initially.  The spouses must be qualified by law to 
exchange consent, meaning there are no impediments disqualifying them from marriage.  
In addition, this consent must be legitimately manifested according to canonical form.  In 
c. 1057 §2, consent is deemed an act of the will, which emphasizes the aspect of 
responsible choice in marital consent but at the same time fails to capture the fullness of 
this deep, internal act of the spirit.  According to John Paul II in his Address to the 
Roman Rota in 1999, consent is the “conscious, responsible assumption of a 
commitment.”  This internal acceptance of a promise given and received by the spouses 
needs to be expressed externally, socially, ritually, and communally.  The object of 
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consent is not so easily identified.  To say the object of consent is marriage merely begs 
the question.  While it is theologically true that what is chosen in marriage is union with 
the other, such a formulation is juridically imprecise.  The formal object of consent is the 
complex of essential rights and obligations of marriage. These essential rights and 
obligations of marriage derive from the bona, the essential elements (which are not 
explicitly listed in the Code but derive from the ends), the essential properties, and 
sacramentality for the baptized.  Again, such a description lends itself to further debate 
and interpretation. 
 The effect of consent validly and licitly given and received is the conjugal bond.  
In continuity with c. 1056, this bond is perpetual and exclusive.  Through the marital 
covenant, spouses choose to inscribe into their history a new direction and orientation to 
their lives with a new set of rights and obligations.  For the baptized, the Holy Spirit 
through the sacrament consecrates the spouses to fulfill these duties by empowering them 
to experience Christ’s unfailing love and fidelity, which they are to symbolize in their 
union.  Due to their inherent dignity as human persons, each spouse has equal duties and 
rights related to marriage.  Because marriage is ordered to the bonum prolis, spouses who 
become parents have the significant and serious duty and right to care for their children’s 
physical, social, cultural, moral, and religious needs.  The canonical structures and norms 
of marriage exist to protect and promote the bonum totius familae. 
 Since the time of the medieval debate regarding what makes marriage, the 
unilateral will-act of marriage has been emphasized.  However, marital consent has a 
bilateral dimension as well, which is complementary to the “act of the will.”  The 
bilateral dimension connotes the union of wills in the marital relationship.  Following 
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Aquinas, one consents with a person, not an object.  Consent implies union, a “feeling 
with” another.  The bilateral dimension gives juridical expression to the reality that 
marriage is a process, begun in the dating relationship, which is given permanent juridical 
status during the wedding ritual.  The moment of consent presupposes a history of 
consenting and anticipates a future of consenting to marriage again and again with one’s 
spouse.  Recognition of the bilateral dimension reinforces the need for effective marriage 
preparation, particularly in the area of discernment.     
 Although consent is bilateral, meaning a union of wills, the unilateral dimension 
cannot be negated.  The unilateral dimension corresponds to Lonergan’s fourth level of 
conscious intentionality where one is responsible for his or her own contribution to the 
consensus.  Canon 1060 states the presumption that marriage enjoys the favor of the law, 
meaning that the validity of a marriage is presumed and upheld unless the contrary can be 
proven.  Various canons state the substantial defects of consent that render marriage 
invalid.  In the 1980’s near the peak of divorce, the number of affirmative judgments in 
annulment cases rose explosively leading John Paul II to caution jurists regarding the 
overuse of the ground of consensual incapacity, which was new to the revised Code.  The 
source of nullity must be a true incapacity and not a difficulty which is common to every 
marriage.  Other grounds for defective consent related to commitment that were 
addressed in the study include ignorance, error about the person, determining error, 
simulation, and condition.  The distinctions among these grounds can be very fine and 
intricate, and the application of concrete, real marriages into these not so neatly defined 
categories can be cumbersome.   A more careful look at how intention can differentiate 
among the grounds can be illuminating.  Finally, the ground of exclusion of the bonum 
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coniugum may shed light on the situation of many contemporary failed marriages.  The 
evaluative question remains as to how effectively these canons promote and protect the 
values of marriage theology has identified and how greater attention to theological 
understandings of commitment and juridical articulations of consent can strengthen and 
support sacramental marriages in the United States. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
TOWARD A PRACTICAL RESPONSE 
 
 
6.1 How Do We Understand Current Concrete Practices of  
 
      Commitment and Consent in Sacramental Marriages in the United  
 
      States? 
 
6.1.1 III Extraordinary General Assembly of the Synod of Bishops on the 
         Topic:  The Pastoral Challenges of the Family in the Context of   
         Evangelization, October 2014 
As an exercise in practical theology, this study moves toward a response rather 
than coming to a conclusion.  Stated at the outset were the primary practical/pastoral 
problems to be addressed, namely:  the failed state of too many Catholic sacramental 
marriages in the United States today, the explosion of cohabitation as a prelude to 
marriage or a replacement for marriage, and the changing cultural landscape of thought 
and practice regarding the ordering of our sexual lives in America.  It cannot be denied 
that many factors contribute to these empirical trends and statistics.  Cultural, social, 
psychological, economic and political explanations of American family disintegration 
and change are insufficient without the theological lens of sin through which to evaluate 
historical trends and sociological findings.  This is not to say that the primary theological 
datum is the doctrine of sin, the experience of suffering, or the practical reality of 
innumerable fractured relationships.  The primary theological datum is the confession of 
an equally merciful and just God Who loved the world enough to send his Son Jesus 
Christ as Lord and Savior.  “The salvation which God offers us is the work of his 
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mercy.”1  The corollary of this confession is that all are in need of salvation, hence, the 
doctrine of sin.  Lonergan’s delineation of individual, group, and general bias gives 
expression to the force of inordinate, myopic, and insular self-preoccupation, self-
protection, and self-promotion that operates on all levels.  The human capacity for self-
consciousness and freedom often leaves human persons “anxious about their finitude, 
status, self-cohesion, relationships, wealth—about anything that they believe important 
for their existence.”2  In this state of uncertainty, human persons are susceptible to a 
narrow preoccupation with one’s own immediate concerns to the detriment of those 
outside one’s self, group, or current situation.  This undue fixation on the individual and 
the immediate can manifest itself in self-aggrandizement or self-negation, as Valerie 
Saiving Goldstein has purported.  Good human relationships are characterized by giving 
and receiving, the precondition of which is that one has a substantial self from which to 
give.3  The reality of ruptured relationships and the experience of disconnect must be 
viewed through the theological lens of sin, the admission that this reality is the fault of 
human persons.  This is precisely the point of the primordial myths of the first chapters of 
Genesis.  Any explanation of the suffering caused by broken promises and damaged 
relationships that does not address the doctrine of sin, and consequently human 
culpability and responsibility, is not only insufficient but also inaccurate. 
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 The church, as the embodiment and continuation of Christ’s work in and through 
the Spirit, responds to the sin of the world.  The church is the practical solution to the 
practical problem of sin.  The visible expression of the force of sin in the world is acutely 
concentrated in family disintegration where loss to all members in one form or another is 
profoundly felt.  The church, comprising all believers in an “organically structured 
communion,” offers a pastoral response in various ways in relation to the gifts of each.4  
The picture of marriage and family in the United States painted at the onset of this study 
demonstrates that this effort has not been enough.  The pastoral response of the church 
must address all stages of marriage preparation and the lifecycle of marriage.  This 
pastoral ministry includes canon law.  In addressing the Canon Law Society of America 
in 2007 regarding the past twenty-five years since the revision of the Code, Reverend 
Monsignor John Alesandro stated, “’Pastoral,’ of course, means practical, and practical 
means behavioral—and behavior requires law.”5  Canon law is an ecclesial science, but 
primarily it is a pastoral ministry serving the church by protecting and promoting 
freedom and good order so that the People of God may receive the gifts of the Spirit and 
the Spirit may freely and effectively work in the world.  James Coriden summarizes, 
“Canon law is an organically developing ministry, not a closed system of laws.  It is a 
theologically driven project of church leadership that strives to maintain both Christian 
freedom and good order, not a fixed set of uniform rules woodenly applied.”6  In 
marriage ministry, canonists serve those who have experienced failed marriages or wish 
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to marry someone who has through establishing freedom to marry and protecting the 
rights of those involved, both spouses and children. 
 In advance of the III Extraordinary General Assembly of the Synod of Bishops, 
Cardinal Lorenzo Baldisseri together with the Ordinary Council of the General 
Secretariat released the Instrumentum Laboris.  This working document contains the 
results of the consultation of the particular churches using the Preparatory Document’s 
questionnaire in anticipation of the Synod for The Pastoral Challenges of the Family in 
the Context of Evangelization to be held in October 2014.  This document “offers a 
broad, yet by no means exhaustive, perspective on the present-day situation of the family, 
on the challenges of the family and on the reflections related to the family today.”7  
Regarding the cultural situation of the family today, this working document describes 
reasons given why so many do not agree with the church’s teaching on family matters.  
Many of these reasons have been purported throughout the present study: 
The responses are also in agreement on the underlying reasons for the difficulty in 
accepting Church teaching, namely, the pervasive and invasive new technologies; 
the influence of the mass media; the hedonistic culture; relativism; materialism; 
individualism; the growing secularism; the prevalence of ideas that lead to an 
excessive, selfish liberalization of morals; the fragility of interpersonal 
relationships; a culture which rejects making permanent choices, because it is 
conditioned by uncertainty and transiency, a veritable “liquid society” and one 
with a “throw away” mentality and one seeking “immediate gratification”; and, 
finally, values reinforced by the so-called “culture of waste” and a “culture of the 
moment,” as frequently noted by Pope Francis.8  
 
However dim this picture may seem, the preceding cultural depiction is predominant, at 
least for most in the United States.  We have discussed how the law continues to presume 
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that Catholics today intend to marry as the church understands marriage.  In this cultural 
context, is this a valid presumption? 
 As discussed previously, the legal presumption that when people marry they 
intend marriage as the church understands it has been seriously called into question.  If 
the church can no longer presume that those marrying have the general intention to marry 
as the church teaches, then not only canon law but all of pastoral marriage ministry needs 
to be entirely rethought and reformed.  Lynda Robitaille notes the difficulty with this 
presumption.  “The problem of the will to marry is not seen from the positive aspect, that 
is, in relation to choosing to oblige oneself, but rather is seen negatively, in that only the 
intention not to oblige oneself has juridic effect.  The intention to oblige oneself is seen 
as the general intention of doing what the Church intends when consenting to marriage.”9  
Is such a general intention enough to elicit valid consent?  I believe that it is.  Despite the 
permeating liquid society and culture of the moment so characteristic of contemporary 
American culture, the presumption must stand; if not, the validity of every marriage in a 
culture with values contrary to the church’s teaching would be called into question.  In 
addition, the requirement of marriage preparation lends further evidence that those 
preparing to marry have some awareness of what the church understands marriage to be 
and consent to that understanding of marriage.  This legal presumption can only be 
overturned in particular cases.  Randolph Calvo identifies levels of culture in order to 
determine points of impact on persons.  These levels are like concentric circles 
illustrating how the impact of culture on a person’s marital consent becomes more 
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profound the deeper the level.10  The outermost level or layer is the practical sphere, 
which is “observable and tangible” comprised of “art, music, language, communication, 
sports, fashion, entertainment, technology and so on.”11  The second level concerns 
relationships, roles, rites of passage, and traditions and customs within families and 
society.  The third level involves the values of a culture.  These intangible values are 
expressed in the outer two levels of relationships and concrete practices.  The final level 
of culture is the deepest and most pervasive.  “It pertains to worldview, that is, the 
particular way a culture orients a group to understand and act towards the world. . . . This 
worldview and the meanings expressed in symbolic forms and in norms of conduct 
underlie a society’s values and shape social expectations and assumptions.”12  This 
deepest level of culture can greatly impact a person’s marital consent, but it does not 
necessarily do so.  Intransigent and deep-seated error was discussed in reference to the 
canons concerning determining error, simulation, and consensual incapacity.  The impact 
of culture on marital consent must be decided on a case by case manner, because culture 
is everywhere impacting people on different levels.  Calvo clarifes, 
It is just there:  Culture is part of the fabric of life woven through the various 
strata of our lives.  It can be so much a part of the way we look at the world that 
we are largely unaware of culture’s influence.  What appears natural and normal 
and what is to be expected all can be shaped over generations by forces called 
culture.  Culture doesn’t dictate the specific choices we make nor does it 
determine the exact way we behave, but it shapes the horizon of the choices and 
consequences that we perceive [italics mine].”13  
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Pertinent here is Lonergan’s notion of effective freedom.  Effective freedom, the 
operational range of one’s essential freedom, is limited by one’s temperament and 
personality, one’s level of maturation, one’s past choices, and one’s external 
circumstances, including culture.  Effective freedom is the limited horizon of essential 
freedom, but ultimately human persons are free, free to make even vertical exercises of 
freedom to a different horizon.  To assert that culture decides not only what we choose 
but how we choose is to deny essential freedom and ultimately the offer of grace.  
Moreover, particularly in our increasingly mobile and digital world, we are subject to 
more than one culture in varying degrees.  The church has cultural influence.  Religious 
beliefs and canon law are a form of culture.14  Komonchak’s ecclesiology was explained 
at the beginning of this study, and it is relevant here.  “A new community of meaning and 
value has been constituted in this natural world of ours:  a new intersubjectivity in grace, 
with its own language and symbols, its own roles and institutions, its own interpretative 
and evaluative culture.”15  It could be argued that one’s choices regarding marriage and 
sexuality will be dependent upon which culture’s deepest level has penetrated the person.  
Should a person identify only superficially with the church or not at all, then a tribunal 
may explore the possibility of overturning the legal presumption for that particular case, 
perhaps on the ground of determining error.  
 6.1.2 Faith, Hope, and Love and the Sacrament of Marriage 
  The health and vitality of all marriages are a concern for the church, but this 
study has focused on sacramental marriages in the United States.  Marriage, as a 
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sacrament, presupposes faith.  As discussed in Chapter Three, faith is a virtue and an act, 
a readiness to believe and “humble submission and personal self-surrender to God.”16  
Lawler contends, “The faith that is obedience and self-surrender to God, the traditional 
fides qua creditor, the act of faith by which one believes, is a free, and at least minimally 
conscious and explicit, act.”17  However, Susan Wood argues,  
Faith, however, cannot be reduced to this explicit act.  A person can possess the 
habit of faith both through the moral order and, most especially, through baptism.   
Baptism is the “sacrament of faith” par excellence.  Not only is the 
reception of this sacrament the occasion of the public confession of faith by the 
individual or, in the case of infant baptism, by the believing community on behalf 
of the individual, but the indelible “character” received at baptism comprises an 
ordination of the baptized to worship, the expression and public witness of faith.18   
 
Faith can be “inchoate and implicit” in the intention of the baptized spouses for 
“indissolubility, fidelity, exclusivity, and openness to children.”19  Wood claims, “This 
ultimate kind of promise and love cannot be explained apart from a transcendence that is 
oriented to God.”20  Lawler responds to this argument by asserting that it is the “virtue or 
the know-how of faith that is bestowed in baptism,” but because the act of faith does not 
necessarily flow from the virtue, the virtue “must be activated, freely, explicitly, 
consciously and however minimally.”21  Lawler concludes, “It is in such active personal 
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faith, and not just in the virtue of faith, that Will and Willma cooperate with God-in-
Christ and Christ-in-the-church in the transformation of secular realities, including their 
marriage, into Christian sacraments.  It is such active personal faith, again however 
minimal, that is required for right sacramental intention.”22  The difficulty is in 
ascertaining if, when, or how a baptized person’s faith has been activated?  In spite of this 
difficulty, the claim can be made that even natural marriage presupposes faith, that is, 
trusting in the other spouse.  Marriage is a relationship of faith.  Marriage, which is 
rooted in the foedus of its partners, is a relationship begun and sustained in faith.  The 
covenant of marriage is based upon faith and trust that the other will keep his or her 
word.  Sacramental marriage is based upon faith and trust in God as well.  In many ways, 
consent is an act of mutual entrustment in that the covenantal gift of self can only be 
received in faith and sustained in the hope that both will remain true to the promises 
made at the wedding.  The sacrament presupposes a faith that recognizes the Spirit 
empowering the couple to be able to love each other as God intended and to manifest 
Christ’s unfailing love for His people.  In the sacrament is the interconnection of faith, 
hope, and love.  Christian spouses love through faith and in hope in time, because their 
love is not yet complete.   
The sacrament of marriage works through the gracing action of God in Christ 
(opus operatum) and the free acceptance of this grace in faith (opus operantis).  Todd 
Salzman relates the sacrament to freedom, love, and faith: 
In terms of our distinction in scripture between agape and philia then, we 
can reasonably assert that it is opus operantis, the recognition and reception of 
God’s grace, which transforms agape and opus operatum into philia.  Without 
acceptance of God’s gift, the offer remains agape, not philia.  The deliberate and 
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active reception of God’s love is an expression of a living Christian faith.  This 
faith is necessary for marriage to be a valid sacrament. 
In summary, then, the efficacious and salvific nature of a sacrament is 
dependent upon mutuality.  That is, God offers salvific love in and through Christ, 
and humans are free to either accept or reject that offer.  The faith manifested in 
the acceptance of God’s grace in and through sacrament creates a friendship 
between the individual and God transforming the very nature of the person, the 
relationships that the person enters into, and the acts that follow from those 
relationships.23  
 
Although I would not argue that agape transforms into philia with the acceptance of 
God’s grace, Salzman’s point is valid and illuminating.24  Marital commitment and 
consent require that mutual exchange, reciprocal relationship, offer and acceptance that 
Salzman refers to here.  Marital consent, as an act of mutual entrustment, is an act of faith 
and love.  Perhaps the flux and disruption experienced in family relationships today calls 
for education or re-education in the meanings of the loves. 
 Throughout this study, the loves, agape, eros, and philia, have appeared and 
reappeared in an effort to understand what it means to promise to love another faithfully 
for life.  The pain and suffering families experience as the result of family disintegration 
is in some way related to love, that is, the lack of love, the failure to love, the withholding 
of love, or the disordering of love.  Because the reality of family fragmentation has been 
studied here through the theological lens of sin and human responsibility, a fitting 
response is a theology of love and a serious questioning of whether love is relevant in the 
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juridical realm.  In marriage, each of the loves has a distinctive and necessary role, which 
needs to be recognized in order for married couples to understand how to love the other 
faithfully for life.  Often agape is held up as the only truly Christian love.  In his 
landmark study, Anders Nygren argues that eros and agape are conflicting, irreconcilable 
fundamental motifs throughout the course of history and that agape is the only Christian 
love.25  He pits agape against eros as opposing types with eros being essentially 
egocentric and acquisitive, love that is evoked by recognizing value, whereas agape is 
essentially theocentric and sacrificial, love that is spontaneous and unmotivated thus 
creating value in its object.26  Although a thorough critique of Nygren’s argument and 
corresponding evidence is not possible here, I call attention to a few deficiencies in his 
argument that could impact a theology of marriage.  Nygren’s depiction of “Christian 
love” omits the emotional quality of love, confuses a myriad of self-relating actions, and 
excludes the importance of mutual relations.27  Agape is not the only love that can be 
deemed Christian, because each has its own goodness and time and place.28   
 Edward Collins Vacek describes love as “an emotional, affirming participation in 
the dynamic tendency of an object to realize its fullness.”29  Granted, this definition 
leaves much to be desired, as any definition of such a vast and rich concept would; 
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however, it does bring to light that love means “actively being affected” by the beloved.30  
Of course, the role of intellect and will are essential in a theology of marital commitment 
and its relation to consent as I have emphasized; that being said, the role of emotion 
cannot be underestimated.  For instance, what is the theological significance of the 
absence of feeling in a marriage?  Vacek delineates reasons why we may no longer “feel 
any love” in a relationship: 
First, the love may in fact be gone.  We may have become insensitive to the value 
of those we once loved, and they no longer make a difference to our lives.  
Second, although they still affect us, other emotions may dominate our 
consciousness, e.g., anger at them or at others.  Third, we may be freely resisting 
or bracketing these feelings, for example, when we are trying to assert our 
independence.  Fourth, we may still love them, but the receptive aspects may have 
become rather “quiet” or taken for granted.  We feel right or fulfilled in being for 
and with the beloved, but these feelings do not occupy our attention.  Perhaps 
only when the beloved is gone do we recognize that a peaceful joy had all along 
been a quiet but important part of our normal consciousness.  Fifth, love may 
continue on in a deficient or incomplete mode.  The perception of the beloved’s 
value may persist only as a memory of how we were once attracted by him or her.  
Or we can still perceive the beloved’s value, but we may be too stressed or tired 
to feel the resonance of that goodness in ourselves.31  
 
A more intricate dissection of what exactly is happening when the feeling of love 
subsides is absolutely paramount, because so many families are changed forever for the 
vague statement, “I don’t love him (or her) anymore.”  The specific meaning of such a 
statement can go unchallenged if the reasons for such a feeling are not brought to the 
surface.  These reasons are not necessarily justifications for breaking a commitment; on 
the contrary, the absence of feeling is a signal that perhaps the relationship needs to 
occupy one’s time and attention, or the root of conflicting and overriding emotions needs 
to be identified, or one needs to recognize that the feelings associated with a loving 
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relationship change over time as the relationship does.  Vacek contends that even agape 
implies being affected.  As a type of love, agape is an “emotional appreciation and 
concern for the good of the beloved.”32  This love is “directed to the whole value of the 
beloved.”33  Agape loves the beloved for the sake of the beloved.  It is a love that is freely 
given, unmotivated by the goodness of the beloved, and forgiving and redemptive.34  
However, the other-directed nature of this love does not deny or negate the reality of the 
self as the one who loves.  The self being affected is an intrinsic aspect of all forms of 
love.   
 In every human action, particularly one so human as love, the self is the agent of 
the activity and so the action is self-enacting or self-expressive.35  It is also true that a 
great deal of “human activity is at least partially self-interested.”36  Human action that is 
self-satisfying or self-interested is not, in itself, evil or sinful.   The problem occurs when 
there is undue regard for the self and an unwillingness to subordinate the self to the needs 
of the other.  Agapic love may include self-sacrifice if the one suffers loss in loving, but 
sacrifice itself is not the defining criterion for agape.37  When agapic love takes the form 
of self-sacrifice (as it surely will in any relationship) depends upon the context of the 
relationship at any given time.  Agape works to repair, restore, and reorient a relationship 
in which inevitable differences in the individual needs of each conflict and compete.  In a 
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loving relationship, the abundance of needs, wants, desires, rights, and obligations to be 
met, respected, and honored for each person is a formidable challenge.  Agape seeks to do 
that for the sake of the beloved.  Attention to the fact that these needs and wants may 
conflict demonstrates love’s relation to justice.  “When our attitudes and acts promote our 
own self and, in order to do so, either deny or ignore what is due other persons or things, 
we call these attitudes and acts selfish.”38  Bias, as Lonergan used the term, is not a 
negation of the proper role of self-interest and self-love, but rather the refusal of the 
authentic pursuit of self-transcendence through disregard of the transcendental precepts.  
The myopic, insular, inordinate concern for oneself is the manifestation of the distortion 
of the loves, and ultimately the outcome of action born from fear rather than love.  
 Eros is an authentic love for another, yet, at the same time, a kind of self-love, 
because in erotic love the other is loved for the sake of the self.39  “Eros affirms the other 
in view of the benefits the lover receives.  These benefits might include goods received in 
return from the beloved, a certain enrichment from being united to the beloved, or merely 
the fulfillment that comes from acting.  Eros ceases once those benefits are no longer in 
prospect.”40  The quest for the soul mate marriage, a marriage where couples expect high 
levels of intimacy, communication, and personal fulfillment,41 suggests a significant 
underlying presumption of the American culture of dating.  That presumption is that the 
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love associated with dating and marriage is eros, and the disappearance of this love 
during the course of the relationship is motivation, if not reason, to break the 
commitment.  If a relationship is based purely, or even primarily, on eros, then the nature 
of eros dictates that the relationship will end when one’s needs are no longer being met.  
Erotic love is an emotional, delightful, passionate desire to be one with the beloved.42  It 
is not the “possession” of the beloved that causes eros to cease; rather, “eros is proved by 
drying up when we are no longer nourished.”43  Eros can energetically begin a 
relationship and drive a relationship forward, but it alone cannot sustain it over time.  The 
other loves are necessary.  A theology of marriage must include eros to some degree as a 
healthy self-love is indispensible in a mutual loving relationship.  “Those without eros, 
however, have little to lose.”44  Because it is a distortion of love to sacrifice and deny 
oneself for the sake of the other out of hatred for the self, eros and ordinate self-love are 
necessary yet not sufficient for marriage.45 
 Love in marriage requires love for the other and self-love, because love begins in 
and aims for communion.  Philia is love for the other for the sake of the relationship 
shared.  The distinguishing feature of philia is mutuality.  It is love that is reciprocated.  
Neither agape nor eros requires any return of love for it to be a genuine love, but philia 
does.  In this way, philia is not able to be directly willed, because its existence depends 
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upon the free consent of the other.  In relationships characterized by philia, we are very 
much dependent on the other since “we cannot will a mutual love.”46  The inability to 
will this kind of love is part of the precarious nature of marriage.  Its vitality is not 
dependent on one’s own will but on the mutual commitment of both persons.  Vacek 
describes how our family relationships are truly filial and related to consent: 
Philia relationships are beyond our direct will for another reason.  Some of our 
special relations begin prior to any possible choice, e.g., we are born into our 
family or baptized into our church as infants.  In order for these special relations 
to become fully human philia relations, we can and must subsequently accept and 
ratify them, but this consent is not a matter of willing them into existence.  In 
these and other philia relations, mutual love may grow imperceptibly and may 
never be explicitly chosen for itself.  The bond will be implicitly consented to 
through the choices we make to do things in accord with the relationship.  There 
are some philia relations, however, that are so important that, once they have 
arisen, we want to ratify them through an explicit commitment, e.g., marriage.  
We want to bind our future and to safeguard the relationship against the 
contingencies of life as well as our own inconsistencies.  We want to declare and 
not just consciously live in and from the relation.  Still, even in these cases, it is a 
matter not of willing the relation into existence.  Rather we consent to it as and 
after it arises.47  
 
Within the context of a theology of love, the bilateral dimension of consent comes to 
light.  A marital relationship may begin in eros, the experience of falling in love, which 
can feel like it is beyond one’s choice, an act of passive receptivity.  The relationship 
becomes one of mutual love and friendship as they consent to the bond that is forming 
between them, explicitly on their wedding and implicitly throughout the lifecycle of 
marriage. 
For a theology of marriage, too great an emphasis has been placed on agape as 
THE form of love, such as in Nygren’s theory.  Martin D’Arcy states, “God is agape, and 
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we should naturally expect someone to be the beneficiary of that love, and as beneficiary 
to respond.  But if this theory [Nygren’s] is taken literally there is no one to respond.  
There is no need of that intercommunication which is essential to love.”48  Nygren’s 
anticipatory response to this query is the following: 
Naturally, there is no question of Paul’s wishing to eliminate the spiritual reality 
denoted by the phrase “love towards God”; he merely seeks to give it its proper 
name, which he calls “faith.”  Faith includes in itself the whole devotion of love, 
while emphasizing that it has the character of a response, that it is reciprocated 
love.  Faith is love towards God, but a love of which the keynote is receptivity, 
not spontaneity.49  
 
Without accepting the whole of Nygren’s argument, his connecting love and faith is 
reminiscent of the contention that marital consent is an act and promise of mutual 
entrustment.  Although Nygren’s account of the God-human relationship is unidirectional 
(with God giving love and the human person receiving love from God), the sacrament of 
marriage which is a symbol of it is a mutual relation of giving and receiving love.  For 
the baptized, this is also an act of faith in God and an acceptance of God’s promise to be 
faithful.   
This inextricable intertwining of faith and love is present in sacramental marriage, 
because mutual, embodied love is the matrix of the sacrament.50  The marital relationship 
can reveal philia as a form of God’s love.  This form of love is a particular, affectionate, 
emotional, and self-connecting friendship that tends toward enduring communion.51  
Philia is involved in forming the couple into the intimate communion of life and love, 
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which implies that philia has a history and “is subject to the erosion of time’s passage.”52  
Should philia fail,53 as it does in the case of divorce, the bond does not cease to exist, but 
rather, it “persists as a failed and presently unfulfilled promise.”54  The bond, the res et 
sacramentum, is not a juridical fiction, as some may claim in the case of a divorced 
couple.  It persists as a mutual promise of love unfulfilled.  The reality that philia is 
absent, dead, or non-existent in a marital relationship does not necessarily mean the bond 
is as well.  Whether or not the bond can be dissolved or proven in the external forum to 
have never truly formed can only be evaluated on a case by case basis.  In this way, philia 
can help make sense of the doctrine of indissolubility.  Should a couple reconcile, there is 
no canonical need to renew consent because the bond remains.   
Although philia is found in all marriages, philia of sacramental marriages 
includes the person of Christ into the marital bond: 
As we have seen, while faith, or the conscious, free, and deliberate choice, is 
necessary to establish friendship with God, so too, faithful consent is necessary to 
establish the bond of friendship between husband and wife united in and through 
Christ.  While faith establishes mutuality and friendship in relation to God in 
terms of sacrament, faithful consent establishes mutuality and friendship between 
husband and wife united with Christ in the sacrament of matrimony.55  
 
Although consent makes marriage, what distinguishes sacramental marriage is “faithful 
consent, a consent grounded in each of the spouse’s living faith in Christ, whereby they 
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commit to each other in lifelong friendship united in Christ.”56  However minimal and 
inchoate, this faithful consent contains awareness of the presence of Christ: 
The difference is in awareness, and how that awareness shapes the identity of the 
couple and what they are doing when they perform such actions.  Within Christian 
marital philia, these actions are a committed response to God’s offer of 
friendship, which strengthens the bond of friendship between the couple, their 
friendship with each other and Christ, and extends this to all relationships.57  
 
To enter a valid, sacramental marriage, baptized Christians must intend to commit 
faithfully to each other and to Christ for a lifetime.  Such an intention implies awareness 
and openness to God’s offer of Himself in Christ.  Karl Rahner describes how a 
sacramental marriage re-presents Christ’s love for the church, because the unifying love 
of the married couple genuinely participates in the unifying love of Christ for the church: 
Marriage, then, opens out into the mystery of God in a much more radical sense 
than we could have suspected just from the unconditional nature of human love.  
Everything is indeed still hidden under the veil of faith and hope, and perhaps all 
of this has not yet unfolded from out of the secret depths of our existence into our 
everyday life.  Nor is there any question that this truth does not come about 
without man and his freedom and his interior assent.  Hence there is no doubt that 
those who are united in married love experience this reality to the same degree 
that they open their hearts to it in faith and love.  Perhaps it has become clear that 
this theology of marriage may not be understood in an introverted and 
“privatized” sense, but rather that genuine Christian marriage in every age is a 
real representation of the unifying love of God in Christ for mankind.  The church 
becomes present in marriage:  marriage is really the smallest community of the 
redeemed and the sanctified.58 
   
Thus, Rahner demonstrates the interconnection of faith, hope, and love in sacramental 
marriage, the experience of which is dependent upon human freedom.  The prophetic 
symbolizing function of the sacrament operates to make Christ’s love present in the midst 
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of human finitude and sin.  “At present we see indistinctly, as in a mirror, but then face to 
face.  At present I know partially; then I shall know fully, as I am fully known.  So faith, 
hope, love remain, these three; but the greatest of these is love.”59  Lawler explains how 
this very human reality of marriage is capable of revealing the divine: 
This doctrine does not mythicize marriage as an imitation of the marriage of some 
divine pair, nor does it idealize it so that men and women will not recognize it.  
Rather it leaves marriage what it is, a secular reality in which a man and a woman 
seek to become one person in love.  What is added is only this, simple and yet 
mysteriously complex.  As they become one body-person in love, they provide 
through their marriage a prophetic symbol of a similar oneness that exists between 
their Christ and their Church.60 
 
Through faith and baptism, married couples participate in the sacrament in their mission 
to make Christ present to the world.  However, the presence of active faith in every 
baptized person cannot be presumed, which leaves the problem of baptized nonbelievers. 
 The practical problem of baptized nonbelievers is clearly recognized and 
addressed in the Instrumentum Laboris.61  First, the distinction needs to be made between 
nonbelievers and non-practicing Catholic that are weak in faith.  Nonbelievers should 
refer to “those who never came to any act of faith in spite of their baptism, or explicitly 
rejected all belief in the Christian mysteries.”62  The working document notes that this 
case is “a very remote possibility.”63  In the case of engaged baptized nonbelievers, 
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Familiaris consortio clearly states, “However, when in spite of all efforts, engaged 
couples show that they reject explicitly and formally what the Church intends to do when 
the marriage of baptized persons is celebrated, the pastor of souls cannot admit them to 
the celebration of marriage.”64  The theological consequence of such a position is that 
baptized nonbelievers are deprived of their natural right to marry, because the contract is 
purported to be inseparable from the sacrament and they do not intend the sacrament.  
Perhaps some resolution could come to this problem with greater attention to what it 
means to reject explicitly and formally what the church intends to do when the marriage 
of baptized persons is celebrated.  Only those who reject explicitly and formally what the 
church intends to do should be considered baptized nonbelievers.  The reason for that 
restriction is due to the interiority of faith.  How and when the virtue of faith is freely and 
consciously activated is known only to God.  While faith should always be expressed in 
one way or another, its presence is not dependent upon its outward manifestation.  The 
only way to overturn the presumption of the intimate connection of faith and baptism is 
by the formal and explicit rejection of faith by a baptized person.  In such a case, “the 
pastor of souls cannot admit them to the celebration of marriage.”65  John Paul II does not 
express what recourses are available to the couple then.  If they are refused sacramental 
marriage due to rejection of faith, can they enter a valid natural marriage?  Lawler argues 
that the question is left open: 
Most interestingly, though the way was then open to him both to ask whether civil 
marriage of these baptized nonbelievers was a valid marriage and to reply that it 
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was not, because “a valid marriage contract cannot exist between baptized persons 
without its being by that very fact a sacrament,” he did not do so. 
I acknowledge the force of the axiom ex silentio nihil probatur.  I find it 
difficult to accept, however, that the Pope’s passing over in silence the new 
Canon 1055.2, approved if not yet promulgated, was simply an oversight.  Rather, 
I find it an unexpected sign that the marriage of baptized nonbelievers is regarded 
as possibly valid and that the theological discussion peremptorily ended by the 
Code in 1917 is, in response to the demand of the Synod, quietly reopened.66 
 
When a juridical “solution” is given to an unresolved theological question, greater 
confusion and uncertainty arise, along with the very real possibility of injustice.  The just 
and merciful response of the church regarding marriage for those who have rejected 
explicitly and formally what the church intends when the marriage of baptized persons is 
celebrated is the possibility of natural marriage.  Theological and canonical clarity would 
be needed to define precisely what this means in real life.   
Recourse to the canonical formula:  “actus formalis defectionis ab ecclesia 
catholica” could be made, but in recent years, this seems to have caused more pastoral 
problems and juridical uncertainty.  The 1983 Code granted three exemptions from 
ecclesiastical law related to marriage for those who formally defected from the Catholic 
Church; these exemptions are found in cc. 1086 §1, 1117, and 1124.  Danilo Flores 
explains, “In other words, these specific exceptions established by the three canons 
suspended the obligations of law arising from the impediments of disparitatis cultus, the 
mandatory canonical form of marriage celebration and the prescription on mixed 
marriages.”67  These exemptions were made “to facilitate the exercise of the ‘ius 
                                                 
66. Michael G. Lawler, Marriage and the Catholic Church:  Disputed Questions (Collegeville, 
Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 2002), 60. 
 
67. Danilo R. Flores, "Formal Defection from the Catholic Church and Its Canonical 
Consequences in Marriage in the Light of the motu proprio Omnium in mentem" (University of Santo 
Tomas: Faculty of Canon Law, 10-11 January 2013), 5, https://www.academia.edu 
/7347927/Formal_Defection_From_the_Catholic_Church_and_its_consequences_in_marriages_-
_Danilo_R._Flores (accessed Oct 5, 2014). 
419 
 
connubii.’”68  Questions regarding what constitutes a formal separation from the Catholic 
Church were answered on March 13, 2006 by the Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts 
regarding the canonical procedure for formal defection.  The basic elements include:  “(a) 
the internal decision to leave the Catholic Church; (b) the realization and external 
manifestation of that decision; and (c) the reception of that decision by the competent 
ecclesiastical authority.”69  Although juridically clear, such a procedure is “almost 
impracticable if one should observe literally the minutiae of the Protocal.”70  In addition, 
these exemptions led to pastoral problems and juridical uncertainty leading Benedict XVI 
to issue the motu proprio Omnium in mentem on October 26, 2009 to modify the Code of 
Canon Law.71  Flores explains,  
The legislator, therefore, decided to formally end the legal uncertainties created 
by the exemption.  By repealing the exemption clause in the three canons, the 
juridical certainty is established:  every Catholic or he who is received into the 
Catholic Church—whether defected in whatever manner or still remains in 
ecclesial communion—he is semper et ubique bound to observe the ecclesiastical 
law on disparity of cult and canonical form under the pain of invalidity of 
marriage.72  
 
Those who formally defect from the Catholic Church may do so to join another church or 
ecclesial community, not necessarily due to explicit and formal rejection of faith; 
therefore, there is not equivalence between formal defection from the Catholic Church 
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and formal and explicit rejection of what the church intends to do when the marriage of 
baptized persons is celebrated.  However, this example brings to light the practical 
difficulties that ensue when trying to facilitate the exercise of the ius connubii while at 
the same time trying to maintain juridical certainty.  Flores concludes, “The exemption 
clause facilitated the exercise of the natural right to marry at the expense of the juridical 
certainty, while the Omnium in mentem assures the juridical certainty at the expense of 
the exercise of the ius connubii.  Is there any other way to harmonize the natural right to 
marry and the juridical certitude?”73  This is the exact difficulty with the case of baptized 
nonbelievers.  The difficulty stems from c. 1055 §2, which is juridically precise yet 
denies the baptized nonbeliever ius connubii.74 
Clarification on the meaning of invalidity may be helpful at this point.  When the 
church declares a marriage invalid in general, it does not mean that the marriage is 
nonexistent but rather “that it is lacking strength or wellness.  It is, in other words, 
infirm.”75  The church’s pastoral practice of refusing baptized nonbelievers is a practice 
based upon the recognition that the marriage should image the love relationship of Christ 
for the church and does not.  It is lacking in spiritual health.  Lawrence Wrenn clarifies 
the meaning of a declaration of invalidity in general:  
We are saying that the marriage suffered from some substantial defect that 
prevented it from achieving its principal effect of creating between the spouses a 
perpetual bond.  We are saying that, from its inception, the marriage did not enjoy 
the kind of wholeness or integrity or soundness or health that the Church, at a 
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given point in history, requires for a marriage to be considered perpetually 
binding.76 
 
A “natural” marriage between two baptized persons is lacking in health and wholeness.  
This is a union that was meant to symbolize Christ’s indissoluble love for the church and 
yet it cannot due to their lack of faith.  However, does this mean that the rejection of faith 
on the part of a baptized person creates a defect that prevents the creation of a perpetual 
bond between the spouses?  Unbaptized persons presumably lack faith and are able to 
form a perpetual bond between them.  Baptized nonbelievers should be able to form a 
perpetual bond that may be extrinsically dissoluble (like any other non-sacramental 
marriage). 
 The case of baptized nonbelievers considered to be a remote possibility differs 
significantly from those with weak, inchoate, obscure, or implicit faith.  Indeed, it is 
difficult to determine what “level” of faith is sufficient to constitute a valid celebration of 
the sacrament.  Susan Wood cautions, “Even minimal faith would appear to suffice and, 
when it is at all possible, presumption is made in favor of faith.”77  This type of case of 
non-practicing Catholics with questionable faith is prevalent.  The Instrumentum Laboris 
testifies to the reasons for this common occurrence: 
The primary reason for non-practicing Catholics to return to their parishes for the 
celebration of a marriage—in the opinion of all the responses which address this 
issue—concerns the “aesthetical aspects” of the celebration (atmosphere, 
attractiveness, photo opportunities, etc.) and, equally, a conditioning from the 
religious tradition of the families of the couple to be married, transmitted to them 
in some fashion.78  
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The admission of this problem in all the responses to this question regarding the pastoral 
challenge of non-practicing Catholics reflects the inordinate focus on the externals of the 
wedding ceremony as referred to in Chapter Four.  In addition, it points to the dwindling 
impact of the faith on the concrete lives of those not yet married and the erroneous view 
that the sacraments are cultural milestones or family traditions without real faith 
commitment.  The dichotomy of baptized believers and baptized nonbelievers is a 
theoretical polarization that artificially delimits the complex human and theological 
reality of faith development.  The presumption that baptized engaged couples 
approaching the church for marriage intend to marry as the church understands marriage 
opens up a fertile opportunity for evangelization.  Whether or not this opportunity is 
effectively utilized is a question for pastoral theology.  The pastoral need and canonical 
obligation have already been addressed in previous chapters.  In order for couples to be 
able to live not only their marital commitment but also their baptismal commitment, 
families need to be evangelized so that as young people grow in faith they will be able to 
elicit valid faith-filled consent and establish a sacramental marriage of mutual love in 
Christ. 
 All of the loves work together “in rhythmically occurring ways” in marriage for 
the good of the whole family.79  It is clear that love is theologically significant, and a 
more differentiated understanding of love in marriage can help sustain marriage practices 
during the vicissitudes of life together.  While acknowledging that a theology of love is 
beneficial for pastoral ministry, the question remains if love is relevant in the juridical 
realm.  We can begin to answer that question by summarizing what has been gleaned 
regarding conjugal love and commitment in this study.  In the Pastoral Letter, Marriage:  
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Love and Life in the Divine Plan, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops 
affirms,  
Conjugal love, the love proper to marriage, is present in the commitment to the 
complete and total gift of self between husband and wife.  Conjugal love 
establishes a unique communion of persons through the relationship of mutual 
self-giving and receiving between husband and wife, a relationship by which “a 
man leaves his father and mother and clings to his wife, and the two of them 
become one body [flesh]” (Gn 2:24).80  
 
In his 1999 Allocution to the Roman Rota, John Paul II expresses the same assertion.  
“Amor coniugalis, therefore, is not only and not primarily a feeling, but is essentially a 
commitment to the other person, a commitment made by a precise act of the will.”81  He 
continues, “Once a commitment has been made and accepted through consent, love 
becomes conjugal and never loses this character.”82  Conjugal love is a specific kind of 
commitment to another person.  It is a commitment to a life-giving, faithful, permanent 
relationship.  In order for it to be truly conjugal, the love must be accepted by the other, 
that is, mutual.  John Paul II adds, “This consent is nothing other than the conscious, 
responsible assumption of a commitment through a juridical act by which, in reciprocal 
self-giving, the spouses promise total and definitive love to each other.”83  Marital 
consent is the assumption of mutual commitment (union of wills) to be faithful to one 
another in a lifelong, loving, and generative union.84  That being said, conjugal love 
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understood as a commitment to another person is certainly relevant in the juridical realm.  
When the promise of total and definitive love to the other is accepted or assumed 
consciously and intentionally, a marriage is created.  This is the juridical act of consent, 
which has theological, psychological, spiritual, moral, and social consequences.  This act 
of choosing one another in marriage is a free act “but as soon as they perform this act 
they establish a personal state in which love becomes something that is owed, entailing 
effects of a juridical nature as well.”85  The indication that love becomes something owed 
with consequent juridical effects is very difficult for many immersed in the contemporary 
American culture of the “soul mate marriage” to accept.   
 In a culture fixated upon “the outward, the immediate, the visible, the quick, the 
superficial and the provisional,” it is not difficult to imagine how to those who adhere to 
such a culture’s worldview the church’s teaching that love is owed and decisions have 
moral and juridical consequences would be rejected.86  However, this is precisely what 
happens through consent.  This is not to say that the rejection of church teaching and 
practice is due purely to opposing cultural values.  Admittedly, the church has failed 
pastorally in many ways, leaving the baptized lacking a “sense of belonging to the 
Church.”87  The Instrumentum Laboris reports that some episcopal conferences attribute 
disagreement with church teaching on the family to “a want of an authentic Christian 
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experience.”88  The pastoral activity of the church should encourage and foster “a truly 
engaging Christian experience.”89  A dispensational account of the sacraments focusing 
on “administering the sacraments apart from other forms of evangelization” diminishes 
their truly grace-filled potential, thus making pastoral activity ineffective.90  Although 
these responses seem to admit humbly that the church in many ways is stifling the Spirit 
through insufficient pastoral responses, implicit in this remark is the suggestion that 
should persons have “a truly engaging Christian experience,” that is, experience Christ on 
a personal level, they would then agree with magisterial teaching on the family.  Such a 
position fails to account for the sensus fidei, “the supernatural appreciation of the faith 
(sensus fidei) of the whole people, when, ‘from the bishops to the last of the faithful’ they 
manifest a universal consent in matters of faith and morals.”91  The sensus fidei is 
founded theologically on the sacraments empowering all of the faithful through the gifts 
of the Spirit to renew and build up the church.92  In Dei verbum 10, the Council fathers 
stress the listening function of the magisterium as the servant of the Word of God.  
Pamela McCann asserts that “the Second Vatican Council articulated its understanding of 
the sensus fidei as a feature belonging to the entire Church:  a gift of supernatural 
discernment in matters of faith.”93  However, “there is no reference at all to either the 
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sensus fidei or the sensus fielium in the legislation of the 1983 Code of Canon Law.”94  
An ecclesiology of communio needs to be open to discernment, reform, and revision from 
the ordained and non-ordained, theologians, canonists, scholars, pastoral ministers, and 
the faithful at every level of government within the church.  The only way this is possible 
is if canonical structures are in place to ensure this process.  In line with Rahner, McCann 
does point out the role of custom “as a Spirit-led phenomenon which allowed for the 
participation of all the faithful in the law-making function of the church.”95  Örsy argues, 
“Thus, there is wisdom in the old maxim re-stated in canon 27:  ‘Custom is the best 
interpreter of laws.’  But there is also a latent irony in the fact that our legal system goes a 
long way to inhibit the emergence of customs.”96  At the same time, the sensus fidei is not 
to be equated with popular opinion.  Understanding the incongruity between the practices 
of Catholics and the teachings of the magisterial church in matters of sexuality and family 
cannot be reduced to any simple explanation.  That being said, the unprecedented 
increase in cohabitation and the prevalence of divorce can be seen in the light of what has 
been articulated regarding commitment and consent in order to determine a practical 
response to this phenomenon. 
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6.2 What Should Be the Church’s Praxis in this Concrete Situation? 
 
 
6.2.1 Cohabitation, Commitment, and Consent 
In a predominantly secular culture in which apprehension toward all institutions is 
acutely present, the privatization of the family is to be expected along with fluid and 
loosely defined family relationships.  The exploding phenomenon of cohabitation outside 
of marriage can be attributed in part to changing economic and cultural conditions in 
America.  Kay Hymowitz and her colleagues conclude that the unavailability of decent-
paying jobs for less-educated Americans discourages them from marrying.  “Under these 
circumstances, it is no surprise that growing numbers of Middle Americans are 
postponing marriage to their late twenties or thirties, or foregoing marriage altogether, as 
they search for jobs that will provide them with a middle-class lifestyle.”97  This is not 
only a concern for men who are hoping to support a family but also for women who 
“expect, and are expected, to become economically independent whether they hope to 
marry or not.”98  This changed economic condition holds such influence over marriage 
practices, because the way people think about marriage has changed so significantly: 
Earlier generations looked at marriage as their entry point into adulthood 
and the crucial vehicle for defining themselves as mature individuals.  By 
contrast, young men and women today expect to achieve an individual, 
autonomous identity before they become part of a bound couple. . . .  
In this new environment, marriage is transformed from a cornerstone to a 
capstone of adult identity.  No longer the stabilizing base for the life one is 
building, it is now more of a crowning achievement.99  
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With the emergence of the developmental stage of extended adolescence coupled with the 
quest for the soul mate, marriage has become an endpoint versus a journey.  “As fully 
formed individuals who are financially and psychologically independent, they expect to 
meet each other on a higher emotional plane.”100  This view of marriage differs in many 
ways from the theology of marriage discussed in this study, because marriage as 
articulated in this study is more of a cornerstone.  Consent in marriage begins a life 
together of growing and learning together and building a life together rather than the 
view that two people have grown and learned and built all they need to bring to a 
marriage alone and are now “ready” to get married. 
 Although it is increasingly being utilized as such, cohabitation is not a 
replacement for marriage.  They are not equivalent.  In their report on delayed marriage 
in America, Hymowitz and her colleagues found that “today’s young people of all 
education levels are entering their first coresidential relationship at about the same age as 
in the past; it’s just that now they are far more likely to be ‘living together’ than 
married.”101   In addition, these households resemble marriage in that they often contain 
children.  “In 2000, about 40 percent of unmarried-couple households included one or 
more children under age 18.  For unmarried couples in the 25 to 34 age group, the 
percentage with children is higher still, approaching half of all such households.”102  
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Despite similarities in appearance, married and cohabiting couples differ significantly in 
terms of the thrust of this study:  commitment and consent.103 
 Without “the conscious, responsible assumption of a commitment through a 
juridical act,”104 that is, the mutual consent that makes marriage, the cohabiting 
relationship is ambiguous.105  In the theology of marriage presented here, conjugal love is 
expressed and made present through the mutual exchange of promises.  The wedding 
celebration is a clear expression of a consensus already begun and the desire and will for 
that union to continue into the future.106  Presuming that one’s internal consent conforms 
to the expressed consent, spouses articulate the promises they are making to one another 
from that day forward.  The wedding liturgy itself is a tangible point of reference for 
spouses to return to during the vicissitudes of married life.  In contrast, cohabitation has 
no clearly defined cultural emblems attached to it nor any explicitly circumscribed 
parameters to identify the nature of the relationship.  Cohabitation lacks the symbolizing 
function that marriage has.  Often men and women in cohabiting relationships have very 
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different expectations regarding the permanency of the relationship.107  Without this 
symbolizing function, the relationship lacks clarity for those inside and outside of the 
relationship, thus contributing to the instability of the relationship.  Stanley and his 
colleagues explain, 
The very ambiguity of cohabitation may undermine the ability of some couples to 
develop a clear and mutual understanding about the nature of their relationships.  
In contrast to ambiguity, a high level of commitment generally speaks to a sense 
of security and mutual clarity between partners and within their social networks 
about exclusivity and a future.  For many couples, the ambiguity of cohabitation 
becomes part of the pathway toward a marriage more prone to distress or divorce 
because of relationship inertia, described next.108  
 
Relationship inertia is the tendency of some cohabiting couples to slide into marriage due 
to relationship constraints that arise from living together rather than intentionally 
deciding to marry.109  The “cohabitation effect,” or the “association between premarital 
cohabitation and poorer marital outcomes,” is due to selection effects (i.e., those who 
cohabit have pre-existing characteristics associated with increased risk for divorce and 
marital distress) and experience (i.e., the experience of cohabitation itself increases risk 
for divorce and marital distress).110  The effect of relationship inertia on consequent 
marriage is that couples who may not have married due to incompatibility or other factors 
end up marrying without sufficient deliberation due to the inertial force created by 
cohabitation.  In contrast, marital consent is an act of rational self-consciousness.  
Through marital consent, spouses freely choose to be bound to one another in love for 
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life.  Marital consent embodies both dedication and constraint commitment.  The explicit 
promise to love another for life and accept their love in return implies that forward-
moving, internal sense of devotion to another characteristic of dedication.  Valid marital 
consent includes elements essential to what has been defined as dedication.  “Dedication 
refers to intrinsic interpersonal commitment and is characterized by a sense of working as 
a team or as a ‘we’ (i.e., couple identity), a desire for a long-term future together, a 
readiness to give one’s partner or the relationship high priority, and a willingness to make 
personal sacrifices for the good of one’s partner or relationship.”111  At the same time, 
marital consent is the willing acceptance of constraints and obligations and binding forces 
that discourage one from abandoning a promise once made.  Marriage is strong in both of 
these kinds of commitment, whereas both dedication and constraint commitment are 
limited and lack vigor in cohabitation.  The choice to cohabit outside of marriage is an 
intentional avoidance of legal and canonical constraints and the evasion of the positive, 
explicit, public promise to devote oneself to another for life.  Marriage is definite and 
demarcated versus cohabitation, which is ambiguous and uncertain, and it is the 
conscious, intentional assumption of a commitment that differentiates the two. 
 It is possible that cohabiting couples can make a commitment to faithfully love 
one another for life and even to be open to children, only to do so privately.  Such a 
commitment is radically different than the juridical act of marital consent.  The very fact 
that it is expressed privately (if at all) changes the nature of the act itself.  The belief that 
some private form of commitment is sufficient is evidence of the pervasiveness of 
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individualism, considering how extensive cohabitation is.  As argued in earlier chapters, 
the private and the public are not mutually exclusive.112  On the contrary, they are 
intricately intertwined.  The belief that what happens in the home is purely private and 
does not spill out into the public realm is dangerously naïve and completely false.  
Although written many years ago, the argument of Habits of the Heart is still relevant 
and true today.  “What would probably perplex and disturb Tocqueville most today is the 
fact that the family is no longer an integral part of a larger moral ecology tying the 
individual to community, church, and nation.  The family is the core of the private 
sphere, whose aim is not to link individuals to the public world but to avoid it as far as 
possible.”113  The choice to live together as an alternative to marriage is the epitome of 
accepting the privatization of the family.  In such a nebulous form of family life, 
cohabitating couples are “free” to determine the terms of their arrangement.  However, as 
David Matzko McCarthy argues, “The price for freedom from formal constraints of 
marriage is a lower commitment in enduring relationships.”114  Hymowitz and her 
colleagues find the same evidence:  “Cohabitation in the United States is far more 
unstable, conflicted, and short-lived—and far more associated with child abuse—than 
marital relationships.”115   
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We must make an important caveat here.  Galena K. Rhoades and her colleagues 
have found that there is a difference between couples that cohabit prior to engagement 
and those that cohabit after engagement: 
The basic findings are in line with previous research, as there were no significant 
differences between individuals who cohabited after engagement versus not until 
marriage, but those who cohabited before engagement reported significantly 
lower quality marriages and greater potential for divorce than those who 
cohabited only after engagement or not at all until marriage.116  
 
Couples that cohabit after engagement have made “a mutual, public commitment to 
marry” through the symbolic functioning of the engagement itself.117  These couples are 
not subject to relationship inertia, because they have made the promise to marry in the 
future prior to cohabitation.  Rhoades and her colleagues conclude that “the premarital 
cohabitation effect could be more fundamentally cast as the pre-engagement [italics 
mine] cohabitation effect.”118  The conscious decision to marry in the future, engagement, 
is a culturally recognized symbol of the couple’s commitment level to each other.  In a 
recent study from Rhoades and Stanley, they explain that “the problem of inertia is 
compounded by the fact that people tend not to make decisions about living together.”119  
Often, couples move in together hastily without due consideration of the consequences or 
                                                 
116. Galena K. Rhoades, Scott M. Stanley, and Howard J. Markman, "The Pre-Engagement 
Cohabitation Effect:  A Replication and Extension of Previous Findings," Journal of Family Psychology 
23, no. 1 (2009): 110; See also Rhoades, Stanley, and Markman, "Pre-Engagement Cohabitation and 
Gender Asymmetry in Marital Commitment, 554" and Galena H. Kline et al., "Timing is Everything:  Pre-
Engagement Cohabitation and Increased Risk for Poor Marital Outcomes," Journal of Family Psychology 
18, no. 2 (2004): 311-18. 
 
117. Rhoades, Stanley, and Markman, "The Pre-Engagement Cohabitation Effect:  A Replication 
and Extension of Previous Findings," 110. 
 
118. Ibid., 111. 
 
119. Galena K. Rhoades and Scott M. Stanley, "Before 'I Do':  What Do Premarital Experiences 
Have to Do with Marital Quality Among Today's Young Adults?" (The National Marriage Project at the 
University of Virginia, 2014), http://nationalmarriageproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/NMP-
BeforeIDoReport-Final.pdf (accessed September 15, 2014). 
 
434 
 
long-term effects of their actions.  It is possible that relationship inertia can factor in to 
marriage nullity cases under the caput of lack of due discretion.120   As discussed in 
Chapter Five, lifestyle choices can impact one’s capacity for eliciting valid consent.  
“Speed and ambiguity can combine to land people in situations that are hard to exit 
because of inertia from constraint—situations that couples might not otherwise have 
chosen if they had been more deliberative.”121  Marriage is a very different reality, and it 
is the consenting and surrendering to a given structure for the permanence and viability of 
the relationship that makes the difference.  McCarthy continues, “The basic structure of 
marriage precedes them, and they accept that they will have to bend to it, that their 
attitudes and habits will be shaped by this given structure of life.  Marriage in the church 
is framed by its place as a sign of God’s grace and by the journey of discipleship.”122  Of 
course, the particular beauty, failures, flaws, and blessings will be dependent upon the 
uniqueness of each couple as they symbolize (or fail to) the enduring love of Christ for 
the church, but the essence is the same for all.  These are the essential properties and 
elements that were discussed in relation to canon law.  These properties and elements 
must find their basis in theology and the lived experience of married persons.  These 
include unity, indissolubility, sacramentality, and the ordination of conjugal life to the 
bonum prolis and the bonum coniugum.  As stated in Chapter Five, the essential elements 
are not specifically listed in the Code but can be extrapolated from other canons and 
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jurisprudence.  This leaves canon law open to the promptings of the Spirit in the 
theological development of marriage. 
 The difference between cohabitation that occurs prior to engagement with the 
intention to marry in the future and cohabitation that occurs without the intention to 
marry is a significant difference that hinges on commitment.  In his proposal regarding 
cohabitation and marriage, Michael Lawler names committed cohabitation “prenuptial 
cohabitation, because marriage is consciously intended to follow it.”123  Such a 
distinction is helpful, because prenuptial and non-nuptial cohabitation (without the 
conscious intention to marry) are very different realities, as noted.  Lawler is clear that 
his proposal refers only to prenuptial cohabitation.  “It is only those cohabitants with an 
emphatic intention to marry who are my concern.”124  After demonstrating the “parallel 
between the pre-modern, pre-Tridentine, pre-Victorian and the modern or post-modern 
practices” of cohabitation and marriage along with the African parallel, Lawler offers his 
proposal for the Catholic Church.  “My proposal is straightforward:  a return to the 
processual marital sequence of betrothal (with appropriate ritual to ensure community 
involvement), sexual intercourse, possible fertility, ceremonial wedding to acknowledge 
and mark the consummation of both valid marriage and sacrament.”125  Lawler’s proposal 
is in line with previous research on the similarities between prenuptial cohabitants and 
married cohabitants.  It is my argument that these similarities are founded upon the 
restriction of his proposal to only prenuptial cohabitants.  His proposal concerns already 
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committed cohabitants.  This study has emphasized the need to publicly express this 
commitment in ritual, which his proposal does as well.  In Lawler’s proposal, the public 
expression of this commitment is moved from the wedding, consent to marry in the 
present, to the betrothal, consent to marry in the future.  Several questions and concerns 
follow from this.  First, Lawler states that prenuptial cohabitants “are committed to one 
another, though they have not articulated that commitment in public ritual; they fully 
intend to marry when the psychological and, especially, the economic restrictions modern 
society puts upon their right to marry are removed.”126  This is clearly the capstone model 
of marriage.  What exactly are the psychological and economic restrictions that modern 
society puts upon them?  How are those restrictions not present in a cohabiting situation 
that essentially resembles marriage, particularly when children are already present?  
Children cannot be counted as an economic reason not to marry; cohabiting households 
increasingly contain children.  The marriage tax penalty may be an economic factor, but 
the marriage tax penalty does not usually apply to those with low incomes, and 
cohabitation is more common among those of lower educational and income levels.127  
Lawler continues, “Modern society has established socioeconomic structures for marriage 
which the couple are presently unable to achieve.”128  If this is the case, then the primary 
strategies for changing marital practices should focus on social justice and alleviating 
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undue economic injustices imposed upon couples.  The reasons for the growing marriage 
gap between the highly educated and the moderately educated needs to be researched in 
greater detail.129  In addition, Lawler’s proposal does not address how to deal with broken 
betrothals, either pastorally or juridically.  The pain and devastation that accompany 
divorce is the result of broken relationships and broken promises; this is true of betrothed 
relationships as much as marriages, even more so when children are involved.  Lawler’s 
proposal simply shifts the “when” of commitment from the betrothal to the wedding.  In 
describing marriage as prophetic symbol, Lawler explains, 
They come to realize that, though their marriage is already a sacramental sign of 
the covenant between Christ and his church, it is not yet the best sign it can be.  
That best sign takes time.  In Christian marriage, even more than in any other 
marriage, the answer to the age old question of when are two people married is 
simple:  a lifetime after they exchange consent.130 
 
There is no question that a couple is “more married” after a lifetime together and that 
milestones, like significant anniversaries, should be celebrated along the way.  That being 
said, if the wedding is celebrated later in life, when is the commitment ritually celebrated 
and expressed?   Lawler’s failure to address this reality is unfortunate, because any 
practical proposal for marriage should have as its aim to help individuals to discern their 
vocation and once marriage is begun, even inchoately, to keep those families together, 
unless the marriage is abusive.  Finally, Lawler completely omits the role of discernment 
                                                 
129. For example, the capstone model of marriage is particularly detrimental to men who are not 
stably employed and for which a college education is not a real possibility.  These men may be viewed by 
themselves and potential partners as “less eligible marriage material.”  Renewed respect for the trades and 
increased opportunities for apprenticeships could be a workable strategy for decreasing the marriage gap.  
However, this does not explain why women and men may be willing to lower their expectations for a 
cohabiting partner than for a spouse, unless they view the cohabiting relationship as easier to leave. See W. 
Bradford Wilcox and Elizabeth Marquardt, eds., The State of Our Unions, Marriage in America 2010:  
When Marriage Disappears:  The New Middle America. 
 
130. Michael G. Lawler, Marriage and Sacrament:  A Theology of Christian Marriage 
(Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1993), 24. 
 
438 
 
in choosing a spouse, and his proposal leads to the problem of relationship inertia as 
discussed previously.  He states, “This inchoate marriage period would be a perfect time 
for the Church community to assist the couple in honing their relationship with an 
ongoing marriage preparation program aimed precisely at their relationship.”131  Lawler’s 
argument may be a somewhat convincing argument for the moral legitimacy of 
premarital sexual acts within the context of prenuptial cohabitation, but it lacks an 
adequate theology of marital commitment necessary for practical strategies of marriage 
preparation in terms of discernment and preventing failed relationships.  Lawler’s vision 
of the processual coming-to-be of marriage resonates with the public nature of consent 
and the bilateral dimension of consent of this study, but he places the beginning of the 
marriage in betrothal rather than consent.  “My proposal envisages a marital process that 
is initiated by symmetrical, mutual commitment and consent, is lived in mutual love, 
justice, equality, intimacy, and fulfillment, in a prenuptial cohabitation pointed to a 
wedding which consummates the process of becoming married in a mutually just, human, 
and public manner.”132  By limiting his proposal to prenuptial cohabiters, Lawler fails to 
account for the many non-nuptial cohabiters who use it to test the relationship or to coax 
the more reluctant partner (usually the man) into marriage.  
The critical element of surrender in consent was underscored in the previous 
chapter.  The practical judgment that this particular marriage with this particular person is 
chosen is a movement of the will in the complete acceptance of the other now and 
always.  It is an act of mutual surrender not only to the other but also to the new reality 
begun together.  This element of consent and commitment is crucial, because it takes 
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seriously the doubts, misgivings, disappointments, and regrets that accompany the 
consortium totius vitae.  McCarthy expresses the givenness of marriage and the element 
of surrender in consent: 
Save the nuptial “I do,” marriage and family life are sustained as much by 
consent—by a kind of resignation—as by choice.  The reality of family life is that 
we look back and think that we could have made a better choice.  We may not 
have the husband or wife we imagined that we would have when we looked in his 
or her face and said “I do.”  We may choose to have children, but in the natural 
course of things, we may have children that we would not have chosen to have.  
Family life is largely about acceptance rather than choice; not withdrawal (or 
passive resignation), but the “yes” of the adopted child . . . who consents to what 
“the taking on” of family has made of him. 
Consenting to our place in a family means that we hope that in accepting 
the demands upon us and the relationships into which we are drawn, we will find 
the depths of friendship that we desire—or that through consenting to family we 
will learn to desire relationships that give us genuine and lasting hope.133  
 
The element of surrender in consent is an unconditional acceptance of the full reality of 
one’s spouse as he or she changes over a lifetime.  Consent is expressed during the 
marriage liturgy, but spouses must continue to accept the other as he or she is every day 
thereafter.  That is the reason fidelity is essential to marriage.  Fidelity is the mobile 
virtue that connects commitment to change.134  “Marital fidelity combines commitment 
and change as two persons seek to grow in the same direction; fidelity is the careful 
tending of both the commitments and the changes necessary in a maturing love.”135  
 The view of marriage as cornerstone of adult identity versus capstone corresponds 
to the theology of marriage espoused here.  In the cornerstone model, marriage is 
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considered the “stabilizing base for the life one is building.”136  One of the essential ends 
of marriage is the bonum coniugum, that maturing of spouses that happens through the 
fidelity of the spouses to their marital commitment.  The capstone view of marriage 
implies that individuals have already achieved their own personal and professional 
perfection, so that they are now ready for marriage.  The popular view that couples 
should live together until they have reached some elusive level of “readiness” is 
antithetical to the understanding that marriage is ordered to the bonum coniugum, because 
the conjugal good is what marriage is directed toward, not what needs to be present in 
order to be ready to get married.  It is what happens to couples in a life well-lived 
together.  Marital consent is the beginning of the journey of growing in goodness 
together.  The wedding celebration is a necessary and formative component of the marital 
journey, because it externally manifests the consensus that is forming and each person’s 
will that this union continue for a lifetime. 
 In the sweeping tide of the phenomenon of cohabitation, the Church needs to 
better explain the difference between marriage and cohabitation and how commitment 
makes a difference in the context of the relationship.  The ordering of our sexual lives 
and family relationships is a very personal matter, but not private.  The church’s interest 
in family relationships does not arise from a desire to impose extraneous and 
cumbersome institutional armor on a self-sustaining, precious, private escape from the 
world.  The external commitment of marriage strengthens the relationship from the inside 
and links it to the greater community, church, and world.  Through marital consent, 
couples step into the structure of marriage in order that they will be able to share in the 
consortium totius vitae.  The wedding celebration invites the church into this relationship 
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to protect and support it.  The canonical form of marriage is the juridical expression that 
the spouses are the ministers of the sacrament, yet the ordained along with the witnesses 
accept that consent and promise the continued prayer and care of the church community.  
The commitment to love another for life in a faithful, life-giving union is much too 
difficult to uphold alone.  Rhoades and Stanley argue that the public nature of the 
wedding ritual contributes to the health and vitality of the committed relationship.  The 
wedding liturgy “symbolizes a clear decision to commit one’s marriage,” and “making a 
clear, deliberate decision to commit to one option and reject alternative options 
strengthens a person’s tendency to follow through on the commitment.”137  They 
continue, “Wedding ceremonies ritualize the foundation of commitment.”138  Beginning 
in faith formation for children and reaching out to the public in evangelization, the 
Church should be teaching the significance of this commitment and how the conscious 
decision to commit along with its public expression changes the nature of the relationship 
itself.   
This effort to educate the faithful and the world regarding the distinctiveness of 
marital consent and the nature of the relationship it produces should be the collaborative 
work of catechists, ministers of marriage preparation, theologians, canonists, clinical 
psychologists, married couples, and ordained ministers.  Considering the prevalence and 
continued increase in cohabitation as a replacement for marriage, this needs to be a 
sustained and structurally organized effort.  Such meetings should be regular and 
collaborative for the practical purpose of marriage ministry.  Marriage ministry in all of 
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its stages would be considered for research, discussion, and decision.  Those pastoral 
ministers involved with marriage preparation and formation would benefit tremendously 
from the expertise of canonists and tribunal advocates that have listened in depth to the 
stories of broken relationships.  The very personal and painful stories of those who have 
gone through the annulment process can be used redemptively to work toward preventing 
divorce through strengthening marriages, more effectively preparing couples for 
marriage, and finding creative ways to incorporate lessons on commitment into children’s 
faith formation.   
6.2.2 Needed:  A Theology of Dating and Discernment 
A topic of particular importance and urgent need is the lacuna in theological 
literature and the church’s documents on the role of dating and discernment in marriage 
preparation.  In Chapter Four, we elucidated the groundless and, therefore dangerous, 
assumption implicit in church documents that couples approaching the church for 
marriage have already discerned their vocation to marriage with their intended spouse 
with the help of the community and pastor.  This is an outlandish assumption.  The 
phenomenon of “sliding versus deciding” identified by Stanley, Rhoades, and Markman 
is evidence that discernment is precisely what is NOT to be assumed.  The transition 
many couples make from noncohabitation to cohabitation is “often a nondeliberative and 
incremental process.”139  Although cohabitation resembles marriage in many ways, this 
ambiguous state is considered by many to be part of the process of dating.  Kline and her 
colleagues hypothesize how negative interaction patterns may contribute to the 
“decision” to cohabit as a part of dating: 
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We speculate that negative interaction patterns may be part of the reason some 
couples decide to move in together before committing to marriage.  These couples 
may be in love, but also may wish to “test” their relationships because they are 
having trouble getting along.  Their lower confidence and interpersonal 
commitment scores may reflect this sense of wanting to test the relationship.  In 
contrast, couples who were less negative during dating may have decided to 
marry instead of cohabiting first, feeling less need to test their relationships.140  
 
The theory of relationship inertia reveals why cohabitation is not a good strategy for 
testing the relationship or using it as a part of the dating and decision process. 
“Obviously, many cohabiting couples break up, but it may be harder to break up when 
cohabiting than when not.  Thus, cohabitation itself may not cause risks as much as it 
makes it harder to terminate a riskier union, thus constraining the search for a better 
partner fit.”141  In short, cohabitation defeats the very purpose of dating.  In addition, 
when cohabiting there is a greater chance of bringing children into an already uncertain 
and tenuous union.  It is a process that is inherently at odds with the rights of children. 
 For the care and preparation of those who do approach the church for marriage, 
whether cohabiting or not, there is still the need for greater clarity and precision 
regarding how and when their commitment forms.  The prevalence of affirmative 
decisions of nullity on the grounds of defective consent speaks to this theological and 
pastoral gap.  This is precisely where conclusions drawn from the myriad of cases 
brought before tribunals could benefit those ministering to the engaged.  What are the 
dominant trends in affirmative sentences across dioceses?  How could have more 
effective marriage preparation either helped this particular marriage to thrive or 
prevented it from happening altogether?  Marriage preparation is happening way too late 
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with inordinate focus on immediate preparation.  At this time, external pressures from 
family and the wedding industry make this the worst possible time for discernment, as 
Fintan Gavin explains:  “One very practical difficulty with these courses is that couples 
tend to do them in the months or indeed the weeks leading up to their wedding when the 
decision has already been made and the preparations are already in place for the wedding.  
It means that these courses or programmes are too late to help people with making this 
critical decision to marry.”142  The church is painfully absent from the process of 
discernment, if it happens at all in dating. 
 In order to formulate a practical response to the Church’s absence in the dating 
process, a theology of dating needs to be further explored.  Jason King and Donna Freitas 
have attended to the theological and spiritual meaning of dating.143  They point out that 
all too often Christian perspectives on dating equate dating with premarital sex in the 
context of sin, or these perspectives view dating as an “intrusion” into one’s relationship 
with God, with marriage being the only relationship that is “divinely ordained.”144  King 
and Freitas conclude that dating can be the subject of theology and a spiritual reality: 
Those who are dating are called to view each other as clues to a mystery, 
assistance in a journey, or preparation for a quest.  The mystery, journey, or quest 
is a process of discerning each one’s response to God’s call.  Hence, dating must 
a) be a relationship that is loving since that is the only proper response to 
mutually exchanged clues, assistance, and preparation, and b) be a relationship 
that is evaluated in light of God’s call.145 
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Dating can have a profound spiritual impact on persons when engaged in consciously and 
intentionally and when both the self and the other are treated with the honor and respect 
proper to human dignity.  Within a theological horizon, the Church can be involved 
pastorally in the context of dating in many ways.  The website, “For Your Marriage,” that 
grew out of the USCCB’s National Pastoral Initiative for Marriage is a tremendous 
resource for people involved in all stages of marriage preparation, including pastoral 
ministers.146  Parishes should provide discussion groups, Bible studies, sponsor couple 
programs, and social events in support of the process of discernment in dating.  Catholic 
schools could provide mandatory marriage courses for upperclassmen.  Resources should 
be made available for group discussion or private study to educate the faithful on 
vocational discernment and mate selection.147 
Although engaged couples are required to participate in the canonical inquiry into 
the freedom to marry, these prenuptial investigations are failing to prevent many invalid 
marriages in the church.  The focus of immediate preparation is primarily instructional, 
whether in the form of classes, retreats, or sponsor couples.  However, with many 
declarations of nullity granted under c. 1095, is instruction sufficient preparation?  
William Woestman posits this question: 
Prenuptial instructions are needed, but it is rare that a tribunal declares a 
marriage null because one or both of the parties lacked the knowledge required 
for validly contracting marriage.  Most marriages are declared null because a 
person was incapable of getting married.  In a word, our pastoral practice of 
preparing couples for marriage has not caught up with the Code and the 
jurisprudence followed by our tribunals.  Prenuptial investigations must address 
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the real problem of the Church’s assisting at the marriages of persons incapable 
of getting married. 
At first glance it may seem that the natural right to marry militates against 
the Church’s right to refuse to witness a couple’s marriage.  But no person has a 
right to do what the individual cannot do.148  
 
Although Woestman refers here to preventing marriages that would be invalid due to 
incapacity, the same difficulty applies to couples that may marry invalidly due to 
determining error, simulation, or condition.  Clearly and ideally, one would hope these 
marriages could be discouraged and the attempt to marry abandoned; however, the 
critical question is:  how do pastors and their marriage preparation teams make this 
assessment and do so with great pastoral care and sensitivity?  Klaus Lüdicke disparages 
the acceptance of a minimalist concept of consent in marriage nullity cases in light of the 
changes to canon law in the revised Code and the theology of the Second Vatican 
Council.  “Canon law on consent assumes that an indiscriminate, unreflective consent 
that corresponds to the minimum standards of c. 1096 suffices for a marriage, and that 
only the qualifying defects mentioned in the Code lead to nullity.”149  He proposes that 
the Church should “raise the bar” by permitting only couples “who have been sufficiently 
prepared by the Church itself for such a demanding community of life.”150  Practically 
speaking, is such a task even possible without turning many people in need of 
evangelization and pastoral care away from the Church, possibly forever?  An even 
greater difficulty is in the doubtful assumption that parishes are equipped with the 
resources to make this kind of assessment of every couple.  That being said, if greater 
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resources are not allocated to pastoral means of marriage preparation in all of its stages, 
then more resources are needed on the other end of the process for tribunals in 
adjudicating declarations of nullity. 
 
6.3 What Means and Strategies Should Be Used to Promote and Protect  
 
       More Loving, Generative, Lifelong Sacramental Marriages? 
 
6.3.1 Collaboration 
The specific means and strategies should grow out of collaboration at all levels:  
local, diocesan, national, and universal.  The Extraordinary Synod on the Family in 2014 
to be followed by the Ordinary General Assembly in 2015 is evidence that this is already 
happening in a significant way.  According to c. 342, the purpose of the synod of bishops 
is “to foster closer unity between the Roman Pontiff and bishops, to assist the Roman 
Pontiff with their counsel in the preservation and growth of faith and morals and in the 
observance and strengthening of ecclesiastical discipline, and to consider questions 
pertaining to the activity of the Church in the world.”  The creation of the synod grew out 
of the spirit of communion and collegiality of the Second Vatican Council.151  The synod 
works to foster unity between the Pope and the bishops, to supply accurate information, 
and to facilitate agreement in doctrinal and pastoral matters.152  As a consultative body, 
the synod does not resolve issues but offers the pope information, perspectives, and 
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suggestions, and the Pope is free to ratify the decisions of the synod or not.153  As Walter 
Kasper says in The Gospel of the Family, the synod is “the common (syn) path (odos) of 
the entire Church, the path of attentive listening to each other, exchanging ideas, and 
prayer.”154  The gathering of thoughts, opinions, and suggestions from the preparatory 
document along with the presence of non-voting auditors at the Extraordinary Synod on 
the Family demonstrates a willingness to hear and learn from the faithful on the part of 
the bishops.  This is the kind of collaboration that should happen at the local, diocesan, 
and national levels on a regular basis.  These findings and decisions can then be 
communicated at the synodal assembly for papal consideration. 
 Because each diocese and community is so diverse, it is impossible to give 
concrete practical strategies and solutions to be implemented and utilized for the 
protection and promotion of vibrant sacramental marriages in the United States.  Those 
specific means and strategies would be the outcome of these regular, sustained, 
structurally organized meetings.  The admitted impossibility of doing so brings up the 
question of the suitability of codification of canon law.  Codification removes canon law 
from the particular contexts and pastoral situations from which the canons arose.  In 
addition, the revised Code does not provide a structural process for necessary revision 
and renewal.155  Unless the concept of a universal code is to be abandoned altogether, 
processes for the Code’s ongoing adaptation need to be promulgated.  In August 2014, 
Pope Francis established a Special Commission for the study of the reform of the 
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matrimonial process in canon law, according to the Holy See Press Office.  The reform of 
canon law in marriage matters should be studied and evaluated every five years or 
whenever an urgent need develops at the discretion of the magisterium.  John McAreavey 
points out that the Code “presupposes that the principles and procedures it contains will 
require further application in the historical and cultural context of each region or diocese, 
whether by Bishops’ Conferences or by individual diocesan Bishops.”156  Examples of 
the Code acknowledging the importance of particular law and custom are canon 1067 on 
the investigation of freedom to marry and canon 1072 on the marriages of the young.  In 
addition, canon law acknowledges civil authority and the civil effects of marriage, thus 
demonstrating that canon law is to be “in continual dynamic dialogue with the culture in 
which it is being applied.”157  McAreavey continues, “The effective application of the 
canon law of marriage presupposes a dialogue between the general law of the Church and 
the particular culture of the region or diocese in which it is being applied.  This demands 
pastoral creativity and imagination, as well as fidelity to the tradition of the Church.”158  
 6.3.2 Pastoral and Juridical as Integrated Unity 
 Although specific practical strategies will not be delineated here, many of these 
potential policies, plans, and procedures would revolve around one central question:  Do 
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the current pastoral means of care and juridical structures stifle or facilitate the working 
of the Spirit in the concrete marriages of the faithful and those preparing for marriage?  
Many areas of dispute and disagreement in the church’s treatment of marriage stem from 
the false dichotomy between pastoral ministry and law.  An example of this 
misunderstanding of the pastoral nature of canon law is found in Joseph Martos’ 
argument that the classical conception of the sacramentality of marriage operates within 
the framework of scholastic theology, and this conceptual framework has been 
surpassed.159  He states,  
It [scholastic theology] is the conceptual framework within which both the 1917 
and the 1983 Code of Canon Law operate, and although Catholic theologians 
have consciously abandoned Aristotelian metaphysical categories (matter and 
form, essence and existence, potency and act, etc.), they still inadvertently attempt 
to pose and solve problems using the linguistic residue of scholastic theology.160  
 
Without considering the possibility that the language and conceptual framework of the 
Code could be translated and transposed into a new framework, Martos proposes 
abandoning the tribunal system completely: 
The approach to the sacramentality of marriage here proposed avoids making 
juridical pronouncements about the presence or absence of the sacramentum et 
res, the sacramental marriage bond or contract, in any existing or previous 
marriage, for that concept simply does not enter into this conceptual framework.  
It therefore dispenses with the possibility of declaring the nullity of marriages, for 
the concept likewise has no place in this frame of reference.  If any portion of it 
were adopted by the church in the future, it would permit the dismantling of the 
current tribunal system, suggesting that the church devote its full institutional 
energies to the pastoral care of engaged and married persons.161  
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In agreement with Martos, this study proposed that were greater time, attention, care, and 
resources spent on the pastoral care of those preparing for marriage and those already 
married, then there would be less need for the ministry of the tribunals; however, canon 
law is still necessary to ensure the rights of persons are protected and the good order of 
the community is promoted.  There is no opposition between the juridical and the 
pastoral.  The language of the code and the intricate distinctions among the sources of 
nullity could be updated and reformed to better reflect theological realities without 
abandoning the entire sytem. 
 The inaccurate mutual exclusion of the pastoral from the juridical dimensions of 
the church can be traced to a false understanding of justice and mercy.  The 1990 Address 
of John Paul II to the Tribunal of the Roman Rota focuses on the relationship between 
pastoral ministry and law in the church.162  John Paul II explains the root of the mistaken 
idea regarding law and pastoral practice: 
This distortion lies in attributing pastoral importance and intent only to those 
aspects of moderation and humanness in the law which are linked immediately 
with canonical equity (æquitas canonica)—that is, holding that only the 
exceptions to the law, the potential non-recourse to canonical procedures and 
sanctions, and the streamlining of judicial formalities have any real pastoral 
relevance.  One thus forgets that justice and law in the strict sense—and 
consequently general norms, proceedings, sanctions and other typical juridical 
expressions, should they become necessary—are required in the Church for the 
good of souls and are therefore intrinsically pastoral.163  
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Not only are the juridical and pastoral dimensions of the church not in opposition, they 
are “united inseparably.”164  “In effect, juridical-canonical activity is pastoral by its very 
nature.  It constitutes a special participation in the mission of Christ, the shepherd 
(pastore), and consists in bringing into reality the order of intra-ecclesial justice willed by 
Christ himself.”165  In his 2014 Address to the Roman Rota, Pope Francis uses the image 
of the Good Shepherd in describing the function of the ecclesiastical judge.166  John Paul 
II continues in his 1990 Address, 
It is not true that, to be more pastoral, the law should become less juridical.  
Surely, the very many expressions of that flexibility that have always marked 
canon law, precisely for pastoral reasons, must be kept in mind and applied.  But 
the demands of justice must be respected also; they may be superseded because of 
that flexibility, but never denied.  In the Church, true justice, enlivened by charity 
and tempered by equity, always merits the descriptive adjective pastoral.  There 
can be no exercise of pastoral charity that does not take account, first of all, of 
pastoral justice.167  
 
Immediately following this description of the pastoral nature of canon law, John Paul II 
emphasizes the necessity of understanding “the harmony between justice and mercy.”168  
Mercy does not mean the relaxation of justice, because “love and mercy cannot put aside 
the demands of truth.”169  In The Gospel of the Family, his address given to the consistory 
in anticipation of the Extraordinary Synod on the Family, Cardinal Walter Kasper 
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reiterates the deep connection between the juridical and pastoral dimensions of the church 
and seeks to proffer an explanation of the pastoral nature of canon law and how this 
encompasses both justice and mercy: 
What does pastoral mean?  Certainly not simply indulgence, which would be a 
false understanding both of pastoral care and of mercy. Mercy does not exclude 
justice; it is no cheap grace or a kind of clearance sale.  Pastoral care and mercy 
are not contradictory to justice, but are, so to speak, the higher righteousness 
because behind every individual legal appeal stands not only a case that can be 
viewed through the lens of a general rule, but rather a human person, who is not 
only a case, but rather a being who possesses unique personal dignity.  That 
makes necessary a hermeneutic that is juridical and pastoral and that applies a 
general law with prudence and wisdom, according to justice and fairness, to a 
concrete, often complex situation.170  
 
The intrinsic connection between justice and mercy means that the church cannot 
sacrifice the truth or eliminate justice for the sake of mercy. 
 Although some may deem Kasper’s recommendations regarding the pastoral care 
of the divorced and civilly remarried more merciful, he is clear that justice and mercy are 
not contrary.  His thoughts regarding divorced and civilly remarried persons are not a call 
for the reversal of the doctrine of the indissolubility of sacramental marriage.171  Mercy 
cannot obliterate what is or pretend something is other than it is.172  Mercy deals with sin, 
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suffering, and injustice with incalculable love.  In his 1983 Theology of Christian 
Marriage, Kasper illustrates the reality of civil remarriage after divorce, a passage worth 
quoting at length, because it is in continuity with his current proposals: 
A broken marriage is not simply cancelled out.  It continues to exist, even 
though it can be compared with a ruin.  It is therefore not possible to replace it 
with a second marriage equal to the first.  What is possible, however, and in many 
cases necessary for survival, is some kind of emergency accommodation.  This 
image would seem to be in accordance with the way in which God acts in the 
history of human salvation.  He often writes on crooked lines.  It is on the basis of 
this point of view that the Church constructed its order of penance in the past—
God does not let us perish after the shipwreck of sin, but he also does not simply 
allow us to board a comfortable new ship.  What he does is to offer us the plank 
of penance so that we can save our lives.  A third comparison may also help us to 
understand this problem.  Guilt wounds us and the wound does not simply 
disappear.  It forms a scar and such scars are lasting signs that can hurt again, but 
they allow us to go on living a humanly fulfilled life that may be all the more 
mature because of suffering. 
These images, then, point to the possible ways of preserving the lasting 
reality of the first marriage and therefore the continued existence of the Christian 
bond of marriage on the one hand and of recognizing, on the other, the human and 
Christian values of a second civilly contracted marriage in cases where people are 
prepared for conversion and reconciliation and do what is humanly possible in 
their situation.173  
 
Kasper’s approach to the problem of divorced and civilly remarried persons is envisaged 
within “the pastoral care for marriage and family life in their totality.”174  This pastoral 
care encompasses remote marriage preparation through the entire lifecycle of marriage, 
including the pastoral care of persons whose marriages have irretrievably broken down.  
Kasper is clear that pastoral care means recognizing and beginning from the unique and 
unrepeatable character of every person.  Recalling the parable of the Good Shepherd, 
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Kasper calls attention to the fact that “no human being is simply an instance of general 
human nature, and no human being can be judged only according to a general rule.”175    
 With the qualification that “there cannot be a general solution for all cases,” 
Kasper mentions two situations that he believes should be seriously considered at the 
synod.176  These “intolerable marriage situations” have been discussed and debated for 
many years.177  The two situations have been called “conflict” and “hardship” situations: 
To recall briefly, the “conflict” situation is one in which a previous marriage is 
objectively invalid, but for some reason it is not possible to prove this in the 
Church’s external forum.  Before God the person is free to marry, but not in the 
Church, hence the “conflict.”  The “hardship” situation is one in which a valid 
marriage has broken down irretrievably and one or both parties have married 
outside the Church.178  
 
Although John Paul II did not use these terms specifically in Familiaris consortio, he 
acknowledges the different situations, like the difference between “those who have 
sincerely tried to save their first marriage and have been unjustly abandoned, and those 
who through their own grave fault have destroyed a canonically valid marriage.”179  He 
recognizes that sometimes there are those that remarry for the sake of the children and 
may or may not believe that their previous marriage was invalid.  Despite these 
distinctions, John Paul II affirms the teaching that those who have divorced and remarried 
are not to be admitted to the Eucharist.180  This teaching was reiterated by the 
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Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in 1994 and again in 2000 by the Pontifical 
Council for Legislative Texts.181  Regarding conflict situations, Kasper does not 
recommend a doctrinal change but questions if there may be “more pastoral and spiritual 
procedures” available and proposes that the bishop entrust this task to a priest with 
pastoral experience as a penitentiary or episcopal vicar.182  In addition, he questions how 
pastoral it can be for cases to be decided at a second or third hearing without contact with 
the spouses.183  Regarding hardship cases, Kasper argues that the refusal of divorced and 
civilly remarried persons to the Eucharist calls into question the entire sacramental 
structure.184  If the divorced and civilly remarried are still members of the church yet 
denied the sacraments, then one must assume that the sacraments are extraneous to the 
path of salvation.  With the admission that experts are not in agreement on the details 
surrounding the practice of the early church in marriage matters, Kasper brings to light 
those practices involving Christians in a second marriage who “had available to them, 
after a period of penance, admittedly no second ship—no second marriage—but indeed a 
plank of salvation through participation in communion.”185  The image of the plank and 
the ship from his earlier work reinforces the point that he is not arguing that the bond is 
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not indissoluble but rather that the church find a way to deal with these situations through 
forgiveness, which is the supreme gift of the faith.  His pastoral solution is for the 
“smaller segment of divorced and remarried individuals who are honestly interested in 
the sacraments.”186  With so many divorces and remarriages and so few of those seeking 
annulment, his concern is that the next generation will be lost due to rigidity in pastoral 
practice. 
 In addition to these recommendations, Kasper mentions the principle of 
oikonomia of the Orthodox churches.  Oikonomia is a “spiritual and pastoral basic 
attitude that applies the gospel like a good paterfamilias, understood as oikonomos, in 
conformity to the model of the divine economy of salvation.”187  Örsy describes this 
pastoral practice that has legal effects but is not strictly part of the legal structure of the 
Orthodox churches: 
Now, what happens in the case of oikonomia is that the bishop, the oikonomos of 
the house of God, turns to the Risen One and brings the insoluble situation before 
him.  Through an analogia fidei, he searches and seeks how the Lord in his power 
would heal a wound, would redress an injustice, would bring peace where it is 
needed.  Then, because the church has the power to “bind and loose,” the 
oikonomos himself (never less than a bishop, or a synod of bishops) brings 
redemption into the situation where everything seemed to be amiss.188  
 
J.M.R. Tillard explains the concept in this way:  “Mercifulness may be the only way, 
recognized by the bishop, to heal tragic situations the nomos could not solve.”189  Kasper 
is adamant that this is not a “cheap path” but rather a pastoral practice that takes seriously 
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the role of repentance and conversion in the Christian life.190  In addition, it puts into 
practice the role of bishop as pastor of those entrusted to his care. 
 Oikonomia is to be distinguished from epieikeia which is “a virtue which helps us 
to apply rules rightly.”191  Hans-Georg Gadamer explains how epieikeia is the “correction 
of the law.”192  “The law is always deficient, not because it is imperfect in itself but 
because human reality is necessarily imperfect in comparison to the ordered world of law, 
and hence allows of no simple application of the law.”193  Örsy contends that the only 
way for justice to be realized and legalism avoided in any legal system is for epieikeia to 
prevail in the application of laws to complex, concrete situations.194  Örsy further 
explicates how equity differs from epieikeia.  Epieikeia and law belong to the same 
system as epieikeia is the virtue that balances out the generality of law when it is applied 
to concrete cases.  Because the perfectly ordered law cannot be applied with full rigor to 
an imperfectly ordered situation, epieikeia must be invoked.  On the other hand, equity 
comes into play when a value needs to be upheld and the law is unable to do so.  “When, 
in concrete life, a case arises which cannot be justly resolved by law, it is right that the 
community should turn to philosophy or religion and let them prevail over the positive 
law.  When this happens, there is authentic equity.”195  Appeals to oikonomia, epieikia, 
and equity attest to the fact that the concrete lives of the faithful are complex and canon 
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law, no matter how well formulated, cannot be rigidly applied.  Intolerable marriage 
situations are prime examples of the multifaceted situations of the faithful where the 
application of the law is far from clear, yet pastoral care needs to be given in a way that 
justice and mercy are balanced. 
 James Coriden offers a proposal for the pastoral care of the divorced and 
remarried in which the tribunal is only one pastoral solution offered, and it should be 
used as a last resort, as John Paul II had told a group of American bishops.196  Coriden’s 
argument is that for most divorced and remarried American Catholics, the diocesan 
tribunal is the “first and preferred option.”197  In other words, the church is approached 
only after the civil divorce and usually when attempt at another marriage is sought.  
Coriden argues that although the tribunal process often brings peace of mind and healing 
and lends itself to discovering the truth of the marital breakdown, it helps only a small 
portion of those Catholics affected by divorce and remarriage due to the unavailability of 
efficient tribunals in most parts of the world.198  In addition, the process itself can be 
painful, embarrassing, and misunderstood.  Coriden’s vision of a renewed pastoral 
strategy for the care of the divorced and remarried has three phases “in parish 
communities, deaneries, vicariates, cities, or other appropriate subdivisions of dioceses, 
with the support of diocesan resources.”199  First, following c. 1063, a comprehensive 
approach to marriage preparation in local churches should be strengthened.  This includes 
therapy and retreats for troubled marriages.  Second, according to c. 1676, a judge is to 
                                                 
196. Coriden, "The Tribunal as Last Resort," 60. 
 
197. Ibid. 
 
198. Ibid., 65-66. 
 
199. Ibid., 69. 
 
460 
 
use pastoral means to induce spouses to restore conjugal living.  In other words, before a 
couple whose marriage is in trouble comes to the church seeking annulment, pastoral 
ministers (counselors, mediators, or sponsor couples) should become involved to help 
them reconcile.  This phase testifies to the public nature of marriage and the belief that 
just as the church was present accepting their consent at their wedding, so also the church 
is present to support them as their consensus falters.  This phase would seem to be the 
most difficult to implement.  With the predominant view that marriage is private, people 
may be very reluctant to explore these options.  A great deal of resources would need to 
be allocated to make this a real possibility, and a plan would need to be created and 
implemented to educate the faithful that the church cares about each marriage and is able 
to support and strengthen couples in significant and meaningful ways.  The final phase 
occurs when couples have civilly divorced and remarried.  A “pastoral diagnostician” 
would listen attentively to the couple and offer a range of options.  Cordien notes that 
“the process of listening, recalling, reflecting, evaluating, and discerning may take 
several weeks or even months.”200  With the assistance of the pastoral minister, the 
couple would employ “their own spiritual authority of discretion as well as the virtue of 
epikeia” as they “choose a course of action which would lead them toward reconciliation 
with God and with the local church.”201  These options include:  a group process of 
penitence and reconciliation, access to the sacraments after a careful process of guided 
reflection, toleration of civil marriage, penitential recognition of non-sacramental 
remarriage, membership in another parish (or ecclesial communion) so as not to cause 
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scandal, or petitioning the tribunal for a declaration of nullity.202  Each of these options 
needs to be evaluated and only those that uphold the values of the unity, permanence, 
fidelity, generativity, and the conjugal good in marriage while at the same time allowing 
for the complexity of concrete, human marriages can be maintained.   
 The prohibition of divorced and civilly remarried persons from the Eucharist is 
found in canon 915—Those who have been excommunicated or interdicted after the 
imposition of declaration of the penalty and others obstinately persevering in 
manifest grave sin are not to be admitted to holy communion.  The reasons for their 
prohibition from the Eucharist are that (1) “their state and condition of life objectively 
contradict that union of love between Christ and the Church which is signified and 
effected by the Eucharist”; (2) “if these people were admitted to the Eucharist, the 
faithful would be led into error and confusion regarding the Church’s teaching about the 
indissolubility of marriage”; (3) “Reconciliation in the sacrament of Penance which 
would open the way to the Eucharist, can only be granted to those who, repenting of 
having broken the sign of the Covenant and of fidelity to Christ, are sincerely ready to 
undertake a way of life that is no longer in contradiction to the indissolubility of 
marriage.”203  Canon  915 applies to those who are “obstinately persevering in manifest 
grave sin.”  John Huels clarifies that this obstinacy implies that “the pastor or other 
church authority has expressly warned the offending party to cease committing the sin, 
but this warning is not heeded” and that this warning is to be given in the external forum 
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either orally or in writing.204  In addition, Huels contends, “The prohibition of the 
Eucharist by a minister in one community does not require that the person also be barred 
elsewhere where the sin may be known only to a few.  This canon is directed to 
individual ministers of communion who must interpret it in the situation of their own 
community.”205  This canon seems to be a prohibition given to an individual obstinately 
and publicly persisting in grave sin given at the discretion of the pastor of the community, 
yet for the divorced and remarried, it is categorically applied to all.  In addition, it is 
unfortunate and inconsistent that this canon is applied most often to “sexual sin” (civilly 
remarried persons being unfaithful to their first spouse).  Other than the question of 
whether public officials with views antithetical to church teaching should be admitted to 
the Eucharist, there is little to no conversation about cases of obstinate, manifest grave sin 
in other areas.  Currently, for the divorced and remarried, the only options for admission 
to the sacraments are to seek a declaration of nullity (or possible dissolution for non-
consummated or non-sacramental marriages) or to live in the so-called “brother-sister” 
relationship.  The “brother-sister” option should be abandoned, because it does not 
preclude scandal (because how are other parishioners to know their private sexual 
arrangement), and it can be detrimental to the marital relationship.  If sexual intercourse 
is what consummates marriage, how can a couple be asked to exclude permanently that 
which is so essential that it effectively completes their consent?  Presently, the only other 
option for divorced and remarried persons is to approach the tribunal for a declaration of 
nullity.  In agreement with Coriden, I see the tribunal as the last resort when efforts to 
                                                 
204. John P. Beal, James A. Coriden, and Thomas J. Green, eds., New Commentary on the Code of 
Canon Law, Commissioned by the Canon Law Society of America (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 2000), 
1110. 
 
205. Ibid., 1111. 
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understand, heal, and reconcile, though not in vain, have been unsuccessful.  In those 
cases, the tribunal is a ministry of justice.  In the vast majority of cases, a declaration of 
nullity is sought in order to demonstrate that a person is free to enter a new union.  In the 
matter of the new union, the church has the responsibility to protect the prospective 
spouse.   
 According to c. 1683, once two conforming sentences have been issued and 
communicated to the parties, they are free to contract a new marriage unless a prohibition 
has been attached to the sentence.  A judicial vetitum, which differs from the 
administrative vetitum or monitum of c. 1077, is a prohibition to marry and does not have 
an invalidating effect but prohibits a licit union.  Robitaille explains, “A judicial vetitum 
is a statement made by a single judge or a college of judges that the reason for nullity in 
the person’s consent is feared to continue to exist at the time of the sentence declaring 
nullity.”206  Because marriage has public and social consequences, the church has a 
responsibility to prohibit a future marriage that would be invalid for the same reasons or 
for other reasons that surfaced during the course of the judicial process.  In the 
preparation process for the new marriage, the provisions or conditions of the vetitum must 
be addressed.  Although Craig Cox notes, 
Tribunal officials, however, often express the concern that those preparing 
couples for marriage do not always take these prohibitions seriously enough, 
sometimes ignoring them entirely or treating them superficially.  In part, this may 
reflect the fact that marriage preparation ministers do not have access to the acts 
of the case.  Thus, they may not fully appreciate why the judge imposed the 
prohibition.207  
 
                                                 
206. Lynda A. Robitaille, "The Vetitum and Monitum:  Consequences of Marriage Nullity or 
Pastoral Preparation for a New Marriage?" Studia Canonica 38 (2004): 63. 
 
207. Beal, Coriden, and Green, New Commentary on the Code of Canon Law, 1778. 
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This is unfortunate, because used properly the vetitum could help the couple preparing for 
marriage to better understand the underlying issues that contributed to the previous, failed 
marriage.  In a more integrated approach with a “pastoral diagnostician,” the vetitum or 
monitum (a warning regarding areas of concern) could be addressed and used as a tool in 
second marriage preparation.  The processes for annulment proceedings are in need of 
reform, revision, and streamlining, but this cannot be at the cost of ascertaining truth and 
seeking justice.  The process of seeking a declaration of nullity should be an opportunity 
to discover one’s own responsibility in the breakdown of the relationship.  Through the 
prudential judgment of the tribunal and the compassionate assistance of advocates and 
staff, this process should aid in understanding and healing, so that ultimately persons are 
able to experience the forgiving and transforming love of God.  It should never be treated 
as a formality in order to be able to participate in the sacraments or to contract a new 
marriage.  The matrimonial nullity process should function in a way that spouses can 
come to terms with the reality of their history and current situation, so that they can grow 
and learn and change.  The tribunal should be viewed as one vital and necessary part of 
the pastoral care of persons.   
 Admittedly, the tribunal system is imperfect and the intolerable marriage 
situations explained earlier will continue to exist no matter how well matrimonial 
processes are revised and streamlined.  One can only think of the case of a spouse who 
has been abandoned.  This is not to say that there is ever a completely innocent spouse in 
a marital relationship.  However, the bilateral dimension of consent elucidated in this 
study along with the explanation of philia illustrates the element of powerlessness in 
every marriage.  Each spouse is responsible for his or her contribution to the consensus, 
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yet ultimately the relationship’s quality and success depends upon the mutual 
interdependence of their wills.  This is why marriage is so precarious.  Often, the sinful 
actions of one spouse are met with a sinful response and the pattern continues in small 
but significant ways until the structure folds.  In a sacramental theology, the stabilizing 
force is the faithful will of God and the continual offer of grace.  Spouses are then free to 
accept or reject that grace and open themselves to forgiveness and healing.  In the case of 
an abandoned spouse, the determination of one spouse alone to forgive and to be faithful 
to the other cannot make the relationship last.  Should that be a case where invalidity 
cannot be proven in the external forum (conflict) or where the marriage is valid but 
irretrievably broken (hardship), this spouse is now faced with the tremendous grief of 
being forsaken and the inability to marry again and at the same time be able to approach 
the sacraments for strength and solace and grace.  In such cases, pastoral strategies need 
to be developed so that these persons can experience the shelter, love, and mercy of God 
in the sacraments even as the ruin of the first marriage remains.   
One of the primary aims of the pastoral ministry of marriage and family in all its 
stages is to enable and empower children and adolescents, young adults, married couples, 
cohabiting couples, and divorced persons to live consciously and intentionally in the 
grace of God.  Marital consent is a decision with such significant moral, social, and 
ecclesial effects that it is protected and governed by canon law.  In a sacramental 
marriage ratum et consummatum, the marital promise once made and accepted is 
inscribed in the history of the spouses permanently.  Objectively, it cannot be erased at 
the whim of the couple.  However, on a case by case basis it may be discovered that the 
marriage is not valid due to diriment impediment, lack of canonical form, or defective 
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consent.  In addition, the bond of a non-sacramental or non-consummated marriage can 
be dissolved when certain conditions are met.208  The choice to enter a sacramental 
marriage is the choice to allow one’s marriage to make present Christ’s faithful love for 
the church in the midst of ordinary trials and joys and extraordinary suffering and 
ecstasy.  It is the choice to live consciously and intentionally in the grace of God with 
one’s spouse.  Lonergan’s three escapes from living morally help to explain the current 
crisis in marriage and family.  The first escape from living morally, which essentially is 
living beneath our created human dignity, is to avoid self-consciousness.  Marital consent 
requires self-knowledge in order to have a self to give on the wedding day and every day 
thereafter.  The avoidance of naked self-reflection is pervasive in our digitally distracted 
culture.  The second escape from living morally is rationalization, that is, changing one’s 
thinking (deceiving oneself) so that there is no inconsistency between knowing and 
doing.  Marriages and, cohabiting relationships in particular, are filled with 
rationalizations to justify one’s current behavior, simply because the work of change is 
too difficult.  The third escape is moral renunciation.  How often the ideal of faithful, 
loving, committed marriage is abandoned, because it seems impossible or out of reach.  
The gift of freedom and rational self-consciousness is that which makes us human and 
imago Dei.  It is also that which is abused or used defectively that leads to broken 
promises and severed relationships. 
If marital consent is a union of wills founded upon the mutual commitment to be 
faithful to another in a life-long, loving, and generative union, then one must value being 
true to one’s word.  Marital consent is the mutual exchange of promises, the giving and 
receiving of one’s word, so that my promise remains in you and yours in me.  Just as the 
                                                 
208. See cc. 1142-1150. 
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Word of God communicates God’s Self to the other, so also does my word communicate 
who I am to the other.  The Word of God becomes incarnate in Jesus Christ and the word 
given and received in marriage become incarnate in consummation.  The promise needs 
to be expressed in word and body.209  Christ the Word was sent from the Father for the 
works of creation and salvation.  In a similar way, spouses send their word, their promise, 
entrusting it to the other for the bonum prolis and bonum coniugum.  These christological 
comparisons are to demonstrate that to give one’s word is one of the most human acts we 
can perform and being true to that word approaches the divine.  Without an 
understanding and appreciation of the value and beauty of freedom and commitment, 
surrender and consent, cohabitation will be preferred to marriage and divorce and family 
disintegration will continue to plague families.  An effective pastoral response is an 
integrated approach with canon law serving as a ministry of justice and love in the 
complexity of the concrete lives of the faithful.  Such a ministry requires prudence, 
creativity, clarity, collaboration, and conversion from the church. 
 
 
  
                                                 
209. The question of consummation is theologically undecided; therefore, it should not be decided 
through canonical norms.  Can canonists in consultation with theologians find a way to express a more 
personalist view of consummation in clear juridical terms?  If consummation is envisioned as occurring 
later in marriage when couples are “more married,” then the understanding of absolute indissolubility of 
consummated, sacramental marriages would need to be reconsidered.  Again, these are theological 
questions that should not be “resolved” through canon law.   
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